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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis adopts a Wendtian constructivist perspective in order to explore how Iran 
defined its interests in the context of the nuclear issue during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency. Against realist-type approaches which often attributed a nuclear 
weapons rationale to Iran and framed its programme as a threat to international 
security, it argues that Iran’s nuclear policy must be interpreted within the context of 
its identity and the latter’s causal and constitutive effects on its interests and 
behaviours. The Wendtian perspective, together with a mixed methods approach 
combining document analysis and interviews, sheds light on how Iran understood its 
interests and why the regime perceived opportunities/threats and 
permissible/unacceptable options in the way it did.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that Iran’s nuclear programme was interpreted within a 
structure of meaning that emphasised its legality and legitimacy. Additionally, it 
shows that the Ahmadinejad administration’s resistance strategies cannot be 
understood outside the context of the perceived humiliating failure of the Khatami 
administration’s confidence-building approach. Not only had Iran’s reputation and 
independence been jeopardised, but its failure to secure recognition of its nuclear 
rights also confirmed that the issue was a Western-led manufactured crisis that 
aimed to undermine the IRI, prevent the development of the Iranian nation and 
transform the IAEA’s mandate. Iran thus engaged in strategies of self-assertion to 
challenge the perceived illegal and illegitimate policies of its negotiation partners, the 
UNSC and the IAEA.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis contends that the Ahmadinejad administration sought to 
transform the diplomatic focus on its nuclear programme into multifaceted 
geopolitical opportunities. On the one hand, Iran attempted to situate the issue within 
the wider context of global debates around access to peaceful nuclear energy and 
the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. Its denunciations of the Western 
NWSs’ discriminatory practices echoed with other states’ concerns. On the other 
hand, Iran’s proposals to the EU-3/P5+1 included repeated offers of cooperation on 
a range of dilemmas of common interests and aversion. As such, Iran pursued dual-
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track strategies towards its main nuclear opponents, combining enforcement costs 
with inducements. Finally, the belief that the US lay at the core of the nuclear issue 
prompted important debates and developments within Iran about the question of 
their bilateral relations. While these challenged conventional wisdoms about the 
principlists’ preferences, Iran’s discursive and ever-increasing strategic dependence 
on the US continued to explain its Janus-faced strategies towards the superpower.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: a Threat to International Security 
On 14 August 2002, during a press conference in Washington, D.C., Alireza 
Jafarzadeh, the spokesperson for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), 
accused Iran of clandestinely developing an underground uranium centrifuge 
enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water production facility at Arak.1 This 
allegation prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organisation 
mandated to verify that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) comply with their international obligations, to begin thorough 
inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and activities.2  
 
During the period 2003-2013, the IAEA never concluded that Iran was pursuing a 
nuclear weapons programme. Instead, it repeatedly noted that it was “unable to 
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in 
peaceful activities”.3  
 
For its part, the intelligence community of the United States (US) produced two 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the first in 2007 
and the second in 2010. Both reportedly estimated that Iran had halted its nuclear 
weapons programme in fall 2003. The 2007 NIE attracted considerable media and 
political attention  since it contradicted previous judgements that Iran was  continuing 
to work towards building a nuclear bomb.4 In addition, it estimated that the 
                                                          
1
 The NCRI is an umbrella organisation of Iranian dissident groups that share a common opposition to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was founded in Paris in 1981. The People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) 
is one of the most powerful groups within the NCRI.  
2
 For a review of the IAEA reports on Iran since August 2003, see “IAEA and Iran - IAEA Reports,” 
accessed 18 June 2015, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports.  
3
 See for example “Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA Board of Governors, 
13 September 2012, accessed 2 June 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2012-50.pdf.  
4
 “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, 
accessed 29 August 2015, 
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programme was halted primarily in response to international pressure, thus 
indicating that “Tehran’s decisions [were] guided by a cost-benefit approach rather 
than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs”.5 
 
Despite the absence, however, of direct evidence of a non-civilian programme, the 
IAEA investigations raised deep concerns amongst policymakers, academics and 
think-tank analysts, mostly based in North America, Europe, the Arab Gulf states and 
Israel, that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions and that its programme 
constituted a threat to international security and stability.6 These beliefs persisted 
throughout the successive administrations of presidents Khatami (1997-2005), 
Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and Rouhani (2013-present). 
 
In the following sections, I analyse the motives behind the strong suspicion that Iran 
was pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions and explore why its programme was often 
conceived as a profound threat to international security and stability. While this 
enables me, in general, to identify conventional perspectives on Iran’s foreign policy 
behaviour since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, particularly during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency, their shortcomings also set the context for my research topic. In this 
thesis, I take issue with the dissociation between ideologically and pragmatically 
foreign policy behaviours on the one hand, and the dichotomisation of the Iranian 
political spectrum along the lines of pro-integration moderates versus status quo 
challengers/aggressive revisionists on the other. Instead, I choose a Wendtian-
constructivist perspective to explore how Iran defined its nuclear interests, why it 
interpreted them the way it did, and how it chose to secure them at the strategic 
level. In so doing, I am in a position to both contextualise Iran’s rationality of action 
“from within” and avoid explaining patterns of continuity and discontinuity in the 
country’s foreign policy against a set of a priori assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20071203_release.pdf. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 References to Iran’s “development of nuclear weapons” implied that this was a known fact when it 
remained an allegation throughout the period 2003-2013. Some analysts took issue with this 
particular coverage of Iran’s nuclear programme. See for example J. Jones, The American Rhetorical 
Construction of the Iranian Nuclear Threat (London: Continuum, 2011); S. M. Walt, “Top Ten Media 
Failures in the Iran War Debate,” Foreign Policy (11 March 2012), accessed 21 June 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/11/top-ten-media-failures-in-the-iran-war-debate/. 
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Attributed Rationale for Nuclear Weapons: Push Factors and Behavioural 
Evidence 
Nuclear weapons, practitioners and experts repeatedly argued, would provide 
substantial benefits to Iran.7 First, they would enable it to manage its acute security 
dilemmas more effectively. Iran was a profoundly isolated state with few external 
opportunities to strengthen its security (necessity of self-reliance).8 It also had to 
contend with an extremely changeable, conflict-ridden and hostile geopolitical 
environment (anarchical regional and international systems). Additionally, Iran’s 
conventional military remained severely limited, constraining its defensive and 
deterrence potential.9  
 
To make matters worse, Iran maintained profoundly adversarial relations with 
several Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs), particularly the US and Israel, which 
significantly aggravated its strategic disadvantage and placed it under the continuous 
threat of military intervention. Writing in the context of the War on Terror, Dueck and 
Takeyh thus argued that the “muscular unilateralism and calls for regime change” of 
the Bush administration had convinced the leadership that Iran required nuclear 
weapons’ immense destructive and strong deterrent capabilities.10 In a co-authored 
article with Pollack, Takeyh also contended that the experiences of Iraq and North 
Korea (and, later, Libya) had strengthened the Iranians’ conviction that nuclear 
weapons were “the only viable deterrent to U.S. military action”.11 Iran’s interests in 
such capabilities were, in other words, a pragmatic response to a situation of 
profound power inequality and uncertainty (maximisation of security).  
                                                          
7
 Official statements pertaining to, and analyses of, Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions often reasoned 
within the prism of Sagan’s nuclear proliferation models. In a pioneering article, Sagan had developed 
the thesis that, contrary to the “proliferation begets proliferation” thesis, states could decide to acquire 
nuclear weapons for a variety of motives (security, domestic politics and norms). See S. D. Sagan, 
“Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 
21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 54-86. 
8
 Juneau and Razavi contend that Iran’s isolation both within and beyond its regional environment 
remains its most defining feature. See T. Juneau and S. Razavi, Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001: 
Alone in the World (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).  
9
 A. H. Cordesman, “Rethinking Our Approach to Iran’s Search for the Bomb,” Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 7 May 2012, accessed 2 February 2014, http://csis.org/publication/rethinking-
our-approach-irans-search-bomb; J. Krause and C. K. Mallory IV, “Strategic Implications of the Iranian 
Nuclear Programme”, in Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Strategic Implications, ed. J. Krause (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 15.  
10
 C. Dueck and R. Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 2 
(Summer 2007): 193.  
11
 K. Pollack and R. Takeyh, “Taking on Tehran,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March-April 2005): 24. 
16 
 
Second, several key domestic actors were thought to have strong interests in 
developing nuclear weapons, whether in the form of latent or actual capabilities. 
Iran’s scientists were considered “strong nationalists determined to […] 
provide their country the full spectrum of technological discovery, 
including advances in nuclear science. ”12 Additionally, Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was responsible for the security of the 
country’s nuclear installations and a chief actor in Iran’s defence programmes, was 
often assumed to favour its power of deterrence.13 Events during and since the 
“Sacred Defence” (the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988) had heightened the Revolutionary 
Guards’ mistrust of foreign powers and international law and institutions, as well as 
their belief in the need for military self-reliance.14  
 
Third, Iran was thought to have profound normative incentives in developing nuclear 
weapons. NWSs have a “special” status within the international system since they 
are commonly associated with the most scientifically and technologically developed 
actors. Within this context, it was only natural that Iran, a profoundly nationalistic, 
independent and proud actor, would be positively oriented towards scientific 
development and the acquisition of nuclear technology.15  
 
Iran’s own pattern of behaviour, both prior to and following the August 2002 
revelations of its concealed nuclear facilities, also strengthened the profound 
assumption, amongst policymakers, academics and think-tank analysts, that Iran 
was pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions. Initially, Iran had chosen to conduct 
significant elements of its nuclear research and development activities under 
conditions of secrecy, thus keeping from the IAEA the full extent of its programme. 
Furthermore, the disclosure of the plants in Natanz and Arak revealed that Iran had 
attempted to develop the sensitive nuclear technologies which, while not restricted 
                                                          
12
 R. Takeyh, “Introduction: What Do We Know?,” in Iran: The Nuclear Challenge, ed. R. D. Blackwill 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), 10. 
13
 Ibid., 10-11. 
14
 S. Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2006), 18-21.  
15
 Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, 18-21; K. Barzegar, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in The Nuclear 
Question in the Middle East, ed. M. Kamrava (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), 231-34. 
17 
 
by the NPT, can be put to weapons use.16 More tellingly, Iran significantly increased 
the elements necessary to nuclear weapons capability from 2005 onwards, including 
uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, thus strengthening 
suspicions that the regime was bent on becoming a nuclear threshold state.17  
 
Such states possess a latent nuclear weapons capability (a “bomb in the closet”) and 
the necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to develop them 
quickly should they so choose.18 Fitzpatrick repeatedly argued that Iran’s programme 
revealed a “nuclear hedging strategy” by which the regime sought to reach the 
threshold of breakout capability while remaining within the legal limits of the NPT.19 
Cordesman similarly contended that Iran’s nuclear efforts were such that it could 
“pursue nuclear weapons development through a range of compartmented and 
easily concealable programs without a formal weapons program”.20 For Patrikarakos, 
this strategy provided the Iranian regime with the significant domestic and normative 
benefits traditionally associated with nuclear technology, but without the political 
costs of publicly developing nuclear weapons (i.e. sanctions, military intervention).21 
Iran, in other words, was considered to be keeping the option of “going nuclear” and 
“breaking out” open, an assumption confirmed by its continuous failure to offer the 
level of transparency and openness required by the IAEA in its successive 
resolutions on Iran.22  
 
                                                          
16
 M. Fitzpatrick, “Chapter One: Framing the Problem: Iran’s Pursuit of Fissile Material,” The Adelphi 
Papers 48, no. 398 (2008): 20. 
17
 Iran could, for example, enrich uranium to high levels necessary for use in nuclear weapons, or 
reprocess spent nuclear fuel to acquire plutonium for weapons. 
18
 M. Fitzpatrick, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 48, no. 
3 (2006): 13; M. R. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by 
Brazil and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (March 2010): 63-64. According to Fitzpatrick, 
“the vast majority of the effort required to enrich natural uranium to weapons grade has already been 
expended by the 20% level”, which is the legally permissible level of enrichment for the Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (NNWSs) of the NPT. In addition, “72% of the effort to produce weapons-grade 
uranium is accomplished by the time the product is enriched to 3.5%. By the time the uranium is 
enriched to 20%, nine-tenths of the effort to reach weapons grade has been expended”. See M. 
Fitzpatrick, “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 
52, no. 3 (June-July 2010): 78.   
19
 Fitzpatrick, “Chapter One,” 13. 
20
 Cordesman, “Rethinking Our Approach.” 
21
 D. Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 287.  
22
 For a full list of IAEA Resolutions on Iran, see “IAEA and Iran - IAEA Resolutions,” accessed 18 
June 2015, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-resolutions.  
18 
 
Iran’s nuclear programme was thus interpreted within a securitised context, marked 
by the assumption that the regime was being deceptive and secretly pursuing 
nuclear weapons ambitions. These negative expectations were strongly intertwined 
with Iran’s rogue state status which, in turn, structured the view that a nuclear-armed 
Iran would be a threat to international security and stability.23  
 
The Securitisation of Iran’s Nuclear Activities: Iran, the Rogue State 
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which led to the abrupt fall of the Pahlavi 
monarchy and the emergence of “a defiant, fiercely independent, proactively 
religious and non-aligned power”, Iran remained a profound and systematic concern 
to the Western core powers, especially the US, and its regional allies, particularly the 
Arab Gulf states and Israel.24  
 
The Revolution, with its calls for “Independence, Freedom: Islamic Republic”, “Self-
Sufficiency” and “Neither West, Nor East: only the Islamic Republic”, signalled Iran’s 
shift from a strategic US ally and status quo power to an enemy state that rejected, 
both theoretically and practically, any form of foreign interference and dependence.25 
The new Iranian leadership, led by the charismatic Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini, divided the world into two broad categories of “oppressors” and 
“oppressed”, equated Iran’s national interests with those of dispossessed nations 
and portrayed Islam as the source of revolution and liberation for all Muslim and 
exploited masses.26  
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The Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) advocacy of national and global social justice, 
together with its emphasis on national independence, sovereignty and dignity, 
profoundly impacted its foreign policy practices: “the new revolutionary state 
envisioned its initiatives as global in scope, ideational in means, and civilizational in 
objective.”27 Indeed, Iran shifted to a self-reliant, pro-Third World and Muslim-
oriented foreign policy that aimed to change the nature of the Arab Gulf regimes, 
revolutionise the regional balance of power and challenge the global world order with 
its core-periphery and dependency dynamics.28 While the US embassy hostage 
taking epitomised the regime’s changed attitudes and strategies vis-à-vis the “Great 
Satan”, Iran’s policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution and its backing of 
organisations such as Hezbollah signalled its anti-status quo strategies.29  
 
Since the late 1970s, Iran’s support for international terrorism, its opposition to the 
state of Israel and the Middle East peace process, its perceived determination to 
acquire WMDs, its antagonistic manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf region and the 
recurrent violation of human rights all served to illustrate its non-compliance with 
international norms of behaviour. For many policymakers, academics and analysts, 
Iran, the “regime of the mullahs”, was a rogue state, whose anti-status quo interests 
and aggressive practices made it a threat to regional security and global peace and 
stability.30 This threat was all the more potent given that Iran, the 18th largest country 
in the world, bordered the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. As 
such, it was rather uniquely situated between the Middle East, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. It was also strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime 
pathway vital for crude oil transport. Furthermore, it possessed substantial 
hydrocarbon resources, ranking second in the world in natural gas reserves and 
fourth in proven crude oil reserves. In sum, Iran was an important strategic actor that 
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could disrupt energy markets and regional stability on both its western and eastern 
borders.  
 
By extension, a nuclear-armed Iran was likely to become a more profound challenge 
to regional and international security. In particular, it was feared that the regime 
would feel emboldened by the possession of the bomb and ultimate strategic 
deterrent. Should it believe that its nuclear capabilities would protect it against 
retaliation, Iran could decide to behave more irresponsibly and further challenge the 
Western core powers and the regional balance of power.31  
 
Specific concerns included a shift to increased support for its non-state allies, 
especially Hamas, Hezbollah and the Shi‘a populations of Iraq, Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia; stronger reliance on its conventional military forces, perhaps to provoke the 
state of Israel or close the Strait of Hormuz to alter global oil prices; and a temptation 
to transfer the nuclear weapon technology to terrorist groups, either accidentally or 
voluntarily.32 This last concern was particularly strong as a result of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (and the subsequent nexus between terrorism and WMDs) and Iran’s long 
record of assisting such organisations. On this aspect, Sagan’s warning was 
unequivocal: 
it is not the professional Iranian military but the Revolutionary Guard Corps 
guarding the development sites whose own financial units have often been 
those used to purchase different parts of the program. These are the same 
individuals running the arms supply operations to terrorist organizations that 
Iran supports. To have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter 
organizations be one and the same is a recipe for disaster.33 
 
Policymakers and analysts thus widely warned against the consequences that a 
nuclear-armed Iran would have on the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
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In particular, they questioned whether other states in the Middle East region would 
chose to mend ties with Tehran (bandwagon), seek protection from a NWS (external 
balancing) or develop their own nuclear capabilities (internal balancing).34 Analysts 
and experts also frequently compared the case of Iran with that of the Democratic 
Republic of Korea.35  
 
North Korea is commonly viewed, by policymakers and analysts alike, as a rogue 
state and its nuclear programme is considered a challenge to international security 
and stability. In January 2003, North Korea abruptly left the NPT after reaching the 
threshold of nuclear breakout capability, which explained much of the uneasiness 
surrounding Iran’s apparent nuclear hedging strategy.36 As Chubin summarises, 
“Enrichment per se is not dangerous. In the hands of a hostile and ambitious regime 
with a record of duplicity and treachery, it becomes another matter.”37 It was also 
feared that Iran could be tempted to use its nuclear programme as “a bargaining 
chip”, much as North Korea did, to extract concessions from the US in the context of 
the 1994 Agreed Framework.38 For Fitzpatrick, according to whom there existed 
“ample prima facie evidence that North Korea and Iran take pages from the other’s 
playbook”, Iran had learned that “high-stakes brinkmanship brings rewards”.39 A 
blackmailing nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable Iran was thus a daunting possibility.  
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Two domestic political considerations also contributed to the securitisation of Iran’s 
nuclear activities. On the one hand, knowledge and understanding of the IRI’s 
decision-making processes remained extremely limited, making it particularly difficult 
to predict how future domestic change would impact on its nuclear calculus and 
whether a deterrence strategy could be effective (logic of uncertainty). Seliktar thus 
emphasises:  
A future change in leadership can make a huge difference, and “the chance 
that a hostile nation armed with nuclear weapons may end up under a leader 
who is mentally unbalanced or who miscalculates the consequences of his or 
he action” is not an outlandish possibility […] even if Tehran acts rationally in 
developing a nuclear weapon, it may still act irrationally or nonrationally in 
using it in the future.40 
 
Analysts had long complained about the “shrouded nature of decision making on 
security matters” and warned against the consequences of not knowing who was in 
charge and how decisions were made.41 On the other hand, Iran was not a unitary 
actor. Since the late 1980s, the IRI’s power structure has grown increasingly 
complex, with “a multitude of loosely connected and fiercely opposed competitive 
power centres, both formal and informal”.42 Additionally, Iran’s factions, which were 
“rather fluid” and “normally comprised of a variety of tendencies and blocs built 
around powerful personalities”, tended to promote different strategic priorities and 
means of engagement with external powers.43 Chubin captures a recurrent 
description of the factions’ preferences:  
In essence, the basic division in foreign policy is between those who seek an 
accommodation with the West from a position of strength (Rafsanjani, 
Khatami, Rowhani) and those who wish to challenge it by adopting the course 
of the Islamic Republic circa 1979 (Ahmadinejad, Larijani, Ayatollah Taghi 
Mesbahi Yazdi). This division corresponds to those who are willing to consider 
a grand bargain with the United States and to adjust their regional policies in 
exchange for recognition and security guarantees and those who reject 
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compromise in favour of pursuit of regional hegemony and self-reliance. Thus, 
if one group sees capabilities and policies as bargaining chips, then the other 
seeks the determined pursuit of goals without reference to the costs or 
consequences.44  
 
Similarly, the 2010 RAND Corporation report “Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An 
Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics” observes:  
Broadly speaking, there are two opposing views of how Iran should approach 
the outside world: There are those (mainly the reformists and some pragmatic 
conservatives) who want to ease Iran into the global system, and there are 
those (including pro-Ahmadinejad principlists) who wish to pursue 
revolutionary goals. In general, the first group sees the necessity for Iran to 
develop into a normal state, a path that requires Iran to be at peace with the 
international community and to espouse a moderate foreign policy. The 
second group sees Iran as a revolutionary state that should adopt an 
assertive foreign policy in defense of Islamic interests, rally domestic and 
regional forces, and create social justice through the redistribution of the 
country’s oil wealth and the marginalization of those considered insufficiently 
revolutionary.45 
 
Within this context, it was thus likely that Iranian factions would have different views 
on the strategic, political and normative benefits of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and 
advocate different uses of the programme.46 These two factors, a limited insight into 
Iran’s decision-making processes and the variety of views and sources of influence 
over the foreign policy machinery, also explain why Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy 
was perceived as a great threat to international security. The closer Iran moved to 
nuclear breakout capability, the greater the risks that a change in leadership would 
lead it to shift to a strategy of weaponisation. The particularities of the Ahmadinejad 
administration revived these threat assessments, which is why Iran’s uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies became a central concern of the EU-
3/P5+1 countries.47 
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The Ahmadinejad Presidency: a Threatening Nexus Between Intentions and 
Capabilities  
Concerns about the likely consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran profoundly 
heightened throughout the Ahmadinejad presidency. First, the coming to power of 
the principlists was commonly associated with the return to “revolutionary ideology” 
and “radicalism” in Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy practices. Iran had 
seemingly broken away from the growing “normalisation” and “moderation” that the 
Khatami presidency had pursued.  
 
Relatively attuned with Iran’s societal developments, particularly the growing range 
of socio-economic, political and individualistic demands, President Khatami had 
articulated a positive relationship between domestic reforms (and their very 
possibility) and the improvement of Iran’s external relations.48 Aware of the sources 
of anxiety regarding Iran’s foreign policy behaviour, President Khatami had multiplied 
practical and symbolic gestures of peaceful intentions, including towards the 
Western core powers, and adopted a language of détente and dialogue among 
civilisations and cultures. A RAND corporation report concluded in 2001 that 
although Iran had not given up its commitment to revolutionary ideals, the regime 
had proved highly selective in its strategies and given great importance to territorial 
integrity.49 In other words, Iran’s behaviour was increasingly “rational”, its policies 
towards Israel and the US “often an exception to its overall shift toward prudence. 
Restrictions on relations with both countries remain one of the strongest parts of the 
revolutionary legacy”.50  
 
Within this context, the June 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad and the coming 
to power of the principlists appeared to be “a throwback to the early days of the 
revolution, with its emphasis on first principles (social justice, independence, and 
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export of the revolution)”.51 The Ahmadinejad administration signalled the increasing 
militarisation of Iran’s domestic politics, a development thought to be favoured by the 
authoritarian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran’s path to liberalisation and 
democratisation had thus given way to a profoundly ideological, nationalistic, populist 
and authoritarian regime. More worryingly, from the perspective of many 
practitioners and analysts, the principlists were highly suspicious of, and hostile to, 
the Western core powers and their regional allies: 
The world, in the view of this group, is a Hobbesian one of unremitting 
struggle, where predatory powers lurk to dictate and dominate and where the 
only currency is military power. Power, in this view, is the indispensable 
element for survival and for the extension of the regime’s values beyond its 
borders. What is known by Ahmadinejad as active diplomacy describes a 
policy that seeks to increase power not just to survive but to impose Iran on 
the international community.52 
 
The principlists were thus perceived as strong proponents of a confrontational, 
aggressive, expansionist and unilateral foreign policy devised to strengthen Iran’s 
independence and undermine the regional and global structures of power.53 
Gasiorowski, for example, wrote about “a new aggressiveness” in Iran’s foreign 
policy, especially with regard to the nuclear issue and Iraq.54 Chubin similarly 
assessed Iran’s foreign policy as more active, manifested in “a certain braggadocio 
and recklessness and a coarsening of language”.55 
 
The Ahmadinejad administration also came to power at a time of profound regional 
and global power shifts, which further heightened the security concerns surrounding 
Iran’s nuclear programme. The US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
had overthrown two profoundly adversarial regimes on Iran’s western and eastern 
borders and, in so doing, created a range of unintended opportunities for 
unprecedented influence in the domestic politics of the two neighbouring countries. 
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Furthermore, Iran’s links with, and influence through, Hamas and Hezbollah 
increased with the former’s victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary 
elections and the latter’s war with Israel in the summer of 2006. Iran also benefited 
from the sharp rise in global oil prices during the period 2005-2008. The rise in 
power of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), together with the 
unprecedented challenges to the US’ relative power position (e.g. financial crisis; 
military bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan) and legitimacy (e.g. undermined soft 
power), offered Iran the prospect of new balancing opportunities. According to 
Takeyh, “the New Right” held a dual belief: Iran may not “need to come to terms with 
the US at all”, due to the diffusion of power within the international system, and the 
regime faced “a rare opportunity to become the predominant power in the Persian 
Gulf region and a pivotal state in the Middle East”.56  
 
Profound doubts emerged as to whether the risk-acceptant and risk-taking 
principlists could be deterred and would abide by the norm of non-use. In August 
2007, US President George W. Bush declared that “Iran’s active pursuit of 
technology that could lead to nuclear weapons threatens to put a region already 
known for instability and violence under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.”57 In his 
September 2012 address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), US 
President Obama stated that “A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be 
contained.”58 Fitzpatrick, for his part, warned against the “inexperience” and 
“dogmatic views” of President Ahmadinejad and his allies, which could lead to 
devastating miscalculations.59 He also deplored “Ahmadinejad’s unrepentant calls for 
Israel to be wiped off the map”, which “underscore the existential threat a nuclear 
weapon in Iran’s hands would pose to that country”.60 The Israeli leadership 
repeatedly made this point, portraying a nuclear weapon-capable, let alone a 
nuclear-armed Iran, as an “existential threat”.  
                                                          
56
 R. Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), 
132-33; R. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 239-40.    
57
 Cited in “Bush Warns Iran over Insurgents,” BBC News, 28 August 2007, accessed 4 February 
2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6967502.stm.  
58
 President Obama, “Remarks at the UN General Assembly,” The White House, 25 September 2012, 
accessed 4 February 2015,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-un-general-assembly. 
59
 Fitzpatrick, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” 21. 
60
 Fitzpatrick, “Iran and North Korea,” 69.  
27 
 
There was alarmism too among those who used a religious argumentation to 
emphasise that the Iranian leadership would be able to justify the use of nuclear 
weapons. The Shi‘a religious doctrine, especially the notions of martyrdom of the 
faithful and “Mahdism”, were often singled out as evidence that ideological goals 
could be prioritised over physical survival.61 Jafarzadeh, the long-time Iranian 
dissident who revealed the existence of the concealed facilities, even argued that  
inherent in Tehran’s version of Islamic rule is a lack of an ethical standard that 
would forestall the actual use of nuclear weapons. Tehran’s leaders have no 
moral ambiguities about using nuclear weapons to annihilate “global 
arrogance” and clear a path for radical Islamic rule.62 
 
Furthermore, the Ahmadinejad administration’s lack of compliance with the hybrid 
diplomatic strategy of the P5+1, which combined positive incentives (i.e. 
engagement, inducements) with instruments of coercion (i.e. unilateral and 
multilateral, broad and targeted sanctions), confirmed practitioners’ and analysts’ 
assessments that the Ahmadinejad administration valued revolutionary goals over 
material benefits, and was bent on developing nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s 
failure in July 2006 to respond to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1696, which threatened sanctions for non-compliance, exemplified the 
regime’s disregard for material considerations and its people.63 So did its non-
reaction to predominantly US warnings that “the window was closing”, “all options 
were on the table” and “time was short”. Iran, in other words, “appeared on a collision 
course with the international community in general and the United States in 
particular”.64 It was acting aggressively and provocatively.  
 
To conclude, Iran was strongly suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions, 
an assessment which originated in the intertwining of its assumed motives for 
nuclear weapons proliferation and the regime’s own pattern of behaviour prior to and 
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following the public revelations of its concealed nuclear facilities and activities in 
2002. Crucially, Iran’s nuclear programme was widely perceived as a threat to 
international security and stability, an interpretation that was embedded in common 
understandings of the untrustworthy, threatening and unpredictable nature of the 
regime of the IRI. Pessimistic threat assessments profoundly increased throughout 
the Ahmadinejad presidency, in large part because the principlists embraced 
“revolutionary ideology” and a foreign policy of confrontation instead of more 
pragmatic and national security considerations.   
 
Statement of the Problems 
The suspicion that Iran was secretly pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions and the 
framing of its programme as a threat to international peace and security, both of 
which pre-existed but deepened during the Ahmadinejad presidency, were 
symptomatic of two key shortcomings within conventional approaches to Iran’s 
foreign policy. The first revolved around the dissociation between ideologically and 
pragmatically motivated foreign policy behaviours. The second lay in the 
dichotomisation of the Iranian political spectrum, along the lines of pro-integration 
moderates versus status quo challengers/aggressive revisionists. I examine both 
aspects successively and highlight their main theoretical and empirical limitations, 
both generally and with respect to the Iranian nuclear issue. This, in turn, sets the 
context for my research topic.   
 
Materialist Approaches and the Exclusiveness of “Ideology” and 
“Pragmatism” 
Iran’s foreign policy since the Revolution has been chiefly interpreted within the 
prism of materialist approaches, which believe that the nature and organisation of 
material forces have the most fundamental effects on international politics. While 
ideas may be important, their effects are only secondary. Further to this, the 
conclusions of many analyses of Iran’s foreign policy since the late 1970s appear to 
be strongly influenced by the dominance of (materialist) realistic perspectives in the 
field of international relations. Broadly speaking, such perspectives reason that 
states evolve in an anarchical international system and rely on self-help mechanisms 
to provide for their security. The structure of the international system forces them to 
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compete with each other and pursue power. Power is based on the material 
capabilities that a state controls. While military capabilities are crucial, a state’s 
wealth and population size also matter. Ideological leanings, cultural systems and 
leaderships make little difference to how states behave towards one another and 
how they define their interests.  
 
For many academics and experts, however, Iran’s foreign policy since the Revolution 
has challenged the premises of “rationalist” or “pragmatic” behaviour, an 
unorthodoxy chiefly explained by the residual influence of ideational factors. I provide 
four examples to illustrate this point. 
 
One, in 1990 Hunter contended that Iran’s foreign policy was best analysed “as that 
of a revolutionary state at different stages of internal consolidation and adaptation to 
its external setting”.65 She noted that, due to a range of internal and external 
pressures, Iran had increasingly “ben[t] its ideological principles” to pursue its 
national interests. Ideology was increasingly used to rationalise and legitimise 
policies rather than to define them.66 However, she observed that “Iran’s Islamic 
ideology still affect[ed] its world view, its aspirations, and its external behaviour, thus 
producing a tension between ideologically inspired goals and a pragmatically 
prescribed course of action.”67 Hunter adopted a rather instrumentalist understanding 
of the role of ideology in Iran’s foreign policymaking and implementation (a tool for 
legitimating regime and state interests). She also juxtaposed “ideology” and 
“pragmatism”, an argument she expanded in her 2010 Iran’s Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. There, she argued that Iran 
had pursued an “unrealistic” and “naïve” foreign policy, which had prevented it from 
“sufficiently [adjusting] its foreign policy objectives and practices to the new 
international realities” of the post-Cold War environment and led it to incur 
“substantial economic, political, and strategic losses”.68 Iran’s “failure to respond 
appropriately to post-Soviet systemic changes” was down to two chief internal 
factors:  
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the ideological rather than national and democratic basis of its legitimacy, of 
which resistance to great-power pressure and support for Islamic causes are 
two essential components; and the fragmented nature of the ruling elite along 
ideological and power lines, and the elites’ manipulation of these fundamental 
ideological principles of the regime for their own interests.69 
 
Hunter thus attributed Iran’s inability to behave pragmatically (a term she does not 
define) to the continuous relevance and effects of its ideological legacy and internal 
infighting.  
 
Two, Ahmadi, who used Morgenthau’s offensive realist perspective to explore what 
he called “the dilemma of national interest in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, attributed 
the pursuit of an essentially idealist foreign policy to the Constitution of the IRI.70 On 
the one hand, the Constitution emphasised “Islamic idealism”, including the defence 
of Muslims’ collective interests, but neither mentioned Iran’s national interests nor 
defined the parameters of a rational foreign policy.71 On the other hand, the 
Constitution embedded a “structural dualism” between “the traditional Islamic 
system” of the Velayat-e faqih and “the modern presidential system”.72 With little 
substantiation of his claim, Ahmadi contended that these two power centres pursued 
different types of foreign policy: idealist for the former and rationalist for the latter. He 
also provided several examples to assess whether Iran had pursued an idealist or 
rational foreign policy. In focusing on policy results, however, he failed to recognise 
explicitly that negative or unintended consequences do not necessarily make policies 
irrational.  
 
Three, Takeyh argued that Iran’s foreign policy was composed of “a matrix” of three 
competing elements: “Islamic ideology”, “national interests” and “factional politics”.73 
These factors were constantly in conflict with each other, thus producing a foreign 
policy that had “always been characterised by a degree of inconsistency and wild 
oscillation between pragmatism and dogma”.74 Ideology was thus antinomic to the 
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pursuit of pragmatic interests, a fact that was lost on some domestic actors more 
than others. The how and why of both aspects were, however, left unexplained. 
  
Four, Ramazani, a prominent academic on Iran’s history and foreign policy, also 
observed a tension between “religious ideology” and “pragmatism” that pre-existed 
the Revolution.75 He contended, however, that Iranian policymakers had seldom 
disregarded the pragmatic interests of the state.76 Additionally, while Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s “spiritual pragmatism” had enabled Iranian leaders to combine 
ideological commitments with pragmatic considerations, Iran had “significantly 
moved away from the intrusion of ideology into foreign policy” from the late 1980s.77 
Writing during the Khatami presidency, Ramazani attributed this shift to a “process of 
maturation”, which the reformist administration epitomised.78 As such, he treated 
ideology and rationalism as two mutually exclusive entities that pulled the country 
towards revisionism and pragmatism respectively.  
 
The aforementioned examples show that realist-type approaches have been based 
upon the premise that ideological elements obstructed Iran from behaving 
pragmatically. Although they tended to agree that Iran’s foreign policy had shifted 
from ideological fervour towards more pragmatic considerations, especially in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and throughout the Khatami presidency, ideational 
factors had nevertheless continued to prevent Iran from pursuing its national 
interests fully. Power and security were not always maximised; ideology had 
negative policy consequences and was an impediment to rational foreign policy 
behaviour.  
 
There are two broad issues with such perspectives. First, they tend to produce 
largely decontextualised, inside-out analyses which examine Iran’s foreign policy and 
judge its rationality of action against a set of a priori assumptions and universally 
predefined interests. As such, they fail to explore what may constitute “power”, 
“security” and “interests” from Iran’s perspective. They also tend to fail to define the 
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methods by which they came to their conclusions on Iran’s relative rationality of 
action. Second, realist-type analyses have had important policy consequences: the 
assessment that Iran’s foreign policy behaviour is always more or less pragmatic 
both participates in, and helps legitimise, its exceptionalisation and securitisation. 
Broadly speaking, since Iran defies “normal” norms of behaviour, it must be carefully 
watched and contained. This is all the more critical given that the IRI is hostile 
towards the Western core powers and their regional allies. 
 
These two limitations are observable in the context of Iranian nuclear issue. Realist-
type approaches resulted in complete denial or outright distrust of Iran’s nuclear 
rationale. During the Khatami and Ahmadinejad presidencies, Iranian officials offered 
consistent discourses on why Iran needed nuclear energy, why it accepted and 
abided by the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and why it firmly 
rejected WMDs. Practitioners and analysts, however, placed little to no trust and 
value in Iran’s claimed nuclear intentions and strategic principles. They did not need 
to engage with Iran’s official discourses in any depth since it had “objective” needs 
for nuclear weapons (security, domestic and normative motives). Iran’s apparent 
nuclear hedging strategy also demonstrated that the leadership intended to mislead 
its negotiation partners until it could deliver a fait accompli.  
 
By the same token, policymakers, academics and think-tank analysts placed little 
confidence and value in Iranian officials’ continuous insistence that Iran refused to be 
treated differently from the other non-nuclear weapon state (NNWSs) of the NPT and 
firmly objected to the principles of a dual-track diplomatic strategy. In realist-type 
accounts, Iran’s non-compliance with the demands of the EU-3/P5+1, the IAEA and 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and its decision to endure increasingly 
stringent unilateral and multilateral sanctions, confirmed that Iran was bent on 
challenging the Western core powers and international institutions. Iran, in other 
words, and the Ahmadinejad administration in particular, was behaving ideologically 
and sacrificing Iran’s national interests. Consequently, its nuclear activities needed to 
be contained for they posed a profound threat to international security and stability.  
 
Such realist-type perspectives on Iran’s nuclear policy thus prevented an in-depth 
and contextualised analysis and understanding of how (and why) Iran defined its 
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(nuclear) interests. Crucial questions pertaining to how (and why) Iran perceived its 
opportunities, threats, permissible and non-permissible options, and strategic 
priorities were systematically excluded. Such questions included: 
 How (and why) did Iran view its nuclear programme and define its necessity? 
 How (and why) did Iran interpret the framing of its nuclear activities as a threat 
to international peace and security?  
 Who (and why) did Iran hold responsible for the securitisation of its nuclear 
programme? 
 How (and why) did Iran understand the aims and motives of the coercive 
diplomatic strategy of individual states and the EU-3/P5+1? 
 How (and why) did such interpretations affect Iran’s nuclear policy and its 
strategies towards the EU-3/P5+1 as well as the IAEA and the UNSC? 
 Why did the Ahmadinejad administration perceive the costs of defiance to be 
inferior to the costs of compliance with the expectations of the EU-3/P5+1 and 
the UNSC?  
 What benefits, if any, did Iran’s nuclear strategy bring to the regime? 
 How, in sum, did Iran define its national interests in the context of the nuclear 
issue? 
 
Instead of seeking to assess Iran’s rationality and the desirability of its actions a 
posteriori and against a set of a priori assumptions, such questions could pave the 
way for an inside-in perspective on its interests and aims. 
 
The Aggressive/Confrontational Versus Détente/Accommodation Prism of 
Debate 
A key concern amongst policymakers, academics and analysts about Iran’s nuclear 
programme was that Iran was not a unitary actor and its factions were affected 
differently by the Revolution’s ideological legacy. The relative power position and 
influence of the more or less ideologically inspired and anti-status quo factions over 
the decision-making process thus explained whether and why Iran’s foreign policy 
behaviour was more or less pragmatic in specific instances or during a particular 
time frame. This, in turn, helps clarify why policymakers, academics and analysts 
frequently questioned and debated “what Iran wanted”:  
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 Did Iran seek to overthrow the international system or improve its position 
within it?  
 What sort of role did Iran aspire to play?  
 What kinds of relations did Iran seek with other states?  
 What price was Iran willing to pay for its aims and ambitions?  
 In other words, did Iran seek isolation or engagement, and at what cost?  
 
The problem with this conceptualisation of Iran’s domestic politics is twofold. First, it 
leads to ideal-type categorisations of Iranian political factions and several 
assumptions about their foreign policy positions. While their views are taken for 
granted, their actual approaches and strategies are not subjected to vigorous 
empirical enquiry. Second, in representing the “ideologues” as “expansionist and at 
war with the world order” and the “pragmatists” as “less confrontational in their 
approach”, most studies have focused on the preferred means of engagement of 
each rather than their respective objectives.79 Yet, as Farhi and Lotfian conclude, 
differences among Iranian policymakers have tended to revolve around “the scope 
and instruments of foreign policy” rather than the overall objectives. For example, 
they widely agreed on Iran’s legitimate role and significance in its external 
environment and a drive for greater regional and international reach.80 They also 
firmly rejected Western imperialism and prioritised Iran’s territorial integrity, national 
sovereignty and independence.81 Iran’s foreign policy discourse thus created a near 
consensus on the objective of pursuing “a foreign policy that enhanced Iran’s 
strategic weight and role in the Middle East region while maintaining the country’s 
Islamic identity in the face of resistance by global power wielders”.82 Importantly, this 
near consensus amongst Iranian policymakers also emphasised the impossibility of 
“giv[ing] in” to external pressures.83 At the same time, Farhi and Lotfian argue that 
there was disagreement about the ways in which Iran might achieve its objectives, 
especially how to achieve “true independence” and enhance Iran’s external role.84 
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In this thesis, I demonstrate that Iran’s foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency profoundly challenged the ideal-type categorisations of the Iranian 
factions. Additionally, it brought to the fore the necessity of understanding more 
clearly the nuances between foreign policy objectives and strategies to secure them. 
Broadly speaking, Iran’s foreign policy during the period 2005-2013 was 
characterised by both patterns of continuity and discontinuity, which also often 
occurred in unexpected ways in light of what was assumed about the principlists’ 
preferences. For example, Iran remained committed to the NPT and renewed its 
defence of the normative and institutional principles of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime (see chapters 4 and 5). It continued the diplomatic negotiations with the EU-
3/P5+1 and regularly offered proposals that paved the way for stronger and broader 
cooperation between Iran and the Western core powers (see chapter 5). 
Furthermore, if the Khatami presidency had witnessed substantial developments in 
US-Iran relations, including strategic cooperation in Afghanistan in the early 2000s, 
the Ahmadinejad administration observed unprecedented transformations, such as 
repeated public offers of direct talks (see chapter 6).  
 
Further to this, Ahmadinejad was president at a time of significant internal and 
external political developments. Iran faced unprecedented crises of governance 
performance (e.g. economic mismanagement and corruption) and electoral 
legitimacy (e.g. the 2009 presidential election and ensuing popular protests) which, 
while severely repressed (securitisation), led to the profound polarisation of the elite 
and the severe criticism of the president (see chapter 3). Regime legitimacy was a 
particular source of concern for the Iranian leadership, not least for the Supreme 
Leader, whose personal role and institutional position faced unprecedented public 
challenges.  
 
In addition, though, as previously touched upon, developments within Iran’s regional 
environment and the global order created substantial opportunities for Iran’s external 
relations, the regime also continued to face profound threats, many of which were 
transnational in nature (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking) and/or accelerated following 
the beginning of the Arab uprisings (e.g. destabilisation of the Syrian regime). How 
Iran perceived such internal and external developments, how it defined its range of 
opportunities and constraints, and how it interpreted its interests, requires analysis 
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and contextualisation. Conventional wisdoms on Iran’s factions in general, and the 
principlists in particular, must be put to the challenge of analytical observation for the 
principlist administration of President Ahmadinejad cannot be assumed to have 
adopted or supported particular foreign policy positions. 
 
Thesis Aims and Rationale 
 
Research Objectives  
In this thesis, I explore Iran’s foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency 
through the prism of the nuclear issue. I specifically analyse how Iran defined its 
national interests in a context where it faced both informal (i.e. discursive 
condemnation) and formal (i.e. UNSC resolutions, state-level and multilateral 
sanctions legislation) external opposition to its nuclear programme, especially from 
the Western core powers. I also examine why Iran interpreted its interests the way it 
did and how it chose to secure them at the strategic level. In so doing, I seek to 
contextualise Iran’s rationality of action “from within”.85 This requires two 
clarifications. 
 
First, my study makes Iran’s identity and interests a central subject of enquiry. 
Although I subsequently explain my choice of a Wendtian-constructivist perspective, 
it is worth noting here that such an approach is equipped to enquire into, and 
contextualise, how (and why) Iran interpreted the nuclear issue as well as its range 
of options and opportunities. As such, it is particularly well suited to examine the 
causal and constitutive dynamics between (construction of) interests on the one 
hand, and logics of action on the other. In so doing, my aim is not to assess whether 
or not Iran behaved pragmatically or ideologically but to understand the underlying 
motives and factors that justified its policy choices. Furthermore, a Wendtian-
constructivist perspective allows for a conceptualisation of Iran’s national interests 
that is not limited to material aggregates and is, instead, inclusive of less tangible 
considerations.  
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It is worth emphasising that my objection to the argument that a dichotomy between 
“ideological” and “pragmatic” sources of foreign policy behaviour has great empirical 
relevance and theoretical validity, and my decision to adopt a Wendtian-
constructivist perspective, lead me to put great value in the work produced by 
academics like Adib-Moghaddam and Warnaar. In rejecting the binary opposition 
between “realism” and “idealism”, they have both been able to question and examine 
the long-term constitutive effects of ideational elements on Iran’s national interests 
and logics of action. Adib-Moghaddam, for example, has often used a critical cultural 
genealogy approach to identify and explain the permanence and resonance of 
ideological factors within Iran’s foreign policy culture. He has also examined how and 
why dynamics of conflict, including between Iran and the US, have been perpetuated 
over time. In particular, he notes that the religiously framed, anti-imperialist discourse 
of Ayatollah Khomeini was codified as a revolutionary narrative and institutionalised 
as a central ideological precept of the IRI.86 This process gave Iran’s foreign policy 
culture a “utopian-romantic meta-narrative” dimension, which penetrated to the core 
of the strategic thinking of the country’s elite. This, in turn, explains why 
core principles of the revolution – radical cultural and political independence, 
economic autarky, diplomatic and ideological mobilization against Zionism 
and resistance against US interference in regional and domestic affairs – 
continue to guide the country’s foreign policy elites.87 
  
Economic independence, support for the Palestinians, competition with US and 
Israeli policies, Islamic communitarianism and empowerment of the non-aligned 
world have all shaped Iran’s strategic preferences and transcended Iranian factions 
and political divisions.88 There is, as Adib-Moghaddam writes, “a culturally 
constituted consensus” about Iran’s external role that “functions as the guardian of 
identity […] and provides for the foreign policy elites a coherent, if systematically 
abstract, overall orientation in the conduct of international affairs”.89 From Iran’s 
viewpoint, there is no contradiction between the IRI’s revolutionary ideals and its 
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national interests.90 Challenging the international status quo and the world’s 
superpower is a function of Iran’s identity commitments and its strategic preferences.  
 
Warnaar, whose work I came across towards the end of my research, uses a 
constructivist perspective to study Iran’s foreign policy. While she argues that the 
country’s domestic “foreign policy ideology” provides the context for its external 
behaviour, she shows that ideas constitute foreign policy by making certain options 
possible whilst precluding others.91 She thus makes a powerful case against studies 
which either ignore the constitutive role of ideational factors in shaping a state’s 
foreign policy or understand them as harmful to its national interests. Rationality, she 
argues, must be contextualised within the state’s foreign policy ideology. As such, 
she pays particular attention to the ways in which the Iranian regime interpreted 
ideas to justify its decisions (internal and external legitimacy). In addition, she notes 
that Iran’s identity is shaped by processes of linking and differentiation with “a 
temporal other” (Iran before and after the Revolution) and “a number of spatial 
others” (Iran as a changed nation against the unchanged arrogant powers; Iran as 
an example for oppressed nations).92 Furthermore, she observes that whilst ideology 
constitutes foreign policy, foreign policy also enacts, confirms and possibly reinforces 
ideology. As such, there is a process of mutual constitution between ideology and 
foreign policy, a dynamic that Iran’s “discourse of change” illustrates. More 
specifically, according to Warnaar, the regime of President Ahmadinejad often “acted 
as if” international change was happening, pursuing an active foreign policy of 
building alliances with rising powers and nations opposed to the Western hegemony. 
In so doing, Iran was able to shape international developments which challenged the 
status quo, especially US hegemony and the notion that Iran was isolated.93  
 
In the subsequent chapters, I make frequent references to Adib-Moghaddam and 
Warnaar’s observations. Having covered the same phase of Iran’s foreign policy as 
the latter, I also explain how and why our conclusions may overlap or differ. 
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However, it is also worth emphasising that Warnaar’s analysis of Iran’s nuclear 
policy was limited to the 2010 Turkey-Brazil-Iran agreement (chapter 6) and the 
regime’s insistence on its nuclear rights. In this respect, we pursued different 
objectives.   
 
Second, I pursue a comprehensive study of Iran’s foreign policy approach to the 
nuclear issue and argue that the Ahmadinejad regime attempted to transform the 
diplomatic focus and concerns around its nuclear programme into complex and 
multifaceted geopolitical opportunities. The regime pursued interests that went well 
beyond the realm of the nuclear field, an argument that I unpack along several lines. 
To begin with, I observe that Iran pursued its own version of dual-track diplomatic 
strategies vis-à-vis its negotiation partners, the Western powers in particular. On the 
one hand, the Western-led opposition to what Iran viewed as its legal and legitimate 
“nuclear rights” revived the leadership’s resentment and mistrust of the Western 
powers. Such perceptions paved the way for a more assertive nuclear strategy that 
would protect Iran’s national interests better than the Khatami administration had 
achieved during the period 2003-2005. On the other hand, Iran repeatedly suggested 
broader cooperation between Iran and the countries of the EU-3/P5+1, the Western 
powers in particular, on a range of issues of mutual interest. Its negotiation proposals 
also frequently included details about the principles that needed to govern their 
modalities of interaction both during and beyond their nuclear-related encounters. 
Iran thus combined elements of pressure with strategies of inducement vis-à-vis its 
main opponents. 
 
Furthermore, I note that Iran attempted to generate external agreement and support 
for its articulation of its nuclear rights and its consequent resistance strategies 
against the demands of the IAEA, the EU-3/P5+1 and the UNSC. I argue that the 
nuclear issue enabled Iran to articulate and reinstantiate its identity and interests as 
a guide and role model for developing nations. To this end, I am particularly 
interested in identifying how and why Iran attempted to “build its case”, legitimise its 
position, make it resonant with other actors’ concerns and interests and, in so doing, 
compete with rival frames. To this extent, I also assess the effects of Iran’s framings 
of the nuclear issue, especially whether, how and why others may have adopted its 
discourses. 
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Finally, I observe that the nuclear issue heightened domestic political debates on the 
question of Iran-US relations during the Ahmadinejad presidency. From the regime’s 
viewpoint, the failure of the Khatami administration to resolve the nuclear issue 
confirmed the prime necessity of the US’ acceptance of an agreement for a 
comprehensive resolution of the stalemate. As such, partly out of necessity (and 
partly out of choice), Iran also attempted to transform the nuclear issue into an 
opportunity to engage its significant Other.  
 
Analytical and Empirical Contributions 
This thesis hopes to contribute to a rich scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy since the 
Revolution, particularly during the Ahmadinejad presidency. By adopting a Wendtian-
constructivist approach and, thus, by making Iran’s identity and interests a central 
subject of enquiry, I am able to go beyond the restrictive paradigm of “ideologically” 
versus “pragmatically” motivated foreign policy behaviours. I dispute this 
conceptualisation for epistemological reasons and its policymaking consequences, 
particularly the securitisation and exceptionalisation of the IRI. In seeking to examine 
and understand the drivers of Iran’s foreign policy in the context of the nuclear issue, 
I produce an in-depth analysis of how (and why) Iran (and its policymakers) 
interpreted specific situations, defined its range of opportunities and threats, 
permissible and unacceptable options, and sought to pursue its interests. This 
systematic approach allows me to contextualise Iran’s rationality of action “from 
within” and to provide new insights into what the regime attempted to achieve. In 
particular, I put forward the argument that the Ahmadinejad administration sought to 
transform the nuclear issue into multifaceted geopolitical opportunities that both 
reified Iran’s identity as an ally of dispossessed nations and a potential interlocutor 
for the Western core powers, including the US. 
 
Additionally, unpacking how (and why) Iran defined its national interests puts me in a 
position to produce a more nuanced analysis of the Iranian political factions, the 
principlists in particular. Although knowledge of Iran’s foreign policy decision-making 
processes remains limited, I nevertheless demonstrate that the ideal-type 
categorisation of the Iranian political spectrum along the lines of 
aggressive/confrontation versus détente/accommodation fails to account for several 
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empirical developments. In focusing on Iran’s multifaceted approach to the nuclear 
issue, I am indeed able to identify (the sometimes unexpected) patterns of continuity 
and discontinuity in its foreign policy behaviour. In so doing, I am able to better 
differentiate between foreign policy objectives and methods, and to contextualise 
foreign policy choices in light of the particular circumstances that Iran faced 
throughout the period 2005-2013. 
 
It is hoped that this thesis will have some policymaking relevance. It reiterates the 
constructivists’ claim that conflicts are socially constructed, that states’ national 
interests are not limited to power maximisation and must be studied empirically. In 
explaining why Iran refused to comply with the resolutions of the IAEA and the 
UNSC, reacted negatively to the Obama administration’s dual-track diplomatic 
strategy and decided to endure the costs of the international community’s unilateral 
and multilateral sanctions, I show that ideological factors constituted how Iran framed 
the nuclear issue and interpreted its interests. It is clear that neither the role nor the 
effects of these elements can be ignored or downplayed. Instead, they must be 
integrated into any planning and decision making process. In this respect, 
policymakers may find it more efficient to tune and frame their foreign policy 
orientations vis-à-vis the IRI in light of the key foreign policy objectives and strategic 
principles that transcend the Iranian leadership. All Iranian political factions are, for 
example, highly adverse to policies or compromises that would jeopardise Iran’s 
independence and dignity. Additionally, this thesis shows that Iran long pursued a 
Janus-faced policy towards the US that reflected a strategic consensus within the 
leadership that less conflictual relations within a context of “mutual respect” could be 
greatly beneficial to the IRI.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
Putting into practice a Wendtian-constructivist approach is not straightforward, in 
large part because Wendt, like many constructivists, neither clarifies nor indicates 
how social processes should studied in practice. As Klotz and Lynch remark, 
constructivist approaches have rarely explained “how to do” constructivist research.94 
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Being little concerned with matters of empirical politics, Wendt remains virtually silent 
on questions of epistemology:  
Readers looking for detailed propositions about the international system, let 
alone empirical tests, will be disappointed. The book [Social Theory of 
International Politics] is about the ontology of the states system, and so is 
much more about international theory than about international politics as 
such.95 
 
However, the ontological premise that structures are social, and that states’ identities 
and interests are in large part constructed by them, called for an interpretive 
epistemology and methodologies capable of acknowledging and capturing 
contingency and context. With this in mind, my theoretical prism of analysis was 
executed through a mixed methods approach, which combined document analysis 
(primary and secondary sources) and semi-structured interviews.  
 
First, my research relies on numerous Iranian official documents which were widely 
available on Iran’s state-sanctioned English-language websites or international 
organisations’ webpages.96 These official documents consisted of interview 
transcripts, declarations and media broadcasts. They offered state-centric and elite 
perspectives, and provided critical access points into the ways in which the Iranian 
leadership and individual officials framed particular situations or challenges, and 
packaged their decisions to domestic constituents and/or external observers in the 
language of national interest. They showed the existence of particular intersubjective 
understandings (structures of meanings) and their effects on logics of action (causal 
and constitutive effects of meanings). Additionally, these official documents helped 
identify and understand whether, how and why the Ahmadinejad administration 
instantiated and reinforced or, quite the opposite, challenged institutionalised 
structures of meanings and practices. Finally, these documents revealed how and 
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Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (http://iran-un.org/en/).  
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why Iran sought to legitimise its position, mobilise support and delegitimise 
competitive claims.  
 
As Bryman rightly notes, several factors must be borne in mind when analysing 
official documents.97 One is the context within which they were produced and their 
implied readership (i.e. the question of biases).98 The declarations of the Permanent 
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA, for example, were directed at the 
Agency as well as the states which were either directly involved in the negotiations 
or concerned by their development. These declarations often revealed a number of 
strategic messages, especially in the way they sought to both portray Iran’s rationale 
for its firm nuclear stance and explain the dynamics of the nuclear issue. The 
documents available on the website of the Office of the Supreme Leader, for their 
part, were often translations of speeches that Ayatollah Khamenei had given within 
Iran. The intended readership was primarily internal and, as such, the impressions 
conveyed were different, especially their emphasis of the legitimacy of the system of 
the IRI and its foreign policy principles. Overall, these official documents were 
relevant for my research since they presented the views and messages that officials 
wished to get across.  
 
Halliday warns us against the dangers of relying solely upon leaders’ declarations:  
We do need to know what leaders, peoples and experts from the region say; 
but if our aim is to explain the course of events, and critically evaluate 
different accounts of these events, the arguments of leaders and rebels, as 
much as those of external observers and powers, need to meet criteria of 
plausible explanation and accuracy.99  
 
To avoid any possible gaps between “claims” and “reality”, I conducted systematic 
validity checks on the information provided in the official documents and interviews. I 
was generally able to do so with the help of a wide range of secondary sources. 
 
Second, my research relied on the examination of an extensive selection of 
secondary sources, such as publications from a variety of academic journals, books, 
think tanks, conferences and panels on Iran, media broadcasts, IAEA reports and 
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UNSC Resolutions. As such, part of the data collected for the purpose of this 
analysis was first researched and interpreted by third parties. The reason for this 
was twofold. On the one hand, secondary sources allowed me to identify key 
concepts, theories and research methods that have traditionally been used to 
analyse Iran’s foreign policy behaviour since the 1979 Revolution. This shed light on 
the main strengths, gaps and areas of disagreement in the field. In turn, this helped 
me position my research project and articulate my contribution. On the other hand, 
secondary sources provided a wealth of knowledge on various aspects of Iran’s 
domestic politics and foreign policy since the Revolution. This abundant material 
offered critical insights into Iran’s subjective and intersubjective identities and the 
structures of its relations with other actors. This was particularly important since the 
Wendtian-constructivist approach required a great amount of contextualisation: to 
understand “what was there” before President Ahmadinejad came to power (the 
context within which meanings had been formed), and how and why his 
administration may have shifted or reproduced existing logics of representation and 
interaction (the practices that may be fixed or changed).   
 
I placed particular importance on the work that scholars such as Adib-Moghaddam, 
Ansari and Ehteshami produced. While their theoretical approaches and topics of 
enquiry differed from mine, their affinity with Farsi, their ability to engage with 
materials (e.g. articles) produced in Iran, and their knowledge of the country’s history 
and culture, were crucial to the very possibility of this project. Indeed, their work 
substantially influenced my understanding of the role and effects of several historical 
episodes on contemporary Iranian politics (e.g. the myth of the 1953 coup against 
Mossadegh) or the motives and meaning of recurrent themes (e.g. the 
representation of the US as “world arrogance”). In a context where I could not read 
sources in Farsi, the work of these authors guided my understanding of several 
aspects of Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy behaviour. As such, they form 
the foundations upon which this analysis of Iran’s nuclear policy during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency was built. 
 
 Additionally, secondary sources shed light on key domestic and geopolitical 
dynamics, developments and trends that shaped Iran’s internal politics and external 
environment. With regards to the nuclear case study, secondary sources also 
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revealed the external, competitive frames that Iran faced; namely, how other actors 
constructed its identities, interests and logics of action, and how these 
understandings shaped their policies towards Iran.  
 
Third, I carried out several interviews with Iranian officials who were based outside 
Iran during the Ahmadinejad presidency. These participants were selected in virtue 
of their involvement in the institutions of the IRI and their knowledge of Iran’s foreign 
policy (i.e. relative proximity to decision-making circles). The interviewees were 
mostly contacted by email. When I could not find their contact details, I approached 
journalists who had interviewed them. I disclosed the fact that I was a research 
candidate at the University of Exeter, studying Iran’s foreign policy during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, and wished to contact X for the purpose of an interview for 
my doctoral thesis. I asked for advice on how to contact the Iranian official in 
question. This strategy proved fairly successful and sometimes led to further 
contacts between the journalists and myself. This was the case with Laura Rozen, 
the writer of the Back Channel news-blog for Al Monitor, and Barbara Slavin, a 
senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a correspondent for Al Monitor and the author of 
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to 
Confrontation.100 
 
I systematically explained the purpose of my research to potential interviewees in 
broad terms and the reasons for seeking their participation in the project. They were 
all informed that, should they accept to grant me an interview, they would receive the 
University of Exeter’s ethics consent form, which detailed the conditions of 
anonymity, the voluntary nature of participation and the measures in place to ensure 
that the data collected remained confidential. It was also clarified that no commercial 
or other interests were involved in the project, which was not funded by any 
organisation. I often had to make several attempts before securing a response, be it 
positive and negative. The date, time and location of the interviews were left at the 
discretion of the participants. Some interviews took place face-to-face, others via 
email.  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to cover the topics I wanted to 
focus on and, simultaneously, to give the interviewees a great deal of leeway in their 
answers. My interest lay in their interpretation and understanding of issues, events 
and decisions. As such, the questions were all open-ended. Similar questions were 
used for all the interviewees in order to make comparisons between answers. Some 
of the questions were rephrased or reordered when I felt they were not 
straightforward or clear enough. For example, questions related to the participants’ 
understandings of the profound motives for external opposition to Iran’s nuclear 
activities were best positioned as follow-up points after the interviewees had 
expressed their views on Iran’s external relations, the power dynamics within the 
international system, etc. Questions specific to the particular occupation and 
expertise of the participants were also included in the interviews. For example, when 
I prepared for my interview with Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA 
from 2005 to 2013, it became clear that the failure of the August 2007 Work Plan 
between Iran and the Agency was a bitter disappointment to him. One of my open-
ended questions related to this specific phase of negotiation. Finally, impromptu 
questions were systematically used in order to follow up on points or information that 
emerged during the interview.  
 
At the start of each interview, I gave the participant a copy of the ethics consent 
form, which had also been sent to them 48 hours prior to our meeting. This often 
provided an opportunity for the interviewee to ask more questions about my research 
aims. Apprehension was often visible, with many interviewees seeking clarifications 
about my intentions, nationality and choice to study in the UK. The ethics consent 
form also provided an opportunity to clarify the conditions of confidentiality and 
anonymity. The interviewees could choose to be identified by their name and 
position, their position only, or not to be identifiable at all. In the majority of cases, 
the interviewees chose to remain unidentifiable.  
 
Each of the interviewees was asked if I could use my voice-recorder and take notes 
during the interview. While most agreed, one individual refused. This was 
undoubtedly my most challenging interview. At first, the Iranian official seemed more 
interested in asking me questions or hearing my thoughts on the questions I 
presented to him. The interview, however, lasted for three hours and was the most 
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revealing that I conducted. The participant was willing to discuss aspects of Iran’s 
domestic politics and highlighted patterns of continuity in Iran’s foreign policy under 
the Shah’s regime and since the Revolution. He also spoke of the numerous 
resemblances between Iran and the US. 
 
I faced four main challeges during my research project. The first lay in that several 
officials expressed the wish to be interviewed by email. I thought this could offer 
them the flexibility to reply as and when was most convenient to them and to take the 
time to construct their responses and elaborate their argument. Email interviews 
would also reduce my own costs and time constraints. Although I was able to secure 
additional interviews by this method, I found that the participants were often slow in 
sending their responses. Furthermore, the interviewees’ responses were generally 
very short, thus making it difficult to assess what some of the responses meant. 
 
The second challenge was that my overall access to Iranian officials remained 
limited. The responses from those who were based inside Iran were all negative, the 
emails and invitation letters often remaining unanswered. In some cases, some 
explained that they could not take part in the research. This was the case of Ali 
Larijani, the Secretary of the SNSC from August 2005 to October 2007 and the 
Majles Speaker since May 2008. Through a contact, I was informed that Larijani 
recommended that I seek assistance from Manouchehr Mottaki and Ali Akbar Salehi. 
Mottaki, Iran’s Foreign Minister from August 2005 to December 2010, declined due 
to time constraints. Salehi, for his part, never replied to my emails. On a number of 
occasions, I was also asked to answer a list of questions pertaining to my nationality, 
the reasons for my interests in Iran, and the name and research focus of my 
supervisors. Unfortunately, I was often refused interviews when such questions were 
raised. Some official organisations, such as the Permanent Mission of Iran to the 
UN, also seemed to have a “geographical division”. The Mission in New York, for 
example, invited me to contact their colleagues in Vienna since I was based in 
Europe.  
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Additionally, the wished-for snowball sampling effect did not materialise.101 It was 
hoped that the interviewees would be able to suggest other participants and, 
possibly, facilitate establishing contact with them and/or others I had difficulties 
getting in touch with. The interviewees were not very receptive to these suggestions. 
This can be understood in light of the fact that most wished to remain anonymous. I 
was also informed that Iranian officials based inside the country were rarely 
authorised to talk to foreigners, especially for the purpose of doctoral theses.  
 
My third challenge was that my fieldwork in Iran was abruptly cancelled in April 2011. 
At the time, the French government recommended against travelling to Iran. 
Following a meeting between my first supervisor and the manager of Exeter’s 
College of Social Sciences and International Studies, it was decided that I should 
postpone my trip. After the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran in November 
2011, fieldwork in Iran was made more difficult. Several Iranian officials also advised 
me against going to Iran for my research. Some encouraged me to go but only in 
order to learn the language and become more acquainted with the country. Another 
official explained that “things are bad” and my presence could jeopardise the position 
of my interlocutors.  
 
My research project could have been substantially enriched, had I had the 
opportunity to do fieldwork in Iran. Spending time in the country, meeting with 
people, connecting with academics, research institutions or other organisations, 
would have been a source of personal fulfilment and made the research process 
much more intellectually rewarding than “at a distance” in my office. I could have 
also carried more interviews, made more observations and perhaps gained 
unexpected insights that, ultimately, would have improved the depth and breadth of 
my research.  
 
With respect to Farsi, had I become more acquainted with the language and not 
limited myself to studying Farsi for two years for two hours per week, I could have 
perhaps read original sources and conducted interviews in the participants’ native 
language. Arguably, this would have enabled me to revisit and check 
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interpretations/meanings and identify potentially new/different frames of reference. In 
this respect, I cannot help but wonder whether and how the official documents I 
accessed on Iran’s state-sanctioned English-language website or international 
organisations’ webpages may have varied if read in Farsi (see page 42). I hope, 
however, that within the circumstances in which my research project unfolded, my 
theoretical and methodological considerations have allowed me to produce as 
thorough and contextualised analysis of Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue during 
the Ahmadinejad presidency as possible.  
 
Finally, a colleague of mine, who had attended one of my presentations during a 
conference on Iran, mentioned that I had a very “idealistic” and “romanticised” 
interpretation of Iranian politics. Having been born and raised in the Middle East and 
having been to Iran, he felt that I overlooked both its destabilising policies within the 
Middle East region and its systematic violation of human rights. This observation 
stayed with me for it touched upon several ethical dilemmas that I had faced: how 
can I reconcile my attempt to empathise with Iran’s foreign policy with the fact that, 
under the Ahmadinejad administration, the promotion and protection of human rights 
in Iran deteriorated to new lows? How can I seek to explain the underlying logics and 
benefits of Iran’s nuclear strategy of resistance for the regime while (not) overlooking 
the substantial costs and consequences of this policy for ordinary Iranians and the 
country’s socio-political dynamics? How can I treat Iran as a nation-state when 
friends and colleagues repeatedly articulate that they do not identify with the Shi’a-
Persian dominated state?  
 
Although these ethical dilemmas never ceased to intersect with my research project, 
I became acutely aware that a constructivist interpretation of Iran’s foreign policy 
could position me as a “government mouthpiece”. Since my aim was to understand, 
contextualise and explain particular aspects of Iran’s foreign policy behaviour, I was 
always at risk of coming across as politically sympathetic to the regime and thus too 
biased and uncritical of the limitations of its policies. Within this context, I found it 
particularly relevant to present and articulate as clearly as possible my theoretical 
approach and insist that I was engaging with Iran’s framings and views. As 
Finnemore and Sikkink highlight, for constructivists, “understanding how things are 
put together and how they occur is not mere description. Understanding the 
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constitution of things is essential in explaining how they behave and what causes 
political outcomes.”102  
 
As such, the analysis focuses on Iran’s narratives; how, for example, the regime 
explained the nuclear issue, justified its position and defended its policies and 
priorities. However, taking into account Halliday’s warning on the limitations of 
relying solely upon leader’s declarations (see page 43), I attempted to study both 
Iran’s rhetoric and behaviour in order to identify and distinguish manipulation and 
issues of “impression management” (see pages 95-96) from more “sincere” forms of 
communication. Although I found remarkable consistency between Iran’s narrative 
and the policies pursued, I also sought to highlight areas where discrepancies 
emerged. Thus, on pages 191-192, it is noted that despite the Ahmadinejad 
administration’s insistence that it was determined to use the full spectrum of Iran’s 
rights under the NPT and no longer accept measures that would single it out, the 
regime nevertheless took several steps that went beyond its legal obligations. 
Additionally, the domestic politics chapter (chapter 3) highlights that it cannot be 
ignored that Iran’s firm and consistent nuclear stance, especially its intransigence in 
the face of mouting external pressures, could have been partly down to domestic 
paralysis (see pages 146-148). 
 
I also found it important to highlight aspects of Iran’s narratives that had been largely 
ignored or overlooked. This included its insistence that the Iranian nuclear file had 
been illegally referred to the UNSC and that the IAEA had stepped beyond its 
statutory and legal mandate. Additionally, I saw the importance in explaining how 
and why a constructivist perspective could contribute to policymaking. One of the 
underlying aspects of the criticism that I “idealised” Iran’s foreign policy was related 
to the fact that my analysis did not really engage with realpolitik, the nuts and bolts of 
foreign policy. I dispute this assertion on the ground that identity and interests must 
be problematised, for only they can shed light on foreign policy orientations, enabling 
policymakers to appreciate how the Iranian leadership may receive their discourses 
and policies.  
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Structure of the Thesis  
I have organised my thesis into seven chapters. Serving as bookends, chapter 1 
contextualises my approach and chapter 7 offers a comprehensive overview of the 
key research findings and articulates my overall empirical and analytical contribution.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework that guided and structured the research 
process. I engage with Wendt’s argument that the structures of the international 
system are social and that states’ identities and interests are in large part 
constructed by them. In the first section, I argue that states always possess 
subjective and intersubjective identities. The former are rooted in processes of self-
understanding, and the latter are structured by states’ beliefs, expectations and 
culture of relations with their significant Others. Crucially, states’ subjective and 
intersubjective identities have constitutive effects on how they interpret their interests 
as well as their (legitimate and feasible) foreign policy options in a given situation. 
Identities thus have important motivational and behavioural consequences.  
 
Furthermore, I engage with Wendt’s contention that states possess several essential 
needs linked to their subjective identities, which are more complex than the realist 
focus on physical security and economic health. In the second section, I delve into 
Wendt’s key argument that “anarchy is what states make of it.” I analyse the ways in 
which and the reasons why states’ intersubjective identities shape their collective 
knowledge and have powerful domestic socialisation effects. This, in turn, allows one 
to shed light on the core motives that sustain resilient patterns of behaviour and 
dynamics of interaction.  
 
In the third section, I outline the main features and policy consequences of the 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures of anarchy. This is particularly useful for 
specifying why similar material resources acquire different meanings, and why 
peaceful, competitive or conflictual relations exist as a result of interaction, and not 
the power distribution or the inevitable consequence of self-help within the 
international system. In the last section, I pursue the argument that cultures of 
anarchy are always contingent and outline the chief domestic and systemic factors 
that either facilitate or inhibit collective identity formation. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on Iran’s domestic politics during the Ahmadinejad presidency in 
order to identify the chief internal forces and pressures that shaped its foreign 
policymaking processes during the period 2005-2013. In the first section, I observe 
that the June 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad paved the way for a growing 
securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics, which was itself a result of a conflagration of 
internal and external circumstances. The post-electoral legitimacy crisis of 2009 
represented the most profound challenge to the IRI’s stability since the Iran-Iraq war 
and deepened the regime’s strategies of repression, violence and control. The acute 
securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics continued until the end of the Ahmadinejad 
presidency, quite unsurprisingly in light of the external pressures that the nuclear 
issue simultaneously exercised on the regime.  
 
In the second section, I analyse the unprecedented polarisation of Iran’s domestic 
politics, which was, in part, created by the aforementioned securitisation dynamics. 
Profound divisions arose within the conservative forces, particularly between the 
“old” and the principlist “new” guard on the one hand, and between President 
Ahmadinejad and his followers and their opponents on the other. Criticisms 
coalesced around the partly related issues of Iran’s economic and foreign policy 
situations. After analysing the chief aspects of the elite-level condemnations of the 
Ahmadinejad administration’s performance, I engage with the institutional and 
informal attempts to constrain and limit the principlists’ role and influence.  
 
I conclude this chapter by arguing that the intertwined dynamics of securitisation and 
polarisation likely affected Iran’s external behaviour in two main ways. On the one 
hand, the regime may have had greater incentives to use the foreign policy arena, 
especially the nuclear issue, as an instrument of domestic diversion and legitimacy 
bolstering. It may have become increasingly dependent on external performance in 
the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election and the international community’s 
enforcement of increasingly stringent sanctions. On the other hand, the acute 
divisions within the elite, and between the elected and unelected institutions of the 
IRI, may have hindered Iran’s autonomy and capacity to adapt and transform its 
foreign policy strategies, particularly from 2009 onwards. Within this context, I cannot 
exclude the possibility that Iran’s firm nuclear stance could have been partly the 
result of domestic paralysis.   
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Chapter 4 forms the first part of my analysis of Iran’s multifaceted approach to the 
nuclear issue. To understand why Iran never agreed to renounce, or significantly 
alter, its nuclear programme following the revelation of its concealed facilities and 
activities in August 2002, I show that it was embedded in a structure of meaning that 
emphasised its legality and legitimacy. I then focus on the first phase of Iran’s 
approach to the nuclear issue, during the Khatami presidency, when the regime 
followed a confidence-building approach towards the IAEA and the EU-3 that led to 
voluntary and temporary suspension of its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing 
activities. This approach failed to secure Iran’s rights to peaceful nuclear energy 
under the NPT. For Iran, its negotiations with the EU-3 not only proved humiliating 
but also demonstrated that at the core of the nuclear issue lay the problem of Iran-
US relations. This formative experience called for a less compromising and more 
assertive negotiation strategy, which the Ahmadinejad administration both pursued 
and legitimised.  
 
In the third section, I analyse the regime’s framing of the nuclear issue as a Western-
led attempt to undermine the IRI, prevent the scientific and economic development of 
Iran, and transform the mandate of the IAEA to weaken Iran’s national security. From 
the regime’s perspective, the securitisation of its nuclear programme was less 
related to the West’s proliferation concerns than yet another attempt to weaken and 
humiliate Iran. Within this context, Iran had to pursue an assertive strategy that 
combined tit for tat dismissal of the IAEA’s demands and the UNSC’s Resolutions, 
with the creation of new de facto nuclear realities. I conclude that, despite its material 
costs, Iran’s resistance strategy benefited the regime. Its substantial nuclear 
achievements and the objective failure of the unilateral and multilateral coercive 
diplomatic strategy to affect its nuclear calculus both strengthened Iran’s national 
independence and confidence in the righteousness of the IRI’s moral and strategic 
principles.   
 
Chapter 5 engages with two other key aspects of Iran’s approach to the nuclear 
issue, which, though different in their emphasis, both related to its attempt to 
transform the matter into wider geopolitical opportunities. In the first section, I 
analyse how Iran attempted to broaden the scope of the dispute by transforming it 
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into a debate about the practices of the NWSs of the NPT, particularly the Western 
powers. On the one hand, it denounced the NWSs’ failure to fulfil their legal 
obligations towards the NNWS, particularly with regard to the development and 
sharing of peaceful nuclear technology. On the other hand, it condemned the NWSs’ 
failure to fulfil their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. Through 
this dual framing, Iran sought to alter perceptions of its nuclear programme as a 
proliferation challenge and a threat to international peace and security. Instead, it 
portrayed its resistance strategy as driven by interests greater than its own. The 
regime positioned itself as a constructive state party to the NPT and a morally driven 
actor actively resisting injustice and acting for the good of the international system in 
general, and developing nations in particular.  
 
I also examine how and why Iran’s condemnations of the NWSs’ double standards 
and illegal and illegitimate practices in the nuclear field enabled it to gain rhetorical 
and practical expressions of support. The NPT Review Conferences, the statements 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the May 2010 Turkey-Brazil-Iran 
Agreement all showed that Iran had tapped into and successfully mobilised pre-
existing sources of discontent and grievances. This external support in turn helped 
legitimise and confirm Iran’s identity narrative as a responsible and morally driven 
state actor that was not isolated within the international system and that was able to 
challenge the Western core powers.  
 
In the second section, I focus on the fact that Iran did not seek solely to devalue, and 
assert itself vis-à-vis the Western NWSs. The negotiation proposals of the Khatami 
and the Ahmadinejad administrations included cooperation on a range of issues 
unrelated to the nuclear question. Despite differences in tone and emphasis, their 
proposals clarified how Iran contemplated its (desired) processes of interaction with 
these actors. I conclude that the nuclear issue provided paradoxical threats to and 
opportunities for Iran since it both profoundly revived its grievances and negative 
beliefs concerning the Western core powers while simultaneously creating potential 
for engagement on issues of mutual interests. In other words, Iran displayed 
complex role-identities as an anti-status quo power that was willing to cooperate with 
long-standing rivals on several transnational security challenges.   
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Chapter 6 builds on the argument that Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue was 
multifaceted and incorporated elements of estrangement and conciliation towards 
the Western core powers, the US in particular. I focus in greater detail on Iran’s US 
policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency to understand how (and why) Iran 
conceived of its relationship with the world’s superpower and whether (and why) its 
logics of representation and interaction persisted or were challenged during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency. To do so, the first section examines the constitutive 
features and dynamics of the Iran-US culture of enmity since the Revolution. I show 
why their mutual mistrust and worst-case assumptions acquired self-perpetuating 
qualities, especially since they became embedded in individual and collective 
consciousness, internal and external status quo interests, and routinised practices of 
hostility. I also emphasise that, despite substantial differences in their material 
capabilities and ability to harm, Iran systematically relied on deterrence strategies of 
different kinds to counter US threats to its physical security, economic well-being and 
status.  
 
In the second section, I demonstrate that Iran often pursued Janus-faced strategies 
towards the US. I outline the Khatami administration’s pronounced and repeated 
attempts to “altercast” the superpower, both rhetorically through the “dialogue of 
civilisations” and practically via its multilevel cooperation in Afghanistan in the early 
2000s and its unprecedented negotiation proposal in May 2003. These efforts were 
prompted by both will and necessity in light of the post-9/11 geopolitical context and 
the Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda.  
 
I then examine in greater detail Iran’s US policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency, 
which witnessed substantial developments in the form of direct public and private 
engagement between US and Iranian officials, including high-level figures, and 
domestic public discussions on the question of engagement between the two 
estranged actors. As such, the Ahmadinejad presidency oversaw substantial shifts in 
Iran’s institutionalised processes of representation of, and interaction with, the 
superpower.  
 
I conclude that Iran’s Janus-faced US policy, which oscillated between 
condemnation and defiance on the one hand, and carefully calibrated engagement 
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and conciliation attempts on the other, must be understood in light of Iran’s 
discursive and strategic dependence on the US. A transformation of US-Iran 
relations, away from enmity and towards more collective identity information, would 
help Iran reduce its security dilemmas and help bridge the gap between the 
perceptions of its legitimate interests and its ability to play a role commensurate with 
its geopolitical aspirations. Crucially, the Supreme Leader’s views on US-Iran 
relations and Iran’s national interests evolved. Engagement was neither necessary 
nor intrinsically negative as long as core and non-negotiable expectations were met 
so that neither the heritage of the Revolution nor Ayatollah Khamenei’s personal 
legitimacy would be jeopardised.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Theoretical Considerations: Wendtian Constructivism and 
its Complements 
 
In this chapter, I explore the theoretical approaches that informed and shaped my 
analysis of Iran’s foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency. I review how 
and why a Wendtian-constructivist perspective raises relevant questions and crucial 
insights into the underlying logics and drivers of states’ behaviours and processes of 
interaction. However, I do not engage with all aspects of Wendt’s thinking, especially 
his argument on the philosophy of social theory. I also include several elements of 
realist thinking and domestic politics to strengthen the overall cohesiveness and 
relevance of my theoretical framework. While Wendt has been the subject of wide 
critique in the literature on International Relations (IR), my data also revealed that his 
approach would struggle to account for and incorporate several key elements, thus 
calling for a refinement of the research design.103  
 
In sum, although a range of constructive approaches exists and scholars have often 
combined them, I chose instead to engage with Wendt’s argument, identify very 
clearly how and why his own particular approach was well suited to my research 
subject, where it lacked analytical potential, and how and why such shortcomings 
would be revealed in the context of this thesis.104 In so doing, I offer a 
comprehensive and cohesive theoretical framework, which avoids both making an 
under-defined claim that I have developed “a constructivist perspective” and the 
“catalogue effect” of combining various constructivist theories.  
 
Wendt’s thought-provoking 1992 article “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics”, and his groundbreaking Social Theory of 
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International Politics (1999), established him as one of the core social constructivist 
scholars in the field of IR.105 His approach was substantially developed in response 
to Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, Wendt himself recognising a process of 
borrowing and rejecting since his “theory competes with Waltz’s argument in some 
ways and supports it in others”.106  
 
Wendt’s theory shares many of the same premises as his counterpart, including the 
choice of developing a “states systemic project.”107 A Wendtian constructive 
perspective thus also seeks to explain the behaviour of states in the international 
system. States, defined as “structure[s] of political authority with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of organised violence,” are considered to be at the centre of the 
international system since they are the channels through which violence, continuity 
and/or change ultimately happen.  
 
Additionally, like Waltz, Wendt seeks to develop a systemic (as opposed to 
reductionist) theory of international politics.108 He similarly emphasises the causal 
powers of the structure of the international system in explaining state behaviour. His 
focus does not lie with the properties of the states per se (i.e. unit-level factors like 
domestic politics or decision-makers’ personality).109 Contrarily to Waltz, however, 
Wendt argues that “the challenge of ‘systemic theory’ is not to show that ‘structure’ 
has more explanatory power than ‘agents,’ as if the two were separate, but to show 
how agents are differently structured by the system as to produce different 
effects.”110 
 
Finally, Wendt agrees that brute material forces have independent effects on 
international politics.111 As such, the Wendtian-constructivist perspective does not 
espouse the contention that international life is ‘ideas all the way down.’ “In at least 
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three ways,” Wendt writes, brute material forces constraint states’ actions.112 Firstly, 
the distribution of material capabilities amongst actors affects “the possibility and 
likelihood of certain outcomes.”113 It is, for example, unlikely that a militarily weak 
state be able to conquer a powerful counterpart. Secondly, the “composition” of 
material capabilities similarly constrains the probability of certain outcomes. “Armies 
with tanks will usually defeat armies with spears.”114 Finally, geography and natural 
resources endow states with differing comparative advantages. Although Wendt 
contends that brute material forces are constituted independently of states and affect 
them in a causal way, “it is only because of their interaction with ideas that material 
forces have the effects that they do”.115  
 
Wendt has three main points of contention with Waltz’s neo-realist approach, which 
form the basis for his account of international politics. First, Waltz’s reliance on the 
analogy of neoclassical micro-economic theory makes him an “individualist”: “States 
are likened to firms, and the international system to a market within which states 
compete.”116 Within this context, states have a universal national interest 
(exogenously given) and a rational behaviour predicated on the maximisation of their 
preferences.  
 
Second, Waltz conceives of the structure of the international system as the 
distribution of material capabilities under anarchy. As such, the “kinds of ideational 
attributes or relationships that might constitute a social structure, like patterns of 
friendships or enmity, or institutions, are specifically excluded from the definition”.117 
The anarchical structure of the international system (i.e. the absence of a central 
authority and collective security) leads states to compete for power and influence, 
thus producing forms of behavioural uniformity (‘like units’) and the punishment and 
elimination of those that do not follow them.118 In anarchic environents, “each unit’s 
incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else 
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can be counted on to do so.”119 As such, there is no profound differentiation of 
function; the principal difference is one of capability: “States perform or try to perform 
tasks, most of which are common to all of them; the ends they aspire to are 
similar.”120 
 
Wendt, by contrast, argues that states’ identities and interests are both significantly 
affected and constituted by the international system. They are not pre-defined and 
exogenous to interaction and can thus be neither ignored nor taken for granted. 
Instead, they must be problematised in order to understand states’ foreign policy 
behaviours. Crucially, Wendt argues, identities constitute and shape states’ 
preferences and actions.121 Additionally, Wendt disagrees that self-help is a 
structural feature of the international system.122 Anarchy, as he famously coined it, 
“is what states make of it”. International politics is determined by “the beliefs and 
expectations that states have about each other”, and the meaning and effects of 
material power depend on the type of social structure that dominates.123 International 
structure is a social rather than a material phenomenon; it does not have a logic but 
is driven by process instead.124 
 
Third, Waltz neglects international interaction and, consequently, situations of power 
transitions and variations in the system structure can only be accounted for by 
changes in the distribution of material capabilities.125 Waltz’s materialist theory, and 
his assumption about state identity, is unable to explain structural change that does 
not involve a transition in the distribution of capabilities, as was the case during the 
Cold War. Arguably, too, the profound transformation of Iran’s foreign policy interests 
and behaviours in the aftermath of the Revolution cannot be explained by reference 
to material structures alone.  
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To summarise, there are two main strands to Wendt’s disagreement with Waltz, 
which both derive from his emphasis on intersubjectivity: the structures of the 
international system are social (rather than material), and states’ identities and 
interests are in large part constructed by them (rather than given exogenously to the 
system).126 In other words, structures exist only through processes and interactions 
substantially give meaning to one’s identities and interests. I now turn to exploring 
both aspects in greater detail, systematically emphasising how and why each 
informs my analysis of Iran’s foreign policy. Additionally, I engage with the limits of 
Wendt’s approach and explain how and why complementary perspectives strengthen 
my overall theoretical framework.  
 
States’ Identities and Interests 
In contending that states’ identities and interests are not given and exogenously 
defined, Wendt is able to make three core arguments regarding the sources of 
foreign policy behaviour. First, identities have subjective and intersubjective qualities 
and, as such, states’ understanding of their identities is rooted in processes that are 
both related and unrelated to interaction with other actors. Second, identities shape 
interests in significant ways since they help interpret situations and identify which 
options are acceptable (question of legitimacy) and possible (question of feasibility). 
Finally, in virtue of their subjective identities, states share universal national interests 
which set limits on their foreign policy options.  
 
Subjective and Intersubjective Qualities 
Wendt defines identity as “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and 
expectations about self” and “a property of intentional actors that generates 
motivational and behavioural dispositions”.127 Identity has both subjective and 
intersubjective qualities. It is subjective in the sense that it is rooted in an actor’s self-
understanding and neither requires nor implies the existence of an Other.128 It also 
has an intersubjective, or systemic, quality as “the meaning of an actor’s self-
understanding will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the 
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same way.”129 The intersubjective quality of identity thus involves an element of 
recognition and acceptance. This internal-external nexus is, however, more complex, 
for Wendt argues for the existence of “several kinds of identities”.130 While 
“corporate” and “type” identities are subjective, “role” and “collective” identities have 
an intersubjective dimension. 
 
Corporate, Type, Role and Collective Identities  
States have “personal or corporate identities”, which are “constituted by the self-
organising, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities”.131 As such, 
corporate identities refer to some of the intrinsic and essential properties of states, 
which are not socially constructed by the international system, but include “a 
consciousness and memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity”.132 
States do not have “‘bodies’ if their members have no joint narrative of themselves 
as a corporate actor, and to that extent corporate identity presupposes individuals 
with a collective identity. The state is a ‘group Self’ capable of group-level 
cognition”.133 “Type identities”, for their part, correspond to “regime types” or “forms 
of state”, such as capitalist or monarchical states.134 Such identities are exogenous 
to the international system since they do not depend on other states for their 
existence.135 They are “constituted by internal principles of political legitimacy that 
organize state-society relations with respect to ownership and control of the means 
of production and destruction.”136 
 
In addition to states’ corporate and type identities, Wendt also identifies two types of 
intersubjective identities. “Role identities” do not have “intrinsic properties and exist 
only in relations to Others”.137 As such, they imply the existence of a social structure 
between the Self and the Other. A role identity, Wendt argues, is learned and 
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potentially reinforced as a result of the way in which actors are treated by Others, a 
principle called “reflected appraisal” or “mirroring”:  
actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or 
“appraise” them, in the “mirror” of Others’ representations of the Self. If the 
Other treats the Self as though she were an enemy, then by the principle of 
reflected appraisals she is likely to internalise that belief in her own role 
identity vis-à-vis the Other.138 
 
This means that a state’s ideas about Self and Other are not passive: “You are an X; 
I expect you to act like an X, and I will act toward you as if you were an X.”139 States’ 
behaviour depends on the perceived meaning of their beliefs about and expectations 
of Others.140 For example, states act differently towards enemies and friends 
because the former are seen as threatening.141 As such, the extent to which, and the 
manner in which, states identify with one another affects whether they pursue 
policies of self- or collective interests.142 However, not all Others are equally 
significant in constituting a state’s identity. Power relations and dependency 
relationships play an important role.143 Wendt provides the example of the Arab-
Israeli conflict to highlight the fact that the enemy’s role identity is not easily 
discarded.144 A similar argument is made in chapter 7 about the Iran-US conflict.  
 
“Collective identities” are specific role identities in which the distinction between Self 
and Other is blurred.145 This is what Wendt calls “identification” and is linked to his 
definition of a “Kantian culture”.146 Collective identities build on type identities since 
identification is “usually issue-specific and rarely total”.147 They “vary by issue, time, 
and place and by whether they are bilateral, regional, or global”.148  
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Wendt thus identifies four types of identities. Importantly, with the exception of 
corporate identities, these identities can “take multiple forms simultaneously” within 
the same state.149 Furthermore, while some situations may call on certain particular 
identities more than others, it is also possible that some circumstances mobilise 
“several identities that may point in different directions”.150 When this is the case, 
Wendt suggests that internal identity conflicts follow the rule: “(1) in any situation the 
solution to identity conflicts within an actor will reflect the relative ‘salience’ or 
hierarchy of identity commitments in the Self, and (2) that hierarchy will tend to 
reflect the order [of corporate, type, role and collective identities]”.151 Identities are 
thus ordered hierarchically: some are crucial to a state’s self-understandings, others 
less so.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is worth highlighting several crucial dimensions of 
Iran’s subjective and intersubjective identities. First, Iran emphasises a sense of 
importance as a regional or global actor: nationalism is very pronounced and has 
long infused Iranian consciousness with perceptions of grandeur and a legitimate 
role in its external environment. Iran’s history is replete with great successes. The 
Achaemenid dynasty (550-330 BCE), for example, ruled an Empire that stretched 
from Egypt to India and is often cited as the apex of Iran’s golden age.152 The 
Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) is also remembered as a period of national greatness 
and regional power.153 The 1979 Revolution similarly stands as a unique event, 
which had significance well beyond Iran’s borders and liberated the country from 
foreign influence. Many analysts thus argued that Iran’s strong sense of national 
identity, together with its strategic geographic location and its substantial 
hydrocarbon resources, profoundly shaped its foreign policy ambitions.154  
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Second, Iran also presents a profound sense of insecurity and suspicion of foreign 
actors in large part due to the fact that it was repeatedly invaded or manipulated by 
foreign powers, including the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and the British and 
Russians from the 19th to the mid-20th century. Iran’s relative impotence in the face 
of Anglo-Russian rivalries left deep scars in the social fabric of Iranian society, 
including intense threat perceptions of foreign powers and a profound need to resist 
interference in the country’s sovereign affairs. The Tobacco Monopoly revolt (1890-
1891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the oil nationalisation movement 
(1951-1953) and the 1979 Revolution all constituted nationalist rejections of external 
penetration and exploitation of Iran’s resources. Abrahamian thus writes that a 
“conspirational mindset” exists among all periods and factions of Iranian politics.155 
Farhi and Lotfian similarly observe that external actors are often represented as 
“thieves, always seeking to extract resources and ‘concessions’ (emtiaz) from Iran by 
manipulating domestic cleavages”.156  
 
Third, and closely linked to the first two points, a near consensus exists within Iran 
on key foreign policy principles. In particular, Iran stands against the unjust and 
oppressive global structures of power, it supports the non-aligned and oppressed 
nations and aspires to greater regional and international reach while maintaining its 
national independence. In this respect, it is worth noting that Ehteshami writes about 
an “arrogance of non-submission”.157 Fourth, the Revolution produced a unique 
political system that combines elements of republicanism and theocracy. While the 
IRI articulates complex conceptions of legitimacy (popular/electoral and 
religious/divine), Iran has continuously demanded external actors’ respect for, and 
acceptance of, its unique political system and norms. Further, while the republican 
component of its political system came under stress during the Khatami presidency 
(i.e. fierce institutional competition between elected and unelected institutions), the 
Ahmadinejad administration posed an unprecedented challenge to the social 
contract (see chapter 3).  
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Identities and Interests  
One of Wendt’s most important claims is that a constitutive relationship exists 
between identities and interests: while the former refers to who or what actors are, 
the latter alludes to what they want.158 Interests thus always presuppose identities 
since an actor cannot know what he wants before he knows what it is: “Actors do not 
have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; 
instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.”159 To define 
situations, actors rely upon their identities.  
 
Additionally, identities strongly imply particular preferences and thus behavioural 
logics. Some forms of actions are weighed and perceived as more appropriate or 
legitimate than others. Constructivists commonly refer to this dynamic as the “logic of 
appropriateness” (a term Wendt does not use), which opposes the realist “logic of 
consequences”, according to which states follow cost-benefit evaluations and 
“calculate the consequences of a particular course of action and […] choose the 
action that offers them the most utility”.160 Constructivists argue, instead, that states 
follow the norms associated with their particular identities. As such, and although 
much depends on the context of the situation, states seek to do “the right thing in 
accordance with their identity”.161 Conceptions of legitimacy thus shape and 
constrain behaviours.  
 
In a 1996 co-authored chapter with Jepperson and Katzenstein, Wendt argues that 
norms are “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity.”162 
Norms not only constitute identities, they also have regulative effects since they 
generate expectations about appropriate behaviour in varying circumstances.163 In 
their analysis of the social construction of weapons of mass destruction as 
unacceptable weapons, Price and Tannenwald demonstrate that “models of 
                                                          
158
 Wendt, Social Theory, 231. 
159
 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 398.   
160
 T. Flockhart, “Constructivism and Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. 
S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 86. 
161
 Ibid. 
162
 R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, and P. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” 
in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. P. J. Katzenstein (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 54. 
163
 Ibid. Also see C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” Theories of International Relations, eds. S. Burchill, 
A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, T. Nardin, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smith and J. True 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 226. 
67 
 
‘responsible’ or ‘civilised’ states are enacted and validated by upholding specific 
norms.”164 States committed to such identities have historically constrained their use 
of these (socially constructed) ‘illegitimate’ weapons; civilised states could not resort 
to nuclear and/or chemical weapons. In sum, norms affect both states’ interests and 
the instruments and means that they deem appropriate to pursue their preferences 
and policies.165 The delegitimisation of these weapons shapes states’ practices and 
their permissible repertoire of action despite their potential utility.                
 
Wendt also introduces nuance to the relationship between being (identities) and 
wanting (interests) with the concept of “subjective interests”.166 These are the beliefs 
actors hold about how to meet their identity needs in practice.167 Beliefs are 
important to explain a state’s behaviour since the latter is caused not only by what an 
actor wants, but also by what it believes is possible.168 As such, beliefs mediate the 
pivotal relation between identities and interests, between wanting and acting.169 
Although Wendt does not explicitly make this argument, his concept of “subjective 
interests” alludes to the fact that foreign policy decisions tend to reflect the 
assessment of a range of opportunities and constraints in contingent circumstances. 
As Hill famously declared, “Foreign policy always exists on the cusp between choice 
and constraint.”170 
 
Universal National Interests: Physical Survival, Autonomy, Economic Well-
Being and Collective Self-Esteem 
If Wendt takes issue with Waltz’s contention that states share given interests, he 
nevertheless contends that it is possible to generalise about a universal national 
interest, which all states share in virtue of their corporate identity.171 In other words, 
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states possess certain essential needs that arise from their nature as self-organised 
political units. These interests are not social constructions; they are “pre-social”.172 
 
Wendt defines national interest as “the reproduction requirements or security of 
state-society complexes”.173 He identifies four types: “physical survival”, “autonomy”, 
“economic well-being” and “collective self-esteem”.174 Physical survival refers to the 
survival of a state-society complex and has increasingly been identified with the 
preservation of territorial integrity.175 Autonomy, a result of sovereignty, relates to 
“the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of 
resources and its choice of government”.176 It enables states to respond to internal 
and external contingencies. Economic well-being refers to the maintenance of the 
mode of production and, in the existing capitalist system, to the state’s economic 
health (growth).177  
 
Finally, collective self-esteem relates to “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for 
respect or status”.178 Wendt transposes an individual-level phenomenon, human 
beings’ need for self-esteem (respect) and recognition, to the state level. A defining 
factor of collective self-esteem is whether “collective self-images” are positive or 
negative.179 This, in turn, depends “in part on relationships with significant Others, 
since it is by taking the perspective of the Other that the Self sees itself”.180 “Positive 
self-images” tend to emerge from mutual respect and cooperation.181 Recognition of 
state sovereignty seems particularly important since “it means that at least formally a 
state has an equal status in the eye of Others.”182 In such a situation, not only are 
states more reassured of their safety from aggression, but they are also less inclined 
to feel the need to compensate for status. “Negative self-images” arise from 
perceived disregard or humiliation by other states and are thus more likely to occur 
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in highly competitive environments.183 If states are to meet the self-esteem needs of 
their members, they cannot long tolerate negative images and will seek to 
“compensate by self-assertion and/or devaluation and aggression toward the 
Other”.184  
 
In his 2003 article “Why a World State is Inevitable”, Wendt clarifies his argument 
that individuals and states desire recognition.185 This desire has deeper aspirations 
than the simple recognition of physical security (“thin recognition”). It is a condition 
fundamental to the Self: “Only through recognition can people acquire and maintain 
a distinct identity. One becomes a Self, in short, via the Other – subjectivity depends 
on inter-subjectivity.”186 Furthermore, the desire for recognition can be fulfilled “either 
symmetrically or asymmetrically – by recognition of the Other’s equality, or by 
securing his recognition of the Self without reciprocating it”.187 The former is more 
stable since, in a situation of asymmetric recognition, those who are not fully 
recognised will struggle for recognition “as best they can”, thus imposing material 
and ideational costs.188 Finally, the effect of mutual recognition (namely being 
accepted as different and accepting the normative constraints that such recognition 
implies) is relatively paradoxical since it leads to a form of “collective identity or 
solidarity”.189  
 
Importantly, Wendt argues that the four essential needs of physical survival, 
autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem must constantly be 
addressed if states are to continue to exist. As such, they set limits on what states 
can do when defining their foreign policy interests and strategies.190 Furthermore, the 
four corporate needs can sometimes have contradictory implications, thus requiring 
prioritisation.191 Both of these points confirm that foreign policy behaviour only 
reflects what a state believes is legitimate, best and possible to achieve at a 
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particular point in time. Some options are more appropriate and justified than others, 
not more or less rational. In addition, physical security and economic health, which 
Waltz and the neo-realists view as the core of a state’s national interests, are two 
among four, equally important, needs.  
 
To conclude, identities have subjective and intersubjective qualities, and causal and 
constitutive effects on states’ interests. Identities help interpret situations and shape 
the range of permissible options, which are defined against the dual backdrop of 
legitimacy (logic of appropriateness) and feasibility (subjective interests). Thus, 
although states share a universal national interest, the way in which their four 
requirements are met in practice is subject to their respective (and contingent) 
interpretations of situations and options. A Wendtian-constructivist approach to Iran’s 
foreign policy can thus bring to the fore factors that have been ignored, downplayed 
or misinterpreted within the prism of the “rationalism” versus “idealism” debate. The 
content and effects of Iran’s identities, and its perceptions of legitimate and possible 
foreign policy options, can be analysed and contextualised. Additionally, the four 
requirements of Iran’s corporate identities can help identify whether processes of 
prioritisation took place and, if so, understand their underlying motives.  
 
Wendt, however, does not develop his argument on states’ likely responses to 
negative images. What, for example, might “self-assertion” or “devaluation” of the 
enemy significant Other entail? How can a state compensate for perceived disregard 
and humiliation, and articulate its demands for respect and recognition?192 As I 
subsequently analyse, Iran prioritised collective self-esteem over economic well-
being and threats to its physical security in its nuclear strategy during the period 
2005-2013. Fear of another weak performance, and its likely consequences for Iran’s 
reputation and future foreign policy options, substantially informed the rejection of 
the Khatami administration’s conciliatory approach (see chapter 4). Additionally, Iran 
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frequently appealed to, and expressed its support for, the international norms and 
treaties that regulate the nuclear non-proliferation regime (see chapter 5). In so 
doing, Iran attempted to present its nuclear policy as legal and legitimate, and thus 
undermine its opponents’ discourses and policies. The subsequent chapters explore 
how and why, in a context where negative self-images were prominent, Iran’s 
processes of “self-assertion” and “devaluation” partly translated into strategies of 
resistance and legitimisation.  
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“Anarchy is What States Make of it” 
Wendt disagrees with Waltz that the structure of the international system is based 
upon a distribution of material capabilities alone. Instead, he makes the central claim 
that all structures are “social structures” that do not exist independently of actors’ 
conceptions and practices.193 More specifically, structures contain three elements: 
“shared knowledge”, “practices” and “material resources”.194 The first defines the 
type of culture of anarchy that exists between two states, which, in turn, shapes their 
processes of interaction and interpretations of material reality.  
 
I engage with Wendt’s argument on the constitution and self-perpetuating qualities of 
structures of identities and interests. I also highlight two main weaknesses in his 
thesis and explain how I seek to compensate for them in my analysis of Iran’s foreign 
policy.  
 
Role and Effects of Collective Knowledge 
Wendt agrees with Waltz and the realists that the distribution of material capabilities 
affects a state’s calculations. How it does so, however, is not a straightforward 
matter and strongly depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations 
that constitute a state’s conceptions of Self and Other. More specifically, behaviour is 
determined by states’ “beliefs” and “expectations” about one another.195 This brings 
us to Wendt’s conception of role identities as well as to his argument on how and 
why social structures of relations tend to acquire self-perpetuating qualities.  
 
Wendt provides the analogy of Alter and Ego encountering each other for the first 
time to explain the processes by which states start creating intersubjective 
meanings. Unlike Waltz, who postulates that states are self-interested, Wendt 
contends that, prior to interaction, they have no particular expectations of one 
another’s interests and likely aggressiveness. They only bring their corporate 
identities with them, together with their associated needs of physical security, 
autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem.196 The first social act 
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between Alter and Ego is thus critical since it “creates expectations on both sides 
about each other’s future behaviour”.197 If, for example, states threaten each other’s 
security in their first encounter, they are likely to develop self-interested conceptions 
of their identities and interests, and engage in competitive dynamics in their 
subsequent relations. If, however, states embrace a friendly and non-threatening 
attitude in their first encounter, less security-oriented and more collective dynamics 
of identity, interests and interaction may ensue. 
 
In the longer term, states’ beliefs and expectations acquire meaning and significance 
in what Wendt calls “collective knowledge”.198 Social acts are processes of 
signalling, interpreting and responding in which shared knowledge is created.199 
Practices are thus critical to Wendt’s argument: “It is through reciprocal interaction 
[…] that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of 
which we define our identities and interests.”200 Role identities are produced and 
reproduced through interaction in a context where little new learning about the Other 
takes place. This stabilised culture comes to form an “institution”, which is defined as 
“a relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests”.201 Consequently, 
social structures often form “self-fulfilling prophecies that tend to reproduce 
themselves”.202  
 
Importantly, Wendt specifies that he uses the term “knowledge” “in the sociological 
sense of any belief an actor takes to be true”.203 These beliefs need not be true, only 
believed to be true, which means that errors of attribution, or misperceptions, are 
possible.204 Within this context, “history matters” since, once a culture has been 
institutionalised, states make attributions about each other’s intentions, which are 
based more on what they know about the structure of their relations than what they 
know about each other.205 The introductory chapter pointed to this dynamic: the 
framing of Iran’s nuclear programme as a weapons programme and a threat to 
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international security was based less on direct and/or circumstantial evidence than 
assumptions about the preferences and ambitions of the so-called “rogue state”.  
 
Social Structures and Domestic Politics  
Wendt recognises that “states are intentional, corporate actors whose identities and 
interests are in important part determined by domestic politics rather than the 
international system”, and that much state action is driven by “domestic politics or 
leader psychology”.206 As such, his explanation of the emergence and self-
perpetuating qualities of cultures of anarchy incorporates the fact that human beings 
play a role in instantiating and reproducing structures of identities and interests: 
“structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their 
practices.”207 
 
In particular, Wendt argues that structures exist only by virtue of actors’ socialisation 
to, and participation in, collective knowledge.208 The relationship between collective 
structures of meaning and individuals’ belief is one of “supervenience and multiple 
realizability”.209 By this, Wendt means that collective representations can neither 
exist nor have effects unless individuals believe in them and are willing to engage in 
practices that reproduce those structures. At the same time, “the effects of collective 
knowledge are not reducible to individuals’ beliefs.”210 Social structures confront 
individuals “as more or less coercive social facts” and are experienced as having an 
existence independent of the individuals who embodied them in the first place.211 
The state, for example, is a real self-organising entity that is not dependent for 
existence on any particular actor.212 Rather, it is contained in many individuals’ 
collective beliefs and narratives.  
 
Group beliefs, Wendt notes, are often held in “collective memory”; that is “the myths, 
narratives, and traditions that constitute who a group is and how it relates to 
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others”.213 Such beliefs enable groups to acquire continuity and identity over time 
through a “process of socialisation and ritual enactment”, and affect the way 
policymakers perceive their external environment.214 Structures of collective 
knowledge thus socialise successive generations of policymakers to certain 
representations of Self (subjective identities), Self and Other, and the world in 
general (intersubjective identities). They provide a frame of reference which helps 
explain “patterns in aggregate behaviour”.215 Thus, individuals develop a double 
relationship with social structures. They are both passive and active actors since, 
while they are influenced by social structures, they also contribute to instantiating 
and shaping them.  
 
Wendt’s argument on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and 
collective knowledge is short and elusive. This is in large part due to the fact that he 
purposely bracketed off domestic factors in his explanation of foreign policy 
behaviours. As he explains, “The fact that state agents are not constructed by 
system structures all the way down does not mean they are not constructed by them 
to a significant extent.”216 While this is a very relevant point, it remains that Wendt 
states, rather than explains, how “domestic politics” and “leader psychology” play an 
important role in shaping a state’s foreign policy behaviour.  
 
Interestingly, constructivist approaches have often been criticised for their structural 
biases: “the explanation of the policy choices made by decision makers is in terms of 
the effect of social structures (broadly defined) on the individual actor rather than 
with reference to any innate characteristics of such actors.”217 In response to this, 
some scholars have called for “‘actor-specific’ complements to constructivism”:218  
Without more sustained attention to agency, constructivist scholars will find 
themselves unable to explain where their powerful social structures come 
from in the first place, and, equally important, why and how they change over 
time. Without theory, especially at the domestic level, constructivists will not 
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be able to explain in a systematic way how social construction actually occurs 
or why it varies cross-nationally.219 
 
In this thesis, I combine the Wendtian approach with a model that offers a synthetic 
but comprehensive perspective on the two-way interaction between agency and 
structure in decision-making processes. Additionally, a focus on the role of language 
is useful since it plays important functions in both the phenomenon of 
“supervenience and multiple realizability” and the creation of social meaning 
between states.220 
 
Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
The model of Hollis and Smith, which draws from the strengths and weaknesses of 
the rational actor and bureaucratic politics models, was first developed in a 1986 
article titled “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making”.221 Later refined 
in Explaining and Understanding International Relations, it makes three key 
points.222  
 
First, roles are “constraining” since they entail “normative expectations”.223 These 
refer to “what is required, in the sense that failure to perform the role is open to 
criticism, censure and penalty”.224 The expectations are partly those that go with the 
foreign policy decision-makers’ positions and those of actors in other roles, who are 
either partners or opponents.225 Decision-makers not only have formal duties by 
virtue of their role, but are also responsible (accountable) to multiple constituencies. 
Furthermore, some of these normative expectations are incorporated into 
institutions, which explains their lasting effects and capacity to define the parameters 
of policy choice. Roles, in sum, are constraining because they incorporate the 
collective knowledge and set standards of legitimacy and performance against which 
officials are judged. As Hinnebusch observes: 
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once a role is established and shapes the socialisation of the next generation 
of policy makers, it sets standards of legitimacy and performance, which, to a 
degree, constrain elites, imparting a certain consistency to foreign policy 
despite changes in leadership and environment.226 
 
In the case of Iran, the Revolution’s foreign policy principles were inscribed in the 
Constitution, which ensured the continuous relevance of its normative framework, 
including: 
the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission 
to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and 
its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment 
with respect to the hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually 
peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.227  
 
The Guardian Council also vets candidates on the basis of their loyalty to the system 
of the IRI and their Islamic credentials, thus enabling constancy.  
 
Second, roles have an “enabling” element in the sense that the requirements of an 
individual’s position cannot be specific enough to command all decisions and make 
them automatic.228 Any role comes with some specific duties and red lines, the 
“normative expectations”, but there is also a large area of indeterminacy, which gives 
decision-makers the opportunity to interpret their role in new ways on the basis of 
their own personality and particular circumstances.229 This partly echoes Wendt’s 
argument that culture is never fixed.230 Agents are behind the accomplishment of 
culture and, whilst constrained by it, they can adopt different practices.  
 
Furthermore, Hollis and Smith note that actors have several roles and conflicts 
between these are not uncommon (e.g. one can be a President but also the leader of 
the Democrats, a father and a churchgoer).231 When such a conflict arises, actors 
have to decide which role should prevail, which implies a place for agency.232 Within 
this context, “personality types” matter because they affect the sort of judgements 
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that actors make when they interpret facts, weigh their importance and assess the 
likely consequences of their decisions.233 Perceptions, motives, beliefs and desires 
play an important part in determining choices.  
 
The decision-making model of Hollis and Smith thus values the actors as well as the 
bureaucratic structures within which they operate: “It relates reasons to structure and 
allows for flexibility and judgement in the playing of the role: in so doing we bring the 
individual back in without reducing our explanations of foreign policy to the individual 
as the unit of analysis.”234 While the organisation constrains the choice an individual 
can make, the latter relies on his “reasoned judgement” and beliefs in the playing of 
his role. Individuals are rational, not because their reasons for action originate from 
calculated expected utilities and means to unquestioned ends, but because they 
“interpret information, monitor their performance, reassess their goals”.235 It is their 
capacity to reflect and define situations that makes them rational.236 The way they 
respond to foreign policy situations is driven by existing frameworks of meanings, 
including assumptions of a desired state of affairs and the “powers, perceptions and 
aims shaped in previous manoeuvres”, which they can decide to support or 
oppose.237  
 
Third, Hollis and Smith highlight that decision-makers always present their policy in 
the language of national interest.238 Although they may be pursuing more parochial 
interests or different goals simultaneously, they tend to embrace the language of 
national unity and collective responsibility: “The language of decision-making is also 
the language of manoeuvre. It constrains and enables the actors, whatever their 
personal aims.”239 Policies must always be presented as legitimate, plausible and in 
service to the national interest.240 Thus, and in line with Wendt’s argument, the 
national interest of a state cannot be assumed: it must be the subject of enquiry. As 
explored in this chapter, states possess different types of identities that have 
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subjective or intersubjective qualities and different degrees of salience. Identities 
also constitute interests, thus implying that the range of permissible options is not 
indefinite. Additionally, the four essential needs of physical survival, autonomy, 
economic well-being, and collective self-esteem impose limits on foreign policy 
options: while their requirements can be prioritised, they must nevertheless be 
addressed for states to continue to survive. Interests, in other words, are constituted 
by the ideas that states hold about how to (try to) meet their needs. Within this 
context, decision-makers seek to frame their policy decisions and priorities in a 
language that articulates the legitimacy of choices in light of their national repertoires 
of meaning, acceptability and desirability.  
 
Hollis and Smith’s model guides my analysis of Iran’s foreign policy in three chief 
ways. To begin with, it helps specify and contextualise Wendt’s argument on the role 
of agents and the phenomenon of “supervenience and multiple realizability”. Iranian 
decision-makers are profoundly shaped, influenced and constrained by Iran’s 
subjective and intersubjective identities, including its “collective knowledge” with 
other actors, in large part due to the institutionalised “normative expectations” that 
come with their role, shape their repertoire of interpretation, and set standards of 
legitimate foreign policy performance. Furthermore, culture remains “an on-going 
[sic] accomplishment” and, as such, Iranian decision-makers always have the 
potential to challenge institutionalised structures of identities and interests, either out 
of will or necessity.241 Finally, the dual aspects of any role, with its constraining and 
enabling elements, provide a useful analytical tool to both interpret President 
Ahmadinejad’s modus operandi during his two terms in office and understand why 
he was perceived as a challenge to the legitimacy and stability of the IRI by its 
internal opponents.   
 
Role and Effects of Language 
Language, to which Wendt refers on several occasions, helps shed light on the 
mutually constitutive dynamics between social structures and individuals’ beliefs.242 
For example, it helps to create reality and produce meaning and, as such, constructs 
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social reality. Language also participates to the instantiation and reproduction of 
structures of subjective and intersubjective identities. It provides the structure within 
which history and collective memories are narrated and actors are socialised. As 
such, institutionalised discourses create perceptions of identities and interests with 
self-perpetuating qualities. Language is a key vehicle through which one’s status and 
prestige are created, communicated, reproduced and contested: the boundaries 
between the Self and the Other; it is what makes the Self different, if not superior, 
from the Other. Language, according to Halliday, “helps to constitute power, identity 
and hierarchy as well as encode history”.243 
 
Additionally, language helps explain the institutionalisation and reproduction of 
cultures of anarchy over time. It forms one of the key elements through which states 
are able to interpret, communicate, signal, reproduce and potentially transform their 
role identities and adjacent interests. As Adib-Moghaddam notes in his analysis of 
Jurgen Habermas’ communicative theories of world politics, language is central to 
“achieving understanding”, including “empathetic understanding”.244 In particular, it 
can play a critical role in processes of mediation and reconciliation.245 A 
transformation of relations may entail not just different behavioural practices but may 
also include (if not require) new verbal performances. Conversely, discourse can 
help produce and instantiate estrangement and condemnation. For “negative self-
images” to be communicated, a state would rely upon a type of discourse that 
criticises and rejects, if not humiliates.  
 
Language has causal and constitutive effects: it can reproduce or challenge existing 
patterns of interaction. It enables and constrains. In chapter 4, for example, I show 
that Iran profoundly rejected the type of language used by the Western-led 
opposition to denounce and delegitimise its nuclear programme. From the regime’s 
perspective, these discourses illustrated the Western core powers’ disrespect for the 
Iranian nation and their “real” intents in politicising Iran’s nuclear activities. 
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Additionally, one of Iran’s main bones of contention with the US lay in the latter’s 
discourses and attitudes regarding Iran (see chapter 6). In both cases, language 
confirmed and reified existing negative images and adjacent role identities.  
 
To conclude, Wendt offers a powerful explanation of the role and effects of social 
structures on states’ logics of behaviour. Interactions (practices) play a key role in 
constituting states’ beliefs and expectations of one another and in defining their role 
identities. Further to this, structures of identities and interests have long-term 
consequences. Not only can stable processes of interaction lead to their 
institutionalisation in the form of collective knowledge, they also have sub-state 
consequences (socialisation effects). Omitted from the analysis so far is the fact that 
Wendt does not make a priori assumptions about the logic of anarchy in the 
international system. If, for Waltz and his followers, self-help is a constitutive feature 
of anarchy, Wendt argues that no such logic exists and that different cultures are 
possible.246 This argument rests upon the fact that it is states’ shared knowledge 
which defines whether a system is conflictual or peaceful: self-help “emerges 
causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role”.247  
 
Cultures of Anarchy 
Wendt identifies three kinds of cultures of anarchy, “Hobbesian”, “Lockean” and 
“Kantian”, which depend on the type of role that dominates the system, namely, 
“enemy”, “rival” or “friend” respectively.248  
 
Each culture of anarchy, an ideal type, involves two key elements: a distinct posture 
or orientation of the Self towards the Other with respect to the use of violence, and a 
different conception of the extent to which, and the manner in which, the Self is 
identified cognitively with the Other.249 Additionally, the culture of anarchy defines the 
particular interpretation of material resources, such as physical phenomena like 
natural resources (e.g. oil, water) and technological artefacts (e.g. weapons). In 
contrast to Waltz, Wendt contends that material resources acquire meaning only 
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through “the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded”.250 
Identities and interests cannot simply be considered alongside material forces; they 
constitute material factors. To illustrate the point that it is not the distribution (and 
composition) of material capabilities per se but the social structure of relationship 
within which they are perceived and interpreted that matters, Wendt provides the 
following example: “The threat posed to the United States by five hundred British 
nuclear weapons is less than that posed by five North Korean ones, because the 
British are friends and the North Koreans are not, and amity and enmity are social, 
not material, relations.”251 This dynamic helps explain the superpower’s contrasting 
responses vis-à-vis the Iranian and Indian nuclear programmes (see pages 217-
218). 
 
I now turn to the main characteristics of the three particularly salient cultures of 
anarchy and emphasise how each impacts on a state’s conceptions of the Other, its 
security requirements and its interpretations of material realities. In contextualising 
the motives for, and characteristics of, different cultures of anarchy, Wendt is in a 
position to analyse how and why their existence is contingent and their 
transformation, though difficult, is always a possibility.  
 
The Hobbesian Culture of Anarchy 
According to Wendt, a Hobbesian culture dominated the international system until 
the seventeenth century.252 Such a social structure is characterised by the role 
relationship of threatening enemies. Actors do not recognise each other’s right to 
exist as an “autonomous being” or “free subject” and are unwilling to limit their use of 
violence in their processes of interaction.253 Importantly, the concept of enmity does 
not imply that the images of the Other are justified. Some enemies are “real” (they 
pose an existential threat to the Self); others are “chimeras”.254 What matters is that 
these images are believed to be true (institutionalisation) and have real foreign policy 
consequences.  
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Wendt identifies “at least four” such consequences.255 First, the Hobbesian culture of 
anarchy produces a very competitive security system in which one’s gain is seen as 
the other’s loss.256 Consequently, states tend to respond to an enemy by acting like 
deep revisionists or power-seeking entities, even though they may have status quo 
interests.257 By mirroring back the representations they have attributed to their 
enemy, states fall into mutual securitisation. Second, decision-making tends to be 
heavily oriented towards worst-case scenarios.258 There is thus little likelihood of 
reciprocating any cooperative move made by the enemy since they tend to be 
interpreted as lies or traps. Mistrust and worst-case assumptions are dominant. 
Third, enemies view relative military capabilities as crucial to their very survival.259 
They also tend to infer others’ intentions from their capabilities.260 Finally, in the case 
of an actual war, enemy states fight with no limits to their own violence.261 Acting 
otherwise would create a competitive disadvantage and endanger their survival.262  
 
A Hobbesian culture of anarchy also has several domestic consequences. First, 
military-industrial complexes are prominent: they tend to profit from the security 
dilemma and lobby their national decision-makers so that they do not reduce arms 
spending.263 In so doing, they contribute to the existence and reproduction of an 
Other who poses an existential threat to the Self. Second, enemies can help 
generate “in-group solidarity”.264 Wendt notes Campbell’s and Mercer’s contributions 
on this topic.265 From the former, he borrows the claim that a “discourse of danger” 
can help produce and sustain a state’s existence, distinction and cohesion by 
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maintaining the Self-Other divide.266 This shows that Wendtian constructivism is 
compatible with a focus on the role and effects of language. It also confirms that 
considerations of domestic legitimacy have an impact on decision-makers’ approach 
to foreign policy issues. From Mercer, Wendt notes that group members have “in-
group bias” and tend to compare their own group favourably to Others.267 Identities 
thus help create hierarchies and comparisons and strengthen the homogeneity of a 
group.  
 
In sum, the logic of the Hobbesian anarchy lies in “‘the war of all against all’, in which 
actors operate on the principle of sauve qui peut and kill or be killed”.268 The self-
help system, however, is only a result of states’ representations of one another as 
existential threats and their consequent practices.269 The Hobbesian culture acts as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that “its beliefs generate actions that confirm 
those beliefs”, thus creating much insecurity and distrust.270 
 
The Lockean Culture of Anarchy 
Wendt contends that a qualitative structural change occurred in international politics 
with the signature of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648: “The kill or be killed logic of 
the Hobbesian state of nature has been replaced by the live and let live logic of 
Lockean anarchical society.”271 The Lockean culture is based on a role structure of 
rivalry. The Lockean Other is less threatening than in a Hobbesian culture since it 
only seeks to revise the Self’s behaviour or property.272 As such, whilst rivals impute 
to each other aggressive intent, their level of mutual violence is constrained by their 
recognition of each other’s sovereignty.273  
 
Sovereignty is relatively central to Wendt’s thinking. It is an intrinsic property of 
states which becomes a “right” when other states recognise it.274 Although it is 
largely taken for granted, mainly because it is institutionalised in international law, 
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sovereignty remains an accomplishment of practice.275 It is a norm which, by virtue 
of their socialisation to it, has transformed states’ understanding of what is good and 
appropriate, thus shaping and constraining their behaviours. Furthermore, 
sovereignty constitutes a particular form of community: one in which states share 
some level of identity (and thus solidarity) since they mutually recognise “one 
another’s rights to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits”.276 
Sovereignty forms the basis of states’ individuality and arguably satisfies their 
corporate interests of physical security, autonomy and recognition.277  
 
Wendt identifies four main implications of a Lockean culture on states’ foreign policy 
behaviours.278 First, war is both “accepted and constrained”.279 While states retain 
the right to use violence to advance their own interests, this remains within “‘live and 
let live’ limits”.280 States tend to behave in a status quo fashion and, as such, the 
system is not self-help all the way down.281 Wendt does not exclude the possibility of 
violation of territorial rights, but highlights that this would not be possible without a 
“just cause”.282 In addition, when wars of conquest occur, other states tend to act 
together to restore the status quo, as was the case during the 1991 Gulf War.283 
Second, states’ concerns for their security are less intense and, consequently, they 
do not need to make decisions on the basis of high security risks.284 Their survival is 
not at stake if their relative power falls.285 Third, and linked to the previous point, 
states’ relative sense of security enables them to entrust international law to 
safeguard their national interests:  
To the extent that their ongoing socialisation teaches states that their 
sovereignty depends on recognition by other states, they can afford to rely 
more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual 
national means – especially military power – to protect their security.286  
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Unfortunately, Wendt does not engage with the fact that many states mistrust 
international law and institutions or, more specifically, the reliability of international 
treaties, norms and organisations to protect their national interests. Many countries 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have, for example, taken issue with the ability 
(and willingness) of some states, especially the Western core powers, to 
instrumentalise them for selfish ends (see chapter 5). Finally, in a Lockean culture 
where states do not face the threat of revisionism, they can resolve their differences 
by remaining neutral or non-aligned.287  
 
The Kantian Culture of Anarchy 
In contending that the structure of the international system is nothing but a function 
of historically contingent shared ideas and practices, Wendt is able to conceptualise 
cultures of anarchy that are not solely based on self-help. According to him, “the 
North Atlantic states”, which he subsequently calls “the West”, seem to have moved 
away from the Lockean culture towards Kantian norms since the Second World 
War.288 While they have not used violence amongst each other, they have also 
consistently thought of their security in more collective terms, thus showing the 
emergence of more solidaristic norms.289 
 
In both the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures of anarchy, security remains the 
individual responsibility of each state.290 In the Kantian culture, by contrast, security 
has a very different logic and results from states’ positive identification with one 
another. Collective identity, Wendt argues, produces identification, which is “a 
cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit 
transcended altogether. Self is ‘categorised’ as Other”.291 Thus, in a culture of 
friendship, states abide by the “rule of non-violence”: war or the threat of war is not 
considered a legitimate means of settling disputes.292 When conflicts emerge, states 
resort to other strategies, such as negotiations and arbitration. A Kantian culture of 
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anarchy would thus expect far fewer conflicts (i.e. democratic peace theory). 
Furthermore, as per the “rule of mutual aid”, friends provide aid to each other if their 
security is threatened since this is perceived as a collective responsibility.293 In sum, 
collective identity leads states to share feelings of solidarity, community and loyalty.  
 
Wendt, however, specifies that identification is “usually issue-specific and rarely 
total”.294 As such, while friendship always concerns national security, identification 
with other issues varies: “I may identify with the United States on military defence but 
with the planet on the environment.”295 Total identification is rare, in large part due to 
the fact that states “worry about being engulfed” by another actor.296 Furthermore, 
Wendt makes an important distinction between “friends” and “allies”.297 While the 
role structures of friendship are open-ended and not limited to specific 
circumstances, alliances are “temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come 
together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat”.298 Wendt 
contrasts them further: 
In an alliance states engage in collective action because they each feel 
individually threatened by the same threat. Their collaboration is self-
interested and will end when the common threat is gone. Collective security is 
neither threat- nor time-specific. Its members pledge mutual aid because they 
see themselves as a single unit for security purposes a priori, no matter by 
whom, when, or whether they might be threatened.299 
 
Consequently, capabilities do not have the same meaning in friendships and 
alliances. Since allies do not expect their arrangement to perpetuate, they will view 
each other as a latent threat, not as an asset for the security of all.300 
 
To conclude, Wendt argues that the social structures of relations can be defined by 
three different conceptions of security and identification with the enemy, rival or 
friend Other. Each culture of anarchy has substantial consequences for states’ 
expectations of one another’s interests and their consequent processes of 
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interaction. As such, Wendt helps understand and contextualise the underlying 
motives that produce and sustain states’ practices, be they peaceful, competitive or 
conflictual. His critical point, however, that “anarchy is what states makes of it,” 
points to the fact that social structures exist only in process.301 A Hobbesian culture 
of anarchy is sustained for as long as actors continue to act towards each other in 
egoistic and confrontational ways. It is neither the result of the material distribution of 
power nor an inevitable consequence of the international system. Thus, while 
structures of identities and interests may appear natural, they are always 
endogenous to interaction and the result of sufficient stabilisation over time (deep 
embedment in individual and collective consciousness and routinised practices, lack 
of contestation).302 Cultures of anarchy are thus contingent and, in principle, can be 
transformed. 
 
The Possibility of Structural Change Towards More Collective 
Identity Formation 
The boundaries of the Self are always at stake in interaction since identities and their 
adjacent interests are produced and reproduced in social practices. As such, it is in 
the process of interacting that states can take on new roles and transform their 
shared ideational structures.303 In his argument on the factors that facilitate or hinder 
the formation of collective identity formation, Wendt focuses on the Lockean culture 
of anarchy and the challenge of transforming rivals into friends.  
 
Domestic and Systemic Factors Facilitating Collective Identity Formation 
Wendt identifies several domestic factors and systemic-level variables that help 
undermine existing cultures of anarchy. At the domestic level, there are two 
preconditions for actors to engage in critical self-reflection and consciously make the 
choice to transform their role identity.304 First, actors must have a reason to think of 
themselves in novel terms, which would “most likely stem from the presence of new 
social situations that cannot be managed in terms of pre-existing self-
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conceptions”.305 In such circumstances, a situation of “cognitive inconsistency” 
emerges, wherein existing beliefs, expectations and norms are no longer relevant 
and cannot be relied upon to identify appropriate behaviour. Second, the benefits of 
such a transformation must outweigh its expected costs.306 The national interest 
must be perceived as being better served by a revised pattern of representation and 
interaction than by the reproduction of existing processes.307  
 
At the systemic level, four main “master variables” can explain why states in a 
Lockean culture of anarchy may decide to engage in “prosocial security policies and 
thereby spur collective identity formation”.308 Three of them, “interdependence”, 
“common fate” and “homogeneity”, are “active or efficient causes of collective 
identity”.309 The fourth, “self-restraint”, is an “enabling or permissible cause”. In the 
following paragraphs, I combine the arguments Wendt made in “Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State” (1994) and Social Theory of International 
Policy (1999).  
 
Interdependence refers to a situation where outcomes for actors are objectively 
dependent on the choice of others.310 Importantly, friends can be as interdependent 
as enemies. To produce collective identity, however, this objective interdependence 
must change into an intersubjective situation. Interdependence is also “issue-
specific” and not transposable (e.g. interdependence in security does not necessarily 
affect other areas, like the economy).311 Additionally, it is “a matter of degree, 
depending on the ‘dynamic density’ of interaction in a context; higher density implies 
greater interdependence”.312 Wendt contends, in his 1994 article, that an increase in 
the “dynamic density” of interactions (e.g. trade and capital flows) can generate 
“dilemmas of common interests” for rivals.313 In an increasingly interconnected global 
system, for example, states share a growing interest in maintaining financial stability 
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or ensuring that pandemic diseases remain under control. In general, growing 
interdependency has heightened the need for multilateral cooperation and 
coordinated measures, thus producing further dilemmas of common interests. 
Wendt, however, also persuasively remarks that a higher density of interaction need 
not imply the realisation of joint gains: “interdependence also entails vulnerability and 
the risk of being ‘the sucker,’ which if exploited will become a source of conflict rather 
than cooperation.”314 Cooperative practices must therefore be rewarded to transform 
competitive identities.  
 
Wendt’s key argument is that cooperative behaviour (due to a situation of 
interdependence) can have constitutive effects on egoistic identities. Cooperation 
can produce a transformation of a social culture because actors can internalise new 
understandings of Self and Other and teach them to each other.315 “Complex 
learning”, Went argues, has construction effects on states’ identities and interests.316 
 
Wendt identifies two types of communication through which states can communicate 
new identities: behavioural and rhetorical (yet again showing Wendt’s engagement 
with the role and effects of language). By choosing to cooperate with a rival, an actor 
engages in new practices and signals that it wants these new behaviours to be 
reciprocated. It is “altercasting”, which is 
a technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-presentation 
and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definitions of social 
situations in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play. In effect, 
in altercasting ego tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby 
enlist alter in ego’s effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had 
that identity.317 
 
If Alter reciprocates, then Ego’s tentative new identity will be strengthened, leading to 
further cooperation and the progressive transformation of their structure of shared 
knowledge (principle of “reflected appraisal” or “mirroring”). Rhetorical practice can 
have similar effects in that it can “create solidarity” to realise collective aims: 
when European statesmen talk about a “European identity,” when Gorbachev 
tries to end the Cold War with rhetoric of “New Thinking” and a “common 
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European home,” when Third World states develop an ideology of 
“nonalignment,” or when the United States demonizes Saddam Hussein as 
“another Hitler,” states are engaging in discursive practices designed to 
express and/or to change ideas about who “the self” of self-interested 
collective action is.318   
 
Human beings, Wendt clarifies, are able to “grasp interdependence symbolically, and 
on that basis engage in ‘ideological labor’ […] to create a shared representation of 
the interdependence and the ‘we’ that it constitutes”.319 Additionally, verbal 
communication can help establish the trust before pro-social behaviours are 
generated and, as such, it has benefits over non-verbal communication, for which 
trust can only emerge after a period of collective behaviour.320 
 
Common fate relates to a situation where one’s “survival, fitness, or welfare depends 
on what happens to the group as a whole.”321 While the threat may be social (e.g. 
Nazi Germany to European states) or material (e.g. ozone depletion), it is a third 
party that affects all other actors. As with interdependence, common fate can only 
produce collective identity if it is an objective condition that becomes subjective.322 
Thus Wendt observes, in his 1994 article, that the rise of a “common Other”, 
whereby states come to share an enemy (an actor or an issue), may produce 
“dilemmas of common aversions”.323 International terrorism emerged as a dilemma 
of common aversion for many states around the world, especially in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Key to Wendt’s argument, however, is that dilemmas of 
common aversions, much like dilemmas of common interests, “increase the objective 
vulnerability and sensitivity of actors to each other” and, thus, the extent to which 
states can no longer satisfy their corporate interests unilaterally: “As the ability to 
meet corporate needs unilaterally declines, so does the incentive to hang onto the 
egoistic identities that generate such policies, and as the degree of common fate 
increases, so does the incentive to identify with others.”324  
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Homogeneity denotes a situation where actors become alike in their corporate and 
type identities.325 This refers to states’ “centralised authority structures with a 
territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” and how their political authority 
is organised domestically. In his 1994 article, Wendt identifies “the transnational 
convergence of domestic values” as a systemic factor able to spur collective identity 
formation.326 Cultural (e.g. the rise of global consumerism) and political areas (e.g. 
the spread of democratic norms and institutions) can help reduce heterogeneity 
among actors and, thus, the likelihood of conflict.327 
 
Self-restraint, however, is the permissible cause that allows states to engage in pro-
social behaviours to transform their objective situation of interdependence, common 
fate or homogeneity into subjective needs. States have national interests by virtue of 
their corporate identities, which they must meet to survive:  
actors must trust that their needs will be respected, that their individuality will 
not be wholly submerged by or sacrificed to the group. Creating this trust is 
the fundamental problem of collective identity formation, and is particularly 
difficult in anarchy, where being engulfed can be fatal.328 
 
However, as Wendt remarks, states are currently evolving in a Lockean culture of 
anarchy, in which the right to sovereignty is strongly institutionalised and respected, 
thus reducing the fear of being killed or exploited.  
 
In principle then, states can transform their Lockean culture of anarchy towards a 
more collective identity formation. While they have a capacity for “reflexivity”, a range 
of internal and systemic factors are required (or may facilitate) such a process of 
social transformation. However, though structural change is possible, it remains 
difficult and the exception rather than the rule:  
The term “structure” itself makes it clear why this must be so, since it calls 
attention to patterns or relationships that are relatively stable through time. If 
things were constantly changing then we could not speak of their being 
structured at all.329 
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Domestic and Systemic Factors Inhibiting Collective Identity Formation 
Wendt identifies two domestic factors and one systemic dynamic which explain why 
cultures of anarchy often tend to act as self-fulfilling prophecies.  
 
At the domestic level, actors tend to have an interest in maintaining relatively stable 
role identities.330 First, human beings have a need for ontological security, namely 
order and predictability.331 Their affective and cognitive predispositions make them 
hostile to change and uncertainty. In general, psychological approaches to foreign 
policy have contradicted the assumptions of the rational actor model. Hollis and 
Smith note, for example, that uncertainty, information overload, complexity and 
bounded rationality continuously confront individuals, preventing them from living up 
to the ideals of rational method.332 In addition, perceptions of reality are always 
filtered by decision-makers’ belief systems and values:  
Beliefs about what should be affect beliefs about what is. This is particularly 
the case when belief-systems are “closed”, so that information is processed in 
such a way as to recuse cognitive dissonance, thereby preventing information 
from challenging deeply held beliefs. This is also a source of misperception.333 
 
In Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, 
Jervis notes that, once a belief or an image is established, new information is likely 
to be ignored and assimilated to pre-existing views.334 This is why change is “difficult 
and slow” and enmity and distance make the job of intelligence, the understanding of 
the Other’s rationality of action and interests, even more difficult.335 By the same 
token, this cognitive predisposition helps explain why policymakers may persevere in 
pursuing unsuccessful policy strategies. They may not be able to grasp the reasons 
for their policy failures, including the effects of their strategies on Others. In the case 
of the Western-led coercive diplomatic strategy to change Iran’s nuclear calculus 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency, the discrepancy between the professed 
intentions and the observable results was often interpreted as a sign of the regime’s 
irrationality and its rogue identity. 
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Second, actors may want to avoid the costs of breaking commitments they have 
made to others, such as domestic constituencies and foreign allies, through their 
previous practices.336 Here, the level of resistance to break these ongoing 
commitments depends on the salience of particular role identities to the actor.337 As 
Hollis and Smith contend, roles are constraining in large part due to the fact that 
decision-makers are held to account by their role partners, opponents and public 
opinion. This is a point that I develop in chapter 6 in relation to President Obama’s 
unprecedented reaching out to Iran.  
 
At the systemic level, Wendt notes that, once constituted, social systems confront 
their members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviours and 
discourages others. The internalisation of role identities produces strong “subjective 
commitments” which are likely to go unquestioned as long as “feedback from the 
system stays within an acceptable range relative to their national interests”.338 The 
transformation of intersubjective structures thus strongly depends on “how much 
“slack” exists in a states system for dynamics of collective identity formation to 
develop”.339 In fact, what really matters is “the degree of interdependence or 
“intimacy” between Self and Other.”340 Wendt takes the example of the Arab-Israeli 
question to show that role identities might not be a matter of choice but positions 
forced on actors by the representations of their significant Other: “In this situation 
even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the Other 
resists out of a desire to maintain its [own] identity.”341 Additionally, the greater their 
degree of conflict, the more states are fearful of each other’s intentions and prone to 
engage in relative gains thinking: 
In a Hobbesian war of all against all, mutual fear is so great that factors 
promoting anything but negative identification with the other will find little room 
to emerge. In the Lockean world of mutually recognized sovereignty, however, 
states should have more confidence that their existence is not threatened, 
creating room for processes of positive identification to take hold.342  
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Arguably, Wendt’s discussion of the systemic factors inhibiting collective identity 
formation would have benefited from a stronger engagement with realist thinking on 
the problem of uncertainty and the issue of deception. Both, as chapter 1 highlighted, 
played fundamental roles in the securitisation of Iran’s nuclear activities. For many 
policymakers, academics and think tank analysts, Iran’s official nuclear rationale was 
dubious and untrustworthy. Not only did the isolated rogue regime possess 
‘objective’ security, domestic and normative motives for seeking to acquire the 
nuclear weapons technology, but its pattern of behaviour, both prior to and following 
the August 2002 revelations of its concealed nuclear facilities, indicated a 
determination to develop the dual-use technologies and become a nuclear threshold 
state. Consequently, Iran’s proclaimed nuclear rationale needed to be viewed and 
managed as an attempt to deceive its opponents. Furthermore, Iran’s domestic 
politics remained a variable that could be neither controlled nor influenced to any 
great extent. Iranian factions were also known to promote different strategic priorities 
and means of engagement with external powers. Uncertainty over future 
developments within Iran’s domestic politics further heightened the security concerns 
over its nuclear programme. 
 
Waltz and his followers claim that it is states’ uncertainty about the present and 
future intentions of other actors which explain their continuous security concerns and 
reliance on relative military capabilities.343 These two temporal dimensions are at the 
core of their understanding of the security dilemma. Uncertainty about others’ 
present and future intentions makes “the levels and trends in relative power” 
fundamental variables for states’ interpretation of their security needs.344 For realists, 
the problem of future intentions is particularly challenging:  
even when states are fairly sure that the other is also a security seeker, they 
know that it might change its spots later on. States must therefore worry about 
any decline in their power, lest the other turn aggressive after achieving 
superiority.345  
 
Other states’ domestic politics is a variable over which they have little control. This is 
a point that Wendt acknowledges since, in his conception of states’ subjective and 
intersubjective identities, corporate and type identities do not exist through external 
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interactions but only through socialisation processes internal to a state.346 The 1979 
Revolution, for example, not only profoundly transformed Iran’s type identity but also 
had substantial consequences for its foreign policy behaviours (and role identities 
with other states). This problem of uncertainty can act as a constraint on states’ 
ability to adopt more collective forms of identity and conceptions of interests. As 
Copeland writes, 
Wendt's building of a systemic constructivist theory-and his bracketing of unit-
level processes-thus presents him with an ironic dilemma. It is the very 
mutability of polities as emphasized by domestic-level constructivists - that 
states may change because of domestic processes independent of 
international interaction - that makes prudent leaders so concerned about the 
future. If diplomacy can have only a limited effect on another's character or 
regime type, then leaders must calculate the other's potential to attack later 
should it acquire motives for expansion.347 
 
Furthermore, in his 1997 article “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” Glaser notes that 
militaries and associated interest groups tend to exaggerate the offensive potential 
and negative intentions of other states, often as a means to pursue their own status 
quo interests.348 This is an argument that Wendt himself developed when he argues 
that, in Hobbesian cultures of anarchy, military-industrial complexes tend to lobby 
their national decision-makers and thus contribute to the reification of enemy Others 
(pages 83-84). 
 
Additionally, Wendt does not address the issue of deception, which realists have 
identified. States could seek to deceive one another and not be genuine when they 
“altercast”. As Copeland rightly observes, Wendt does not discuss the issue of 
“impression management”, whereby states’ public images of their interests and 
intentions may have little to do with their profound beliefs and aims:  
In laying out his dramaturgical view of Ego and Alter co-constituting each 
other’s interests and identities, Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are 
making genuine efforts to express their true views and to ‘cast’ the other in 
roles that they believe in. But deceptive actors will stage-manage the situation 
to create impressions that serve their narrow ends.349 
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In other words, Wendt does not clarify when peaceful gestures should be taken at 
face value or discounted as deceptions: “If the other is acting cooperatively, how is 
one to know whether this reflects its peaceful character, or is just a façade masking 
aggressive desires?”350 As Wendt himself acknowledges, states are more prone to 
engage in relative gains thinking when they are fearful of each other and their 
relations are structured by a role identity of enmity or rivalry. In such situations, they 
may be likely to believe that the Other is set on deceiving them and that its 
conciliatory gestures may be lies or traps.  
 
Finally, Wendt’s argument that, in the current international system, states can “learn 
a great deal about what the other is doing and thinking” is questionable.351 As 
Copeland notes, this view is inconsistent with Wendt’s other argument that states 
often have difficulty learning about the other: “behaviour does not speak for itself” 
and, instead, must be interpreted.352 Mistakes in inferences can occur. Thus, the 
problem of present and future intentions and the issue of deception, whose effects 
are present in the Lockean culture of anarchy, also explain why states may struggle 
to undermine and overcome their rival role identities.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
A Wendtian-constructivist approach allows for systematic research that makes Iran’s 
identities and interests a central focus. Its national interests cannot be taken for 
granted (they are not pre-defined) and must be the subject of empirical enquiry. 
Iran’s foreign policy behaviour cannot be adequately understood if it is not 
contextualised within its ideational structures. 
 
Like all other states, Iran has subjective and intersubjective identities which shape its 
interests since they help interpret situations and define which options are legitimate, 
acceptable or, on the contrary, undesirable and impossible. Furthermore, Iran’s 
corporate identities set limits on its foreign policy options since its four equally 
important needs – physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective 
self-esteem – must be continuously addressed. This point holds much importance: 
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states aspire to respect and recognition and such desires can profoundly shape their 
foreign policy behaviours.  
 
A Wendtian-constructivist approach also sheds light on what is actually at stake 
when states interact. By contending that the structures of the international system 
are intersubjective, rather than material, and that actors take each other into account 
when they decide on their behaviours, Wendt is able to show that culture matters.353 
More specifically, Iran’s behaviour during the Ahmadinejad presidency can be 
explained to a great extent in light of Iran’s beliefs and expectations of the other 
states with which it came into contact, thus meaning that these structures of ideas 
must be analysed to understand their effects and potentially self-perpetuating 
qualities.  
 
Cultures of anarchy tend to act as self-fulfilling prophecies to the extent that they are 
institutionalised in individual and collective consciousness (socialisation effects) and 
routinised in practices that confirm the relevance of these very beliefs and 
expectations. Thus, shared knowledge cannot be easily discarded. In this respect, 
Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy are profoundly helpful since they identify three 
possible “types” of relations between Iran and other actors. More specifically, they 
clarify the possible causal and constitutive effects of each role identity associated 
with those types on Iran’s national interests and interpretation of material 
capabilities.  
 
Finally, the Wendtian-constructivist approach reveals that social structures only exist 
as a result of practices. As such, they can be subject to change. Wendt’s distinction 
between “allies” and “friends” is particularly useful, as is his discussion on the 
domestic- and systemic-level factors which can spur collective identity formation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Securitisation and Polarisation of Iran’s Domestic Politics: 
Domestic Functions of, and Constraints on, Foreign Policy 
 
This chapter examines the main characteristics of Iran’s internal politics during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency in an attempt to assess the likely domestic functions of, and 
constraints on, its foreign policy. First, I engage with the country’s growing 
securitisation. The results of the June 2005 presidential election shifted the balance 
of power in favour of the more conservative factions of Iran’s political spectrum, 
including the formal and informal ascendance of the IRI’s military-security stratum. 
Preoccupation with (perceived) internal and external security threats grew 
substantially, as did the responses to these multi-level pressures.  
 
Second, Iran’s domestic politics underwent an unprecedented polarisation. The 
disputed 2009 presidential election, the brutal repression of protesters and political 
figures, and the Supreme Leader’s public endorsement of the official results all 
produced a profound crisis of popular legitimacy. The regime, which became much 
warier of foreign meddling and domestic traitors, responded to these perceived 
threats by substantially increasing its strategies of repression, violence and control. 
A simultaneous crisis of elite cohesion placed additional stress on Iran’s social 
contract. While President Ahmadinejad faced repeated denunciations for threatening 
the country’s national interests, elite-level criticisms also coalesced around the two 
interrelated issues of Iran’s deteriorating economic situation and the management of 
the nuclear negotiations. The substantial securitisation and unprecedented 
polarisation of Iran’s domestic politics produced mutually reinforcing dynamics, 
particularly throughout President Ahmadinejad’s second mandate.  
 
Third, I turn to President Ahmadinejad’s personal behaviour and the consequences 
of his modus operandi for internal and external political dynamics. I examine the 
formal and informal strategies he used to extend his influence and ensure that he 
would not be sidelined from any important domestic or foreign policy-related debate.  
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I then analyse the potential consequences of Iran’s political dynamics of 
securitisation and polarisation for the regime’s foreign policy options. Although 
conclusive answers are the exception rather than the rule, in large part due to our 
limited knowledge of Iran’s decision-making processes, I first ask whether the 
situation of weakened domestic legitimacy and external “negative self-images” may 
have strengthened Iran’s need to articulate and demonstrate the relevance, 
righteousness and appeal of the Islamic Revolution. In this respect, the nuclear issue 
acted as a foreign policy diversion and an opportunity to rearticulate and 
reinstantiate the raison d’être of the revolutionary regime. I then bring to the fore the 
fact that the Iranian regime’s weakened domestic legitimacy could have complicated 
consensus-building efforts. Iran would likely have struggled to redefine, adapt and 
transform its foreign policy strategies, particularly from 2009 onwards. As such, it is 
possible that Iran’s remarkably firm and consistent nuclear stance could have been 
partly the result of domestic paralysis.  
 
Securitisation of Iran’s Domestic Politics 
To explain the securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics, I first engage with the forces 
that brought President Ahmadinejad to power in June 2005. I then analyse the 
increasing influence of Iran’s military-security stratum over the state’s economic and 
political institutions. Finally, I turn to the 2009 election dispute and its key political 
ramifications.   
 
Key Dynamics behind President Ahmadinejad’s June 2005 Election 
Ahmadinejad’s election came as an immense surprise to most policymakers and 
analysts.354 As Hourcade and Silverstein write,  
The case of Ahmadinejad is completely singular and, at first blush, 
inexplicable. How could an almost unknown Islamist militant, who made his 
name in local administration and the intelligence services, receive several 
hundred thousand more votes than a political figure with as much capacity for 
popular mobilisation as Karroubi? How could he mobilise such an 
electorate?355  
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Of the eight candidates, Ahmadinejad was the least well known.356 His campaign 
had received little domestic coverage and institutional support.357 Until a week prior 
to the election, he had barely surfaced in opinion polls.358 Yet, though former 
President Rafsanjani came first in the first round, with 21.5 percent of the votes and 
Ahmadinejad second with 19.5 percent, the second round witnessed the latter’s 
landslide victory with 64 percent of the votes against Rafsanjani’s 36 percent.  
 
Popular appeal. In his presidential programme and election campaign 
strategy, Ahmadinejad consistently emphasised his feeling of proximity with the 
Iranian people. He repeatedly described himself as “a common working man”, 
stressed that he was “first and foremost a university teacher” and highlighted his 
poor village background and frugal lifestyle.359 When casting his ballot, he declared “I 
am proud of being the Iranian nation’s little servant and street sweeper.”360 To an 
extent, his proclaimed simplicity and humility were observable in his campaign 
strategy since he did not make much use of the national radio and television, and 
resorted to recorded messages and monochrome posters instead.361  
 
Throughout his campaign, Ahmadinejad claimed that the revolutionary ideals had 
been subverted after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death.362 He promised an alternative (“the 
beginning of a new era”), signalled by his slogan “we can”, and vowed to change the 
country’s power structure in favour of social justice – a cornerstone of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s ideology and programme of governance.363 Changes in the country’s 
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economy would enable him to realise his programme of social justice.364 As such, he 
declared his intention to redistribute oil and gas income (“put Iran’s petroleum 
income on people’s table”), raise wages, and tackle unemployment and poor 
housing.365 Ahmadinejad also promised to reverse previous policies that had 
enriched a minority at the expense of the majority.366 In so doing, he targeted 
influential personalities, especially Rafsanjani, whom he described as wealthy, 
corrupt and out of touch with the Iranian people. Ahmadinejad, in other words, 
portrayed himself as an outsider determined to fight the widespread national 
inequalities and inequities.367  
 
His sociopolitical programme and distinctive campaign strategy won over large 
numbers of Iranian voters. In promoting a sense of belonging to the people and 
prioritising a programme of social justice, he became the candidate of the politically 
disenfranchised masses.368 His anti-establishment, anti-corruption and social justice 
campaign thus successfully echoed people’s resentment of the “old guard”, of which 
Rafsanjani was a key representative.369  
 
Furthermore, many voters who had previously backed President Khatami also came 
to support Ahmadinejad in June 2005. The 2003 municipal and 2004 Majles 
elections had shown tangible signs of growing disappointment with the reformist 
administration.370 Khatami was first elected in 1997 with almost 70 percent of the 
votes, with strong support from the country’s youth, women, intellectuals and urban 
areas. In 2001, he received a greater mandate with almost 78 percent of the votes 
cast. In the 2003 and 2004 elections, however, the turnout was quite low, particularly 
in urban areas, and a large majority of seats fell into the hands of conservative lists 
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and candidates.371 Their prioritisation of socio-economic change over programmes of 
political liberalisation had managed to attract more voters.372 As such, the result of 
the 2005 presidential election confirmed that the reformists had disappointed their 
once enthusiastic supporters. Several analysts also suggested that, unlike his 
predecessors and most other candidates, Ahmadinejad was not a cleric and may 
have seemed like a breath of fresh air in a political environment that had been 
dominated by the clerics since the Revolution.373  
 
Support of the military-security stratum and the conservative 
establishment. Ahmadinejad received significant support from the Basij in both 
rounds of the election.374 Founded in November 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
decree, the Basij (“mobilisation”) aimed to protect the IRI against internal and 
external disruptions.375 It played a critical role during the Iran-Iraq war through its 
mobilisation of many volunteers to the front. From the late 1980s onwards, its role 
became increasingly domestically oriented, with law enforcement responsibilities 
formally included in its mandate in November 1993.376 The Basij played a central 
part in the promotion of revolutionary values and a “culture of defence”, a term 
Ostovar describes as “the ethos of religious and nationally-motivated militancy and 
sacrifice fostered during the Iraq war”.377  
 
That Ahmadinejad received the Basij’s support during the 2005 election can be 
understood in light of the fact that he had consistently declared his allegiance to 
them long before (and after) coming to power. In February 2004, then Mayor of 
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Tehran, Ahmadinejad had stated that Iran needed “revolutionary forces who can 
come with the mentality of Basij members” to solve its problems.378 Once elected, he 
continued to show his respect, for example declaring a Basij week in November 
2005.379  
 
Although Ahmadinejad was never close to the IRGC senior command, he received 
significant support from the Guard during the 2005 election.380 During the campaign, 
the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Ayatollah Mohavedi-Kermani, 
highlighted six key attributes of the ideal presidential candidate:  
 that he heed the religious demands of the people and be accountable to them,  
 be obedient to the Supreme Leader and serve at his pleasure,  
 live a modest life and understand the suffering of the poor and dispossessed,  
 lessen the gap between the wealthy and the impoverished,  
 speak on welfare and the economy, 
 not attract votes with empty slogans.381  
For many analysts, Ayatollah Khamenei had articulated his preference for the 
military-security stratum.382 Ahmadinejad may have also been the ideal candidate 
since he was a devoutly religious engineer running on a campaign platform of social 
justice, integrity and devotion to the people and the Revolution.383  
 
Finally, Ahmadinejad benefited from the support of older figures of the 
establishment.384 In particular, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the Secretary of the Council 
of Guardians, publicly favoured his candidature.385 It is also worth recalling that, 
confronted with calls for reform from both within and outside Iran, the conservatives 
clearly wished to regain power, especially after 9/11. In the 2003 municipal and the 
2004 Majles elections, the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs and Councils 
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and the Council of Guardians used their respective institutional powers to restrict the 
base of the reformists and facilitate the victory of more conservative elements, 
including the political manifestation of the IRGC, the Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami 
(“Developers’ Coalition of Islamic Iran”). For Arjomand, the gatekeeping of all elected 
offices had become the Council of Guardians’ most important function during the 
Khatami presidency.386  
 
To conclude, President Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2005 was the result of an 
informal coalition of popular support and institutional and non-institutional 
conservative backing. It also reflected a conflagration of internal and external 
circumstances that had made the securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics a prime 
necessity.  
 
Increasing Influence of the IRGC Over State Institutions 
The Ahmadinejad presidency witnessed a deep infiltration of the state institutions by 
the security and military apparatus of the IRI, the IRGC in particular. To assess the 
extent to which the Ahmadinejad presidency “transformed” its role and relative power 
position, I briefly outline its responsibilities and functions prior to 2005. 
 
The role of the IRGC prior to the Ahmadinejad administration. Created in 
May 1979, the IRGC started as a militia mandated to protect the nascent Revolution 
from its internal foes.387 Under the command of the Supreme Leader, it played a 
critical role in eliminating non-Islamic opposition. The Iran-Iraq war brought the first 
change to its structure and mission. Iran’s regular military was in complete disarray 
following the Shah’s fall, the desertions and the purges of the officer corps.388 Shortly 
after Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Iranian territory in September 1980, Ayatollah 
Khomeini thus reorganised the IRGC into a parallel military to ensure Iran’s external 
security. Alongside the Basij, the IRGC proved critical to the IRI’s survival. 
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Following the end of the war and Iran’s power transition, the IRGC witnessed 
another significant transformation of its role and responsibilities. Faced with the 
challenge of demobilising and integrating the Guard into Iran’s post-war development 
plans, the regime expanded its mandate to non-military affairs and gave it a central 
role in the reconstruction schemes.389 The IRGC was placed at the centre of Iran’s 
industrial and commercial development, and became the chief recipient of lucrative 
state contracts.390 Its expanding corporate and financial interests thus gave the 
Guard an important stake in the regime’s policies.391  
 
Analysts often portray the Guard as profoundly devoted to the security and defence 
of the IRI.392 They would perceive the 1980s as a decade of ideological solidarity, 
national cohesion, and personal and collective struggle and sacrifice.393 As such, the 
Revolution and the Sacred Defence generated their own primary group of solidarity 
among the IRGC and the Basij.394 As Octovar writes, “The Iran-Iraq war had both 
played a central unifying role for the nascent Islamic Republic of Iran and come to 
define the values of an entire generation of combatants.”395  
 
Having proved their efficiency and loyalty to the Revolution during the war, the Guard 
claimed a legitimate right to guide Iran’s politics. In his 1992 study, Katzman already 
emphasised that the IRGC saw “involvement in politics as not only permissible, but 
as part of its mission to defend the Islamic revolution”.396 In his assessment, the 
Guard was less a professional military power than a political force, distinguishable by 
its “flexibility, adaptability and resiliency”.397 Unlike other revolutionary armed forces 
formed in revolutions, the IRGC had turned into 
a relatively complex and cohesive organisation without losing its ideological 
zeal […] The conventionalisation of the Guard’s structure did not bring its 
tactical and strategic decision-making process more in line with those of 
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professional armed forces. Objective military criteria did not replace hardline 
revolutionary goals, and conventional organisation did not thwart ideological 
enthusiasm and motivation.398  
 
The Khatami presidency represented another turning point in the development of the 
Guard, especially since its alliance with the Supreme Leader grew stronger. Having 
served as Iran’s Minister of Defence in 1980, supervisor of the IRGC after the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and as President from 1981 until Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
death, Ayatollah Khamenei had established deep connections with the Guard.399 
Following his appointment as Supreme Leader, he used these relations to secure the 
appointments of military commanders and intelligence agents into various 
institutions.400 In doing so, he was able to marginalise his rivals and shepherd a new 
generation of politicians loyal to him.401  
 
Much like him, many Guards perceived President Khatami’s socio-economic and 
foreign policy agendas as threats to the heritage of the Revolution.402 The IRGC 
directly interfered with the Khatami administration’s decisions on a number of 
occasions (e.g. the abrupt closure of the Imam Khomeini International Airport in May 
2004).403 The Guard also strengthened its role as the state’s premier security 
institution, leading to an “empowerment of militarism in Iran”, a strategy that became 
more pronounced after the January 2002 Axis of Evil speech and the 2003 municipal 
elections.404  
 
Formal and informal penetration of Iran’s economic and political 
institutions. The Ahmadinejad presidency gave rise to a substantial increase in the 
power of the IRGC. Its significant formal and informal penetration of all sectors of the 
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Iranian state, including domestic security, foreign policy, economic development and 
ideological promotion led a RAND Corporation report to conclude that, while the 
1980s was the clerics’ era, and the 1990s the epoch of the Bonyads, the 2000s 
marked the ascendance of the Guard. The IRGC had “acquired all the trappings of a 
state within a state accountable only to the Supreme Leader and increasingly 
present or even dominant in many facets of society”.405 I outline below three main 
dimensions of the growing influence of the IRGC over Iran’s domestic politics.   
 
Economic infiltration. As Mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad had given the 
IRGC and the Basij many of the capital’s lucrative development projects and waived 
the municipality’s financial claims on the Guard.406 Such favouritism continued during 
his presidential mandate. Examples include the unilateral allocation of significant 
budgets or the award of important contracts, especially in the areas of oil and natural 
gas extraction, pipeline construction and large-scale infrastructure development.407 
As such, despite his anti-corruption campaign, President Ahmadinejad came to face 
accusations of cronyism.408  
 
In 2006 alone, the Guard secured 1,500 projects, whose value amounted to billions 
of dollars.409 In addition, the IRGC considerably expanded its influence over Iran’s oil 
and gas projects, thus placing itself at the centre of Iran’s economy.410 Its economic 
empowerment transformed the organisation into an economic powerhouse in fields 
as varied and critical as Iran’s energy sector, armament manufacturing, electronics 
and transportation. Furthermore, international sanctions against Iran played in its 
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favour to the extent that the organisation was able to use its role in border security to 
operate an extensive smuggling network.411  
 
In sum, the Ahmadinejad presidency expanded and institutionalised the IRGC’s 
bureaucratic privileges. With such significant economic and corporate interests, it 
likely became more inclined to influence political developments to ensure that the 
country remained a place beneficial to its parochial interests.  
 
Political infiltration. To implement his programme of social justice and 
inaugurate the “beginning of a new era”, President Ahmadinejad engineered a 
drastic change of most of the officials in charge of governmental or state-owned 
institutions, including at local and middle-ranking levels.412 His approach was to 
appoint “clean hands” and dismiss those who were reformists or had enriched 
themselves.413 He also selected representatives more in tune with his personal 
specifications. These new individuals were predominantly not clerics and tended to 
be educated in technical fields, most of them holding engineering degrees.414 They 
often came from Iran’s provincial peripheries, not Tehran. They were largely 
indebted to the IRI for the social prestige they had acquired through their 
involvement in the Iran-Iraq war and the post-war administration of provincial rule.415 
As such, the majority of President Ahmadinejad’s government were relatively young, 
often unknown, men with little (if any) political experience.  
 
The Guard undoubtedly benefited from this political strategy. President 
Ahmadinejad’s first cabinet, for example, included an unprecedented number of 
IRGC veterans and people with security intelligence and military backgrounds.416 
They also occupied some of the central positions, such as the ministries of energy, 
industries, justice, petroleum, defence and commerce. Rahimi thus concludes that 
Iran became a “military-theocratic order” defined by 
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the consolidation of a clergy-military monopoly of power in the systemic 
prioritising of technical security considerations in the management and 
performance of politics. In terms of elite institutional realignment, it is not that 
the IRGC is simply gaining power over the civilian sphere, but that there is a 
growing cross-fertilization of an organisational network, familial ties, and 
information security ties between the clergy and the paramilitary forces, which 
is shaping a very unique elite guardian class with claims on state power.417 
 
The Ahmadinejad presidency thus profoundly transformed Iran’s domestic politics. 
Not only did it substantially constrain the traditional balancing dynamics between 
Iran’s reformist and conservative tendencies, it oversaw a multi-level ascendance of 
the military-security stratum within state institutions. As Adib-Moghaddam highlights, 
the IRGC and the Basij had become “a sophisticated military-industrial complex with 
political clout”, which gave the state “transversal power” and the ability to diffuse 
mass demonstrations.418 The Iranian state developed and strengthened its “diffuse, 
multi-structural power” in the form of administrative influence, muti-level disciplinary 
surveillance through its police stations, military compounds, Bassij headquarters, 
Internet police, and with the help of its bonyads that have supported the welfare of 
millions of Iranians and acted as vehicles of social mobility. This dissemination of 
power made protests and challenges to the state much more difficult.   
 
Post-Electoral Challenges to the Stability of the IRI in 2009 
According to the official count, President Ahmadinejad won a landslide victory, 
securing 62.63 percent of the vote, while Mousavi gained 33.75 percent.419 The 
turnout was also the largest recorded since 1979 (85 percent).420 The announcement 
of the results, however, prompted large-scale demonstrations in Tehran and other 
cities.421  
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Electoral fraud: popular and elite indignation, legitimacy deficit. The 
protests crossed generational, ideological and social lines.422 The slogan “Where is 
my vote?” expressed protesters’ demand for accountability as well as a “sense of 
humiliation”.423 The unprecedented televised debates between the candidates and 
the authorised public gatherings had given an “illusion of democratisation” with great 
freedom of speech and assembly:  
Demonstrators vividly posed the problem of “democratic self-esteem”. Not 
only was indignation deeply felt, but people also believed they were cheated, 
treated as non-citizens in a fool’s bargain that put into question their sense of 
honour and dignity.424 
 
Analysts and journalists widely focused on the so-called “Green Movement”, which 
was variously described as an “Iranian-style Intifada” (Robert Fisk), a “great 
emancipatory event” (Slajov Žižek), a “grassroots civil rights movement” (Hamid 
Dabashi) or a “post-Islamist democracy movement to reclaim citizenship within an 
ethico-religious order” (Asef Bayat).425 It reportedly embodied the depth of internal 
changes that had taken place within Iranian society since the late 1970s, in particular 
the profound yearnings for civil and political rights, governmental accountability, and 
freedom from fear and arbitrary rule.426 Bayat, for example, contended that the 
Green Movement was “the outcome of Iran’s deep political and social divide between 
a doctrinal regime which regards people as dutiful subjects and a large segment of 
the population who see themselves as full citizens of a Republic”.427 Ansari similarly 
viewed the protests as symptomatic of a “far deeper malaise in the structure and 
ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, especially between its two pillars, Islam and 
Republicanism.428 The 2009 popular protests, in other words, brought to the fore the 
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issue of the IRI’s political trajectory and the contentious legacies between popular 
sovereignty and religious authority.  
 
Furthermore, as protesters’ demands were met with repression, the nature of their 
contestation changed and turned to questioning the very legitimacy of the Supreme 
Leader’s authority (“Down with the dictator”, “Down with Khamenei”).429 In endorsing 
President Ahmadinejad’s re-election, Ayatollah Khamenei had inadvertently turned 
the dispute into a challenge to his own authority.430  
 
Importantly, expressions of discontent were not limited to bottom-up dynamics. 
Prominent personalities also strongly condemned the fraudulent election and the 
violence used by the security institutions. Ayatollah Montazeri, whose mobilisation 
was particularly symbolic as he was once the heir apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini, 
fiercely condemned the electoral fraud, denounced Ayatollah Khamenei as an 
“unqualified and illegitimate” leader and declared the Ahmadinejad government 
illegitimate in a number of fatwas.431 In his 17 July 2009 public prayer sermon, 
Rafsanjani openly challenged the election results and condemned the Ahmadinejad 
government. He also warned against deviating from the state’s dual sources of 
legitimacy: “the term Islamic Republic is not a ceremonial title. It is both a republic 
and Islamic. [Both] have to be together. If one is damaged, then we will no longer 
have a revolution and an Islamic Republic.”432  
 
Repression, violence and control. Iranian policymakers had long 
denounced internal and external conspiracies against Iran. Similar dynamics were at 
play in the regime’s portrayal of the protests as “a velvet revolution”, a product of 
Western interference and internal traitors (“seditionists”).433 On the one hand, the US 
and Great Britain, especially the BBC and the British Embassy in Tehran, were 
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accused of plotting to “dismember” Iran by aiding the protesters, ethnic insurgents 
and separatist groups.434 On the other hand, accusations of surrendering to, 
sympathising with, and allowing foreign meddling intensified during President 
Ahmadinejad’s second mandate, particularly against reformist figures.435  
 
The popular protests expanded and grew more defiant until February 2010, when 
they became fewer and further between, possibly because of the level of violence 
the Iranian regime deployed against the demonstrators and prominent 
personalities.436 Indeed, the protests were fiercely suppressed. Whilst the images of 
26-year-old Neda Aqa Soltan’s death in the streets of Tehran in June 2009 were 
widely broadcast, the Evin and Kahrizak prisons became notorious for their daily acts 
of torture, rape and murder. The death of Iranian blogger Sattar Beheshti in 
November 2012 acquired similar notoriety.437 The reports of Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International consistently highlighted the extensive human rights 
violations during President Ahmadinejad’s second term.438 Violence and repression 
thus became the cornerstones of the regime’s response to expressions of dissent.439  
 
The regime also sought to limit Iranians’ access to information and communication 
technologies. Such technologies, which challenge the regime’s monopoly on 
information, acquired a new threat dimension in the summer of 2009, partly because 
of the protesters’ ability to use cyberspace to share videos and pictures and organise 
themselves. The regime developed new ways of policing the media with the result 
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that Iran ranked 175 out of 179 for press freedom in Reporters Sans Frontières’ 2012 
report.440  
 
Two new institutions were set up to police the Internet: Fata, a cyber-police in charge 
of identifying bloggers and users breaking laws, and a supreme council of virtual 
space tasked with filtering the Internet and blocking access to websites deemed 
inappropriate.441 YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Google and Gmail were all regularly 
blocked.442 In addition, the regime tried to establish a walled-off national Intranet 
separate from the worldwide Internet. Officially, “Internet melli” aimed to improve the 
nation’s cybersecurity against threats such as the Stuxnet virus. Unofficially, it limited 
Iranians’ access to the outside world.443 Thus, as cyberwarfare became a new 
battlefield between Iran and its external adversaries, the regime increasingly turned 
its attention to the Internet as a means of reasserting control over both domestic 
narratives and internal opponents.  
 
Finally, the regime’s determination to tighten its control over Iran’s domestic politics 
translated into visible acts of coercion against influential individuals and their 
networks. Karroubi, Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahaward were placed under house 
arrest. Rafsanjani and Khatami, two major pillars of the IRI, were publicly humiliated 
on repeated occasions. Rafsanjani lost his post as Head of the Assembly of Experts 
in March 2011, was prevented from leading the Tehran Friday prayers and was 
disqualified from running in the 2013 presidential election by the Council of 
Guardians. His family also experienced heightened governmental pressures. In 
September 2012, for example, his daughter was sentenced to a six-month jail term 
for supporting the reform movement and “spreading anti-state propaganda”.444 In an 
unprecedented move, Rafsanjani openly stated in April 2013 that there was distrust 
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between himself and the Supreme Leader. According to Namazikhah and Marashi, 
he also “criticised Ayatollah Khamenei for allowing the Revolutionary Guard undue 
influence in Iran’s economic and foreign policy, and enabling the development of a 
militarised state”.445 Such public expressions of disagreement and disapproval 
between Ayatollah Khamenei and Rafsanjani were significant in view of their 
respective historical pedigrees, political experience and substantial authority and 
influence. 
 
A challenging external environment. The Arab uprisings also likely 
contributed to the regime’s continuous reliance on measures of control and 
repression. The dynamics of contentious collective actions and processes of political 
change that spanned Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria from 
December 2010 onwards took “almost everyone by surprise”, as Bayat put it.446 
These unexpected developments initially held great promise for the IRI: “anti-Iranian 
regimes were toppled across the region, Islamic political parties promised to do well 
in many important countries and US influence in the Middle East seemed to 
diminish.”447 The Iranian regime, the Supreme Leader especially, portrayed the 
uprisings as an “Islamic Awakening” that was following the path of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution. However, the sociopolitical developments within the Middle East and 
North Africa resulted in three broad challenges to the Iranian leadership.  
 
First, Iran’s neighbours were facing severe internal questioning of their social 
contracts. Many grievances echoed those that Iranians had articulated in the 1997 
and 2001 presidential elections, and the post-2009 electoral protests. Although the 
uprisings varied in their intensity and development, they all partly originated in 
citizens’ frustration with their countries’ deep socio-economic problems. These took 
the form of “persistently high unemployment, especially among youth (and educated 
youth at that), rampant corruption, internal regional and social inequalities, and a 
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further deterioration of economic conditions because of the global 2008 financial 
crisis and food price increases”.448 These socio-economic grievances were also 
intertwined with, and catapulted by, “a call for dignity and a reaction to being 
humiliated by arbitrary, unaccountable and increasingly predatory tyrannies”.449 In 
other words, the uprisings displayed the gaps between governmental promises on 
the one hand, and sociopolitical and economic realities on the other.  
 
Second, although it remains unclear how the Internet contributed to social and 
political change before, during and after the uprisings, the events of late 2010-early 
2011 showed that Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in general, 
and social media in particular, played important sociopolitical roles.450 References to 
the “Facebook revolutions” and “citizen journalism” abounded. For Iran, much like 
other states, ICTs formed an increasingly important mediating variable of state-
society relations with enabling (e.g. dissemination of official information to domestic 
and foreign audiences) and constraining (e.g. display of dissent, publicity of protests, 
creation of new webs of solidarity) effects. 
 
Third, the uprisings had various political consequences, including regime change, 
reform measures and profound internal fracturing. Despite the Iranian leadership’s 
initial hopes, its regional environment became less predictable and more challenging 
following the uprisings. For example, the short-lived government of Islamist 
President Mohammed Morsi produced neither a rapprochement between Iran and 
Egypt nor a transformation of Egypt’s dependence on the US; the situation in Libya 
resulted in a NATO-backed military intervention; and the cases of Syria and Bahrain 
showed continuing foreign meddling.451 Additionally, sectarian tensions, already 
heightened by the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, continued to deepen, while Iran 
and Saudi Arabia were drawn into a renewed regional power competition.452 The 
Arab uprisings, in other words, intensified the Iranian regime’s profound concerns 
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vis-à-vis its polity (i.e. social contract under stress), foreign meddling within its 
neighbours’ internal affairs and the destabilisation of the axis of resistance (i.e. Syria, 
Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah).453 
 
To conclude, the Ahmadinejad presidency amplified processes that had become 
increasingly visible during President Khatami’s second term in office. The June 2005 
election of a principlist candidate, and the subsequent multi-level power ascendance 
of the military-security stratum, ensured that Iran’s domestic politics became more 
authoritarian. The popular and elite protests that followed the official announcement 
of the June 2009 presidential election results had complex consequences. On the 
one hand, the domestic legitimacy crisis meant that the social contract was under 
profound stress and the regime remained insecure. The very fact that prominent 
personalities publicly disavowed the 2009 electoral process, including the actions of 
the Supreme Leader, indicates the extent to which the regime lacked traditional elite-
level legitimising forces. Conversely, the vehemence with which influential individuals 
and their networks were condemned, delegitimised, ostracised and “neutralised” by 
the state, shows that, in a context where the regime faced substantial internal and 
external threats, Iran continued to rely on strategies of oppression and control. 
Containment and deterrence of further challenges to domestic stability became a 
priority. The growing securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics, however, had causal 
and consequential effects on the polarisation of the Iranian elite.   
 
Polarisation of Iran’s Domestic Politics 
Although there had always been political divisions, the Ahmadinejad presidency was 
distinguishable by the unprecedented level of elite polarisation it produced. In this 
section, I draw attention to three main factors. First, the period 2005 to 2013 
witnessed the acceleration and deepening of divisions within the (inherently 
pluralistic and ill-defined) “conservative” tendencies of the Iranian political spectrum. 
Second, elite criticisms coalesced around the intertwined issues of the country’s 
economic situation and its nuclear policy. Finally, President Ahmadinejad’s 
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interpretation of his role and modus operandi profoundly alienated his domestic 
rivals.  
 
Old and New Lines of Fracture Within Iran’s Elite 
If the Khatami presidency was dominated by severe power rifts between the 
“conservatives” and the “reformists”, the Ahmadinejad mandates were marked by 
divisions within the conservative bloc itself. Reflecting on the 2005 presidential 
election, Ehteshami and Zweiri persuasively highlighted that  
In many ways, Ahmadinejad’s victory reflects the transformation of the 
political struggle in Iran from being one between the conservatives and the 
reformists to one within the powerful conservative faction itself. The new 
guard represents the rise of the military in Iranian politics. The old guard, 
however, remains at the heart of power, occupying many of the unelected 
offices of the system.454  
 
After outlining how and why the “new guard” challenged the “old guard”, I briefly 
engage with the national elections held under Ahmadinejad. This allows me to 
nuance my depiction of Iran’s military-security stratum (the IRGC is not a cohesive 
actor) and to emphasise that President Ahmadinejad proved relatively unpopular 
throughout his mandates. 
 
Acute political competition within conservative factions. Analysts and 
academics have used a plurality of terms to qualify the Ahmadinejad governments 
and the emerging force they represented within the Iranian political spectrum. These 
include “neo-conservatives” (Naji), “principlists” (Ansari), “hardliners” (Arjomand), 
“puritan hardliners” (Haghghi and Tahmasebi) and “the new right” (Takeyh). While 
this absence of consensus captures long-standing difficulties in analysing Iran’s 
political groups, I refer to “principlists”, a term those concerned themselves used.  
 
Broadly, the principlists were profoundly loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini and “reimagined 
the Islamic Republic in the nostalgia of the war years and in terms of the redemptive 
ethos of self-sacrifice for the nation and Islam”.455 Shaped by the Iran-Iraq war more 
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than the struggle against the Shah, they wished to revive the “utopian-populist spirit” 
of the Revolution and, thus, reinvigorate social justice policies.456 Additionally, they 
criticised the right of veto of many unelected offices, argued in favour of justice and 
meritocracy, and contended that their technocratic credentials and ideological 
commitment made them ideal candidates.457 They also often used religious 
arguments to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the “old guard”. In this 
context, the drastic personnel changes among the elite during President 
Ahmadinejad’s first mandate could have been an attempt to undermine the power of 
the clergy.  
 
National elections: thermostat of Iran’s elite-level polarisation. The 
municipal and Majles elections that took place during the Ahmadinejad presidency 
attested to the profound polarisation of Iran’s domestic politics. First, the Council of 
Guardians continued to use its veto to limit the reformists’ political influence. In the 
March 2008 Majles election, for example, the Council disqualified 41.1 percent of the 
candidates, most of whom were reformists.458 In response, the reformists boycotted 
the March 2012 Majles election on the grounds that the basic requirements for a free 
and fair election did not exist. The “republican” component of the state thus remained 
severely unbalanced throughout the period 2003 to 2013, both out of will (official 
strategies) and necessity (refusal to participate in an unfair political process). 
 
Second, the military-security stratum of the IRI never presented a cohesive front. 
Instead, its affiliated candidates systematically ran on competing lists. This illustrates 
two important political dynamics: internal divisions and competition for power on the 
one hand, and opposition to the candidates and lists affiliated with President 
Ahmadinejad on the other. Crucially, from his first electoral test in December 2006 to 
his last in March 2012, President Ahmadinejad faced fierce competition and often 
lost to candidates more closely affiliated with the Supreme Leader. In the December 
2006 municipal election, for example, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, an IRGC 
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commander during the 1980s and a candidate in the 2005 presidential election, did 
better than President Ahmadinejad.459  
 
The March 2012 Majles election set the conservatives associated with the Supreme 
Leader against those allied to President Ahmadinejad.460 As was the case during the 
March 2008 Majles election, IRGC affiliates won enough seats to limit substantially 
the Ahmadinejad administration’s room to manoeuvre.461 Despite the quasi-absence 
of reformist candidates, voters were able to reject President Ahmadinejad (and his 
vetted followers) by giving their support to other conservative groupings, thus forcing 
“the ideological moderation of the Iranian political spectrum by rebalancing the 
conservative factions represented in parliament”.462 Going back to the argument that 
the IRGC neither presented a cohesive front nor provided the principlists with an 
unconditional support base, an Iranian official insisted that: 
The Revolutionary Guards is not a political party. They have many different 
opinions. It was very interesting for me that, in 2009, most of the supporters of 
the Green Movement were coming from the Revolutionary Guards. They are 
not a unified military group that tries to capture all the power. It is a wrong 
perception. They have different political opinions. Some of them have 
supported Khatami and, at present, some of them are supporting President 
Ahmadinejad. Of course, they are influential. I do agree with that. They have 
increased their influence. Why have they done so? The reason is clear: 
insecurity. When the security of the country is in danger, who will get more 
support and influence? The security forces. When the United States tried to 
threaten Iran, when Israel threatens Iran, when the EU states that all options 
are on the table, what do you expect?463 
 
Economic Policies and Foreign Relations: Two Particularly Contentious Issues 
Domestic critics repeatedly castigated President Ahmadinejad and his administration 
as threats to Iran’s national interests, a point upon which all rival candidates agreed 
during the 2009 presidential election.464 After examining the main motives behind the 
claim that the regime had endangered Iran’s national economy and foreign relations, 
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I analyse the informal (verbal delegitimisation) and formal (institutional) strategies put 
in place to constrain the President and his administration’s room to manoeuvre. The 
section on Iran’s economic situation is longer for I also explore the interconnected 
effects of mismanagement and sanctions.   
 
Economic policies: ruptures and continuities. Iran’s economy was always 
a major preoccupation for its successive presidents. Despite its vast hydrocarbon 
resources, crucial geographic location and impressive human resources, Iran always 
faced a low and volatile economic growth rate, a situation explained by five main 
factors.465  
 
First, Iran was structured as a typical rentier state, exporting its hydrocarbon 
resources, importing higher-end manufactured products, and adversely affected by 
change in oil prices and selling capacities. Second, Iran’s economy was dominated 
by a relatively large state sector characterised by “the prevalence of highly 
subsidised, inefficient and overstaffed state-owned enterprises”.466 Third, since the 
Revolution, Iran had faced a combination of high inflation and unemployment.467 
Fourth, Iran attracted relatively little foreign direct investment, in part due to a 
number of legislative issues in the areas of foreign ownership and exploitation of 
Iranian oil.468 Finally, the private sector showed little incentive to commit to long-term 
investments, which, according to Karshenas and Hakimian, was attributable to 
[the] lack of credibility in government policies, [the] capture of the state by 
particular interests, which undermine competition and divert energies to 
unproductive, rent-seeking activities, and the arbitrary interventions by 
different branches of the government in safeguarding the interests of 
particular groups at the helm of power.469 
 
Although the Iranian leadership never abandoned the Revolution’s ideals of 
achieving economic independence and social justice, the economic and political elite 
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often acted as powerful entrenched groups that limited the impact of successive 
restructuring programmes.470  
 
Nevertheless, President Ahmadinejad inherited a relatively good economic situation 
when he first came to power. This was mainly due to his predecessor’s 
establishment of an “Oil Stabilisation Fund” and high oil revenues:471  
Iran’s oil revenues under Ahmadinejad’s first term were 44 percent higher 
than the entire earnings of Khatami’s eight years in office, and nearly double 
that of Rafsanjani’s two terms. Of the more than $700 billion that Iran has 
earned through oil exports in the past thirty years, nearly 40 percent came in 
during the past four years [2005-2009].472  
 
The oil windfall, which considerably increased the government’s monetary resources, 
helped President Ahmadinejad implement his programme of social justice.473 During 
his first term, he increased the government’s subsidies for a wide range of products, 
including food, energy and bank credit.474 Poorer Iranians benefited from the 
government’s social welfare policies, especially the new “justice shares”.475 Other 
initiatives included a housing initiative for low-income families and an offer of 
interest-free loans to young couples for marriage and housing needs.476 
Ahmadinejad closed down Iran’s Management and Planning Organisation, following 
the resignation of its head in late 2006 due to the President’s “arbitrary and undue 
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interference in the budgetary process”.477 This decision was indicative of his 
determination to take control of the country’s developmental planning, including the 
drafting of the national budget and the five-year plans. It also meant that President 
Ahmadinejad was in a stronger position to reward those who supported him and his 
administration.478  
 
Economic situation: effects of mismanagement and sanctions. The 
Ahmadinejad administration’s edifice of subsidies and initiatives weakened previous 
attempts to divert excess oil revenues and considerably shrunk the Oil Stabilisation 
Fund.479 Iran’s twin issues of high unemployment and inflation also sharply 
increased. For example, the regime’s decision in December 2010 to lift the subsidy 
on a number of state-sponsored items resulted in a sharp rise in government 
spending and inflation.480 As gasoline prices quadrupled and bread prices tripled, the 
government had to increase its direct cash grants to families.481 Iran’s economic 
policies also generated a lack of confidence amongst Iranian and foreign 
businessmen, investors and bankers.482 This resulted in large transfers of Iranian-
owned assets to the United Arab Emirates where a large Iranian business 
community exists.483 Iran’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index also steadily deteriorated: from 88 in 2005 (out of 158 countries 
surveyed) to 144 in 2013 (out of 177).484   
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Within this context, domestic critics continuously accused the Ahmadinejad 
administration of pursuing incoherent policies, exacerbating structural weaknesses 
and hampering long-term development. While this was a major rallying point for its 
opponents during successive election campaigns, Iranian economists and professors 
repeatedly voiced their concerns.485 Popular disapproval was also visible in a 
number of protests.486 Importantly, several threats and institutional attempts were 
engineered to rein in Ahmadinejad’s influence over the economy. In March 2007, 
Rafsanjani, then head of the Expediency Council, declared that President 
Ahmadinejad’s “trial period is over” and that the Council would use its supervisory 
powers to reshape the government’s economic policies.487 The Council’s ability to 
oversee the administration’s economic policies was the result of a constitutional 
change the Supreme Leader had instigated in October 2005, when he gave it 
supervisory powers over all branches of government.488 President Ahmadinejad and 
the Executive branch were required to submit their planning and policies for approval 
before implementation.  
 
If Iran’s deteriorating economic situation was substantially due to the administration’s 
mismanagement, the comprehensive regime of individual and multilateral sanctions 
also produced highly destabilising effects. In a July 2013 article, Khajepour, Marashi 
and Parsi emphasise that the representatives of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce 
they had interviewed believed that “50 percent of the economic predicament [was] a 
direct consequence of sanctions and the other 50 percent [was] due to failed 
economic policies.”489 As the political stalemate over Iran’s nuclear programme grew, 
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sanctions moved from targeting individuals and specific goods to more vital 
economic activities such as oil trade, financial transactions and foreign investment.  
 
Sanctions against Iran’s oil trade were particularly hard-hitting for the rentier 
economy since they constricted its ability to export its crucial resources, receive 
foreign exchange and buy vital imports for food supply and industrial inputs. In 
February 2013, the International Energy Agency thus reported that Western 
sanctions had slashed Iran’s oil export revenues by over $40 billion in 2012, Iranian 
crude exports had declined to an average 1.5 mb/d in 2012, down about 1 mb/d from 
2011 levels, and its oil production was hovering below three-decade lows.490 
Sanctions against Iran’s financial transactions led to a decrease in foreign 
investment.491 Several foreign oil and gas companies abandoned their activity in the 
country, such as the Dutch-British multinational oil and gas company Royal Dutch 
Shell, France’s Total and Norway’s Statoil.492 Iran’s exclusion from the Swift banking 
system in March 2012 was particularly damaging since it prevented businesses from 
carrying out international transactions and sharply increased the price of imports due 
to higher banking, insurance and shipping charges.493 The banking restrictions also 
led to the bankruptcy of many Iranian contractors and producers, thus exacerbating 
the structural problem of unemployment.494  
 
In 2012, Iran’s economic situation started to deteriorate significantly and an 
increasing number of (foreign) reports focused on Iranians’ daily struggles. The price 
of basic food and goods skyrocketed,495 and Iranians faced medicine shortages for 
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the treatment of illnesses.496 The deteriorating economic situation also had 
significant sociopolitical consequences. According to a 2009 International Monetary 
Fund estimate, Iran was losing more than 150,000 of its educated and skilled 
citizens annually (brain drain).497 Observers and activists increasingly deplored the 
effects of the sanctions on Iran’s middle classes.498 The International Crisis Group 
and the National Iranian American Council both observed that, far from causing 
significant domestic upheaval or affecting Iran’s nuclear calculus, the sanctions had 
deepened the securitisation of Iran’s politics.499 As such, the sanctions had similar 
domestic effects to the 2002 Axis of Evil speech: a state of war that necessitated 
increased repression and control. 
 
Importantly, the Ahmadinejad administration changed its public position on the 
effects of the sanctions after 2012. While it had mainly dismissed them as ineffective 
until then, it began to acknowledge that they had created difficulties for the country. 
In early September 2012, in a live interview on Iranian state television, President 
Ahmadinejad declared that the country was facing “problems” exporting its oil.500 In 
October 2012, Foreign Minister Salehi recognised that “the sanctions create[d] 
inconveniences”.501 In general, the regime portrayed the sanctions as “barbaric”.502 
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The Supreme Leader presented the image of an immoral and oppressive enemy 
determined to keep Iran underdeveloped and dependent (see next chapter).503 He 
rejected the notion that the sanctions were targeting Iran’s nuclear activities and 
called on national solidarity and resistance against external oppression and injustice. 
As such, he proclaimed 2010 the year of doubled effort and labour, 2011 the year of 
economic jihad, 2012 the year of national production and support of Iranian labour 
and capital, and 2013 the year of political and economic epics. In other words, the 
Supreme Leader appealed to Iranians’ patience and confidence in the regime’s 
steadfastness.  
 
The framing of the sanctions as a tool of humiliation, oppression and coercion also 
worked at the elite level. According to a 2013 study carried out by Khajepour, 
Marashi and Parsi from the National Iranian American Council, and for which the 
authors relied on interviews with senior Iranian politics officials, analysts and 
members of the business community:  
Stark divisions over foreign and domestic policy among the Iranian elite are 
unmistakable. However, those divisions do not appear to have affected 
regime cohesion around the nuclear issue or on the response to sanctions. 
And if elite insiders are to be believed, sanctions have helped strengthen 
cohesion rather than intensify rifts.504 
 
Despite the depth of its antagonism towards the Ahmadinejad administration, the 
survival of the IRI remained a priority for all. The elite also widely agreed that Iran 
should never give up its nuclear rights (see next chapter). Additionally, though 
dissatisfied with the negative impact of the sanctions and government policies, the 
Iranian business community (private or quasi-governmental), systematically lobbied 
the government to secure concessions.505 In so doing, they were not campaigning 
for a change of nuclear policy but for an improvement of their own situation within a 
largely unfavourable context. 
 
Diplomatic inexperience and failed strategies. Throughout the period 2005 
to 2013, President Ahmadinejad and his administration faced vivid internal criticisms 
for undermining Iran’s external relations and the country’s security. These 
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condemnations were twofold. On the one hand, they targeted the personalities and 
the perceived amateurishness of those who staffed the Ahmadinejad administration. 
This illustrated tensions between the “old” and the “new” guard, and their conflicting 
legitimacy claims: technocracy and political experience for the former, meritocracy 
and security involvement for the latter. On the other hand, domestic criticisms 
focused on the strategies (methods rather than overall objectives) pursued by the 
Ahmadinejad administration to secure Iran’s nuclear interests.  
 
Domestic criticism of President Ahmadinejad’s modus operandi in the area of foreign 
policy started very early in his mandate. Following his October 2005 statements on 
the Israeli-Palestine issue and the Holocaust, President Ahmadinejad was accused 
of promoting “adventurism at the expense of national interests” and deviating from 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology.506 He was also criticised for heightening 
misunderstandings and fears.507 Rouhani, one of his most vociferous critics, accused 
him of using an excessively provocative rhetoric that played against Iran’s 
security.508 He also scathingly criticised his decision-making methods, declaring in 
October 2007:  
The country is not the private property of anyone, this sentiment that the 
country belongs to you is the biggest and incurable disease of our nation and 
also to leave difficult problems to a few, not listening to experts and not taking 
their advices [sic] into account.509  
 
Additionally, Rouhani sought to delegitimise the President’s religious discourse and 
his declarations of proximity with the Twelfth Imam. In February 2008, he 
characterised Ahmadinejad’s views as “superstitious” and “charlatanistic”, and called 
his allies a “bunch of misguided children”.510 Similarly, Rafsanjani regularly used the 
media as a means to bypass President Ahmadinejad and promote an alternative 
message to the international community, especially the message that Iran did not 
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wish to dominate the region or interfere in other countries’ spheres of influence.511 
Rafsanjani also condemned the systematic replacement of competent officials with 
inexperienced individuals.512 Other influential personalities, such as Seyed Hossein 
Mousavian, a spokesperson for the Iranian nuclear negotiation team during the 
Khatami administration, denounced Ahmadinejad’s “limited comprehension of 
complex foreign policy issues” and his systematic retaliation strategy in response to 
each new UNSC resolution.513  
 
During the 2013 presidential election campaign, Saeed Jalili, Iran’s top nuclear 
negotiator from 2007 to 2013, was also strongly challenged for failing to win 
diplomatic results and leading Iran down a path of increasingly extensive sanctions. 
His critics tended to target his inexperience, intransigence and preference for 
posturing and maximalist demands.514 Ali Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader’s 
main foreign policy advisor, criticised Ahmadinejad’s approach during the final 
debate of the 2013 presidential election: 
You want to take three steps and you expect the other side to take 100 steps, 
this means that you don’t want to make progress […] This is not diplomacy 
[…] We can’t expect everything and give nothing […] Being conservative does 
not mean being inflexible and stubborn.515 
 
The last sentence indicates a degree of internal competition amongst “conservatives” 
over the kind of strategies best suited to protect Iran’s national interests and the 
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legacy of the Revolution. It also points to attempts, on the part of the President’s 
domestic opponents, to disentangle the conception that a firm nuclear policy ought to 
reject compromise.516 Velayati’s condemnation was particularly symbolic because of 
his official position. 
 
In addition to strongly condemning and delegitimising the diplomatic performance of 
President Ahmadinejad and his administration, his opponents used several 
institutional avenues to limit the latter’s influence over Iran’s foreign policy. Foreign 
Minister Mottaki was thus more or less forced upon President Ahmadinejad in 
2005.517 Also telling was Ayatollah Khamenei’s creation of the Strategic Council for 
Foreign Relations in June 2006. Not only was the Council responsible for devising 
new foreign policy approaches and facilitating the decision-making process, but the 
appointments of Velayati and Kamal Kharazzi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
during the Khatami presidency, also illustrated a search for expertise and 
experience.518  
 
Additionally, institutional attempts to contain President Ahmadinejad’s personal 
influence noticeably increased during his second mandate, when several of his close 
allies were “neutralised” by way of impeachment, dismissal and imprisonment. In 
September 2012, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, a close aide and press advisor, was given a 
six-month sentence after being convicted of publishing material offensive to Islamic 
codes and public morality.519 Akin to a public humiliation strategy, the judicial 
authorities repeatedly rejected President Ahmadinejad’s attempts to visit Javanfekr 
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in prison.520 In February 2013, former Tehran chief prosecutor Said Mortazavi, a 
close ally, was arrested on corruption charges.521 Finally, the 2013 modification of 
the presidential election procedure ensured that President Ahmadinejad would not 
be able to use his influence within the Ministry of the Interior to promote his preferred 
candidate (Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei) or attempt to delay the election.522  
 
To conclude, President Ahmadinejad and his administration faced strong domestic 
criticism, including from influential personalities closely affiliated with the Supreme 
Leader, and several institutional attempts to limit their ability to shape Iran’s 
economic and foreign policy strategies.  
 
President Ahmadinejad: Modus Operandi and Role Interpretation 
President Ahmadinejad’s political strategy illustrates Hollis and Smith’s argument 
that roles always include “constraining” and “enabling” elements: while they 
structure, they do not determine reasoned judgements. Broadly, President 
Ahmadinejad followed the “normative expectations” that came with his position. 
While he put the Constitution into practice and directed the Executive branch of the 
government, he presented a programme that aimed to strengthen the cause and 
principles of the Revolution. His role, however, also comprised large areas of 
indeterminacy. It is in the nexus between constraints and opportunities that President 
Ahmadinejad’s determination to assume a decisive and proactive leadership 
becomes visible. I outline his main internal and external strategies to identify why 
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and how he was often able to carve out opportunities to exist politically, including 
when institutional avenues were unavailable. 
 
Political strategy within Iran. President Ahmadinejad consistently used 
three main strategies to expand his influence within Iran’s domestic landscape. First, 
he travelled and spoke extensively. Second, he relied on tit for tat retaliation, which 
allowed him to exploit tensions and conflicts with his domestic rivals in order to 
remain at the centre of Iran’s politics. Finally, he increasingly and openly challenged 
the clerical elite, including the Supreme Leader.  
 
Domestic travel and speeches. President Ahmadinejad travelled extensively 
within Iran and gave many speeches, including in small towns and villages.523 In his 
first year in office, he visited all thirty provinces and delivered more than 166 
speeches in more than 2,000 towns.524 Unlike his predecessors, he held several 
cabinet meetings away from the capital and in smaller towns.525 His first cabinet 
meeting, for example, took place in Mashhad.526 During these trips, especially 
throughout his first mandate, he received hundreds of requests and petitions, and 
promised many new services and infrastructure projects.527 His provincial tours 
increased his visibility and proximity, which reportedly earned him the devotion of 
millions of Iranians.528  
 
His speeches were widely broadcasted on national television, thus helping him to 
become “the newsmaker rather than a person in the news”.529 He used the national 
media as an instrument of power projection and dissemination of his values and 
ambitions for the development of Iran. He also used a “Khomeini-type language”, 
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simple and easily accessible whilst simultaneously ferocious and denunciatory, to 
silence his critics and strengthen his position.530  
 
Tit for tat. President Ahmadinejad refused to be sidelined from key policy 
debates. He seemed to have little interest in consensus building and embraced 
division as a means to exist politically. His tit for tat strategy was most evident in five 
key areas. 
 
First, he developed a particularly tense relationship with the conservative-dominated 
Majles, whose constitutional control over the government’s budget he regularly 
attempted to deny. A case in point is his decision to set up the Imam Reza Love 
Fund despite the Majles’ rejection of his bill to use US$8 billion of Iran’s foreign 
exchange to achieve this.531 He also repeatedly failed to enact bills passed by 
Parliament. The Majles never impeached President Ahmadinejad but questioned him 
in March 2012: a first in the history of the IRI. He was strongly criticised for his 
economic policies and for challenging the Supreme Leader’s authority.532 
Ahmadinejad, however, instrumentalised the live session to increase his domestic 
visibility. He denied accusations of failure and underplayed the significance of the 
session, declaring that he wanted to share “jokes” with the legislators and that their 
questioning “was not a very difficult quiz”.533 
 
Second, Ahmadinejad frequently used his constitutional prerogative to dismiss 
ministers in order to isolate his opponents and surround himself with close allies. In 
May 2008, he dismissed Interior Minister Mostafa Purmohammadi without warning or 
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explanation.534 In December 2010, he fired Foreign Minister Mottaki while the latter 
was on an official tour of Africa.535 Equally insightful of the President political strategy 
was the 2007 Larijani crisis.  
 
According to article 176 of the Constitution, the President is responsible for naming 
the Chairman of the SNSC. Traditionally, however, the Ayatollah had appointed the 
Chairman. In August 2005, the Supreme Leader replaced Hassan Rouhani with Ali 
Larijani, who was the lead negotiator with the EU-3 until 2007. He was known to 
benefit from the Supreme Leader’s confidence and disagree with President 
Ahmadinejad’s handling of the nuclear issue.536 In October 2007, Ahmadinejad 
asserted his constitutional prerogative and appointed Said Jalili, a close ally, as the 
new Chairman of the SNSC. This decision was noteworthy for three main reasons.  
 
To begin with, it illustrated President Ahmadinejad’s determination to play a 
proactive foreign policy role and “unify all foreign and security related policy issues, 
including the nuclear dossier and the decision-making processes related to them, 
under his authority”.537 Furthermore, it showed Ahmadinejad’s preference for 
appointing relatively unknown low-level officials who shared his generation’s 
battlefield experience. Jalili, a Deputy Foreign Minister, had “little personal 
experience of international life” and had never held such a senior position.538  
 
Finally, Ahmadinejad’s relations with Ayatollah Khamenei were never as cooperative 
as many analysts often claimed them to be. For many, his election was a triumph for 
the Supreme Leader since all elected and unelected institutions were under the firm 
control of conservative elements. Takeyh, for example, argued that Ayatollah 
Khamenei “was finally heading a regime whose politicians yielded to his judgements 
without undue protest, shared his dogmatic values, and viewed him as the arbiter of 
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all of their debates”.539 While conservative forces represented a lesser threat to 
Ayatollah Khamenei, tensions between President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme 
Leader existed early on. In this respect, it is worth noting that Ayatollah Khameini 
almost immediately named Larijani as one of his two representatives on the 
SNSC.540 Larijani was thus able to attend the nuclear negotiations between Jalili and 
EU Foreign Minister Javier Solano in October 2007, when it was made clear that 
Jalili was not representing the Supreme Leader.541 Larijani was also elected Speaker 
of the Majles in May 2008 and used this institutional platform to offer constant 
condemnation of President Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy.542 
 
Third, the more domestic criticism and institutional pressures President Ahmadinejad 
faced, the more he pursued his anti-establishment programme. In July 2011, for 
example, he accused the IRGC of smuggling goods through the country’s key ports. 
In a letter published in October 2012, he also accused Sadeq Larijani, the head of 
the Judiciary, of protecting certain individuals from prosecution for economic 
corruption.543 In February 2013, he played a secretly recorded conversation with 
Fazel Larijani during a televised Majles session.544 Ahmadinejad accused Fazel and 
his family of fraudulent business activities. His unprecedented move undermined the 
Supreme Leader’s October 2012 warning that any officials from the three branches 
of the state who argued in public would be guilty of treason.545 While his critics 
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dubbed his tactic begam, begam, “I’ll tell, I’ll tell”, Ahmadinejad’s actions certainly 
complicated their attempts to isolate him and his allies.546  
 
Fourth, Ahmadinejad denounced the subversion of the Revolution’s ideals and 
openly challenged the authority of the ruling clerical elite. According to Rahnema, 
President Ahmadinejad, Mebah Yazdi and his students, used religious superstition 
for two concomitant political purposes.547 First, they acted as a tool of popular 
manipulation to increase the President’s power and authority. In claiming to have 
seen a halo of light during his speech at the September 2005 UNGA, President 
Ahmadinejad started to advance the idea of his connectedness with the Hidden 
Imam. That same month, he sponsored the first annual International Conference of 
Mahdism Doctrine in Tehran.548 Ahmadinejad, who made the Mahdi a central focus 
of his rhetoric and policy, claimed to enjoy a special status, as “an oracle and a 
facilitator of the Twelfth Imam’s appearance”, which complicated efforts to criticise 
his government’s policies.549 It is worth noting that his friendship with Mashaei 
caused significant domestic uproar since the latter was accused of supporting a 
deviant current that sought to overthrow the clerics and promote direct relations with 
God.550 Second, religious superstitions and the appropriation of the Hidden Imam 
enabled President Ahmadinejad and his followers to delegitimise previous 
administrations’ policies and justify the use of repression against their critics. 
Ahmadinejad also questioned the clerics’ interference in the domain of morality and 
pushed for a more nationalist conception of Iran (rather than calls for the ummah).551 
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In particular, he praised elements of Iran’s pre-Islamic past, including Cyrus the 
Great of the ancient Persian Empire.552  
 
Finally, in questioning the religious, moral and political authority of the clerical elite, 
President Ahmadinejad also challenged the Supreme Leader’s legitimacy. Much as 
those with Khatami, the tensions between Ayatollah Khamenei and President 
Ahmadinejad partly stemmed from the dual structure of the state’s institutions. Unlike 
his predecessor, however, Ahmadinejad very openly challenged the Supreme 
Leader, especially during his second mandate. Three examples are noteworthy.  
 
To begin with, less than a month after his disputed re-election, he refused to obey 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s order to dismiss Mashaei from the post of Vice-President.553 
While his action was widely condemned, he proceeded to dismiss the Ministers of 
Intelligence, Culture and Islamic Guidance, Labour and Health.554 In another tit for tat 
retaliation, he named Mashaei as his Chief of Staff and, in December 2012, Head of 
the Secretariat for the NAM.555 Ayatollah Jannati, the Secretary of the Council of 
Guardians and a key supporter of his 2005 election, reproached him for his 
disrespect.556 Second, in the summer of 2010, Ahmadinejad appointed four special 
envoys in a presumed attempt to bypass the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister 
Mottaki, the Supreme Leader and the Majles all criticised this decision.557 In 
response, Ahmadinejad called the envoys “advisors” and appointed two more. 
Finally, in April 2011, President Ahmadinejad dismissed Intelligence Minister Heydar 
Moslehi.558 Ayatollah Khamenei opposed this decision and reinstated him. The 
President retreated to his house for eleven days and failed to attend cabinet 
meetings; an act that was widely condemned within the Iranian establishment.559  
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These thee examples indicate President Ahmadinejad’s demonstrated willingness to 
both publicly challenge the Supreme Leader’s authority (a first in the history of the 
IRI) and sacrifice sources of support in doing so. As an Iranian official pointed out 
during the October 2014 conference “Iran in the World: Old challenges and new 
opportunities in the changing Middle East”, President Ahmadinejad left office with 
minimal support because he had “deviated from the system of the Islamic Republic”, 
especially in terms of his lack of respect for the Supreme Leader’s authority.560 
However, President Ahmadinejad’s modus operandi illustrates his ability to use 
retaliation as a means to enhance his political visibility and de facto influence. 
Although this modus operandi caused great domestic consternation, it nevertheless 
ensured that he remained an actor to be reckoned with.  
 
President Ahmadinejad and the world stage. Ahmadinejad’s statements 
during international events and trips abroad routinely attracted considerable global 
media and political attention. He used these trips as opportunities to raise his profile 
and visibility on foreign policy-related matters. Although Iranian presidents have 
limited authority over foreign policy, they can substantially affect its tone and style.561 
 
I review the three main issues that President Ahmadinejad was particularly active on: 
the Palestinian question, the nature of the international system and the nuclear 
issue.  
 
The Palestinian issue. President Ahmadinejad’s statements on the Palestine 
question were the primary initial factor behind the considerable media and political 
attention he attracted. In October 2005, shortly after his speech at the UNGA, 
President Ahmadinejad declared during the Tehran-held conference, “A World 
without Zionism”, that the “Jerusalem-occupying regime must disappear from the 
page[s] of time”.562 He denounced attempts to normalise relations with the “Zionist 
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regime”, condemned all Muslim leaders who accepted its existence as 
“acknowledging a surrender and defeat of the Islamic world” and declared that the 
Palestine issue would be resolved “the day that all refugees return to their homes 
[and] a democratic government elected by the people comes to power”.563 Although 
he was wrongly accused of calling for the destruction of the state of Israel, the 
statements attributed to him caused media and political uproar. Iran’s opponents, 
including Israeli officials, rapidly framed the President’s comments as a sign of the 
potent threat that Iran’s nuclear activities posed to regional security and international 
stability.564 On this occasion, President Ahmadinejad’s views were largely consistent 
with Iran’s previous policies. He continued, however, to make a series of rather 
ludicrous and appalling statements.  
 
In December 2005, during the two-day summit of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference in Saudi Arabia, he explained that Israel should be relocated to 
Europe.565 He also defended the academic integrity and freedom of speech of 
Holocaust deniers and expressed doubts about the extent of the Shoah.566 Later that 
month, in a speech broadcast live on Iranian television, Ahmadinejad made similar 
assertions, questioning the historical reality of the Holocaust.567 He repeated that the 
perpetrators of the crimes against Jews should give the latter a piece of their own 
land, “somewhere in Europe or America and Canada or Alaska”. A year later, in 
December 2006, he participated in the organisation of an “International Conference 
to Study the Global Vision of the Holocaust”, which aimed to explore how the 
Holocaust had been used to deny Palestinians their right to national self-
determination. Widely depicted as a Holocaust denial event, many politicians 
shunned the conference.568  
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In sum, in making the extravagant suggestion that the state of Israel should be 
relocated and in endorsing revisionism, President Ahmadinejad caused internal and 
external outrage and conflated perceptions of Iran’s foreign policy behaviour with his 
persona. For many, his statements illustrated his fundamentalism and the threat 
posed by Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear activities. His declarations, however, 
allowed him to increase his profile considerably. 
 
Iran and the world. Although foreign policy issues did not figure highly in his 
2005 election campaign, President Ahmadinejad proved to be profoundly proactive 
on this front. He regularly offered his views on the nature of the international system, 
and three interconnected points appeared quite consistently in his discourse.  
 
First, he shared Iranian officials’ perceptions (collective knowledge) that world 
politics was both unfair and organised to favour the Western core powers and their 
allies. He deplored the practices that regulated states’ interactions and denounced 
the “arrogant” and “bullying” Western powers for pursuing policies based on 
intimidation, double standards and injustice. He condemned the tendency amongst 
those powers to think of themselves as representing, and speaking on behalf of, the 
international community, thus failing to recognise states’ sovereign independence 
and equality: 
Some certain states are calling themselves a world manager and consider 
themselves to be the ruler, the possessor of the world. These countries 
consider themselves above other states and do not respect the rights of other 
nations. They wage wars and occupy lands by the virtue of various excuses 
[…] The world can’t be run by unilateralism and monopoly any longer. It is not 
acceptable to see that a select group of governments and countries consider 
themselves superior and prevent others from the world management [sic].569  
 
He often denounced the UN in both enabling and sustaining these situations of 
injustice and insecurity. In his opinion, the very institution in charge of regulating 
international relations had failed in its responsibility to promote the equality and 
security of all nations. It had become an instrument of threat or coercion at the hands 
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of the most powerful states. Nevertheless, President Ahmadinejad never disputed 
the existence of the UNSC nor the values it promotes. In 2009-2010, for example, he 
attempted to secure Iran a position as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.570 He 
denounced the organisation’s credibility and effectiveness and advocated a reform of 
its structure and working methods so that it could act as a peaceful and just 
organisation. As such, Ahmadinejad’s discourse on the UN was reminiscent of the 
grievances expressed by many developing states since the end of the Cold War.  
 
Second, Ahmadinejad believed that the power dynamics within the international 
system were immoral and unsustainable. The bullying powers were pursuing foolish 
policies, which were harming the interests of the oppressed nations as well as their 
own. As previously highlighted, Ahmadinejad came to power at a time when the 
world’s superpower was confronted by a rising tide of anti-Americanism and anguish 
over violence in Iraq and Afghanistan.571 The US was also entering a new era of 
competition with rising powers, especially China and Russia. In addition, anti-status 
quo and pro-Third World governments had come into power, especially in Latin 
America, and shared many of Iran’s grievances. 
 
Third, if the power dynamics within the international system were unfair and 
unsustainable, Ahmadinejad considered Iran to be in a position to offer an alternative 
to the current world order. As such, he shared the solidarity outlook of the 
Revolution. In his September 2012 speech for the 32nd anniversary of the 
commemoration of the Iran-Iraq war, he recalled that the “sacred defence was not 
defending a territory, a nation or a school of thought alone. It was well beyond that. It 
was defending human dignity, the rights of all nations and those of the oppressed 
people of the world”.572 In his view, Iran was guided by the very ideals of justice, 
spirituality and ethics which not only justified, but also required, that it play a 
proactive role in the international system. Amuzegar thus rightly concludes that 
Tactically, [Ahmadinejad] has changed Iran’s position from that of a defendant 
to that of a prosecutor. That is, instead of defending the regime’s socio-
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political policies against western accusations, Iranian diplomats are now 
required to highlight the West’s own shortcomings, present Iran’s grievances 
against the superpowers, and counter Washington’s “arrogance and 
hegemony.” The new orthodoxy has thus changed the earlier post-revolution 
slogans of rights and wrongs to those of justice and tyranny, and substituted 
the goal of exporting the revolution by offering moral guidance.573 
 
President Ahmadinejad’s opinions on the nature of the international system 
translated into a dual foreign policy strategy: resistance against imperialist policies 
towards Iran, the Middle East region and within international institutions on the one 
hand, and prioritisation of relations with “independent nations” and “emerging 
powers” on the other. As Ehteshami and Zweiri observe, “The conduct of Iran’s 
foreign relations represents a picture far from the idea of Ahmadinejad leading Iran 
down a path of isolation and painful retraction.”574 Quite the contrary, President 
Ahmadinejad sought to diversify Iran’s external relations. In his eyes, by working 
together more closely, “justice and freedom seeking countries” would be able to 
realise their ideals and limit the harmful influence of the “bullying powers”.575 
However, as I contend in chapter 6, he also showed a profound interest in the 
contentious topic of US-Iran relations.  
 
President Ahmadinejad tried to position himself as a spokesperson for developing 
and oppressed nations.576 He visited numerous countries, most of which were 
Muslim-dominated or widely viewed by the Western core powers and their allies as 
rogue, anti-American and anti-Western.577 As Warnaar contends, Ahmadinejad 
focussed less than Ayatollah Khamenei on Muslim communities and more on 
developing countries: “He [did] so by emphasizing their shared identity not just as 
victims of arrogant powers, but also as the cradles of culture, civilization, and of 
great thinkers and poets.”578  
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His relations with several Latin American heads of state were highly personal and 
“supplanted institutionalised, formal policies”.579 Such was the case with Chávez 
(Venezuela), Ortega (Nicaragua), Morales (Bolivia) and Correa (Ecuador). He 
sometimes attended functions he was not expected at, such as the March 2010 NPT 
Review Conference, where he was the only head of state.580 Several polls attested 
to his initial popularity in the Middle East.581 As Amuzegar writes: 
as much as he is admired in the East and South, he is vilified in the North and 
West. To millions of displaced Palestinian refugees, poor Arab masses in the 
street and a vast majority of Washington-bashers among the Non-Aligned 
Movement, he is a savvy and indisputable hero.582 
 
This quote must be contextualised, however, for the 2009 disputed presidential 
election may have damaged his reputation. 
 
The nuclear issue. Ahmadinejad regularly expressed himself on the nuclear 
issue both within and outside Iran. While this was unsurprising in view of the 
centrality of this policy challenge for Iran’s security, the tone and content of his 
declarations explain why and how Iran’s nuclear programme became significantly 
intertwined with his own persona.  
 
Within Iran, he transformed the nuclear issue from an elite matter to a popular one. 
He repeatedly discussed Iran’s nuclear policy during his trips and sought to rally 
popular support by “sloganeering about Iran’s ‘nuclear rights’, putting out stamps 
bearing an image of Natanz and declaring a “nuclear awareness day’”.583 In so 
doing, he bypassed his limited constitutional responsibilities and overshadowed the 
institutions formally entrusted with the foreign policy decision-making process.  
 
                                                          
579
 D. Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Overview,” in Iran in Latin America: Threat or “Axis of 
Annoyance”?, eds. C. Arnson, H. Esfandiari and A. Stubits, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the 
Americas no. 23, 2009, 14, accessed 27 April 2015, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf. 
580
 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, 394.   
581
 Kian highlights that the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies conducted a poll in August 
2006 on a sample of 1,700 Egyptians shortly after the Israel-Hezbollah war. The results showed a 
very large support for both Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, and President 
Ahmadinejad. An additional poll conducted by Al Jazeera later confirmed the popularity of the Iranian 
regime and President Ahmadinejad. See L’Iran: Un Mouvement Sans Révolution?, 163.    
582
 Amuzegar, “The Ahmadinejad Era,” 36. 
583
 Chubin, “The Domestic Politics of the Nuclear Question,” 103.  
144 
 
Externally, he positioned himself as a courageous, moral and justice-seeking 
president of a great nation that was the victim of the Western core powers’ 
discriminatory practices. His first statement abroad on the nuclear issue took place 
during the September 2005 UNGA, where he focused at length on the Western 
“propaganda ploy” and denounced “attempts to impose an apartheid regime on 
access to peaceful nuclear energy”.584 The expressions “apartheid regime” and 
“nuclear apartheid” were catchy and widely broadcast. For Ahmadinejad, the nuclear 
issue exemplified the pitfalls of the international system, especially the core powers’ 
policy double standards, violation of international treaties and instrumentalisation of 
international institutions.  
 
Furthermore, the nuclear issue enabled Ahmadinejad to position himself as a man of 
principle. He promoted an assertive strategy of not bowing to pressure. During his 
speech at the 2005 UNGA, he thus alluded to a stronger Iranian position on the 
nuclear issue: “if some try to impose their will on the Iranian people through resort to 
a language of force and threat with Iran, we will reconsider our entire approach to the 
nuclear issue.”585 Throughout his mandates, he thus likened Iran’s nuclear 
programme to “a train with no brakes and no reverse gear” and presented the 
accelerating nuclear activities as a strategy of resistance against imperialist 
policies.586  
 
Additionally, Ahmadinejad presented himself as a man of solutions, able to offer a 
noble outcome for the resolution of the nuclear issue. As per the example of the 
Palestine question, this was quite typical of his modus operandi: he would rarely 
condemn a situation without offering an alternative. During his September 2005 UN 
declaration, he thus made three offers. First, Iran was prepared to engage in 
partnerships with foreign private and public sectors for its uranium enrichment 
programme: “This represents the most far reaching step, outside all requirements of 
the NPT, being proposed by Iran as a further confidence building measure.”587 Thus, 
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far from advocating Iran’s withdrawal from the international instrument of regulation 
of nuclear activities, President Ahmadinejad seemed inclined to build the necessary 
trust and confidence to resolve the issue (see chapter 4). Second, he suggested that 
South Africa, a NNWS of the NPT and a unique witness of the apartheid regime, be 
involved in the negotiations. Finally, he proposed that the UNGA mandate “an ad-
hoc committee to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical 
mechanisms and strategies for complete disarmament”.588 This committee should 
also investigate Israel’s nuclear activities and help establish a nuclear weapon-free 
zone in the Middle East. This suggestion confirmed Ahmadinejad was critical of the 
UN but advocated reforms within the system rather than its abolition. 
 
In sum, President Ahmadinejad’s modus operandi within and outside Iran presents 
the picture of an official who embraced a very expansive interpretation of his role, 
responsibilities and capacity to influence. He systematically sought to position 
himself as a strong player in many aspects of Iran’s domestic and external politics. 
Since institutional avenues offered limited opportunities to assert his authority, he 
used informal means to capture power. His numerous trips, both within and outside 
the country, and his highly mediatised statements, enabled him to carve out 
opportunities to exist politically and position himself as a proactive leader driven by 
profound ethical principles and moral convictions. I agree with Maloney that the 
Iranian President had “a real talent for populist theatrics and bureaucratic 
gamesmanship”, which helped him outmanoeuvre his rivals.589  
 
Concluding Observations 
In this chapter, I have argued that Iran’s domestic politics during President 
Ahmadinejad’s two terms was characterised by the intertwined and interrelated 
dynamics of securitisation and polarisation. Additionally, it was marked by informal 
and formal attempts to delegitimise, isolate and contain the proactive and 
controversial President and his administration of perceived inexperienced and short-
sighted staff. The results of national elections between 2005 and 2013 revealed 
continuous curtailment of the reformists, profound divisions within the conservatives 
and the systematic isolation of President Ahmadinejad’s followers.   
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Information is scarce on the subject of Iran’s decision-making processes. Although 
this is not unique to Iran, its complex system of competing institutions, and formal 
and informal sources of influences over the policymaking processes, make it 
particularly difficult to assess how decisions were made and implemented. While the 
argument that the Supreme Leader remained Iran’s ultimate arbiter and decision-
maker led analysts and observers to assume that the country’s foreign policy 
decisions had his consent, it failed to provide any insight into the domestic jockeying 
for influence. Additionally, although the Ahmadinejad presidency witnessed an 
unusual display (in both content and intensity) of elite-level conflict, this did not shed 
much light on the ways in which foreign policy strategies were formulated and 
revised. In the following two sections, I suggest that the domestic political situation 
had two broad effects on Iran’s foreign policy orientation and processes.  
 
Diversion and the Rally Around the Flag Effect 
Key ideas of the diversionary theory of war may have some relevance in light of the 
domestic situation of extreme discontent and the regime’s contentious legitimacy. 
Broadly, the theory posits that unpopular leaders may generate or exploit foreign 
policy crises as a means to divert the public’s attention from dissatisfaction with their 
rule and bolster their legitimacy through a rally around the flag effect. Domestic 
issues can thus provide incentives for foreign policy diversions. I suggest that the 
nuclear issue may have provided two such opportunities for attention grabbing and 
legitimacy bolstering.  
 
First, as previously highlighted, President Ahmadinejad popularised the nuclear 
dispute and helped transform it into a matter of national dignity and rights.590 He 
continuously attempted to position himself as a man of principle who strove to uphold 
the principles of the Revolution and the norms, regulations and institutions that 
regulated the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This positioning helped him raise his 
internal and external profile and made it more difficult for his domestic opponents to 
silence and isolate him.   
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Second, the Ahmadinejad administration’s framing of the nuclear issue and 
(Western-led) sanctions may have been partly designed to heighten feelings of in-
group solidarity and support for the regime’s firm nuclear stance. As explored in the 
previous chapter, discourses of danger can help sustain and revive a state’s internal 
cohesion and legitimacy by maintaining Self-Other, us-them and superior-inferior 
dichotomies. In the official portrayal, the bullying and oppressive Others were 
presenting Iran, a deeply moral state actor, with profound material threats to its 
economic independence and physical security on the one hand, and ideological 
menaces to its national dignity and pride on the other. This framing of the nuclear 
issue called on nationalist feelings of solidarity and resistance. The issuing of new 
stamps celebrating Iran’s nuclear programme (2005), or 50,000 Rial notes bearing 
images of nuclear isotopes (2007), illustrated governmental efforts to mobilise the 
population. 
 
Additionally, the nuclear issue provided an avenue for the regime to reaffirm its very 
raison d’être as well as the relevance, righteousness and appeal of the Revolution. 
By framing the nuclear issue as a Western-led politically motivated attempt to 
undermine the IRI and prevent the development of the Iranian nation (see chapter 4), 
and as an issue of discrimination against the NNWSs of the NPT (see chapter 5), 
Iran articulated and instantiated its identities as a fiercely independent actor and a 
role model for oppressed nations. This framing may have aimed to distract from, if 
not overshadow, the regime’s weakened domestic legitimacy. In the post-2009 
context, the Iranian regime may have become more performance-dependent. 
  
Difficulties of Adapting Iran’s Foreign Policy  
The Iranian regime likely struggled to redefine, adapt and transform its foreign policy 
strategies, particularly from 2009 onwards. The extent to which a regime is secure 
profoundly affects its autonomy to devise and implement a coherent foreign policy 
strategy. The more fragmented a regime is, the more constraints it faces in its 
decision-making, in large part since it may not be supported by a sufficient degree of 
internal agreement. Iran’s weakened domestic legitimacy and its profound intra-elite 
disputes could thus have complicated consensus-building efforts, let alone its 
capacity to implement policy shifts and adapt to changing circumstances. As such, it 
is possible that Iran’s firm and consistent nuclear stance, especially its intransigence 
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in the face of mounting external pressures and its almost continuous acceleration of 
its nuclear activities (see chapter 4), could have been partly down to domestic 
paralysis.  
 
Furthermore, the abrupt and unexpected turnaround of the Iranian leadership 
following the 2009 Vienna Agreement signalled that a diplomatic resolution of the 
nuclear issue while President Ahmadinejad was in power was unacceptable to 
opponents from all sides of Iran’s political spectrum. This calls into question whether 
the Iranian regime was in a position to agree to a comprehensive agreement with the 
P5+1, let alone implement it, in the post-2009 context. Broadly, Iran made a request 
in June 2009 to the IAEA to buy fuel pads for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).591 
The reactor produced medical isotopes for hundreds of Iranian patients and its fuel 
pads were expected to run out by the end of 2010. On behalf of the so-called Vienna 
Group, which comprised France, Russia, the US and the IAEA, the Agency proposed 
that Iranian-produced Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) be exchanged for the supply of 
fabricated fuel.  
 
Two main developments showed that Iran’s domestic political situation was affecting 
its foreign policy. On the one hand, Iran continually delayed its responses to the 
Vienna group proposals and requested additional negotiations, thus potentially 
indicating paralysis of the decision-making process.592 On the other hand, the Iranian 
government unexpectedly revoked the modalities of the agreement with the Vienna 
Group shortly after its conclusion on 21 October 2009. Analysts widely attributed the 
regime’s change of position to the pressures exerted by President Ahmadinejad’s 
opponents, especially Mousavi, Larijani and Rafsanjani. Had the agreement been 
successful, he could have used it as a means to revive his political legitimacy.593 
Critics of the deal also condemned the fact that it deprived Iran of its rights under the 
NPT and threatened Iran’s national autonomy and independence.594 In particular, the 
agreement did not guarantee Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its national territory. 
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These considerations, in turn, call for additional observations on the Supreme 
Leader’s ruling strategy during the Ahmadinejad presidency.  
 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s Ruling Strategy 
In October 2011, Ayatollah Khamenei hinted at the possibility of altering the state’s 
political structure and eliminating the position of president.595 While former 
Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami had both profoundly challenged the Ayatollah’s 
relative authority and influence, the Ahmadinejad presidency posed a substantial 
threat to his personal rule, position and the overall system of the IRI. Despite these 
challenges, the Supreme Leader visibly opted for a strategy of “buying time” until the 
June 2013 presidential election. For example, in November 2012, he ordered the 
Majles not to summon Ahmadinejad over Iran’s economic situation.596 In February 
2013, shortly after the President played the secretly recorded tape in the Majles, 
Ayatollah Khamenei held an emergency meeting with Sadeq Larijani, the head of the 
Judiciary.597 Sadeq subsequently declared that, at the request of the Supreme 
Leader, he would not pursue the issue against President Ahmadinejad. Ayatollah 
Khamenei had repeatedly warned that internal divisions were playing in favour of 
Iran’s opponents, thus leading him to opt for strategies of repression and coercion, 
co-optation schemes via the electoral process and patronage, and the institutional 
and informal containment of the controversial President.  
 
Although Ayatollah Khamenei’s personal and institutional authority were severely 
challenged in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, it is important to 
emphasise that he continued to remain profoundly influential within Iran. He was able 
to rely on the vast and powerful network of supporters he had started to cultivate 
soon after taking up his position. From the late 1980s onwards, he extended his 
influence and authority through the creation, and henceforth consolidation, of an 
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independent base of support, “a personal network working as his ‘eyes and ears’”.598 
Ayatollah Khamenei enjoyed a relatively fragile religious and political authority when 
he first became Supreme Leader, especially in comparison to his charismatic 
predecessor and President Rafsanjani’s authority.599 He consequently expanded the 
Leadership Office to unprecedented proportions, which allowed him to exercise 
tremendous control over Iran’s politics, monitoring many aspects of the state’s 
policies through his closely interconnected, nationwide system of clerical 
commissars.600 According to Buchta, these commissars were “more powerful than 
ministers and other government functionaries”.601  
 
Ayatollah Khamenei also continued to exercise indirect control over vast sectors of 
Iran’s economy.602 While the Leadership Office benefited from a huge discretionary 
budget, the Supreme Leader was also responsible for appointing the directors of the 
bonyads, the powerful para-state institutions that held a substantial influence over 
Iran’s economy and acted as influential vehicles for patronage.603 In the summer of 
2009, they reportedly controlled an estimated 10 to 20 percent of Iran’s gross 
domestic product.604 In other words, the rentier structure of the economy, together 
with the Supreme Leader’s direct and indirect influence over state-owned 
enterprises, the bonyads and other organisations, helped ensure that the Iranian 
people were continuously provided with employment opportunities, subsidies and 
welfare benefits. Here, it is worth noting that the demonstrations in 2009 had come 
from a particular section of Iran’s middle class and failed to attract other 
constituencies.605 The IRI retained some ideological support, particularly in the 
poorer, rural areas of the country, where Iranians tend to be more pious and 
dependent on state-controlled media and support.  
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Finally, individuals profoundly loyal to the Supreme Leader continued to lead some 
of the country’s most powerful institutions, such as the Council of Guardians and the 
Judiciary. The Majles’ decision in December 2008 to exempt all financial and political 
activities under the Leadership Office from parliamentary oversight showed his 
authority.606 
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CHAPTER 4  
Contextualisation of Iran’s Nuclear Strategies of 
Resistance Through its Framing of its Programme and the 
Nuclear Issue 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the motives for, and aims of, Iran’s firm nuclear policy 
towards the EU-3, the P5+1 and the UNSC during the Ahmadinejad presidency. To 
do so, I first explore how Iran defined its interests in the field of nuclear energy and 
the value of its nuclear programme. I highlight that Iran’s determination to develop 
nuclear energy and acquire the full fuel cycle was founded on three mutually 
reinforcing factors: its rights as a NNWS party to the NPT; its corporate needs for 
autonomy, economic well-being and self-esteem; and its experience in the field of 
nuclear cooperation with the Western core powers.  
 
Second, I examine Iran’s nuclear policy from 2003 to 2005. The Khatami 
administration’s pursuit of a confidence-building approach with the IAEA and the EU-
3 is important for two main reasons. It shows that the Khatami and the Ahmadinejad 
administrations pursued the same objectives, thus attesting to a profound strategic 
consensus within the leadership that transcended factional divides and arguably 
revealed the Supreme Leader’s preferences and ambitions. Furthermore, Iran’s less 
conciliatory nuclear approach during the Ahmadinejad administration cannot be 
understood outside the context of Iran’s experience during the period 2003 to 2005. 
On the one hand, the failure of the October 2003 Tehran Statement and the 
November 2004 Paris Agreement to pave the way for the recognition of Iran’s 
nuclear programme, confirmed that the nuclear issue was a proxy in a wider struggle 
between the Iranian regime and the Western core powers and their allies. On the 
other hand, Iran’s conciliatory approach towards the IAEA and the EU-3 brought few 
tangible benefits and actually endangered its national interests. The Iranian regime 
and nation stood humiliated, their reputation and credibility discredited.  
 
Third, I build on the previous sections to contextualise the Ahmadinejad 
administration’s framing of the nuclear issue as a Western-led attempt to undermine 
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the IRI, prevent the development of the Iranian nation and transform the IAEA’s 
mandate. This threefold narrative, which competed with the portrayal of Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a threat to international security, profoundly structured how 
Iran chose to engage with its negotiation partners, the IAEA and the UNSC. In 
particular, I argue that Iran’s proclaimed resolve to develop indigenous nuclear 
energy capabilities, and its demonstrated scientific and technological achievements, 
were the responses of an aggrieved regime that was the victim of a hidden, illegal, 
illegitimate and immoral foreign agenda. Only by refusing to bow to external 
pressures, and by creating new, indisputable and undoable nuclear realities could 
Iran protect its national interests. Furthermore, Iran’s assertive nuclear stance was 
an indispensable reaction to the repeated humiliations the Iranian nation had 
experienced, whether in the form of unfulfilled agreements, degrading language, 
sanctions or the martyrdom of its scientists. In sum, Iran’s nuclear strategy under the 
Ahmadinejad administration was one of resistance based on legal and moralistic 
principles against the imperialist strategies of the Western core powers and the 
politically instrumentalised IAEA and UNSC.  
 
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: a Sine Qua Non for the State’s 
Corporate Needs 
Following August 2002’s public revelations of its concealed facilities and activities, 
Iran and its nuclear opponents engaged in a discursive battle over the regime’s 
intentions and the nature of its programme. As the introduction highlights, a very 
significant number of policymakers, academics and think tank analysts firmly 
believed that Iran was secretly pursuing nuclear weapons ambitions and aimed to 
become a nuclear threshold state at the very least. They also widely viewed Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a threat to international security; a perception that was 
embedded in their beliefs about the rogue state’s interests, ambitions and foreign 
policy practices. These views had important political consequences: the Iranian 
nuclear issue was a political and security challenge because several states firmly 
opposed the regime’s activities and were able to promote and implement policies to 
curtail and oversee its programme.  
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Iran systematically rejected accusations of nuclear weapons ambitions and 
depictions of its programme couched in threatening language. Officials put forward a 
profoundly consistent narrative that emphasised the legality and legitimacy of their 
nuclear activities.  
 
Peaceful Nuclear Energy: a Legal and Legitimate Right  
Iran’s nuclear energy rationale was rooted in arguments that intertwined legality and 
legitimacy. While each element was important in and of itself for the way in which 
Iran perceived itself and its scientific performance, their combination ensured that the 
leadership would be extremely resistant to the idea of renouncing its nuclear 
programme, especially its enrichment activities. 
 
A legal nuclear programme with no ulterior motives. Iranian officials 
continuously argued that their programme pursued two chief objectives: the 
production of fuel for Iran’s domestic economy and medical isotopes for its national 
health service. They also contended that the facilities they were installing to realise 
these ambitions were legal and in line with Article IV of NPT, whose first section 
refers to “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination”.607  
 
From the Iranian leadership’s viewpoint, the NPT provided an independent right of 
peaceful nuclear energy research, production and use, including uranium 
enrichment.608 In its August 2005 communication to the IAEA, Iran thus stated that 
its right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
cannot be undermined or curtailed under any pretext. Any attempt to do so, 
would be an attempt to undermine a pillar of the Treaty and indeed the Treaty 
itself. Iran, like any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, has no obligation to 
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negotiate and seek agreement for the exercise of its “inalienable” right, nor 
can it be obligated to suspend it.609 
 
As an official emphasised, “principles matter a great deal to Iran because justice and 
peace cannot exist if you don’t have these principles.”610 Consequently, the regime 
could not compromise Iran’s “inalienable rights” under the NPT.  
 
The Iranian leadership also rejected claims that it had illegally concealed nuclear 
facilities and activities from the IAEA. At the time of the revelations, Iran was subject 
to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which enabled the Agency to verify 
that a state’s nuclear programme was not diverted to military purposes and that all its 
nuclear activities had peaceful purposes only.611 Iran had not committed to any other 
agreement, such as the Additional Protocol (AP), which would have allowed the 
IAEA to increase its monitoring capacities. Indeed, until the AP was introduced in 
1997, the Agency’s assessment of the “correctness and completeness” of a state’s 
nuclear programme was limited to the state’s own declared activities.612 The AP, 
which provided the IAEA with greater investigative powers, aimed to complement the 
Safeguards Agreement to increase the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear 
weapons programme. According to the Arms Control Association,  
The essence of the Additional Protocol is to reshape the IAEA’s safeguards 
regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities 
of materials and monitoring declared activities to a qualitative system aimed at 
gathering a comprehensive picture of a state’s nuclear and nuclear-related 
activities, including all nuclear-related imports and exports.613  
 
The AP remained a voluntary agreement however.614  
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From the Iranian leadership’s viewpoint, it was not obligated under the terms of its 
Safeguards Agreement to inform the Agency about the construction of the Natanz 
and Arak facilities until six months before introducing nuclear material into them.615 
The unreported facilities constituted a violation of neither the NPT nor the IAEA’s 
Safeguards Agreement.616  
 
Furthermore, in a likely attempt to undermine suspicions of nuclear military intentions 
and articulate truth claims about Iran’s identity and normative principles, the regime 
continuously declared its opposition to nuclear weapons on religious and moral 
grounds.617 Ayatollah Khamenei issued an oral fatwa in October 2003, which 
characterised nuclear weapons as “a cardinal sin”, and condemned their 
development, production, stockpiling and use. Iranian officials frequently claimed that 
their Supreme Leader’s fatwa held more significance than the NPT. According to Ali 
Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s permanent representative to the IAEA during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency:  
Doubts about the fatwa are irrelevant. Our track record is clear. We have 
proven in practice that we are against using weapons of mass destruction, as 
we opted not to retaliate against Saddam’s use of chemical weapons during 
the Iran-Iraq War. Additionally, as the Supreme Leader is both a religious 
leader and the commander-in-chief, implementation of his edicts is 
compulsory.618 
 
In other words, if treaty-based commitments were insufficient to promote the 
necessary trust and confidence that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons 
ambitions, the internal “chain of command” demonstrated officials’ sole commitment 
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, while Iranians had fallen victim 
to the indiscriminate impact of WMDs during the Iran-Iraq war, the IRI had stood firm 
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against their use.619 This demonstrated that WMDs did not fit Iran’s ethical and 
normative self-images. In a February 2013 speech in the Iranian region of 
Azerbaijan, Ayatollah Khamenei also insisted that Iran’s normative condemnation of 
nuclear weapons was unrelated to the US: 
We do not want to make nuclear weapons. Not because America is upset 
over this, but because it’s our own belief. We believe that nuclear weapons 
are a crime against humanity and must not be produced and that those that 
already exist in the world must be eliminated. This is our belief. It has nothing 
to do with you.620 
 
Iran was thus guided by its own ethical concerns and its unequivocal stance on 
WMDs remained unaffected by the superpower’s position or political pressure.  
 
Iranian officials also rejected the production and use of nuclear weapons on strategic 
grounds. They continuously insisted that Iran’s security doctrine was based on 
deterrence, not offensive action, thus challenging Iran’s rogue and power-seeking 
image. They also argued that nuclear weapons would have no deterrent value since 
Iran’s negotiation partners already possessed vast and high-quality nuclear arsenals. 
To the contrary, nuclear weapons would increase Iran’s strategic vulnerability:  
Iran is negotiating with group of 5+1, which includes 5 nuclear weapon states, 
on the basis of mutual respect and on equal basis. If, hypothetically Iran 
decides to manufacture nuclear weapons; it would not be able to compete 
with the nuclear weapon states whom possessing over 20,000 nuclear 
warheads. As far as number of nuclear weapons is concerned, dealing with 5 
nuclear powers would then be at disadvantage and weaker position, no more 
in an equal footing, as it is the case now, therefore it would be a strategic 
mistake for Iran to go for nuclear weapons [sic].621 
 
In a 2007 article, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the 
UN from 2002 to 2007, similarly highlighted that nuclear weapons never provided 
domestic stability or external security and “Even the perception that Iran is pursuing 
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nuclear weapons negatively impacts Iran’s power by decreasing its regional 
influence and increasing its global vulnerabilities.”622  
 
Iran thus partly framed its nuclear programme as a legal undertaking. As a NNWS 
party to the NPT, it had a legal right to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear materials, 
including uranium enrichment activities. Its firm condemnation and rejection of 
nuclear weapons also served to emphasise its normative and strategic commitment 
to the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran, in other words, was 
pursuing neither the illegal activities nor the concealed ambitions that other actors 
attributed to it. Before exploring the second aspect of Iran’s narrative of its nuclear 
programme, it is important to emphasise that the IAEA’s December 2015 report 
challenged the argument that the regime had not illegally concealed nuclear facilities 
and activities from the Agency. Entitled “Final Assessment on Past and Present 
Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme”, the report noted that: 
The Agency’s overall assessment is that a range of activities relevant to the 
development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the 
end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. 
The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond 
feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant 
technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible 
indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear 
explosive device after 2009.623 
 
A legitimate programme for autonomy, economic well-being and self-
esteem. Iran also framed its nuclear programme as the legitimate undertaking of a 
sovereign state that had an objective need for nuclear energy. First, in view of its 
growing population, rising domestic energy demands and aging energy 
infrastructures, Iran contended that it needed to rely on a mix of energy sources and 
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less on oil revenues. Nuclear energy would thus contribute to its long-term energy 
security and enhance its economic well-being and autonomy.  
 
Such concerns can be understood in the context of the Revolution, which conceived 
self-sufficiency and economic independence to be crucial to the country’s ability to 
achieve genuine political independence.624 While systematic attempts were made to 
minimise the constraints of economic dependency on its autonomy and sovereignty, 
the unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran profoundly revived the 
leadership’s urge to address the country’s structural weaknesses and reduce its 
dependence on oil revenues (e.g. 2011 the year of economic jihad). 
 
Second, the Iranian leadership claimed that nuclear energy would produce a positive 
snowball effect in other scientific areas. Ambassador Soltanieh, who emphasised 
that he was a nuclear physicist by training (legitimacy claim), presented this ambition 
as follows in interview:  
The nuclear technology is the meeting point of the highest standards of 
different disciplines. It means that, if a country embarks on a nuclear 
technology, that country needs the highest calibre of engineers and scientists 
[…] in civil engineering, mechanics, metallurgy, electronics, all this. Therefore, 
the universities have to train top scientists, top graduates in science and 
technology. Therefore, you won’t be surprised that this country will jump from 
developing country to developed country.625  
 
Nuclear energy, Iranian officials hoped, would accelerate Iran’s scientific and 
technological development, create new economic prospects and, in turn, strengthen 
its internal and external reputation and prestige.626  
 
Here, it is worth recalling that, both prior to and since the Revolution, Iran had 
aspired to great status among the powerful and respected nations of the world, and 
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placed great importance in scientific and technological development.627 The 
Ahmadinejad administration took forward this ambition in its Strategic 20-Year Plan 
for the period 2005 to 2025, which sought to transform Iran into a developed country, 
ranking first in the region economically, scientifically and technologically.628 Its 
nuclear programme was “part and parcel of this thrust for demonstrable development 
– demonstrating Iran’s arrival as an industrialised nation”.629 It was a crucial 
component in its journey towards greater economic well-being, autonomy and status. 
As Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2010, explains: 
The right of the people of Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear technology is a 
clear example of the realisation of the “right to development”, “right to natural 
resources” and “right to self-determination”. Such rights are among the 
fundamental rights of nations.630  
 
Additionally, Ayatollah Khamenei continuously valorised and emphasised national 
development and self-determination: 
A recurring theme in Khamenei’s speeches is the causal relationship linking 
scientific advancement, self-sufficiency, and political independence. His ideal 
vision is of an Iran that is scientifically and technologically advanced enough 
to be self-sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be economically independent, 
and economically independent enough to be politically independent.631 
 
The Supreme Leader clarified, in a September 2007 address to “young elites”, 
however, that the national determination to build a scientifically developed country 
did not mean westernising it: 
These two must not be confused. Westerners enjoy a high level of scientific 
progress, but their scientific progress is contaminated by other things, which 
we avoid. We loathe being westernized. We only seek science. The current 
knowledge of the so-called advanced countries is dangerous for humanity. 
Westerners have used science to make wars, encourage violence, and 
advertise prostitution and sex. They have also used it for supplying drugs, 
invading and colonizing other nations, and spilling blood […] We seek to use 
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science as a means to serve humanity, justice, peace, and security. That is 
what we seek. Islam has advised us to pursue such science.632 
 
This quote, much like his argument on Iran’s condemnation of nuclear weapons, 
reveals that Iran profoundly defined itself, its ethical principles and scientific 
interests, in juxtaposition to its significant Other, the US – a point I develop further in 
chapter 6.  
 
Iran’s nuclear programme was thus embedded in a structure of meaning that 
emphasised its legality and legitimacy. Its quest for peaceful nuclear energy was 
conceived as crucial to its national interests, particularly in light of the technology’s 
ability to satisfy Iran’s corporate needs of economic well-being, autonomy and self-
esteem. Iranian officials, however, also emphasised that indigenous capabilities 
were essential.  
 
An Indigenous Nuclear Energy Programme for Genuine Independence 
Following the Revolution, Iran’s external partners unilaterally dissolved their 
contracts to build nuclear power plants in Iran or withheld nuclear material that the 
Shah’s regime had purchased.633 In addition, several nuclear agreements were 
implemented with long delays.634 These past experiences strongly informed Iran’s 
post-revolutionary nuclear strategy, thus confirming Wendt’s argument that “history 
matters”.  
 
History cannot repeat itself. Iran’s experience of Western countries violating 
their contractual obligations and the NPT “in complete impunity” produced the 
expectation that such an experience could occur again.635 Such was the regime’s 
narrative. Whether this concern over the country’s autonomy in the field of nuclear 
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energy was more instrumental than genuine, it nevertheless remained central to the 
argument that Iran needed to be able to develop the full fuel cycle. In 2006, Ali 
Larijani, the Secretary of the SNSC, thus declared that “it is possible that other 
countries will one day decide to stop supplying nuclear fuel to Iran and we should 
therefore be capable of producing it ourselves as a manifestation of our national 
dignity and independence.”636 Iran could not accept dependence on external 
procurement of nuclear fuel. Only indigenous nuclear capabilities would ensure its 
autonomy and interests. They were a sine qua non to Iran’s “national dignity and 
independence”. As Zarif articulates, although domestic production of fuel for nuclear 
power plants was economically sound, “Iran’s decision should not be judged solely 
on economic grounds.”637 It was also informed by its experience of the US’ 
systematic attempts to restrict all aspects of its nuclear programme, and the regime’s 
determination that Iran would never again be dependent and “hostage to the political 
whims of suppliers in a tightly controlled market”.638  
  
Lessons learnt and the necessity of concealing Iran’s nuclear activities. 
Iran’s nuclear experience following the Revolution also served as a justification for 
the leadership’s decision to acquire nuclear technology and capability covertly. 
Mousavian summarises this logic as follows:  
Iran, due to sanctions and pressure from the West, had no option other than 
to obtain materials and technology for its civilian nuclear program secretly and 
on the black market. For Iran to declare to the IAEA far in advance its 
intention to build a new enrichment facility would only make it easier for 
Western countries to prevent Iran from obtaining the necessary materials and 
technology.639  
 
In this narrative, Iran did not turn to the black market because it was inherently 
deceitful and defiant but because of the behaviour of its key nuclear partners in the 
aftermath of the Revolution. It is their actions that encouraged such dynamics. Zarif 
uses a carefully calibrated choice of words when he writes that “Iran was left with no 
option but to be discrete in its peaceful activities.”640  
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Furthermore, the regime’s rationale for not declaring “to the IAEA far in advance its 
intention to build a new enrichment facility” illustrates the role of beliefs in 
constituting behaviour. Iran defined its posture in view of the importance it attributed 
to its nuclear programme, and its expectation that the US and European 
governments would seek to prevent its policy. Thus, and quite paradoxically, Iran’s 
expectations regarding the policies that these states would pursue produced the very 
type of behaviour which would later confirm, rather than undermine, the latter’s 
beliefs that the IRI was a rogue regime.  
 
To conclude, Iran continuously put forward a cohesive counter-narrative to the one 
that portrayed its nuclear programme as a weapons programme and a threat to 
international security. As an Iranian official explained, “Iran’s nuclear programme 
[was] a matter of pride and independence.”641 The intertwining of treaty-based rights 
(legality) and corporate needs (legitimacy) strongly explains the leadership’s 
unfaltering commitment to its nuclear programme throughout the period 2002 to 
2013. Furthermore, Iran’s insistence on developing indigenous nuclear energy 
capabilities was informed by its past negative experiences with the Western core 
powers, especially the US, France and Germany. The fact that these same states 
would, from 2002 onwards, be the key proponents of a constrained Iranian nuclear 
programme, heightened Iran’s need for indigenous capabilities. This became 
particularly true after the Khatami administration’s confidence-building approach 
towards the IAEA and the EU-3 failed to secure recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights.  
 
Iran’s Nuclear Policy during the Khatami Presidency 
The Khatami administration’s nuclear negotiation strategy was remembered with 
much bitterness within Iran and repeatedly condemned by the Ahmadinejad 
administration. From the principlists’ viewpoint, the regime’s confidence-building 
approach during the period 2002 to 2005 failed to bring tangible results and, instead, 
compromised Iran’s journey to become a more economically independent and 
secure country, as well as its image and identity as an independent force.  
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To shed light on this key formative experience, I outline Iran’s negotiation approach 
towards the IAEA and the EU-3. I also explore how Iran defined its nuclear and 
national interests in the context of the October 2003 Tehran Statement and the 
November 2004 Paris Agreement, and how the failure to reach a comprehensive 
agreement ultimately necessitated a less conciliatory and more assertive approach.  
 
Confidence Building to Secure Iran’s Nuclear Rights 
At the time of the public revelations of Iran’s covert facilities, significant 
developments were taking place within both Iran’s regional environment (e.g. the 
2001 military intervention in Afghanistan) and the international system (e.g. the US’ 
War on Terror and preventive first strike option policy). The January 2002 Axis of Evil 
speech had also singled out Iran as a key agent and exporter of “terror”. Within this 
context, the Khatami administration rapidly moved to manage and respond to what 
was emerging as an international security challenge and a key subject of media, 
political and analytical focus. In line with President Khatami’s détente policy, Iran 
opted for a confidence-building strategy to provide the assurances required by the 
IAEA, secure the formal recognition of its legal rights to nuclear energy and prevent 
a referral from the IAEA Board of Governors to the UNSC.  
 
Iran and the IAEA: modifying the Safeguards Agreement, negotiating an 
AP. The August 2002 revelations prompted the beginning of the IAEA’s inspection 
activities, which continuously paralleled the diplomatic negotiations between Iran and 
the EU-3/P5+1. The Agency published its first report on Iran’s nuclear activities in 
June 2003 and its resolution in September 2003. Although the IAEA did not cite any 
violations of the NPT per se, it identified three chief failures of notification: the 
importation of natural uranium in 1991, the Natanz enrichment facility and the heavy 
water production plant at Arak.642 By framing the issue as a failure of transparency, 
the IAEA seized on the matter, and encouraged Iran to “promptly and unconditionally 
sign, ratify and fully implement the additional protocol” on the grounds that “Without 
such protocols in force, the Agency’s ability to provide credible assurances regarding 
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the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited.”643 Additionally, Iran was 
asked to “suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the 
further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and, as a confidence-building 
measure, any reprocessing activities”.644  
 
In February 2003, Iran had announced that it would accept modifications to its 
Safeguards Agreement, which would “require the early provision of design 
information on new facilities and on modifications to existing facilities”.645 In addition, 
in a letter dated 24 August 2003, Iran informed the IAEA that it was prepared to 
begin negotiations on the AP.646 Rouhani, Iran’s lead negotiator and the Secretary of 
the SNSC, the body now in charge of Iran’s nuclear decision-making processes, 
justified these decisions in view of the new “emergency conditions”.647 These most 
likely referred to the IAEA 2003 resolution and the particular circumstance of the 
international context of the time.  
 
Importantly, Iran presented its nuclear-related decisions as ones of goodwill and 
transparency. Although not legally obliged to adopt an AP, Iran was willing to comply 
with these additional responsibilities to increase international confidence in its 
nuclear intentions.648 Iranian officials strongly emphasised the voluntary nature of the 
AP and that the suspension of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities could not be interpreted as a legal entitlement of the IAEA under its 
transparency and verification mandates.  
 
This is a particularly significant point: from the publication of the Agency’s first report 
on Iran’s nuclear activities to the end of the Ahmadinejad presidency, the leadership 
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took great pains to identify, differentiate and articulate its legal rights as a state party 
to the NPT, the IAEA’s legal mandate and the extra-legal demands that were placed 
on Iran. While Iran proved willing to abide by additional and extra-legal provisions, 
the regime made it clear that these could not be forced upon it. Iran’s insistence that 
its confidence-building measures be clearly differentiated from its legal obligations 
allowed it to portray itself as both a responsible state party to the NPT and a 
constructive member of the international community (see chapter 5). It also indicated 
the leadership’s determination that Iran be treated indiscriminately and its nuclear 
rights be fully recognised. It is also worth noting that during the Khatami and the 
Ahmadinejad administrations, Iranian officials systematically emphasised that the 
nuclear issue started in 2003 following the results of the IAEA investigations in 
Natanz and Arak. In so doing, they negated the political significance of 
Jafarzadeh/the NCRI’s public revelations and emphasised the Agency’s sole 
expertise in assessing the nuclear programmes of the state parties to the NPT. 
 
Iran and the EU-3: resolving the nuclear issue through dialogue. Soon 
after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, and the 
publication of the June 2003 IAEA report, Iran and the EU-3 entered a process of 
diplomatic negotiations, which requires three main observations.  
 
First, while the EU-3’s ad hoc approach to addressing the Iranian nuclear challenge 
was unusual, it was not unprecedented. Since the end of the Cold War, states or 
groups of states had attempted to address nuclear proliferation challenges either 
unilaterally (e.g. the 2005 Indo-US nuclear initiative) or multilaterally (e.g. the 
preventive war against Iraq’s WMD programme in 2003).649 This trend aimed to 
complement traditional institutional approaches, such as the NPT, and non-treaty 
based multilateral strategies, such as the various UN declarations and UNSC 
Resolutions.650  
 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of 9/11, the EU recognised the proliferation of WMDs 
as a growing threat to international peace and security, and began to “formulate a 
                                                          
649
 W. P. S. Sidhu, “The Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime,” in Security Studies: An 
Introduction, ed. P. D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2012), 421-22. 
650
 Ibid., 419, 421.  
167 
 
stronger, more coherent policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction”.651 In December 2003, the European Council adopted its first European 
Security Strategy and an EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD.652 The latter 
called for the universalisation of multilateral agreements as well as stronger 
compliance with the existing processes of multilateral arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament. It also advocated stronger capabilities to detect treaties’ violations 
and the possibility of relying on coercive strategies under Chapter VII of the UN 
when measures to prevent nuclear proliferation fail.653 Importantly, the EU advocated 
a “holistic” approach to address the root causes of nuclear proliferation.654 For 
example, it identified that a stable international and regional environment was an 
essential condition: 
The best solution […] is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If 
possible, political solutions should be found to the problems which lead them 
to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to 
abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle 
just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race.655 
 
In late 2003, the EU was thus more willing and better prepared to deal with a nuclear 
proliferation challenge, including on an ad hoc basis.  
 
Second, the diplomatic track record between Iran and the EU-3 reflected the 
significant security concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities, which, from the 
perspective of the US, the EU and many of their regional allies, needed to be 
resolved as soon as possible. As such, the parallel negotiations were designed to 
complement, if not accelerate, the IAEA investigations. They were intended to 
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persuade Iran to provide greater transparency regarding the history, scope and 
purpose of its programme and thereby restore the necessary trust and confidence in 
its activities and intentions.  
 
From Iran’s perspective, a goodwill nuclear policy would help diffuse the crisis and 
secure its rights. However, the dual dimension of the nuclear issue, a technical 
investigation by the IAEA and parallel diplomatic negotiations, had mixed 
consequences for the Iranian regime. The involvement of the EU-3 (and later the 
P5+1) contributed to the politicisation of its nuclear programme since the 
investigations and the negotiations were not solely the preserve of the IAEA; a point 
that I develop below. 
 
Third, the fact that the European states took the lead in the negotiations with Iran 
showed their profound disagreements with the Bush administration. The US had 
argued that the issue should be brought immediately before the UNSC. European 
leaders, however, emphasised the importance of resolving the nuclear issue through 
diplomacy.656 In addition, the EU had promoted a strategy of dialogue and 
conditional engagement with Iran since the late 1980s. During the Rafsanjani 
presidency, the EU adopted the “Critical Dialogue” (1992-1997), which sought to 
influence the regime on key areas of concern, especially human rights, regional 
stability and terrorism.657 In contrast, the US had pursued a policy of active 
containment from 1995 onwards, which included increasingly severe economic 
sanctions. President Khatami’s election in 1997 opened new opportunities for Iran 
and the EU with the inauguration of a “Comprehensive Dialogue”, which offered 
further incentives for cooperation. In particular, the EU began to negotiate a 
comprehensive Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran in 2002, which linked 
deeper economic and diplomatic relations with progress in human rights, non-
proliferation, terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process. A contrario, the Bush 
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administration launched its Greater Middle East initiative in June 2004, which sought 
to actively transform the countries of the region into democratic societies.658  
 
In sum, the US and the EU profoundly disagreed on the types of strategies that were 
desirable and effective to encourage the Iranian regime to transform its internal and 
external behaviours, and its nuclear policy in particular. The October 2003 and 
November 2004 agreements reflected the EU’s preferences for a hybrid and holistic 
policy approach. 
  
The 2003 Tehran Statement and the 2004 Paris Agreement. The EU-3 and 
the Khatami administration concluded two major agreements between 2003 and 
2005.  
 
The Tehran Statement was adopted on 21 October 2003 and was a significant 
agreement that endorsed Iran’s rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy under the 
NPT and stressed that the issue could be resolved by the IAEA. In addition, the 
statement clarified EU support for long-term cooperation with Iran in nuclear energy 
and regional security. This reflected the EU’s willingness to address Iran’s security 
situation and create incentives to influence the regime’s nuclear policy.  
 
Under the terms of the Tehran Statement, Iran committed to engage in full 
cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve all of the Agency’s outstanding 
questions.659 Furthermore, Iran signed the AP, commenced ratification procedures 
and began its full implementation of the Protocol. As such, in addition to allowing for 
expansive IAEA inspections, Iran suspended all activities related to uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing. These measures were presented as means to 
“promote confidence” and confirm its “good intentions”.660 The Tehran Statement, 
however, emphasised that Iran’s suspension of its activities did not contravene its 
rights to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: “the Additional Protocol is in 
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no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity or national security of 
its State Parties.”661 Rouhani warned that, in case of referral to the UNSC, Iran would 
immediately suspend implementation of the AP and resume its enrichment 
activities.662 Thus, while a solution to the nuclear issue could not single out Iran and 
enact restrictions to which other NNWSs were not subject, Iran nevertheless 
accepted short-term interruptions to the parts of its programme which were of 
greatest concern. 
 
On 14 November 2004, the EU-3 and Iran concluded the Paris Agreement, which 
built on the Tehran Statement. Iran pursued its confidence-building policy, affirming 
that it would “continue implementing voluntarily the Additional Protocol pending 
ratification”.663 In addition, the Agreement specified that Iran had decided “on a 
voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment 
related and reprocessing activities”.664 The EU-3 presented these suspensions as “a 
voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation”, thus recognising 
Iran’s rights under the NPT “without discrimination”.665 Furthermore, Iran and the EU-
3 clarified the timeline and the principles of their mutually acceptable agreement, 
trading “objective guarantees” (i.e. Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle was for peaceful 
purposes only) for “firm guarantees” (i.e. political, security, technology and nuclear 
cooperation between Iran and the EU-3 would continue). In particular, the agreement 
clarified that, as soon as the IAEA confirmed the full suspension of Iran’s 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, negotiations on a trade and 
cooperation agreement would resume, and the EU would actively support the 
opening of negotiations on accession to the World Trade Organisation with Iran. 
Finally, the Paris Agreement specified several key security concerns on which the 
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EU-3 and Iran would cooperate, “irrespective of progress on the nuclear issue”. 
These included the activities of Al Qaeda and the Iraqi political process.  
 
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
declared that the November 2004 Agreement represented the beginning of “a new 
chapter” in EU-Iran relations.666 Mousavian similarly argued that this was a truly 
historical opportunity since an enhanced cooperation between the two parties “had 
the potential to enhance Iran’s position in regional and global security arrangements 
as well as its economic situation”.667 As such, and as I analyse in the following 
chapter, if the EU-3 was using the carrot of cooperation on economic, security and 
nuclear energy matters to induce Iran to comply with the IAEA’s investigations, the 
nuclear issue was also providing Iran with a wider geopolitical opportunity. The 
negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 stumbled after the conclusion of the Paris 
Agreement however. 
 
“Objective” and “Firm Guarantees” Between External and Domestic Pressures  
Before the end of the Khatami presidency, Iran put forward four proposals to the EU-
3 (17 January, 23 March, 29 April and 18 July 2005). The EU-3 proposed one 
negotiation agreement (5 August 2005). These offers largely paralleled each other 
and demonstrated an increasing distance between Iran and the EU-3, particularly as 
each side sought to prioritise its respective expectations of “objective” or “firm” 
guarantees.  
 
The Khatami administration put great stock in its March 2005 proposal.668 It provided 
exhaustive details of the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to provide to 
enhance international trust and confidence in its nuclear programme. Entitled 
“General Framework for Objective Guarantees, Firm Guarantees, and Firm 
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Commitments”, the proposal included a step-by-step approach in four distinct phases 
and simultaneous actions to be undertaken by the EU-3 and Iran at each stage. This 
provided a strategy to deal with the issue of mutual mistrust. According to the terms 
of the March 2005 proposal, Iran would first develop the least sensitive aspects of its 
enrichment programme and move to its more delicate components as confidence 
increased. Iran offered “enhanced monitoring” of its nuclear activities, in the form of 
continued implementation of the AP and the constant on-site presence of IAEA 
inspectors at its conversion and enrichment facilities.669 
 
The EU-3 did not respond to Iran’s March proposal and presented, instead, a 
“Framework for a Long-Term Agreement” in August 2005.670 Key in the EU-3 
proposal was the demand that Iran “make a legally binding commitment not to 
withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards under all circumstances”. Although illustrative of the concerns that Iran 
would chose to “break out” and act like North Korea, this demand essentially called 
on Iran to renounce its sovereign right to withdraw from an international treaty. 
Furthermore, the EU-3 demanded that Iran make “a binding commitment not to 
pursue fuel-cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water 
power and research reactors”, and acquire its fuel through external sources. In 
effect, Iran was asked to renounce the full spectrum of its rights under the NPT. The 
proposal also stated that Iran’s “binding commitment” not to pursue fuel cycle 
technologies would be subject to review every ten years.  
 
For the Khatami administration, the EU-3 offer was a significant setback since it 
failed to formally recognise Iran’s right to enrichment and showed an intention to 
treat Iran differently from the other NNWSs of the NPT. It was also unclear whether 
Iran would ever be able to pursue fuel-cycle activities as it would first need to restore 
international confidence, an unspecific variable which the US and others could 
instrumentalise. The package was thus deemed “insulting” and an “empty box”.671 An 
Iranian official stated in interview that “the Europeans were treating the Iranians in a 
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very cheap way” and their proposal was “disrespectful”.672 President Ahmadinejad 
declared that the European proposal was “an insult to the Iranian nation. They have 
talked in a way as if the Iranian nation was suffering from backwardness and the 
time was 100 years ago and our country was their colony”.673  
 
From Iran’s perspective, the EU-3 had broken the terms of the Paris Agreement. On 
1 August 2005, in the final days of the Khatami administration, Iran thus notified the 
IAEA that it would resume its uranium conversion activities at the Isfahan facility. In 
its communication to the Agency, Iran insisted that it had “repeatedly expanded its 
voluntary confidence building measures only to be reciprocated by broken promises 
and expanded requests”.674 It had become evident that the EU-3 was pursuing 
“prolonged and fruitless negotiations, thereby prejudicing the exercise of Iran’s 
inalienable right to resume its legal enrichment activities”.675  
 
To understand why the 2003 Tehran Statement and the 2004 Paris Agreement failed 
to pave the way for a long-term, mutually beneficial nuclear agreement between Iran 
and the EU-3, key external and internal power dynamics must be incorporated into 
the analysis. 
 
The US position on Iran’s enrichment technology. The trade that the Paris 
Agreement laid out between “objective guarantees” and “firm guarantees” failed, in 
large part, due to the EU-3’s inability to provide the necessary guarantees for Iran to 
develop peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT. More 
specifically, the European negotiators were constrained by the US’ continuous 
refusal to accept, let alone formally recognise, an agreement which would leave Iran 
with dual-use technologies. The Bush administration viewed the IRI as a threat to 
international security, and a key member of a so-called international “axis of evil”, 
thus maintaining a zero-enrichment objective and dismissing Iran’s nuclear claims.676  
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The differing positions of the US and the EU-3 significantly affected diplomatic 
attempts to resolve the nuclear issue. As Kaussler persuasively argues, the EU-3 
was successful in creating a diplomatic engagement and preventing a military 
intervention against Iran but “ultimately failed to implement an effective problem-
solving strategy”.677 On the one hand, the Bush administration wanted to declare Iran 
non-compliant with the NPT so that the nuclear issue could be referred to the 
UNSC.678 On the other hand, the EU-3 increasingly adopted the US policy of 
demanding cessation of enrichment.679 In turn, this external context put significant 
limitations on the Khatami administration’s room to manoeuvre.  
 
Mounting domestic pressures in Iran. The Khatami administration’s 
goodwill and confidence-building nuclear policy had significant domestic political 
consequences. First, divisions in Iran’s elite increased as it became clear that the 
negotiation strategy was compromising Iran’s rights under the NPT and leading to 
discriminatory policies against its programme. Rouhani’s National Security and 
Nuclear Diplomacy (2011) and Mousavian’s The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir 
(2012) offer insights into the internal dynamics and security calculus that guided 
Iran’s nuclear negotiations during the period 2003 to 2005.680 Both insist that the 
suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities was the result of a heightened debate within 
official circles.681 The argument that such an approach was the best option to protect 
Iran’s national interests had prevailed, at a time when the US was pursuing a 
confrontational foreign policy and wished to refer Iran to the UNSC.682  
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However, Iran’s policy was contingent upon the prospect of securing a formal 
recognition of its rights to peaceful nuclear energy. As such, when the negotiations 
stumbled after the 2004 Paris Agreement, at a time when conservatives of different 
shades had come to dominate the Majles (following the March 2004 elections), and 
all Iranian factions were preparing for the upcoming June 2005 presidential election, 
the Khatami administration’s push for policies of engagement and incentives beyond 
the legal requirements of the NPT lost ground. Various forces within Iran, including 
extremely influential personalities such as Ali Larijani and Ahmad Jannati, were 
strongly opposed to the pursuit of such strategies with the EU-3.683 From their 
perspective, the two years spent pursuing intensive negotiations had led to the 
recognition of neither Iran’s right to enrichment nor the promised nuclear, economic 
and security guarantees. In addition, they had endangered Iran’s independence 
through facilitating external interference in its sovereign affairs. According to Ansari, 
the recently elected Parliament was averse to ratifying the AP and insisted that Iran 
should exercise all its national rights. As per the diversionary theory of war (see 
chapter 3), this emphasis on nationalism partly aimed to compensate for the 
Parliament’s legitimacy deficit: 
Nuclear developments, particularly the need to enrich uranium, became an 
iconic issue that would brook no questions, not even those relating to the cost 
of the venture. It became an exercise in vulgar nationalism, a hijacking of an 
ideology in the interests of power that disguised the supreme irony: a 
Parliament elected on the basis of contempt for the national will presenting 
itself as the protector of that nation.684 
 
Second, Ayatollah Khamenei appears to have shifted position. In January 2008, 
reflecting on Iran’s two-year suspension of its enrichment activities, he declared:  
We, for our part, imagined that it was temporary and imagined that it was 
voluntary. Then, when we talked of resuming work, they started this media 
frenzy and tumult in political circles, saying. “Woe! Iran wants to end the 
suspensions!” The suspension became a sacred issue that Iran had 
absolutely no right to approach. […] Finally, they said, “This temporary 
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suspension isn’t enough; you must completely pack the whole atomic project 
in.” This was a setback for us.685 
 
Consequently, he decided to end “the course of retreat” and instructed the Khatami 
administration to start “a course of advancing”.686 Since the negotiations were being 
used as a means to prolong the suspension of Iran’s enrichment activities 
indefinitely, a change of approach was necessary to defend the country’s rights, 
sovereignty, independence and honour. Rouhani reportedly informed European 
negotiators in April 2005 that Ayatollah Khamenei had instructed that the uranium 
conversion activities at Isfahan recommence.687 In addition, in his 18 July 2005 letter 
to the EU-3, Rouhani warned the negotiators that they should not use Iran’s 
presidential election as an excuse not to move forward, especially since the new 
administration would honour past agreements.688 Officials within the Khatami 
administration may have thus likely attempted to warn of the escalating domestic 
pressures and limited manoeuvrability.689 
 
Third, discontent within the Iranian leadership was matched by the dissatisfaction of 
individuals and groups working for the Iran Atomic Energy Organisation and within 
the wider field of nuclear energy (i.e. students and academics), for whom the 
suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities meant that they could no longer carry out their 
research and development projects. At the end of October 2003, about 500 students 
from the most prestigious engineering school in Iran and 240 faculty members from 
different universities wrote two open letters asking the government to be careful with 
its promises to the IAEA.690 In October 2004, 1,375 professors signed a similar letter 
calling for the resumption of enrichment activities. The Khatami administration’s 
nuclear policy was thus facing simultaneous top-down and bottom-up criticisms and 
pressures.  
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To conclude, the period from 2003 to 2005 constituted the first phase of the Iranian 
nuclear issue. The Khatami administration pursued a proactive, confidence-building 
strategy in its interaction with the IAEA and the EU-3 in an attempt to secure Iran’s 
rights to peaceful nuclear energy, prevent the referral of the nuclear dossier to the 
UNSC and set out the terms for a wider geostrategic partnership between Iran and 
Europe. Iran’s voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing activities clearly illustrated the regime’s understanding that its dual-use 
technologies were particularly sensitive for its negotiation partners, who had limited 
trust and confidence in its intentions and behaviours. Similarly, the regime’s 
emphasis of the point that its policy of suspension did not contravene any of Iran’s 
rights under the NPT reflected its own limited trust and confidence vis-à-vis its 
European counterparts’ intentions (and those of the US and its regional allies). 
External pressures, especially from the US, and changing domestic circumstances in 
light of the limited policy results of the Iran-EU-3 talks, significantly affected Iran’s 
nuclear negotiation strategy towards the end of the Khatami administration. 
According to an Iranian official, in his National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy, 
Rouhani shows that the government had no choice but to relinquish its strategy of 
compromise, especially after the “insulting” European proposal of 2005.691 It is within 
this context that President Ahmadinejad came to power and his administration 
helped legitimise the shift in Iran’s nuclear negotiation strategy. 
 
Iran’s Nuclear Policy During the Ahmadinejad Presidency 
The Ahmadinejad administration presented a threefold narrative of the nuclear issue, 
which substantially reflected the mistrust of the principlists and the military-security 
stratum regarding the Western core powers’ intentions and behaviours vis-à-vis Iran 
and within international institutions. Iran shifted to a more assertive nuclear policy, 
which continued during the period 2005 to 2013. The path of resistance and 
steadfastness proved relatively beneficial, both domestically and externally.  
 
Official Narrative of the Nuclear Issue 
President Ahmadinejad and his followers presented a highly securitised and 
conspiratorial interpretation of the profound motives of Iran’s nuclear opponents. 
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Their framing of the nuclear issue was based on deeply held beliefs, lessons learnt 
from the Khatami administration’s negotiation strategy and developments during the 
period 2005 to 2013. 
 
Before I move on to the Ahmadinejad administration’s threefold narrative of the 
politically motivated crisis, it is worth emphasising that my interviewees 
systematically highlighted a profound anger with the EU-3. In their view, the nuclear 
issue should have been resolved during the Khatami presidency. The fact that it was 
not was illustrative of their opponents’ intention to pressure Iran as much as possible 
to deprive it of its nuclear rights. As one official explained, during the first, “more 
optimistic phase”,  
Iran was more cooperative and the negotiators thought Iran would be able to 
solve everything through the channels of negotiations. Iranians were looking 
for their Western partners to solve everything; to build confidence and ensure 
Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy. We did everything we could but this 
approach did not bring any results to Iran […] This was a bitter experience for 
Iran. Iran was not successful at all with this approach. For every step Iran was 
taking, the Western countries wanted more and more.692  
 
Officials also repeatedly highlighted that the IAEA had been able to conduct an 
unprecedented number of routine and unannounced inspections during which no 
evidence of the diversion of nuclear material to military purposes was ever found. 
From 2003 to 2005, “Iran […] proactively cooperated with the Agency in an extra-
ordinary manner […] with almost continuous inspections, amount[ing] to over 1300 
man-day inspection, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA.”693 The 
Agency’s reports were quoted frequently, in particular the fact that there was no 
evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities were related 
to any nuclear weapons programme.694 
 
Iranian officials also pointed out that, had Iran not been a state party to the NPT, it 
would never have faced such challenges. In November 2009, Ambassador Soltanieh 
made the acerbic remark that 
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In spite of the fact that Iran is fully implementing the NPT, what could be the 
status quo if Iran were not party to the NPT? Not only it would certainly not 
have faced such challenges in the IAEA and UN Security Council, but it would 
have been embraced for nuclear cooperation by the same countries which 
have created obstacles and imposed illegal resolutions and sanctions [sic]!695 
 
The bitterness and humiliation of this experience should not be underestimated: it 
substantially shaped the Ahmadinejad administration’s perception of the nuclear 
issue and its range of permissible options, thus showing that history resonates and 
acts as a repertoire of interpretations and actions.  
 
A Western-led attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. For the 
Ahmadinejad administration, the nuclear issue was a Western, mostly US and 
Israeli-driven, plot to destabilise, if not break, the IRI. As one Iranian official pointed 
out, “we are not talking about the legal aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme but 
about the intent of Iran with its nuclear capabilities. This is political, not legal.”696 It 
was also beyond doubt that “the nuclear issue [was] rooted in the history of the Iran-
West relationship, especially the US,” and served as “a pretext” to confront the IRI.697 
Iran was being challenged over the independence of its foreign policy since the 
Revolution, and for refusing to “listen and follow” the Western core powers.698 In 
sum, at the core of the nuclear issue was a problem with the identity and interests of 
the IRI.  
 
Furthermore, the conviction that Iran’s opponents were using the nuclear issue as a 
proxy to undermine the IRI was strengthened by the fact that there was little the 
Iranian leadership could do to satisfy the EU-3 and its strategic allies. The more Iran 
“gave in”, the more it was asked to do. Reflecting on the 2004 Paris Agreement, 
Ambassador Soltanieh explained that his government had come to the conclusion 
that  
no matter how much it [made] concession[s,] they [were] intending to keep 
Iran’s issue in the Agenda since there was a hidden agenda, to pave the way 
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to refer to [the] United Nations Security Council in order to impose sanctions 
and further punitive measures.699  
 
In March 2013, Ayatollah Khamenei similarly declared:  
Whenever we are close to a solution, the Americans cause a problem in order 
to prevent reaching a solution […] My assumption and interpretation is that 
their goal is to keep the issue unresolved so that they can have a pretext for 
exerting pressure on us.700  
 
The Western core powers were thus deceitful: their actions were not guided by 
nuclear proliferation concerns but by the aim of undermining a regime they had 
never come to terms with and which repeatedly challenged their status quo interests. 
The unilateral and multilateral sanctions also fed this narrative, especially those 
imposed upon Iran’s oil revenues. As Ayatollah Khamenei said in an August 2010 
declaration, such sanctions were tantamount to a policy of regime change: 
They want to bring the revolution down. One of the important means they 
have employed has been these economic sanctions. They say that [the 
sanctions] are not targeting the Iranian people, but they are lying! The 
sanctions are meant to cripple the Iranian nation. They are designed to 
exhaust the Iranian people and make them say, “We are under the pressure 
of the sanctions because of the [policies of] the Islamic Republican state.” 
They want to sever the ties between the people and the Islamic Republican 
system. This is the true aim of the sanctions.701 
 
Similarly, US and Israeli deterrence strategies, especially their threats of military 
intervention against Iran, were depicted as “part and parcel of ‘psychological’ or ‘soft’ 
war” against Iranian officials and the Iranian people.702  
 
In sum, a key pillar of Iran’s narrative of the nuclear issue during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency concerned the belief that the Western core powers, the US in particular, 
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were instrumentalising the dispute in order to undermine a regime they profoundly 
disliked and had long sought to destabilise through coercive strategies.  
 
A Western-led attempt to prevent the development of Iran. The 
Ahmadinejad administration also framed the Western-led opposition against Iran’s 
peaceful nuclear activities as an attempt to hinder the scientific, technological and 
economic development of the Iranian nation. President Ahmadinejad declared in 
2010 that “The western and US sanctions and threats are not only aimed at putting 
the brakes on Iran’s progress in nuclear technology, but come to keep Iran from 
becoming an economic and industrial power.”703 In other words, the nuclear issue 
was a secret targeting of a regime the Western governments detested and a nation 
they had so often exploited and destabilised and wished to keep dependent.  
 
From the Ahmadinejad administration’s perspective, the nuclear issue was also used 
as a proxy to humiliate and disrespect the Iranian nation, an argument which had two 
main components. First, the “carrot and stick policy” and “dual track diplomacy” 
demonstrated that Iran was treated with great disregard and unfairness. On the one 
hand, officials argued that sanctions and threats were taking precedence over 
engagement, thus showing the duplicity and hypocrisy of the Western core powers 
and the negotiators. On the other hand, officials rejected the very language used by 
their counterparts. The carrot and stick policy was not considered “an acceptable 
phrase. It is for the donkeys. Iranians do not want to feel like donkeys”.704 
Ambassador Soltanieh similarly qualified this language as “a humiliation […] the 
language used to animals and therefore whoever is using it is condemned and 
considered uncivilised. This is a colonialist mentality”.705 For him, the Western states’ 
language and methods showed that they did not understand “how to deal with Iran”, 
particularly in view of its culture and the importance of showing mutual respect.706 
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President Ahmadinejad echoed this position when he declared: “We cannot hold a 
stick over someone’s head and force them into dialogue. This is not the spirit of 
dialogue and cooperation or negotiation.”707 Iranian officials thus repeatedly argued 
that sanctions, deterrence strategies and the involvement of the UNSC were all 
counterproductive. Pressure and intimidation would fail to alter Iran’s nuclear 
calculus. 
 
Second, Iran was reduced to its nuclear programme, which constituted another sign 
of disrespect of the nation. Nothing but its nuclear activities mattered. In his October 
2012 statement at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Minister Salehi accused 
the West of producing a fear industry and “reducing the totality of a nation like Iran, 
with its deep-rooted traditions of several millennia, its revolution of historical 
magnitude […] to a single issue of nuclear activity”.708 The Western media were 
often blamed for their negative role and responsibility in this situation. While Iranian 
voices were rarely heard, the repeated comparisons between Iran and North Korea 
were profoundly misleading and harmful:  
It’s much easier to attack Iran by putting it together with North Korea […] They 
want to add another negative image. It’s totally wrong. Iran, from the nuclear 
point of view, is a member of the NPT. We have not expelled the IAEA, nor its 
inspectors. We have continued our cooperation. We have no nuclear 
weapons. We have not decided to make nuclear weapons.709  
 
Additionally, researcher Nabi Sonboli complained that Western policymakers, 
analysts and journalists compared Iran to the Soviet Union: they used the same 
concepts (i.e. sanctions, containment, deterrence) and behavioural logics. “But Iran 
is not the Soviet Union. You cannot compare the two. From a military point of view, 
for example, Iran is not a threat. It has one of the lowest military budgets in the whole 
region.”710 
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In sum, Iranian officials interpreted the reduction of Iran to its nuclear programme, 
and the North Korea and Soviet Union analogies, as signs of disrespect and the 
Western core powers’ lack of willingness to resolve the nuclear issue. This grievance 
narrative was strengthened by the belief that these Western actors were 
simultaneously politicising the only international institution mandated to inspect Iran’s 
nuclear activities.  
 
A Western-led attempt to transform the mandate of the IAEA. Iranian 
officials’ criticisms of the politically motivated nuclear issue included a third, largely 
unnoticed but equally important, component according to which the Western core 
powers were seeking to transform the mandate and responsibilities of an already 
failing IAEA. Four arguments were systematically put to the fore.  
 
First, Iranian officials denounced the IAEA’s reliance on open source information for 
its inspections. Since the revelations of Iraq’s covert nuclear weapons programme in 
1991, third-party data increasingly enabled the Agency to complement its own field 
inspections and search for evidence of unreported nuclear activities.711 The Iranian 
regime criticised the quality and reliability of this open source information.  
 
Second, Iranian officials accused the IAEA Board of Governors, especially the US 
and European representatives, of seeking to transform the “nuclear material driven 
safeguards” into “intelligence driven safeguards”.712 Following the Revolution, Iran 
systematically stressed that the IAEA’s improved verification capabilities should not 
be used to exert diplomatic pressure on NPT member states and threaten their 
national sovereignty and security.713 According to Ambassador Soltanieh, the 
Western powers aimed to transform the Agency into a “‘UN Watchdog’ with 
maximum intrusiveness in safeguards in order to interfere to [sic] the national 
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security of majority of Members States, under the pretext of non-proliferation”.714 
These actors were pursuing a “hidden agenda” and wished to “monitor and control 
Vienna from New York!”715 In his interview, he thus spoke of the Western core 
powers’ intent to establish a so-called “Additional Protocol Plus” that would allow 
them maximum intrusiveness in the internal affairs of the NNWSs.716  
 
Third, Iranian officials often highlighted that, in view of the the IAEA’s status as an 
independent and autonomous organisation, the UNSC and the Agency could not and 
should not be dependent upon each other’s activities and decisions: 
There are no provisions in the Safeguards Agreements and IAEA Statute 
which may authorize the United Nations Security Council to take over the role 
of the IAEA in implementing the Safeguards Agreements, impose new 
requirements, or modify the obligations of the parties to the Safeguards 
Agreements; Nor does the Agency have the right or authority to impose ultra 
vires demands on Iran by relying upon the UNSC resolutions.717 
 
Thus, after its referral to the UN in February 2006, Iran vehemently denounced the 
IAEA’s systematic references to UNSC Resolutions in its reports on Iran. In 
particular, the Resolutions required Iran to comply with the AP and provide access 
and information beyond its Safeguards Agreement. Iran did not consider the Agency 
to have a mandate to ask for such inspections and information, and accused the 
IAEA of producing political (not technical) reports that were neither balanced nor 
factual since it “arbitrarily [stepped] beyond its statutory and legal mandate”:718  
the Agency has become more Catholic than the Pope by seeking to 
implement the provisions of illegal resolutions of the UNSC, instead of 
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focusing its attention on its core mandate and the specific provisions of the 
Safeguards Agreement with Iran.719 
 
The failure of the “Modalities of Resolution of all Outstanding Issues” (the Work Plan) 
epitomised Iran’s aforementioned disagreement with the IAEA.720 The Work Plan 
was completed on 21 August 2007 and consisted of an agreed timetable under 
which Iran would answer the Agency’s six outstanding questions in stages so as to 
reconstruct the history of its programme and build confidence about the scope and 
nature of its activities. Once these issues were resolved, the implementation of 
safeguards would be “conducted in a routine manner”. In its November 2007 and 
February 2008 reports, the IAEA concluded that it had been “able to verify the non-
diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran”, and that the “answers provided by 
Iran […] are consistent with its findings […] or are not inconsistent with its findings 
[…] Therefore, the Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this 
stage”.721 Iranian officials emphasised that the Agency had been able to address the 
six identified issues within six months instead of the eighteen months originally 
provided, a sign of the regime’s determination to resolve the nuclear issue. The so-
called “alleged studies”, however, poisoned Iran’s relations with the IAEA until the 
end of the Ahmadinejad presidency. As the Arms Control Association reports:  
these alleged studies primarily stem from a claim by Western intelligence 
agencies that they acquired a laptop computer and documentation that once 
belonged to an Iranian nuclear technician and that contained research 
relevant to a nuclear weapons program. This research included work on the 
conversion of uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride, use of high 
explosives in a manner similar to that of a nuclear-weapon trigger, and the 
design of a missile re-entry vehicle that might be capable of accommodating a 
nuclear warhead.722 
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The IAEA considered the verification of these “alleged studies” crucial to its 
assessment of “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme”. Iran, 
however, argued that these allegations were “baseless and unfounded”. The regime 
declared that it did not need to cooperate with the Agency’s inquiries and 
systematically refused access to potentially relevant individuals, locations and 
documentation. Additionally, Iran repeatedly complained that it was not provided with 
any original and authenticated document pertaining to these studies: “How the 
Agency can support [sic] or pursue allegations against a country without provision of 
original documents with authenticity and ask the country concerned to prove its 
innocence or ask it to provide substantial explanations?”723 For Iran, the “alleged 
studies” demonstrated the IAEA’s over-reliance on politicised open source 
information and the US’ intent to interfere with the Agency’s work.724 
 
Fourth, the very behaviour and reporting style of Director General Yukiya Amano, 
who took up the leadership of the IAEA in December 2009, were repeatedly 
challenged.725 Iranian officials vigorously denounced his reports, especially the 
inclusion of what they perceived as biased judgements and discriminatory 
conclusions.726 For example, the November 2011 report stated that the information 
that had given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear 
programme was assessed by the Agency “to be, overall, credible.” An Iranian official, 
a lawyer by training, highlighted that this conclusion was highly problematic: “the 
term ‘credible’ is a standard of proof within the law of evidence. The term ‘overall’ 
annuls the fact that the information is ‘credible.’”727 
                                                          
723
 “Communication Dated 10 July 2013 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of 
Safeguards in Iran,” IAEA, 23 July 2013, accessed 15 March 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2013/infcirc853.pdf. 
724
 “Communication Dated 28 September 2008 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to the Agency,” IAEA, 1 October 2008, accessed 17 March 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2008/infcirc737.pdf. 
725
 In October 2009, WikiLeaks released a cable from the US Embassy in Vienna to the US State 
Department in Washington, which stated that Amano was “solidly in the US court on every key 
strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear 
weapons program”. 
726
 The February 2010 report was a case in point since it referenced the “alleged studies” and ignored 
past reports’ judgement that there was no clear evidence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iran. 
See “Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,” IAEA, 2 March 
2010, accessed 15 March 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2010/infcirc786.pdf. 
727
 Author interview with Iranian official 1 working in an Embassy in Europe, 15 January 2013. 
187 
 
 
More generally, under Amano’s leadership, the IAEA appeared to be “working under 
a US dictated mandate”.728 In a July 2013 note, Ambassador Soltanieh bluntly writes: 
“It is clear that the DG’s [Director General] intention is to keep open this issue in 
order to pave the way for Iran’s enemies.”729 Additionally, Iran denounced a pattern 
of incidents whereby the disclosure of confidential information to the IAEA resulted in 
a range of covert actions that included the assassination of Iranian scientists and 
sabotage of its nuclear facilities. The Agency’s impartiality, neutrality and credibility, 
and its respect for its Safeguards Agreement with Iran (which required protection of 
confidential information), were all called into question.730 An Iranian also asked: 
Information is leaked and publicised in the media. What is the aim of releasing 
this [confidential] information in the IAEA reports? What is the purpose? Is it a 
matter of nuclear proliferation? No, it’s a matter of political pressure.731 
 
To conclude, during the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iranian officials widely interpreted 
the Western-led opposition to Iran’s legal and legitimate nuclear programme as a 
covert attempt to undermine the IRI, prevent the scientific, technological and 
economic development of the Iranian nation and expand intelligence-gathering 
activities in Iran. As such, the securitisation of Iran’s nuclear programme threatened 
the very corporate needs the regime wished to strengthen through the development 
of indigenous nuclear energy capabilities. Iran’s interpretation of the value of its 
nuclear programme and its understanding of the nuclear issue both profoundly 
shaped the Ahmadinejad administration’s approach towards the P5+1, the IAEA and 
the UNSC. 
                                                          
728
 “Iran Answers IAEA Questions if it Sees an End to Process: Analyst,” Press TV, 18 January 2013, 
accessed 17 March 2015, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/18/284268/iaea-queries-of-iran-
must-end-analyst/. 
729
 “Communication Dated 10 July 2013,” IAEA, 23 July 2013. 
730
 Iran strongly criticised the Agency’s failure to protect confidential information in its following 
communications to the IAEA: “Communication Dated 9 June 2011 Received from the Permanent 
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on 
Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,” IAEA, 28 July 2011, accessed 16 March 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2011/infcirc823.pdf; 
“Communication Dated 10 June 2010 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of 
Safeguards in Iran,” IAEA, 28 June 2010, accessed 16 March 2015,  
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2010/infcirc804.pdf; 
“Communication Dated 8 June 2010 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran to the Agency Regarding the Issue of Confidentiality,” IAEA, 10 June 2010, accessed 16 March 
2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2010/infcirc796.pdf. 
731
 Author interview with Iranian official 1 in an Embassy in Europe, 15 January 2013. 
188 
 
 
A More Assertive Nuclear Strategy to Protect Iran’s National Interests 
The August 2005 notification to the IAEA that Iran would resume its uranium 
conversion activities at the Isfahan facility signalled a shift to a less compromising 
nuclear policy. In an interview, an Iranian official strongly emphasised that, although 
the Ahmadinejad administration’s negotiation strategy was vehemently criticised 
within Iran, it was initially strongly supported.732 The two and a half years of intensive 
negotiations and intrusive inspections had failed to produce the much sought after 
recognition of Iran’s rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy. While Iran’s prospects 
for enhanced economic well-being and autonomy had been jeopardised, the regime 
had also suffered humiliation, and gambled its internal and external reputation. 
Sonboli used a Persian proverb to explain Iran’s position:  
For one-sided love leads to headache. This means that you cannot like 
someone, cooperate with someone when he/she is behaving completely 
differently from you. If you do so, and your actions are not reciprocated, you 
will face problems. This is what happened between Iran and the EU from 
2003 to 2005. 2005 was the headache for us. We didn’t want to change our 
plans. We didn’t change our positions on many issues [Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Palestine]. However, we could no longer pursue the same cooperative 
policies with the EU-3.733  
 
Iran could not risk another weak performance in the nuclear negotiations. As 
Freedman and Raghavan persuasively remark: 
A state’s behaviour during an encounter could influence the outcome of 
another encounter, as other states will scrutinise one’s behaviour for signs of 
resolve or lack thereof. Thus, if a state retreated in one area of contention, it 
would acquire a reputation for weakness or for lacking resolve. This in turn 
would lead its adversaries to doubt the credibility of its threats in other areas 
of contention, so rendering the state incapable of preserving its commitments 
by using coercive strategies.734  
 
The Iranian leadership was profoundly concerned about potential future challenges 
to the IRI should it continue what the Supreme Leader called a “course of retreat”. 
Officials thus strongly emphasised that Iran’s more assertive approach from 2005 
onwards was a direct result of the lack of tangible results produced during the first 
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phase of the nuclear negotiations735 Iran’s shift to a less compromising nuclear policy 
was partly prompted by its need to “compensate by self-assertion and/or devaluation 
and aggression” towards the Western core powers for their “negative self-images” 
(perceived disregards and humiliation).736 These factors paved the way for a more 
assertive nuclear policy that was bent on resisting illegal and immoral external 
pressures on the one hand and, on the other, reinstantiating Iran’s reputation and 
honour as a force of resistance.  
 
Interestingly, the regime drew numerous analogies between the nuclear issue and 
other experience of concerted pressures brought to bear upon Iran’s pursuit of 
independent policies or technological progress.737 For example, parallels were drawn 
with Britain’s unwillingness to accept Iran’s nationalisation of its oil resources and the 
1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh. In addition, Iranian diplomats referred 
to the suspension of nuclear research as “a scientific Turkmenchai” in reference to 
the humiliating treaty of 1828 with Russia, which resulted in a huge loss of territory 
for Iran.738 The nuclear issue was also often compared to Iran’s eight-year war with 
Iraq, another episode of profound injustice and struggle for survival and legitimacy. 
According to Ambassador Soltanieh: 
We had eight years imposed war by Saddam. We were trying to protect our 
national independence, sovereignty, around the international borders […] 
Now, we are facing another war, another imposed war. We are protecting the 
borders of science and technology and our right. And this war is more 
important, more costly, and no compromise could be acceptable for 
generations. [The] Iranian next generation would never forgive [the] Islamic 
Republic if we would make a compromise […] If you lose this territory of 
science and technology, which is [an] inalienable right, then we will lose for 
everything else. Therefore, there are two different wars. That war was 
physical war, this is moral. And nobody could compromise, neither this 
government nor [the] other government would be able to compromise on this, 
because this is something different. This is on the matter of principles […] We 
have [an] inalienable right to have science and technology, nobody could 
deny it [sic] this right.739  
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While these various historical analogies strengthened Iran’s self-portrayal as an 
unfairly aggrieved party and potentially served instrumental functions, such as 
rallying broad popular support, they also provided a repertoire of interpretation and 
action that informed the regime’s approach to the nuclear issue. In particular, they 
justified the need to withstand external pressures, notably through making full use of 
Iran’s rights as a NNWS to the NPT and responding to pressure with pressure.  
 
Returning to the letter of the law. Iran’s assertiveness partly translated into 
a proclaimed determination to return to the letter of the law by using the full spectrum 
of its rights under the NPT and no longer accepting measures that would single it 
out. As an official explained, “Iran was too generous in the dealings with the nuclear 
dossier. The international community was in debt to Iran.”740  
 
In practice, Iran renewed its commitment to comply with its Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA, repeatedly highlighting that the Agency was the only institution legally 
mandated to assess the technical aspects of its programme. Iran placed all its 
nuclear facilities under the Agency’s Safeguards and allowed IAEA inspectors to 
inspect and verify its activities. Furthermore, Iran stopped cooperating voluntarily in 
the context of the AP, and claimed that its readiness to adopt and implement its 
provisions were conditional upon the return of the nuclear file from the UNSC to the 
IAEA. The AP was thus used as a bargaining chip. Additionally, Iran refused even 
temporary suspension of its nuclear enrichment activities. The development of an 
indigenous full nuclear fuel cycle became a priority. The regime’s rejection of the US’ 
May 2006 offer to engage in direct, bilateral negotiations with the IRI, under the 
condition that it first suspend its enrichment activities and allow more intrusive IAEA 
inspections, demonstrated the regime’s uncompromising position.741  
 
Iran’s commitment to exercising its nuclear rights under the NPT, while complying 
with its legal obligations to the IAEA, was accompanied by several attempts to 
establish “truths” about its nuclear programme. For example, in March 2010, Iran 
produced a document entitled “The root cause of Iran’s confidence deficit vis-à-vis 
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some western countries on assurances of nuclear fuel supply”.742 It outlined Iran’s 
negative experience with the US, Germany and France to explain its profound 
mistrust of the idea that it could rely on foreign procurement for its nuclear fuel. In 
November 2011, Iran published a list of 20 questions and answers on the grounds 
that “The public has the right to know the truth about the Nuclear Activities of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran”.743 In September 2012, it published key “Facts on Iran’s 
Nuclear Policy” which served to emphasise why Iran expected “dialogue and 
negotiations without precondition, with mutual respect, and on [an] equal footing”.744  
 
Interestingly, for all its condemnations of the Khatami administration’s confidence-
building approach, the Ahmadinejad regime did take several steps that went beyond 
its legal obligations. Although these actions were kept relatively quiet, they pursued 
similar intentions: to demonstrate that Iran was a constructive state actor, reach a 
diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue and avoid a military escalation of the 
conflict. Iran thus allowed the IAEA to visit the military site Parchin twice in 2005 to 
provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities 
there. Additionally, prior to its referral to the UNSC, the Ahmadinejad administration 
repeatedly proposed the establishment of regional and international consortiums for 
the development of Iran’s fuel-cycle activities.745 As such, the regime sought to 
address the confidence deficit issue by offering consent to external participation in 
Iran’s most sensitive activities. During this period, the Ahmadinejad administration 
simultaneously multiplied gestures of goodwill towards the IAEA, offering additional 
access and information, providing that the nuclear case remained within the Agency 
and be discussed in the context of Iran’s compliance with its Safeguards 
Agreement.746  
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Furthermore, after putting a request to the IAEA in June 2009 to buy fuel pads for its 
TRR, Iran initially accepted the fuel swap proposal of the Vienna Group.747 Although 
it questioned the principle of the swap, especially since its LEU posed very limited 
proliferation risks, Iran nevertheless accepted to be treated differently as long as the 
delivery of the fuel pads was guaranteed. Additionally, when, in February 2010, Iran 
notified the IAEA about its decision to start enrichment activities up to 20 percent, it 
emphasised that, under its Safeguards Agreement, it was only obliged to declare a 
new facility to the IAEA 180 days prior to introducing nuclear material into it. In this 
case, however, it was giving the Agency 18 months’ notice.748  
 
Responding to pressure with pressure. Iran’s objection to yielding to 
external coercion, and its decision to actively confront injustice, translated into a 
threefold strategy.  
 
First, Iran refused to comply with successive UNSC Resolutions, which it deemed 
illegal, illegitimate and, therefore, unbinding. The IAEA Board of Governors referred 
Iran to the UNSC on 4 February 2006 on the grounds that the Agency remained 
unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the correctness and 
completeness of Iran’s declarations with a view to confirming the peaceful nature of 
Iran’s nuclear programme.749 Three UNSC resolutions were subsequently adopted 
within the space of nine months: a timeframe indicative of a consensus that Iran’s 
nuclear programme posed a threat to international peace and security.750 The 
international context, especially the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah 
and North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, also likely heightened 
convictions that Iran’s nuclear activities had to be limited and brought under stricter 
control.751 Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolutions required 
Iran to both comply with the AP and suspend its enrichment activities until 
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme was restored. Iran 
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was thus asked to observe obligations beyond the NPT and its Safeguards 
Agreement.752  
 
For the regime, these extra-legal demands confirmed the Western core powers’ 
intent to transform Iran’s past voluntary suspension of its enrichment and 
reprocessing activities into legally binding commitments.753 Iran also contended that 
it had been illegally referred to the UNSC. While the IAEA had never declared 
evidence of diversion of nuclear materials, the Agency had continuously affirmed that 
it had been able to pursue its verification activities in the country. As such, Iran’s 
nuclear programme could not be considered a threat to international peace and 
security. Additionally, in his declaration at the UN on the day the Iranian nuclear file 
was referred to the UNSC, Zarif highlighted that the IAEA had identified 45 other 
countries in the same category as Iran (i.e. cases where the Agency was unable to 
conclude that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities), including 14 
European countries.754 Furthermore, the adoption of Resolutions under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter was unjustifiable: “The Security Council, before resorting to the 
measures stipulated in Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter must have exhausted all 
required procedures under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.”755 From Iran’s 
perspective, the UNSC had no legal right to be involved in the nuclear issue, which 
explained its non-compliance strategy with the UN Resolutions. 
 
Iran also took issue with the Security Council’s double standards, particularly in 
relation to its failure to act on the repeated threats of force made against its territory. 
Officials often recalled paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states that 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”756 The 
Bush and the Obama administrations, for example, never discarded the military 
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option against Iran, repeatedly declaring that “all options are on the table”.757 
Following the adoption of the 2006 UN Resolution against Iran, Zarif declared:  
the resolution can only remind the Iranian people of the historic injustices this 
Security Council has done to them in the past six decades. It is reminiscent of 
the attempt made in this Council to punish the Iranian people for their 
nationalization of their oil industry, described as a threat to peace […] It 
refreshes the memory of the time when the Council did not consider the 
massive invasion of Iran by the former Iraqi regime as a threat to international 
peace and security, and refused to even call on the invading army to withdraw 
from Iranian territory. It brings back the horrors of the long years when the 
Council turned a blind eye to the extensive and brutal use of chemical 
weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers, and by so doing, shouldered 
responsibility for tens of thousands of Iranians who continue to suffer and 
perish as a result of chemical weapons whose components came from certain 
countries permanently seated in this Council.758 
 
Second, the regime not only continued to pursue, but also sped up and expanded, 
Iran’s nuclear programme. In so doing, it imposed enforcement costs on its 
coercers.759 Official declarations following the public announcement of the Fordow 
facility in September 2009 were emblematic of this position: “this new site at Fordow 
has a political message: we are saying to the world that even the threat of military 
attack will not stop enrichment […] Enrichment in Iran will not be stopped or 
suspended at any price.”760  
 
In general, Iran’s technological and scientific achievements produced striking results. 
In 2003, it possessed about 164 centrifuges, one enrichment facility, one type of 
centrifuge, no fissile material stockpile and sought to enrich uranium to 5 percent.761 
At the end of the Ahmadinejad presidency, however, Iran possessed more than 
18,000 centrifuges, two enrichment facilities, several types of advanced centrifuge, 
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considerable amounts of fissile material and was enriching to both 5 and 20 percent 
levels.762  
 
Third, the regime often retaliated with a tit for tat strategy against the coercive 
diplomatic manoeuvres of the UNSC, the P5+1 and the IAEA. Examples include 
Iran’s decision in February 2006 to suspend all provisions of the AP and other non-
legally binding Safeguards measures in reaction to the IAEA’s decision to report Iran 
to the UNSC. Following the publication of the November 2011 IAEA report, whose 
Annex detailed the basis of the Agency’s concerns about the “possible military 
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme” and clarified that the information was found 
to be “overall, credible”, Iran declared numerous technological achievements in 
various areas of its nuclear programme.763 For example, on 1 January 2012, Iranian 
state television announced that Iran had, for the first time, produced fuel rods for 
power plant use. Enrichment at the Fordow facility also started and new uranium 
enrichment centrifuges were to be built.764 In February 2013, Iran unveiled a new 
uranium production facility at Ardakan and two extraction mines in Saghand, just 
days after the failure of the Almaty talks with the P5+1.765  
 
The Majles both supported and sometimes instigated this strategy of non-compliance 
and retaliation. For example, in reaction to the January 2006 statement by the P5+1 
that Iran should be referred to the UNSC, the Majles warned “the government that it 
should not allow the inalienable rights of the Iranian nation to be bargained away to 
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any government, nor bend to foreign bullying.”766 Following the adoption of the 
December 2006 UNSC Resolution, the Majles approved a bill which called on the 
government to review its cooperation with the IAEA, suspend the voluntary 
implementation of the AP and accelerate Iran’s nuclear activities.767 The Majles 
similarly reacted to the March 2007 UNSC Resolution by passing a law that, this 
time, obliged the government to revise its cooperation with the IAEA. Thereafter, Iran 
banned several IAEA inspectors and refused to allow the installation of remote 
monitoring cameras. Furthermore, after the US and the P5+1 swiftly rejected the 
May 2010 Turkey-Brazil-Iran deal and imposed new sanctions against Iran (see 
chapter 5), the Majles passed a bill that authorised the government to continue 
enriching up to 20 percent for the TRR.768  
 
Interestingly, it is also after the dismissal of the May 2010 agreement that President 
Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would postpone nuclear talks to “teach a lesson to 
the West”: “It’s a punishment to teach them a lesson to know how to have a dialogue 
with nations.”769 According to Mousavian, he also identified four new preconditions 
for negotiations with the P5+1.770 First, Iran’s negotiation partner had to clarify their 
position on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Second, the P5+1 countries must declare 
whether they support the organisation of a review conference to strengthen the NPT. 
Third, they were expected to clarify their ultimate objectives in the negotiations with 
Iran. Fourth, Iran wished to involve more countries in the multilateral negotiations 
about its programme. By postponing nuclear negotiations, and defining new rules of 
engagement, the Iranian President articulated Iran’s anger with the way it was 
treated. Both symbolically and practically, it was signalling that the conduct of the 
P5+1 was unjust and unacceptable. It remains unclear whether President 
Ahmadinejad’s new preconditions were the result of a concerted strategy within his 
administration, however, as the negotiations’ postponement could have been a 
default position due to domestic paralysis within Iran. Indeed, Lady Ashton’s June 
2010 offer of negotiations with Jalili remained unanswered, as had Amano’s 
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invitation to Iran.771 Furthermore, Jalili declared that the nuclear programme would 
not be discussed during the January 2011 Istanbul talks, and that Iran had two new 
preconditions for its negotiations with the P5+1: the removal of all sanctions and the 
formal endorsement of Iran’s right to enrich uranium.772 These announcements cast 
doubt on the regime’s capacity to negotiate and compromise, which was also partly 
confirmed by the fact that Iran and the P5+1 held no negotiations between January 
2011 and April 2012.773 
 
In sum, Iran pursued a firm and assertive nuclear diplomacy which was determined 
by the belief that the nuclear issue was not a technical and scientific matter but a 
politically motivated crisis manufactured by Iran’s long-term opponents. To protect 
Iran’s national interests and its legal and legitimate nuclear rights, the regime refused 
to comply with the illegal UNSC Resolutions and the IAEA’s illegitimate demands. 
Iran pursued its nuclear programme and proceeded to create new realities on the 
ground, in accordance with its rights and obligations under the NPT and its 
Safeguards Agreement. The nuclear issue undoubtedly worsened during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency: Iran was referred to the UNSC, six UNSC Resolutions 
were adopted and increasingly stringent unilateral and multilateral sanctions were 
enforced against its economy. However, Iran’s stance of defiance and resistance 
produced several important positive domestic consequences. 
 
Domestic benefits of Iran’s path of resistance and steadfastness. Iran 
achieved considerable scientific and technological progress during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency and these had three chief benefits for the regime.  
 
First, the significant nuclear accomplishments allowed Iran to position itself as 
“capable to meet its highest technological needs, even in a field as complicated as 
nuclear energy, without having (external) support”.774 Iran’s technological and 
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scientific achievements strengthened a sense of national pride and dignity. Officials 
and scientists were able to demonstrate that the Iranian nation was capable of high 
technical and scientific development on their own. These achievements were thus 
portrayed as evidence of the righteousness of the Iranian leadership, and the strong 
moral and strategic principles of the IRI. Importantly, Ayatollah Khamenei helped 
legitimise Iran’s resistance policy. He argued this was a necessary (morally driven) 
strategy, which was worth fighting for despite its material costs: 
In order to attain independence and achieve national sovereignty and honor, 
any nation will have to pay a certain price. But nations should incur such 
expenses and make every effort to achieve the above objectives. They should 
be hopeful of the valuable results of their endeavors, despite all the attempts 
that are being made by the enemies to undermine their hopes and 
aspirations.775 
 
Second, Iran’s nuclear achievements were presented as all the more remarkable 
because they had been made in an antagonistic context in which Iran faced 
continuous coercion and intimidation. More specifically, from the Ahmadinejad 
administration’s viewpoint, external pressures had pushed Iran to become more self-
reliant and independent.776 In other words, the punitive policies had strengthened 
Iran’s national interests. For example, it was claimed that external circumstances 
had forced the regime to seek to become a fully independent producer of nuclear 
energy: 
We had faits accomplis, one after the other. We created, we succeeded, we 
obtained this technology on our own […] The West created the will and the 
determination […] we could not swim but they push us to the pool and now we 
can swim, not only in the pool, but also in the ocean.777  
 
Ambassador Soltanieh similarly talked about a feeling of “wanting to grow as fast as 
possible” and “to go as far as we can”.778 For him, the intrusive IAEA inspections 
also had an unexpected ad hoc benefit: the formal recognition of Iran’s technical 
achievements. Without the Agency’s investigations and reports, Iran’s claims of 
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technical progress would have been dismissed.779 “And, therefore, when I say ‘we 
are masters of nuclear enrichment technology’, it is based on the reports of top 
experts of the world that we are masters of nuclear technology”.780  
 
Third, Iran’s firm nuclear stance, and its decision to endure the costs of resistance, 
allowed the regime to demonstrate the objective failure of the coercive diplomatic 
strategies of the P5+1 and the UNSC. Iran was not submitting; it was resisting and 
this was a source of considerable pride and confidence. Soltanieh’s November 2009 
statement to the IAEA is emblematic of this position:  
In conclusion, I reiterate that the Great Nation of Iran shall never [bend] to 
pressure and intimidation vis-à-vis its inalienable right for peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. The knowledge is the heritage of mankind and no one has the 
right to deprive any nation to benefit from it […] Neither resolutions of the 
Boards of Governors nor those of the United Nations Security Council which 
lack legal basis, and the last but not the least, neither sanctions nor the threat 
of military attacks can interrupt peaceful nuclear activities in Iran even a 
second [sic].781 
 
In interview, he insisted that although Iran had paid “a heavy price” for its resistance, 
including “the loss of national scientists in terrorist assassinations, sanctions and 
stuxnet,” Iran was strong because it had not compromised on matters of 
principles.782 
 
Iran’s nuclear achievements also created new de facto realities that could not be 
unlearnt and undone. For Mousavian, Iran’s decision to accelerate its enrichment 
programme was “a way of forcing the West to negotiate with them on an equal 
basis”.783 In this respect, it is worth noting that the Western core powers’ position 
evolved, from demanding a complete halt of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme to 
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requesting that it cap enrichment at a low level and accept stricter inspection of its 
nuclear facilities.  
 
For example, during the April 2012 Istanbul talks, Iran and the P5+1 partly discussed 
their negotiation framework: a telling indication that, almost a decade after the 
beginning of the parallel diplomatic tracks, the parties still needed to set out a 
mutually acceptable framework for their discussions.784 The P5+1’s red lines shifted 
somewhat once Iran’s suspension of its enrichment activities was no longer a 
precondition for negotiation. Additionally, it was no longer the UNSC Resolutions, but 
the NPT, that was formally identified as the framework for future discussions. As a 
sign that goodwill begets goodwill, the IAEA reported that, between May and August 
2012, Iran had converted almost half of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium 
for medical use, thus keeping its stockpile of higher enriched fuel steady at a time 
when the P5+1 and Iran were negotiating.785 Although the Ahmadinejad 
administration never suspended its enrichment activities, it nevertheless used its 
dual-use technologies as a bargaining chip to ease external concerns or retaliate 
against its interlocutors.  
 
During the February 2013 talks in Almaty, the P5+1 also dropped its long-standing 
demand that Iran shut down its underground enrichment plant at Fordow and 
allowed Tehran to keep some of its 20 percent enriched uranium for use in the TRR. 
This, as Farhi notes, was a de facto recognition of Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
rights.786 
 
Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, Iran’s nuclear policy demonstrates that states do not pursue 
exogenously defined interests that are a sole function of their structural position 
within the international system. The Iranian leadership viewed the nuclear 
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programme as a crucial component of Iran’s national interests, which would 
strengthen its corporate need for economic well-being, autonomy and self-esteem. 
Indigenous capabilities and the full fuel cycle promised a sustainable and rewarding 
long-term opportunity for greater economic and political independence, as well as 
higher domestic and international status. As such, neither the Khatami nor the 
Ahmadinejad administration could accept either renouncing or undermining Iran’s 
legal and legitimate nuclear programme.  
 
Furthermore, Iran’s responses to its opponents and negotiation partners show that 
states define their interests in the process of interpreting situations. The 
Ahmadinejad administration’s threefold narrative of the profound motives that 
explained the Western-led opposition to its nuclear activities was structured by Iran’s 
past experiences (analogical reasoning) and collective knowledge with those states. 
Additionally, the failure of the Khatami administration’s confidence-building approach 
towards the IAEA and the EU-3 had profoundly revived the mistrust, negative beliefs 
and threat assumptions of those who had assumed power to defend and revive the 
heritage of the Revolution. Worse, this first phase of the nuclear issue had humiliated 
Iran and compromised its independence and reputation.  
 
Within this context, Iran’s nuclear policy from 2005 to 2013 demonstrated a 
prioritisation of long-term ambitions (corporate needs, principles of rights and dignity) 
over shorter-term considerations (harm to Iran’s economic well-being and autonomy, 
threats to its physical security). Iran engaged in strategies of self-assertion through 
which it claimed and demonstrated its determination to exercise the full spectrum of 
its rights under the NPT, and to challenge the perceived illegal and illegitimate 
policies of its negotiation partners, the UNSC and the IAEA. Thus, despite profound 
political and material consequences, which the regime acknowledged and justified, 
Iran’s strategies of resistance produced substantial domestic benefits.  
 
From the leadership’s viewpoint, Iran’s national dignity, honour and independence 
were strengthened by the regime’s compliance with, and instantiation of, the values 
of the Revolution: independence and resistance against injustice. The resistance 
strategies helped boost Iran’s identity, affirming the IRI’s material and ideational 
independence, as well as its significant technical and political capabilities. The 
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coercive diplomatic strategies of the P5+1 and the UNSC were outweighed by the 
regime’s cost-benefit calculation that it was within Iran’s national interests to endure 
the costs of resistance and apply enforcement costs. In particular, the regime’s 
acceleration of its nuclear activities, and its substantial scientific and technological 
achievements in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, created new realities with 
which the negotiation partners had to contend and to which they had to adapt. I now 
turn to the other aspect in which Iran’s strategies of resistance contributed to the 
reinstantiation of its identity as an independent, ethical and morally driven state 
actor, and brought several external benefits to the regime.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Iran’s Dual-Track Nuclear Policy: Turning Threats Into 
Geopolitical Opportunities 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored Iran’s positioning vis-à-vis the main direct (the 
EU-3, P5+1, UNSC and the IAEA) and indirect (the Western core powers, the US 
especially) protagonists of the nuclear issue. I examined how and why Iran’s 
indigenous nuclear programme was framed as a crucial component of the country’s 
long-term interests. I also analysed how the perception that the nuclear issue was a 
political (not a technical) crisis that was both endless and manufactured by Iran’s 
long-term rivals, determined the regime’s responses and strategic priorities. 
Confronted by illegal, illegitimate and unacceptable UNSC Resolutions, IAEA 
reports, covert warfare and media propaganda, Iran had to pursue an assertive 
nuclear policy.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration framed its nuclear strategies of resistance as the 
legal and legitimate undertaking of an NNWS of the NPT whose rights were being 
unfairly compromised. Its refusal to comply with the UNSC resolutions and some of 
the demands of the IAEA was matched by a strong commitment to make full use of 
Article IV of the NPT and actively cooperate with the Agency regarding its 
Safeguards Agreement. In so doing, Iran mixed incentives with enforcement costs 
and presented itself as a constructive state actor. On the one hand, Iran sought to 
demonstrate that it was a profoundly committed state party to the NPT that believed 
in its normative principles and upheld its legal obligations, including by helping to 
clearly differentiate between states’ responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement 
and their potentially non-legally binding voluntary measures. On the other hand, Iran 
maintained a deeply proactive resistance to the Western core powers’ immoral and 
illegal practices.  
 
Finally, Iran’s ability to achieve substantial scientific and technological development 
fed a sense of national pride and confidence in the normative and strategic principles 
of the IRI. Not only did Iran’s resistance strategies allow the regime to pursue its 
commitment to greater economic and political independence with renewed vigour, 
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but its refusal to submit to external pressures also bolstered its honour and dignity. In 
sum, Iran’s nuclear policy instantiated and reaffirmed key values of the Revolution, 
including those of independence, scientific and economic development, and 
resistance against injustice and oppression.  
 
In this chapter, I turn to another aspect of Iran’s nuclear policy, which also relates to 
the regime’s attempt to present itself as a constructive state actor. My argument is 
twofold. First, the Ahmadinejad administration sought to position Iran as a guide and 
role model for the NNWSs of the NPT, which, it argued, were similarly confronted by 
the injustice and double standards of the NWSs. On the one hand, the NNWSs’ 
access to peaceful nuclear energy had been continuously limited and jeopardised by 
the NWSs’ biased interpretations of the rights and obligations of the states party to 
the NPT. On the other hand, the NWSs had failed to comply with their own nuclear 
disarmament obligations. In so doing, they had undermined the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and paved the way for serious vertical and horizontal 
proliferation challenges.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration, in other words, situated the Iranian nuclear issue 
within the wider context of global debates around access to peaceful nuclear energy 
on the one hand, and the sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime on the 
other. In broadening the scope of the issue, and in positioning itself as a voice of 
international justice and security, the Ahmadinejad administration attempted to 
weaken its main nuclear opponents and to strengthen external legitimacy and 
support for its strategies of resistance. Iran, I argue, was partly successful since it 
received discursive and strategic backing from several NNWSs of the NPT, 
members of the NAM, and China and Russia, two permanent members of the 
UNSC. As such, while Iran was able to capitalise on potential disagreements and 
rifts among UNSC members, and delay and soften several resolutions, expressions 
of support for its nuclear policy also helped delegitimise the prominent claims that 
the IRI was an isolated rogue state.  
 
Second, the Iranian leadership used the nuclear negotiations as an opportunity to 
discuss issues of potential mutual interest between Iran and the Western core 
powers. Iran’s negotiation proposals during the Khatami and Ahmadinejad 
205 
 
administrations included repeated offers of cooperation on a broad range of security 
matters that were unrelated to the nuclear issue. I engage with the similarities and 
differences of their respective offers to the EU-3 and the P5+1 to draw out some 
conclusions on key processes of identity and interests formation within Iran. In 
particular, I note that Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue was complex and 
multifaceted. It pursued processes of self-assertion and devaluation of the Western 
core powers to both reinstantiate its identity commitments as a force of resistance 
within a highly hierarchical international system and enhance its legitimacy and 
reputation. At the same time, it also attempted to transform the nuclear negotiations 
into a broader geopolitical opportunity to engage with its significant Others, the US in 
particular, which remained a prominent actor within the international system and its 
regional environment.  
 
Treaty Obligations Versus Practices: the NWSs on Trial 
The Ahmadinejad administration attempted to alter the framing of Iran’s nuclear 
programme as a threat to international security and to put forward a non-security 
oriented perspective of its nuclear rationale. The regime argued that, while the 
Western-manufactured crisis was a proxy to undermine the IRI, prevent the 
legitimate development of the Iranian nation and increase intelligence-gathering 
activities within Iran, it was also the result of the core powers’ profoundly 
discriminatory practices in the field of nuclear technology. In particular, Iran 
denounced the short-sighted behaviour of the Western NWSs of the NPT which, it 
argued, were threatening the implementation, effectiveness and sustainability of the 
formal (treaty-based) and informal (norms) institutions of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. As such, it was the Western NWSs, not Iran, that were a threat 
to a key pillar of international stability and security.  
 
Issues of Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Nuclear Energy  
Iran attempted to broaden the scope of the nuclear issue by presenting the Western-
led opposition against its legal and legitimate nuclear activities as a powerful 
example of discriminatory practices against the NNWSs of the NPT. 
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The NWSs’ discriminatory practices against the NNWSs. As highlighted in 
the previous chapter, Iranian officials frequently referred to Article IV(1) of the NPT to 
support their claim that Iran had the right to enrich uranium. As per the provisions of 
Article IV(2), they also regularly pointed to the fact that all states party to the Treaty 
had the right to participate in “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials 
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy”.787 Importantly, the article also clarifies that the onus was on those “in a 
position to do so” to  
contribut[e] alone or together with other States or international organizations 
to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to 
the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world.788 
 
This specification was pushed by the NNWSs during the NPT negotiations to avoid 
the possibility of the treaty-sanctioned mechanisms of control over their peaceful 
nuclear activities hampering their access to the knowledge and technology most 
needed to pursue their scientific development.789 As such, the recognition of their 
nuclear rights under Article IV(1) was matched by “a reciprocal obligation primarily 
incumbent upon NWSs to aid them in their development of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy”.790  
 
In practice, the NPT proved relatively weak on enforcement and Article IV(2) was 
never implemented fully and effectively by “those in a position to do so”. The NWSs 
states, the US in particular, often distorted the NPT in such a way that access to 
peaceful nuclear energy was under-prioritised, resulting in the NNWSs’ legal 
interests being “unlawfully prejudiced”.791 According to Joyner, the NWSs gave 
greater consideration to the NNWSs’ non-proliferation obligations and used three 
main strategies to limit their access to peaceful nuclear energy.792  
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First, they tended to require that the NNWSs “exclusively source nuclear material 
from a multilateral fuel bank or multinational enrichment centre as a condition of 
supply”.793 Preference was thus given to fuel-cycle facilities operating under 
international control and monitoring. This strategy was partly prompted by the 
structural weaknesses of the NPT, including the issue of dual-use technologies and 
latent nuclear weapons capability:  
To alleviate potential concerns about proliferation, multilateral nuclear 
agreements have grown in popularity as a way to strengthen the non-
proliferation regime through the “de-nationalisation” of sensitive fuel cycle 
facilities in non-nuclear weapons states. Access to nuclear energy technology 
by non-nuclear weapons states inevitably leads to concerns about the 
possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, as both require similar skills and 
technologies, the most notable being uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing capabilities.794 
 
Interestingly, discussions on whether and why Iran may have been tempted to 
become a nuclear threshold state largely failed to engage with the pressing 
questions that such states raise for the sustainability and efficacy of the non-
proliferation regime.795 Nevertheless, the preference for the NNWSs to outsource 
their nuclear material impacted upon their right to develop indigenous nuclear energy 
production.  
 
Second, the NWSs often demanded that the NNWSs accept the AP as a condition of 
supply. The voluntary agreement thus became a quasi de facto obligation. Third, 
they often conditioned supply and recognition of rights to nuclear technologies on 
compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.796 According to Joyner, the NWSs 
tended to maintain the following interpretation: 
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1. Noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement constitutes a breach of 
NPT Article III, 
2. A breach of NPT Article III results in the invalidity of the rights and obligations 
in Article IV, 
3. Thus, noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement results in the 
invalidity of the rights and obligations in Article IV.797 
 
In sum, the “inalienable right” of the states party to the NPT “to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, and to receive 
contribution from those “in a position to do so”, was significantly hindered by the 
NWSs’ ad hoc requirements. From Iran’s perspective, this situation was highly 
problematic: 
The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the NPT are of 
equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the “rights and obligations” 
enshrined in the treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and 
encourages both universality of NPT and its full implementation.798 
 
Iran thus partly framed the nuclear issue as a product of the NWSs’ discriminatory 
practices and the resulting situation of imbalance between the rights and obligations 
enshrined in the NPT. The politically motivated crisis exemplified the NWSs’ failure 
to comply with their own legal requirements and responsibilities towards developing 
nations.  
 
In his study of Iran’s arms control diplomacy from the Revolution to the Khatami 
presidency, Pirseyedi highlights the resilience of these concerns and demonstrates 
that Iranian officials systematically used international arms control fora to raise the 
issue of the prevention of NNWSs’ access to peaceful nuclear energy.799 At the 1995 
NPT Review Conference, for example, Iran took a lead role among the NAM 
countries in arguing that nuclear export controls were both discriminating against 
NNWSs’ rights to peaceful nuclear energy and enabling the NWSs to evade their 
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obligations towards them.800 Worse, the NNWSs were profoundly disadvantaged 
since the non-party states to the NPT had faced no such restrictions and been able 
to benefit from cooperation and trade in nuclear technology for peaceful uses.801  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration sought to actively expose the illegal and illegitimate 
situation faced by the NNWSs and articulated two main motives to explain the 
NWSs’ seeming determination to block their access to peaceful nuclear energy. 
First, the Western core powers wished to restrict the transfer of advanced nuclear 
technology in order to monopolise the equipment, materials, and scientific and 
technological information necessary for research into and production of nuclear 
energy. Ayatollah Khamenei stated during his opening statement to the August 2012 
NAM Summit:  
Some Western countries, themselves possessing nuclear weapons and guilty 
of this illegal action, want to monopolize the production of nuclear fuel. 
Surreptitious moves are under way to consolidate a permanent monopoly 
over production and sale of nuclear fuel in centres carrying an international 
label but in fact within the control of a few Western countries.802  
 
President Ahmadinejad also denounced the NWSs’ politically motivated conflation of 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons: 
One of the gravest injustices committed by the nuclear weapon states is 
equating nuclear arms with nuclear energy. As a matter of fact, they want to 
monopolize both the nuclear weapons and the peaceful nuclear energy, and 
by doing so to impose their will on the international community.803 
 
Second, the Iranian regime argued that this Western-led strategy aimed to 
strengthen and entrench the division of the world into “two classes of nations […] 
those that have nuclear technology and can be advanced, and nations that must be 
restricted to production of tomato juice and air conditioners”.804 Ambassador 
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Soltanieh framed the issue as one between the “‘Haves’ and ‘Have-nots’ […] 
‘Aggressors’ and ‘Victim’ […] ‘Justice’ and ‘Injustice.’”805 From Iran’s viewpoint, the 
imbalanced interpretation and enforcement of the NPT’s provisions was intended to 
maintain the NWSs’ scientific and technological superiority over developing nations 
and perpetuate situations of dependency. The NWSs were pursuing imperialist 
ambitions through their manipulation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
 
Iran as a guide and role model. In attempting to broaden the scope of the 
Iranian nuclear issue and transform it into a debate over the right of the NNWSs to 
access, and receive cooperation in, peaceful nuclear energy, the Ahmadinejad 
administration sought to portray its resistance strategies as driven by interests larger 
than its own. More specifically, it tried to position itself as a constructive state party to 
the NPT that was acting for the good of the international community in general, and 
the developing nations in particular. Three points are noteworthy.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration framed the issue of non-compliance with the rights 
and obligations laid out in the NPT as a threat to states’ sovereign equality and, 
therefore, their security and independence. In their statements, officials repeatedly 
implied that effective compliance with international laws and treaties was a key 
foundation for a fair and stable international order. In the aftermath of Iran’s referral 
to the UNSC, Zarif thus declared: 
We are told we need to build confidence. Indeed. We all do, in this tumultuous 
world. But confidence could only be built through respect for and non-
discriminatory application of the law. That is the only objective criteria; 
anything else would be to accept the whim of the powerful. And, international 
law and international treaties cannot be the subject of arbitrary, fluctuating 
and self-serving re-interpretations, adjustments or red lines even if they are 
convincingly imposed through resolutions. Such a precedent is dangerous for 
everyone.806 
 
By introducing elements of predictability and relative certainty, and by reducing 
states’ incentives to cheat or seek to maximise power, international norms and 
treaties could thus ease some of the most negative and security-oriented logics of 
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interaction present in the Lockean culture of anarchy. From Iran’s viewpoint, 
although hierarchy and the uneven distribution of power within the international 
system were highly immoral, unjust and had to be changed, they did not pose a 
threat to states’ national security per se so long as their sovereign equality and the 
provisions of international treaties were fully implemented.  
 
This position helps explain why Iranian officials repeatedly denounced the Western 
core powers’ tendency to equate themselves with the “international community” and 
their consequent manipulation of international treaties for politically motivated aims. 
In August 2012, the Supreme Leader declared that the Western states imposed their 
interests on others “in the name of ‘international law’ and their domineering and 
illegal demands in the name of [the] ‘international community’”; the Western core 
powers “disguise their lies as the truth […] and their oppression as efforts to promote 
justice. In contrast, they brand as lies every true statement that exposes their deceit 
and label every legitimate demand as roguish”.807  
 
Iranian officials also warned that the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue would 
have significant consequences for the other NNWSs of the NPT. Ambassador 
Soltanieh stressed that Iran’s nuclear policy was particularly important for developing 
nations since a domino effect would likely result if it failed to secure the recognition 
of its rights to peaceful nuclear energy:   
Iran’s nuclear issue is a concern of all developing countries because we are 
talking about [the] inalienable right of a country to have access to a 
technology – peaceful use of nuclear technology – and nobody can accept the 
denial of this right […] they have no doubt that if Iran would not resist, they 
would be the next one in the queue […] Because if we would yield to 
pressure, then it would become a precedent for others. That is why we do not 
want to establish any precedent, at any price.808 
 
Thus, not only was Iran resisting for itself and its fellow NNWSs, it was also deeply 
conscious of the responsibility it shouldered.  
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Finally, the Ahmadinejad administration did not stop at denouncing the illegal, unfair 
and hegemonic practices of the NWSs. It also tried to proactively address the issue 
of unequal access to peaceful nuclear energy among the states party to the NPT. 
During his September 2005 address to the UNGA, President Ahmadinejad thus 
recommended that the General Assembly ask the IAEA “to report on violations by 
specific countries that have hindered the implementation of [Article IV of the NPT] 
and also produce practical strategies for its renewed implementation”.809 Additionally, 
the regime emphasised that, in conformity with the NPT, it would support other 
NNWSs in their development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. Iran would thus act “with due consideration for the needs of the 
developing areas of the world”, an ambition articulated by its motto “nuclear energy 
for all, nuclear weapons for none”. In a 2009 statement to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, 
Iran’s Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation, declared: 
We will be pleased to contribute in meeting the humanitarian demands of 
brotherly and neighbouring countries by providing them pharmaceutical 
radioisotopes. Having acquired considerable experiences [sic] in nuclear 
technology, the Islamic Republic of Iran stands ready to host various 
workshops and training courses on the applications of nuclear technology in 
medicine, agriculture and industry. Such workshops could be organized in 
collaboration with the IAEA, at regional and international levels.810  
 
Salehi thus framed Iran’s rationale as a humanitarian project, a statement that 
echoed other declarations according to which the prevention of nuclear energy 
cooperation amongst the NPT states was producing profoundly negative 
consequences for security. In his September 2011 statement to the High-Level 
Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, Salehi, then Iran’s Foreign Minister, 
explained: 
We underline the role of free and open technical and technological exchange 
among States in strengthening global nuclear safety and its contribution to 
safe development and use of nuclear energy, including safe operation of 
nuclear power plants. We express serious concern over the continued undue 
restrictions on exports to developing countries of such items which negatively 
impact the national capacity of developing countries in the nuclear safety 
areas [sic]. As the Fukushima accident demonstrated, any deficiency in terms 
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of nuclear safety shall lead to widespread casualties with no proper 
compensation. As a result, there should be no restrictions of any kind for the 
transfer of nuclear-safety-related technologies and exchange of 
information.811 
 
Pirseyedi also notes that, since the Revolution, Iranian officials had continuously 
proclaimed their determination to share their knowledge in the field of nuclear 
science and technology with the world’s developing nations.812 Science and 
technology, it was argued, should benefit the whole of humanity and not individual 
nation states, which could use their technological advantage to pursue unjust 
policies.  
 
To conclude, the Western-led opposition to Iran’s nuclear activities provided the 
regime with a platform to articulate its long-standing grievances against key power 
dynamics and behavioural practices within the international system. More 
specifically, it acted as an opportunity to expose and denounce illegal and illegitimate 
practices in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The regime condemned 
double standards and violations of international treaties. It emphasised principles of 
equality, justice, inclusivity and multilateralism, all of which were conducive to a more 
stable and fairer international system. In so doing, the Ahmadinejad administration 
attempted to portray Iran as a state that was well socialised to international norms 
and that promoted security and stability. Furthermore, the regime’s framing of the 
NWSs’ intentions and behaviours allowed it to position Iran, both symbolically and 
practically, as a proactive defender of developing nations, which relied upon the full 
and effective implementation of the NPT for their scientific and technological 
development. As such, Iran was able to instantiate its identity narratives as a 
responsible state party to the NPT and a morally driven entity. Reproducing such 
conceptions of Iran’s identity was particularly important since the nuclear issue was 
partly a struggle for the recognition of Iran as a legitimate nuclear state and a 
constructive actor in the international system. However, Iran’s attempt to broaden the 
scope of the nuclear issue was not limited to the question of the NNWSs’ 
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constrained access to peaceful nuclear energy. It also included a fierce 
condemnation of the NWSs’ failure to comply with their own obligations of nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation.  
 
Problems of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Obligations 
The Ahmadinejad administration vividly exposed and denounced the NWSs’ lack of 
compliance with their nuclear disarmament obligations and the double standards in 
their dealings with nuclear-armed states that were not signatories of the NPT. In so 
doing, Iran sought to alter perceptions of its nuclear programme as a proliferation 
challenge and blame the Western core powers, especially the US, for the profound 
security threats posed by the dynamics of horizontal and vertical proliferation. These 
states’ practices, not Iran’s, were profoundly undermining the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and threatening the stability of the international system.  
 
The NWSs between disarmament obligations and vertical proliferation. 
The NPT rests upon three key pillars: peaceful use of nuclear energy (Articles IV and 
V), non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Articles I, II and III) and disarmament of 
nuclear weapons stockpiles (Article VI). In exchange for their commitment to forego 
the possession of nuclear weapons, NNWSs were provided two guarantees.813 First, 
they had the right to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Second, the 
NWSs would disarm:  
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.814 
 
The NWSs were thus obligated to move towards nuclear disarmament in “good 
faith”. This was a “legal understanding but also a political expectation”: “When the 
treaty was negotiated, halting further proliferation was the immediate concern; 
achieving nuclear disarmament the longer-term goal.”815 The NNWSs’ relative 
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strategic vulnerability was acceptable because it was meant to be temporary.816 The 
NWSs were also required “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly” (Article I). This included the transfer of any 
nuclear-related information or material to states that were not signatories to the NPT.  
 
In practice, the NWSs neglected to implement many of the provisions pertaining to 
their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Ahmadinejad administration 
repeatedly denounced an “imbalance in the pillars of the NPT” and pointed to three 
main failures.817 First, the NWSs, especially the US, prioritised the principles of 
nuclear non-proliferation abroad over their own disarmament obligations.818 In his 
2010 declaration to the NPT Review Conference, President Ahmadinejad thus 
complained that the NWSs had manipulated the instruments of regulation of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime: 
despite clear provisions of article VI of the Treaty and the Statute of the IAEA, 
no single report has been issued by the IAEA inspectors on the nuclear 
weapons facilities of the United States and its allies, nor is there any plan for 
their disarmament […] The IAEA has been putting the most possible 
pressures [sic] on non-nuclear weapon States under the pretext of 
proliferation risks, whilst those having nuclear bombs continue to enjoy full 
immunity and exclusive rights.819 
 
Second, despite significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the NWSs remained 
very far from meeting their disarmament commitments.820 Additionally, during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, there was no agreement on a timeline for complete and 
irreversible cuts in the NWSs’ arsenals.821 Pledges to a commitment to a nuclear 
weapon-free world remained largely rhetorical.  
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Third, contrary to their legal obligations, several NWSs sought qualitative and 
quantitative improvement of their nuclear arsenals (vertical proliferation).822 The UK, 
for example, decided to update Trident, its strategic deterrent system.823  
 
From the perspective of the Ahmadinejad administration, the biased interpretation 
and unequal enforcement of the NPT’s provisions constituted profound threats to the 
sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. By failing to reduce and eliminate their 
nuclear arsenals, the NWSs ran the risk that the NNWSs would lose trust and 
confidence in the benefits of the Treaty, thus undermining the prospects of 
international peace and security: 
It is now clear that the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and 
policies practiced by some nuclear weapon States, along with the weakness 
of and the imbalance in the NPT provisions have been the main causes of 
insecurity and served as an incentive for the development of such 
weapons.824 
 
Iran, however, did not limit its criticisms to the NWSs’ attitudes and practices vis-à-
vis their nuclear arsenals. It also denounced their behaviours towards the NWSs that 
were not signatories to the NPT.  
 
The NWSs and the challenge of horizontal nuclear proliferation. It is 
worth recalling that, during the period 2005-2013, India, Pakistan, North Korea and 
Israel were known or believed to have obtained nuclear weapons outside the 
purview of the NPT. These states presented two critical challenges to the 
sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
 
First, horizontal proliferation, which refers to states’ quest to develop and/or acquire 
nuclear weapons, undermined the NPT’s universal reach and made it increasingly 
inadequate as a means to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. At the time of its 
adoption in 1968, the states party to it had widely assumed that the NPT would 
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ultimately bind all states to the same obligations.825 Second, the nuclear-armed 
states outside the NPT were not subjected to the same regulatory obligations and 
constraints as their counterparts who were NPT signatories, thus leading Sidhu to 
ask:  
Can the (nuclear non-proliferation) regime make non-members comply with 
the norms and principles of the treaties even if they are not legally bound to 
the rules and regulations? Can non-members behave like members of the 
regime in spirit if not in law?826  
 
In sum, the NNWSs had strong incentives to mistrust the NPT’s original bargain: 
while the NWSs failed to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations, they 
also faced security dilemmas from those armed actors that remained non-NPT 
member states.827 
 
Additionally, the US provided substantial political, military, and/or scientific and 
technical support to Israel and India, including during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency.828 This assistance was significant for two main reasons. To begin with, it 
brought into question the US’ commitment to the NPT. The Ahmadinejad 
administration denounced the fact that strategic considerations, not legal and 
normative principles, were guiding the US’ non-proliferation priorities. The October 
2008 US-India nuclear agreement, for example, which allowed civilian nuclear trade 
between the two states, overturned long-standing American policy efforts to curb, roll 
back and eliminate India’s nuclear weapons programme.829 As such, it created “a 
major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does 
not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities”.830 India entered a 
“strategic partnership” with the US and became a de facto NWS outside the NPT.  
 
Furthermore, the US’ apparent willingness to support the nuclear armament of some 
non-NPT NWSs showed its contrasting policy responses towards adversarial and 
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non-adversarial proliferators. As Litwak argues, “Although leakage from Pakistan is 
the more likely pathway of terrorist acquisition, the transfer scenario involving Iran or 
North Korea had dominated the US strategic debate precisely because both 
countries are adversarial proliferators.”831 US treatment of the Indian, Pakistani, 
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes thus diverged because the 
administration had different threat assessments of each state’s identity, interests and 
likely behaviours.832 Haynes develops a similar argument and explains that, from the 
US’ perspective, India was a democracy and Iran a non-democratic theocracy.833 If it 
shared interests, values and trusts with the former, the US struggled to relate to Iran, 
which it found aggressive and untrustworthy.834 Consequently, Iran’s nuclear 
programme was securitised whilst India’s was desecuritised.  
 
From Iran’s viewpoint, the treatment and support that some NWSs outside the NPT 
received from the US demonstrated the double standards of the superpower’s 
policies and its disregard for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. India, a non-
signatory to the NPT, was allowed access to US nuclear technology while Iran, a 
state party to the NPT, was refused the right to the full fuel cycle.835 This fed the 
twofold narrative that the Iranian nuclear issue was a politically motivated move 
against Iran specifically (i.e. a regime with which the US never came to terms) and 
all NNWSs generally (i.e. a developing nation whose legal rights could be prejudiced 
via the medium of biased interpretations of the NPT). 
 
Iran, a peaceful and morally driven state actor. The Ahmadinejad 
administration attempted to alter the framing of Iran’s nuclear programme as a threat 
to international peace and security by emphasising the menacing and short-sighted 
practices of the NWS of the NPT, especially the US. Their direct and indirect 
complicity in the dynamics of vertical and horizontal proliferation profoundly 
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undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime and threatened international 
security. Iran took a firm and proactive stance on these issues. It portrayed its 
position as driven by interests larger than its own and sought to present itself as a 
constructive, legitimate and morally driven state acting for the good of the 
international community in general, and the developing nations in particular. Its 
strategy was twofold.  
 
First, the Ahmadinejad administration sought to reinforce the institutionalised norm 
against the use of nuclear weapons (the nuclear taboo). As shown in the analysis of 
the previous chapter, officials repeatedly argued that Iran was firmly opposed to the 
existence, production and use of nuclear weapons. In an attempt to strengthen Iran’s 
moral claims, frequent references were made to the fact that “only the US 
government has committed an atomic crime”.836 Furthermore, the Ahmadinejad 
administration firmly denounced the fact that the NWSs of the NPT continued to 
base their security policies on the strategic concept of nuclear deterrence. The use 
of nuclear weapons in their national and security doctrines was portrayed as an 
illegal practice that contravened the security assurances provided in the NPT.  
 
The NNWSs accepted the permanent rejection of nuclear weapons in exchange for 
two kinds of security guarantees: positive assurances in the form of a commitment 
on the part of the NWSs to act in support of NNWSs threatened by nuclear attack, 
and negative assurances in the shape of a pledge by the NWSs to never employ 
nuclear weapons against them.837 Within this context, Iran firmly condemned the 
2002 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which stated that the US reserved the right 
to resort to nuclear weapons in future conflicts and identified Iran as one of its seven 
potential targets.838 The Obama administration’s 2010 NPR similarly included a 
reference to 
US commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other 
non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use 
WMDs, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven 
for such efforts.839  
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The expression “fully accountable” left open the option of the use of nuclear 
weapons against the US’ adversaries.840 During the 2010 Tehran nuclear 
disarmament conference, President Ahmadinejad therefore complained that “the 
American government has both used nuclear weapons and has also officially 
threatened to use nuclear weapons”.841 Additionally, he warned against the potential 
consequences of such behaviour:  
When those who possess nuclear weapons and use those weapons have the 
unequal veto right in the highest body responsible for international security, 
does this not mean encouraging others to proliferate nuclear weapons in 
order to provide their national security [sic]?842  
 
President Ahmadinejad thus pointed to the profound security dilemma that US 
behaviour was creating for Iran and the NNWSs of the NPT. Ambassador Soltanieh, 
for his part, stressed that “nuclear blackmail” constituted a “serious violation” of US 
obligations and commitments under international law, “particularly Article 2 (4) of the 
Charter of the United Nations and also the provisions of the Security Council 
Resolution 984, to refrain from the threat or use of force against any state”.843 In his 
communication to the IAEA, he specifically quoted a comment the US Secretary of 
Defence had made during a news briefing at the Pentagon on 6 April 2010, 
according to which the NPR had “a very strong message for Iran […] all options are 
on the table in terms of how we deal with you”.844  
 
The second strand of the regime’s strategy was to engage in considerable diplomatic 
activity to reinforce the norm against the possession of nuclear weapons. To do so, it 
acted on four main fronts. To begin with, the Ahmadinejad administration tried to 
downplay the role of nuclear weapons in providing national security, pointing to a 
mismatch between the strategic insurances that nuclear weapons were commonly 
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assumed to bring and the changing nature of threats in the twenty-first century. 
Although I subsequently engage with these considerations, suffice it to say that Iran 
emphasised the point that national security was increasingly less predicated on hard 
power and unilateral capabilities than states’ capacity to (multilaterally) respond to 
increasingly global threats, such as terrorism and narco-trafficking. In addition, 
nuclear weapons could not provide much deterrence and security against non-state 
actors.  
 
Furthermore, the Ahmadinejad administration sought to reinforce the norm of non-
possession of nuclear weapons by delegitimising the claim that they acted as 
sources of political influence and national prestige. Complete nuclear disarmament 
had been partly hindered by the fact that nuclear weapons continued to carry high 
value as instruments of status and power projection, both domestically and 
internationally. During the 2010 NPT Review Conference, President Ahmadinejad 
thus declared: 
the sole function of the nuclear weapons is to annihilate all living beings and 
destroy the environment, and its radiations would affect the coming 
generations and its negative impacts would continue for centuries. The 
nuclear bomb is a fire against humanity rather than a weapon for defense. 
The possession of nuclear bombs is not a source of pride; it is rather 
disgusting and shameful.845 
 
In addition to downplaying nuclear weapons’ strategic and political value, the regime 
also sought to build up international pressure against the NWSs and provide 
solutions to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world. Thus, in April 2010, shortly after 
the US held its Nuclear Security Conference, Iran organised its own international 
nuclear disarmament conference, titled “Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for 
None”. During the event, which was attended by various foreign ministers and 
worldwide nuclear experts, President Ahmadinejad laid out a range of propositions 
for global disarmament. In particular, he emphasised Iran’s readiness to help in the 
management of nuclear disarmament, and suggested that an independent 
international body be set up to oversee global nuclear disarmament.  
 
                                                          
845
 “Statement by H. E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” UN, 3 May 2010. 
222 
 
While the timing indicated a determination not to be sidelined from key nuclear-
related debates, the conference also revealed an attempt to portray Iran as a 
constructive and proactive actor in its approach to matters of international security. 
The 2010 Tehran conference also indicated Iran’s lack of faith in the existing 
(politicised) international institutions to carry out the objectives of Articles I and VI of 
the NPT. Tellingly, President Ahmadinejad declared during the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference that 
Comparing the Washington Nuclear Security Summit with the Tehran Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Conference, the efforts of the host of the 
former were aimed at preserving the monopoly over the nuclear weapons and 
superiority on [sic] other countries, while in the latter Conference all 
participants were seeking a world free from nuclear weapons.846 
 
During the same Review Conference, he also suggested that the NPT should be 
transformed into a “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty (DNPT)”, 
which would place the complete destruction of nuclear weapons at the core of its 
mandate.847 Alongside other recommendations, he advocated the establishment of 
an independent international group with full authority from the [NPT Review] 
Conference to prepare a set of guidelines to operationalize the provisions of 
article VI of the NPT, including planning and fully supervising nuclear 
disarmament and preventing proliferation.848 
 
The Ahmadinejad administration’s approach to the problem of nuclear weapons was 
consistent with those of its predecessors, who similarly sought to mobilise the 
NNWSs and advanced proposals to control the NWSs’ arsenals.849 In the 1980s, for 
example, Iran had suggested the creation of an “international police force” consisting 
of developing countries and tasked with the control of the two superpowers’ nuclear 
arsenals under the supervision of the IAEA.850 The Khatami administration had 
called for the creation of “a Nuclear Weapons Convention” which would ban nuclear 
armaments.851 During his September 2005 statement to the UNGA, President 
Ahmadinejad also suggested the General Assembly “mandate an ad-hoc committee 
to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms 
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and strategies for complete disarmament”.852 Of course, as Pirseyedi notes, Iran’s 
nuclear disarmament diplomacy was partly intended to alter the balance of hard 
power capabilities.853 
 
Finally, the Ahmadinejad administration portrayed Israel’s nuclear weapons as a 
destabilising factor and a profound threat to regional security. Israel long pursued a 
policy of nuclear ambiguity and remained outside the NPT. From Iran’s perspective, 
this was the obstacle to the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone (MENWFZ), which the Shah’s regime had initiated and the UN had endorsed in 
a December 1974 Resolution.854 Successive Iranian administrations repeatedly 
presented the MENWFZ as an essential element of regional and international 
security, and a positive step towards global nuclear disarmament. In so doing, they 
denounced Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the illegal and illegitimate support it received 
from the US and the Security Council: 
The Council has […] ignored the fact that the main obstacle to the 
establishment of such a zone is the Zionist regime that has not adhered to the 
treaties prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, a regime that its [sic] 
nuclear program and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities are a threat to 
international peace and security. The said regime, while enjoys [sic] impunity 
and is supported by the United States, continues to produce and stockpile all 
types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.855 
 
To conclude, Iran systematically attempted to broaden the scope of the Iranian 
nuclear issue by identifying and articulating key mismatches between the rights and 
obligations laid out in the NPT and the practices of the NWSs. As such, it 
continuously appealed to the treaty, the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and a key pillar of international security, to both justify its determination to 
acquire peaceful nuclear energy and expose the repeated legal breaches of the 
NWSs. In so doing, Iran sought to legitimise its nuclear policy and delegitimise the 
Western core powers by emphasising their failure to help NNWSs develop 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, disarm their nuclear weapons 
arsenals and not transfer nuclear weapon technology to any recipient. This framing 
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produced a number of abstract and tangible external benefits for the Iranian regime, 
which partly explain the resilience of its strategies of resistance between 2005 and 
2013. 
 
External Benefits of Iran’s Nuclear Policy of Resistance 
Iran received discursive and strategic support for its firm nuclear policy, especially for 
its articulation of the legal rights and obligations of the states party to the NPT. This 
was partly because other actors shared its concerns with the de facto restrictions 
placed on NNWSs’ access to peaceful nuclear energy. As such, Iran was able to tap 
into pre-existing discontent and mobilise these grievance narratives. The May 2010 
Turkey-Brazil-Iran Agreement was also significant because it demonstrated that Iran 
enjoyed diversified relations in a global context of power diffusion. Finally, China and 
Russia, two major rising powers and members of the P5+1, provided important but 
ambiguous support to Iran’s nuclear policy.  
 
Tapping into an existing reservoir of discontent. A review of official 
statements pronounced during the NPT Review Conference and the NAM summits 
demonstrates why Iran’s attempt to broaden the scope of the nuclear issue could 
resonate with other states’ grievances and concerns.  
 
Every five years since 1975, the states party to the NPT have held a Review 
Conference on the treaty, with the aim of assessing the implementation of its 
provisions and recommending measures to better fulfil its requirements. Two main 
strands of disagreement systematically punctuated these conferences: the right of 
NNWSs to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Article 
IV), and the NWSs’ compliance with their disarmament obligations (Article VI). 
 
NNWSs denounced the slow and limited pace and scope of the NWSs’ disarmament 
efforts. The 1995 NPT Review Conference, during which the Treaty was extended 
indefinitely, advocated the need for stronger and more explicit commitments to 
disarmament.856 The NWSs, however, fiercely opposed the introduction of any 
specific timetable and argued that they could eliminate their nuclear arsenals only 
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when the international security situation permitted.857 For many of the NAM countries 
and the NNWSs, this showed how “unbalanced and discriminatory” the NPT was 
since it placed more restrictions on the have-nots than on the complacent NWSs.858 
As Alpin persuasively remarks: 
States signed the Treaty in the belief that it would reduce dangers to their 
security, and provide gains in exchange for required sacrifices […] This 
arrangement naturally provokes resentment and charges of injustice when 
some parties are seen as neglecting, or simply violating, their pledges while 
profiting from the compliance by others.859 
 
The 2000 NPT Review Conference led to the adoption of “13 practical steps” for 
systematic efforts to implement Article VI and reach the complete abolition of nuclear 
arms.860 The two Review Conferences that took place during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency, however, brought limited results. While the 2005 Conference ended with 
no consensus, the 2010 Conference approved a final document that called on the 
NWSs to move “towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of 
nuclear weapons” and to “enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence”.861 
The NWSs were notably asked to report on the progress of their disarmament. 
Additionally, the Conference decided that a regional conference be organised in 
2012 to facilitate progress on a MENWFZ. However, in June 2014, the Arms Control 
Association reported that, while the regional conference had yet to take place, the 
NWSs’ progress reports showed that they did not always agree on how to proceed 
with their disarmament efforts.862 
 
Aside from the NPT Review Conferences, where objections similar to those of Iran 
were expressed, members of the NAM also often articulated similar grievances. In 
particular, the NAM, of which Iran was a member, regularly complained about the 
power structure of the international system and the behaviour of its dominant actors. 
Officially formed in 1961, the NAM had always emphasised the fundamental rights of 
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all states to self-determination.863 It continuously rejected hegemonic and unilateral 
policies, which were “increasingly leading to the erosion and violation of international 
law, to the use and threat of use of force and to pressure and coercion by certain 
countries as a means to achieving their policy objectives”.864 In its statements, the 
NAM stressed its commitment to multilateralism, and argued that the UN Charter and 
principles of international law were crucial to international peace and security. In 
sum, multilateralism, principles of justice, and inclusivity were considered key to a 
fair and stable international order. Furthermore, and of particular relevance to Iran, 
the NAM continuously rejected the labelling of countries as “good” or “evil” and 
“repressive”.865 They also raised concerns regarding the imposition of sanctions, 
which should be considered “only after all means of peaceful settlement of disputes 
under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter have been exhausted and a 
thorough consideration undertaken of the short-term and long-term effects of such 
sanctions”.866 As for issues related to peaceful nuclear energy, the NAM repeatedly 
put forward five key arguments.  
 
First, each state party to the NPT had the sovereign right to define its national 
energy policies, including on fuel cycles, in accordance with its national requirements 
and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.867 Iran’s decision that it needed 
nuclear energy for its economic development could thus be neither questioned nor 
curtailed. Second, the NAM continually highlighted the obligation of the NWSs to 
help developing countries fulfil their legitimate right to nuclear energy.868 It also 
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warned against discriminatory limitations and restrictions on the export of nuclear 
material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to developing 
countries.869  
 
Third, the NAM firmly rejected any attempt to politicise the work of the IAEA and 
considered its existing criteria for the transfer of nuclear technology to be “robust and 
effective”.870 In this context, it systematically expressed its concerns at the 
expanding set of ad hoc and non-institutional approaches to deal with potential 
nuclear proliferation challenges. In its 2012 statement, the NAM emphasised that  
measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear 
security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict 
the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.871 
 
Fourth, the NAM often stressed the fundamental importance of a clear distinction 
between the legal obligations and the voluntary confidence-building measures 
adopted by the states party to the NPT. Voluntary undertakings could not be 
transformed into legal obligations.872 Finally, the NAM repeatedly asserted that non-
proliferation should go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament. As such, it 
systematically deplored the slow pace of progress and noted that reductions in 
deployment and operational status were no substitute for irreversible cuts in nuclear 
arsenals.873 The NAM also continually called on Israel to sign the NPT without 
preconditions or further delay.874 
 
For Iran, these articulations of the rights and obligations of the states party to the 
NPT were important. Not only did they help demonstrate that Iran was far from 
                                                          
869
 Ibid.  
870
 Ibid.  
871
 “Statement by Indonesian Delegation,” Non-Aligned Movement, 9 May 2012.  
872
 “Statement by … on Behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on 
Chapter 2 Issues: Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty Relating to Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones,” Non-Aligned Movement, Vienna, , 
7 May 2012, accessed 31 March 2015, 
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Statement/05.07.2012_statement.pdf. 
873
 See “14
th
 Summit Conference of Heads of State,” Non-Aligned Movement, 11-16 September 2006, 
28. 
874
 See for example “Communication Dated 6 December 2012 Received from the Permanent Mission 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,” IAEA, 14 December 2012, accessed 31 March 2015, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2012/infcirc844.pdf. 
228 
 
isolated within the international system (other states shared its grievances), they also 
illustrated the righteousness of its stance. As Sonboli explained, public expressions 
of support for Iran’s nuclear policy were crucial because “when the NAM or others 
support Iran, the EU and the US cannot say the ‘international community’ is opposed 
to Iran.”875 For example, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez incessantly rejected 
the unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran, and promised unrestricted 
support for Iran’s legitimate aspirations for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In 
so doing, Venezuela joined Iran in its criticism of the Western-led international 
system, its advocacy for deeper relations between the developing nations and its 
pursuit of greater autonomy and independence.876 In interview, Ambassador 
Soltanieh emphasised that the statements of the NAM were important to Iran 
because they showed that “on matters of principles, the NAM is united […] We are 
grateful for this support because it proves that we are on the right track and that the 
Americans are not telling the truth to the international community.”877 
 
Iranian officials also frequently expressed their thanks for supportive statements in 
official declarations to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN.878 They also 
frequently referred to the NPT Review Conferences’ final documents to legitimise 
their position and resistance strategies. In a March 2012 note to the IAEA, for 
example, Iran articulated its right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities in light of the 
Final Document adopted during the 2000 NPT Review Conference.879 
 
In addition to discursive (direct and indirect) support, Iran’s nuclear policy also 
received strategic backing. One chief example is the May 2010 Turkey-Brazil-Iran 
Agreement, which was concluded three months after the Ahmadinejad administration 
announced that it would proceed to enrich uranium for its TRR.  
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The May 2010 Turkey-Brazil-Iran Agreement. Iranian, Turkish and Brazilian 
negotiators reached an agreement rapidly (within 18 hours) and on terms similar to 
those discussed during the Vienna talks (a fuel swap deal). The so-called Tehran 
Declaration stipulated that, in exchange for removing 1,200 kilograms of its LEU to 
Turkey, the Vienna Group (namely, the IAEA, France, Russia and the US) would 
agree to provide 120 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium fuel to Iran within 
one year, for its TRR.880 However, the US and the EU rapidly and unequivocally 
rejected this Agreement. Sanctions had come to take priority over engagement, in a 
context where substantial political capital had been invested in rallying support for a 
new UNSC Resolution (Resolution 1929 of June 2010).881 In a joint letter to the 
IAEA, headed by France, the US and Russia, the Agreement was also decried for 
not addressing “Iran’s production or retention of 19.75 percent enriched uranium”, 
and for asserting “a right for Iran to engage in enrichment activities” despite several 
UNSC resolutions prohibiting Iran from pursuing such activities.882 Additionally, the 
Agreement failed to set a date for the removal of the LEU from Iran and to account 
“for Iran’s accumulation of LEU since the IAEA first proposed the TRR deal. Removal 
of 1,200 kg at present would leave Iran substantial stocks, decreasing the 
confidence-building value of the original proposal.”883 
 
The timing and characteristics of the Agreement indicate that a certain level of trust 
between Iran, Turkey and Brazil most likely played a constitutive role in the success 
of their negotiations. After nearly seven years of unsuccessful talks with distrusted 
Western-led partners, the May 2010 deal may have succeeded because it involved 
less antagonistic and threatening actors. Importantly, as Parsi argues, Turkey and 
Brazil’s diplomatic approach to the Iranian nuclear issue was based on equality, 
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respect and problem-solving rather than coercion.884 Additionally, Turkey and Brazil 
were non-permanent members of the UNSC, which lent weight and authority to their 
agreement. They were less constrained by domestic considerations than the US and 
the EU in their negotiations with Iran. As such, the Iranian regime may have felt 
relatively confident about transferring LEU off its soil. 
 
Importantly, the Tehran Declaration illustrated the depth of NNWSs’ concerns over 
their ability to access peaceful nuclear energy. Analysts systematically highlighted 
that, through the Tehran Declaration, Brazil and Turkey were seeking to strengthen 
the right of the NNWSs of the NPT to develop peaceful nuclear power in their own 
territory.885 The Declaration thus stipulated Iran, Brazil and Turkey’s commitment to 
the NPT and “recall[ed] the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear 
fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without 
discrimination.”886  
 
Turkey, which ratified the NPT in 1980 and the AP in 2000, continuously campaigned 
for the full implementation of Articles IV and VI of the treaty. Its ambition to develop 
nuclear energy was also pursued more vigorously after the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) came into power in 2002.887 Turkish officials vigorously denounced any 
attempt to limit NNWSs’ right and ability to access peaceful nuclear technology, 
including Iran. Brazil, for its part, only signed and ratified the NPT in 1998 after 
denouncing the institutionalised asymmetry between the NWSs and NNWSs for 
almost three decades.888 Interestingly, Brazil joined the NPT after it had developed 
capabilities to enrich uranium. It was a firm supporter of global nuclear disarmament 
and made “continued, explicit references to the grand bargain of non-proliferation for 
disarmament”.889 Brazil also refused to sign the AP, arguing that it placed 
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unnecessary burdens on NNWSs in a context where the NWSs were not fulfilling 
their disarmament obligations.890  
 
The May 2010 Agreement also demonstrated that Iran had strengthened its relations 
with a range of regional and extra-regional actors. For example, Iranian-Turkish 
relations expanded between 2002 and 2011, when the Syrian crisis tremendously 
complicated their efforts. The Erdogan AKP government pursued a policy of “zero 
problems” with its neighbours, seeking to “leverage Turkey’s geostrategic location in 
the center of Eurasia, as well as its historical Ottoman ties and Muslim affinities, to 
give Turkey ‘strategic depth’ and wider influence”.891 Turkey and Iran notably 
expanded their trade and economic cooperation.892 The Brazilian governments of 
President Lula da Silva (2003-2011) repeatedly expressed hopes of expanding 
economic, scientific, industrial, technological and cultural cooperation with Iran – a 
call the Ahmadinejad administration welcomed.893 
 
Within this context, the Turkey-Brazil-Iran deal was also a reflection of changing 
power dynamics within the international system. The substantial and growing 
capabilities of the rising powers were matched by their increasing political 
assertiveness in regional and global fora. While they repeatedly emphasised key 
principles, such as multilateral diplomacy, international law, state sovereignty or 
reform of the UN, they also grew more vocal in their criticisms of the Western core 
powers’ practices, especially US behaviour, and manoeuvred for greater influence 
over decision-making processes.894 Thus, while the AKP pursued the overall 
ambition to strengthen Turkey’s regional and international visibility and influence, it 
saw an opportunity to position itself as a crucial mediator in the context of the Iranian 
nuclear issue. In Brazil, the eight-year presidency of Lula da Silva presented a 
substantial and proactive shift towards “South-South relations” in an attempt to 
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improve the country’s economic situation, relative autonomy and international 
influence.895  
 
In sum, the May 2010 Tehran Declaration represented an opportunity for Turkey and 
Brazil to demonstrate their individual and collective aspirations for greater influence 
over international challenges, as well as their ability to lead high-stake negotiations. 
Ultimately, however, their inability to prevent the passing of a new UNSC Resolution 
against Iran showed that the Western core powers continued to exert significant 
influence over political dynamics.896 In this respect, China and Russia’s approach to 
the Iranian nuclear issue illustrates both the opportunities and the constraints of 
these emerging global dynamics.  
 
Before I move to this point, it is worth emphasising that Warnaar similarly observed 
that “the international environment was not uniformly hostile to the Iranian regime.”897 
Emerging and aspiring powers were increasingly challenging US hegemony during 
the Ahmadinejad presidency, “demanding their share in determining who [was] ‘in’, 
who [was] ‘out’, and on which conditions.”898 While these powers created “important” 
international opportunities for Iran, these remained “limited” only, in large part due to 
the preponderant power and influence of the US (see chapter 6).899   
 
Limits of the changing global power dynamics. China and Russia shared 
a range of interests with Iran and proved both willing and able to delay and soften 
the coercive diplomatic strategy against its nuclear activities. However, for reasons 
related to the structure and power dynamics of the international system on the one 
hand, and their rivalrous relations with Iran and the other, they did not use their 
permanent seats on the UNSC to veto Resolutions. Instead, they repeatedly 
instrumentalised a range of conflicting pressures that emanated from Iran and the 
Western powers to secure significant concessions and increase their own benefits.  
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Three main factors brought China and Russia closer to Iran during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency. First, they shared deep grievances with the structure and power 
dynamics within the international system, particularly regarding the Western core 
powers’ practices (e.g. interference in sovereign states’ affairs). They shared a 
desire for a more multipolar world and resented the “hegemony” of the US. During 
the Ahmadinejad presidency, China and Russia asserted their (wish for) a greater 
role within the international system and “bringing new rules of the game”.900 In 
particular, China tried to expand its authority in the Pacific by interfering with 
American ships, objecting to US-Korean military exercises and restricting military-to-
military cooperation in protest at US arms sales to Taiwan. In addition, China and the 
US increasingly engaged in cyberattacks and state-sponsored espionage activities. 
As for Russia, President Obama had initially come into power with the ambition to 
“reset” relations with the Kremlin, but the two states widely disagreed on the 
presence of American missile defence systems in Eastern Europe and Russia’s 
2008 military incursion into Georgia.  
 
Second, China and Russia did not share the Western core powers’ sense of urgency 
regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. They continuously argued in favour of a 
diplomatic solution, particularly since NNWSs had a right to peaceful nuclear energy 
and the Western core powers had repeatedly employed double standards vis-à-vis 
nuclear proliferators.901 China and Russia also refused to impose unilateral sanctions 
against Iran.  
 
Third, China and Russia both expanded their relations with Iran. In the early 1990s, 
China began to seek new long-term solutions to its growing domestic energy 
demands.902 Over the years, Iran became one of its major suppliers, providing over 
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10 percent of China’s total oil imports in 2011 (China, for its part, was Iran’s largest 
oil export market and trading partner).903 Additionally, China benefited from the US 
and EU sanctions on Iran, which provoked the departure of international companies 
and enabled it to substantially increase its foreign direct investments in the country, 
especially in the oil and gas sectors.904 According to the International Crisis Group, 
Iran pursued a “binding strategy” in its energy relationship with China: 
Underpinning this strategy is a belief that the more its companies are 
embedded in Iran, the more likely China will be to attempt to delay, weaken, 
or block sanctions. Moreover, Chinese investment in infrastructure, 
particularly in the construction of refineries, increases Iran’s ability to produce 
its own petrol, minimising the potential impact of sanctions on that commodity. 
Iran tightened bilateral energy bonds in 2009 by awarding multiple major oil 
and gas deals to Chinese companies. It also actively sought deeper 
involvement in refining and distribution channels by offering Chinese 
companies tax breaks and discounts on raw materials purchased in Iran.905  
 
Crucially, Iran offered long-term energy security to China thanks to its substantial 
hydrocarbon resources, pivotal geographical location, and its potential to both 
counter US influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, and reduce China’s 
dependence on the Malacca Strait.906  
 
Iran shared a long and complicated history with Russia, not least because its territory 
was effectively divided between Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century. 
Russia, however, played an important role in the development and (much-delayed) 
completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant and considerably expanded its energy and 
security cooperation with Iran.907 Despite their deeper and broader cooperation, their 
bilateral relations became severely strained after Russia voted in favour of UNSC 
Resolution 1929 in 2010 and subsequently refused to sell its advanced S-300 air 
defence system to Iran.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Iran relations since the 1979 Revolution, see S. Harold and A. Nader, “China and Iran: Economic, 
Political, and Military Relations,” Rand Corporation, 2012, 2-5, accessed 26 March 2015, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP351.pdf. 
903
 Hong, “China’s Dilemma on Iran,” 409. 
904
 Ibid., 414.  
905
 “The Iran Nuclear Issue,” International Crisis Group, 7. 
906
 M. Dorraj and J. English, “Iran-China Relations and the Emerging Political Map,” in Iranian Foreign 
Policy since 2001: Alone in the World, eds. T. Juneau and S. Razavi (London: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2013), 184-85; W. S. Chen, “China’s Oil Strategy: ‘Going Out’ to Iran,” Asian Politics & 
Policy 2, no. 1 (January 2010): 40, 48; Harold and Nader, “China and Iran,” 17-20. 
907
 See M. Katz, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 2 
(Spring 2008): 202-03; S. Blank, “Resets, Russia, and Iranian Proliferation,” Mediterranean Quarterly 
23, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 24.  
235 
 
This last point illustrates an important limitation in Iran’s relations with Russia and 
China: both had to balance their interests with and in Iran against other 
considerations, especially their relations with the US and their reputational concerns. 
This was particularly true of China, which was repeatedly criticised by the Western 
powers for refusing to behave responsibly.908 As Garver examines: 
There is a strong tension in China’s contemporary relations with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI). On the one hand, Beijing views Iran as an important 
country with whom China may advance its interests in a number of areas by 
expanding cooperation. On the other hand, China’s remarkably successful 
post-1978 development drive has been predicated on maintaining positive 
relations with the United States (US), and Washington has frequently objected 
to aspects of Sino-Iranian cooperation. Beijing must continually balance 
maintenance of positive relations with Washington, against expanded 
cooperation with the IRI.909 
 
Interestingly, the International Crisis Group observes that Russia and China’s votes 
at the UNSC tended to be complementary, thus attesting to their shared concerns 
over isolation.910 However, they both voted in favour of Iran’s referral to the UNSC 
and the subsequent UN Resolutions. As such, they approved of the increasingly 
stringent multilateral sanctions, as well as the request that Iran suspend its 
enrichment activities and implement the AP. Importantly, they tended to pursue “a 
delay-and-weaken strategy” with regards to the Resolutions.911 They sought 
concessions from the US, the UK and France (and Germany) to try to ensure that 
their own economic interests would not face great restrictions.912 At the same time, 
the increasingly coercive sanctions reduced Iran’s relative bargaining power vis-à-vis 
China and Russia.913 Thus, while Iran shared substantial long-term interests with 
China and Russia, and received important support from them, the two rising powers 
used the Iranian nuclear issue as an opportunity to assert themselves vis-à-vis the 
Western core powers, test their range of options in a changing international system 
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and expand their leverage over Iran at a time when it had become more dependent 
on them.  
 
I have so far examined how Iran sought to broaden the scope of the nuclear issue by 
contextualising it within wider debates revolving around the NWSs’ (lack of) 
compliance with their NPT obligations. I have argued that Iran portrayed its 
determination to defend its own and other NNWSs’ rights to peaceful nuclear energy 
(Article IV) and total nuclear disarmament (Article VI) as a reflection of its identity as 
a constructive, peaceful and inclusive state actor within the international system. 
Additionally, Iran was particularly keen to challenge injustice in the field of nuclear 
technology, and help the developing nations of the NPT produce peaceful nuclear 
energy if they so wished.  
 
Within this context, Iran’s anti-status quo nuclear policy contributed to the 
reinstantiation and reproduction of key principles of the Revolution. Iran’s 
devaluation of the NWSs’ attitudinal and behavioural practices, especially those of 
the US, its self-portrayal as a force of good and justice and its emphasis on 
principles of sovereign equality and multilateralism, helped the regime win some 
external recognition and legitimacy for its nuclear stance. While Iran’s ability to 
nurture and receive discursive and strategic backing prevented neither its referral to 
the UNSC nor the imposition of stringent sanctions, it nevertheless demonstrated 
that Iran was not an isolated rogue state. Additionally, its relations with China and 
Russia imposed constraints and limits on the Western core powers’ approach to the 
Iranian nuclear issue, both within and outside the UNSC. In other words, Iran 
challenged these states both directly (through its strategy of non-compliance with the 
UNSC and IAEA resolutions) and indirectly (via proxy support).  
 
But Iran did not limit itself to discrediting its significant Others and asserting itself in 
opposition to them. In their negotiation proposals to the EU-3 and the P5+1, the 
Khatami and the Ahmadinejad administrations repeatedly included various security 
matters that were of profound concern to both Iran and the Western powers. 
Alongside its attempt to broaden the scope of the Iranian nuclear issue, the Iranian 
leadership thus also sought to transform the controversy into a broad geopolitical 
opportunity for Iran and its long-term adversaries.  
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Iran’s Negotiation Proposals: Similarities, Differences and 
Significance 
The negotiation proposals of the Khatami and the Ahmadinejad administrations 
included offers of cooperation on a wide range of issues unrelated to the nuclear 
question. I use a thematic perspective to identify potential similarities and differences 
in the areas where Iran suggested stronger engagement. I also highlight whether the 
administrations emphasised different modalities of interaction.  
 
Overview of the Khatami Administration’s Negotiation Proposals 
The Khatami administration submitted three key negotiation proposals to the EU-3 in 
2005, on 17 January, 23 March and 29 April.914 These systematically included calls 
for discussion and cooperation between Iran and France, Germany and the UK in 
areas unrelated to the nuclear issue. The proposals also emphasised core principles 
of interaction with the IRI.  
 
 Key themes. The Khatami administration’s proposals suggested wider 
cooperation to combat terrorism, such as exchanging information regarding the 
actions, movements and resources of terrorist individuals and groups. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US soil, and those of March 2004 in Madrid 
and July 2005 in London, terrorism figured high on European governments’ agendas. 
For Iran, processes of cooperation against this “dilemma of common aversion” would 
have had three main benefits: recognition of its legitimate security concerns (e.g. al-
Qaeda), acknowledgement of its critical geopolitical location and influence, and 
erosion of its image as a rogue state.  
 
The proposals further made recommendations for the security and stability of the 
Persian Gulf region, an area of crucial importance to both Iran and the Western 
powers. Iraq and Afghanistan were systematically singled out as the two countries 
where Iran and the EU could collaborate to strengthen internal and external 
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stabilisation. Additionally, the proposals included the objective of establishing 
“democratic, stable and broad-based governments”, thus indicating that Iran was 
pursuing similar values and political aims to the EU (and the US).915 In suggesting 
broader and deeper cooperation in the Gulf, Iran attempted to position itself as a 
constructive, legitimate and significant regional actor. It also implicitly acknowledged 
that extra-regional actors would continue to play an important role within the Middle 
East. In the January 2005 proposal, the section pertaining to the Gulf region was 
tellingly titled “Sustainable Partnership on Regional Issues”.  
 
The proposals also called for wider security and defence cooperation to promote 
peace and security at the global level. The Khatami administration advocated a 
balance between recognition of Iran’s legal rights to self-defence (and, therefore, its 
legitimate need to acquire the means to provide for its security) and the necessity of 
mutual defence cooperation. In particular, the fight against drug trafficking and 
terrorism was identified as necessitating broader cooperation between Iran and the 
EU. The January 2005 proposal thus stated that “The E3/EU recognise that Iran 
should be supported as a country in a region which is highly affected by drug-
trafficking and terrorism.”916 
 
Finally, the proposals included a number of suggestions regarding wider economic 
cooperation between Iran and the EU, mainly in the form of guarantees for Iran’s 
access to EU markets and EU recognition of Iran as a major source of energy for 
Europe. As highlighted in the previous chapter, economic and energy cooperation 
were key elements of the Iran-EU “Critical Dialogue” and “Comprehensive Dialogue”. 
 
 Chief principles of interaction with the IRI. The Khatami administration’s 
negotiation proposals included important details on how Iran and the EU ought to 
interact with each other in order to develop and maintain “strong and mutually 
beneficial relations”.917 There were three chief considerations.  
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First, the proposals frequently referred to the necessity of respecting states’ inherent 
right to choose and develop their own political, social, economic and cultural 
systems. They also rejected the threat, or use, of force, and emphasised the 
inviolability of states’ territorial boundaries. Iran thus placed paramount importance in 
non-interference with states’ physical integrity and sovereignty. While this can be 
understood in light of Iran’s generally negative relations with the Western powers 
since the Revolution, the politicisation of its nuclear programme and the Bush 
administration’s shift to hard power regime change policies likely profoundly 
heightened these concerns. As such, Iran’s January 2005 proposal included the 
principle that  
The E3/EU and Iran will refrain from engaging in, supporting or assisting any 
intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in their respective 
internal or external affairs, regardless of their mutual relations. They will in all 
circumstances refrain from any act of military, or of political economic or other 
coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another 
party of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantage of 
any kind. Accordingly, they will refrain from direct or indirect assistance to 
terrorist or subversive activities against each other.918 
 
Second, the proposals continuously referred to the importance of abiding by, and 
engaging within the limits set by, international law and bilateral and multilateral 
treaties. These were portrayed as essential regulating principles of the international 
system, which further illustrates the argument that Iran viewed international norms 
and agreements as a cornerstone of security and stability.  
 
Third, the proposals called for several “working groups” or “task forces” to be set up 
to discuss defence cooperation, counter-terrorism or the exchange of expertise in the 
area of export control.919 Such an approach could have strengthened shared 
expertise and accelerated progress in areas of mutual concern. In addition, repeated 
meetings between small groups of Iranian and European officials could have helped 
build mutual understanding, trust and confidence.  
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In sum, the Khatami administration’s negotiation proposals identified several areas 
where further collaboration between Iran and the European countries was not only 
possible but also desirable in order to achieve greater regional and international 
security and stability. In his memoir, Mousavian states that Iran had decided to both 
pursue “a long-term strategy of ‘turning threats into opportunities’” and to “resolve 
some long-standing problems […] especially with regards to economic, 
technological, security, political, and nuclear cooperation with the West, including the 
US”.920 In a way, Rouhani’s 18 July 2005 message to the EU-3/EU ministers 
confirms Iran’s attempt to transform the nuclear negotiations into a broader 
geopolitical opportunity: 
For twenty-five years, I have focused on security issues surrounding Iran and 
the region. Never have I seen such potential for commonality of purpose and 
concern about mutual sources of threat in significant areas. Today, in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Lebanon, I find strong and inescapable reasons and 
elements that bind us in shaping and establishing durable stability.921 
 
However, the Khatami administration’s negotiation proposals also specified 
important conditions of engagement and interaction between Iran and France, 
Germany and the UK. Engagement would benefit Iran’s national interests as long as 
specific conditions were met. In particular, its sovereign independence and equality 
had to be recognised.  
 
The Ahmadinejad Administration’s Negotiation Proposals  
Iran’s proposals during the Ahmadinejad presidency similarly included several issues 
related to regional and international security and stability.922 Thus, despite assertive 
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strategies towards the P5+1 and the UNSC, the regime also attempted to reach out 
to its negotiation partners, the Western core powers in particular. As Foreign Minister 
Salehi declared prior to the April 2012 Istanbul talks: 
If the intention of dialogue is merely to prevent cold conflict from turning hot, 
rather than to resolve differences, suspicion will linger. Trust will not be 
established […] In the upcoming talks, we hope that all sides will return to the 
negotiating table as equals with mutual respect; that all sides will be 
committed to comprehensive, long-term dialogue aimed at resolving all 
parties’ outstanding concerns; and, most important, that all sides make 
genuine efforts to reestablish confidence and trust.923 
 
During my interviews with Iranian officials, I systematically sought clarifications on 
the reasons why Iran had included a range of issues that were unrelated to the 
nuclear question in its successive negotiation proposals to the P5+1. Their answers 
varied. Ambassador Soltanieh, for example, explained that Iran had wanted the 
nuclear issue to remain a technical matter. Since the IAEA was the only organisation 
mandated to inspect and verify its nuclear activities, Iran could not discuss such 
matters with its negotiation partners. Additionally, Iran was opposed to the idea of 
discussing these issues with France, Germany and the UK (and the US) because of 
its experience during the period 2003 to 2005. Sonboli, for his part, gave a different 
explanation: “The reason is clear, we want to make the cake bigger”: 
I have seen this trend within Iran of using the nuclear issue as an opportunity 
to solve problems with the EU and the US. When Iran proposed consortiums, 
what did it mean? It meant that we wanted more of US and EU presence, to 
strengthen cooperation [sic] […] I think that the question of the Iranian nuclear 
issue is between Iran and the US […] And we have to solve this problem with 
the US directly. It is a waste of time to discuss these issues with the IAEA, 
Russia, China and the EU.924 
 
 Main characteristics. Five main features characterise the Ahmadinejad 
administration’s negotiation proposals. First, Iran identified several political and 
security issues of regional and global dimensions, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, 
illegal immigration, organised crime and environmental issues. The administration’s 
proposals tended to be broader in scope and reach since they also often suggested 
the need for cooperation with the Balkans, Africa, Latin America and East Asia. This 
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attested to the regime’s interests in diversifying Iran’s relations at a time of global 
power diffusion and rising assertiveness on all continents.  
 
Second, the proposals incorporated a range of economic issues, such as the 
possibility for energy, trade and investment cooperation. Unlike the Khatami 
administration, they emphasised a Third World and social justice priority, identifying, 
for example, the necessity for “a common effort to help fight poverty in less 
developed countries and to reduce the divide between social classes”.925 The 
proposals also reflected new developments such as the financial crisis and 
recommended “Combating underground economy, economic corruption, financial 
frauds and organized crime activities that are detrimental to economic security.”926    
 
Third, Iran clearly articulated how nations ought to interact with each other in order to 
nurture sustainable peace and security. In its 2008 package to the P5+1, Iran 
emphasised the following principles: 
respect for the principles of justice, abidance by law, recognition of the rights 
of nations, respect for the sovereignty of states, reinforcement of regional and 
international peace, abstaining from monopolistic actions and threat, respect 
for democracy, human values and cultures of different nations; and rejecting 
the injustice and lawless behaviors towards the rights of nations.927 
 
In general, Iran proposed more multilateral and inclusive approaches to international 
security. It advocated reform of the UN to improve its effectiveness and ensure that 
principles of sovereign equality and international justice be respected. Democracy 
was also frequently mentioned as a key dimension of a peaceful and stable 
international system. 
  
Fourth, Iran’s proposals stressed the notion that new modes of interaction between 
states were both desirable and a prime necessity in light of the increasingly 
interconnected international system and the changing nature of threats. Its July 2008 
proposal, for example, noted that, “in view of the developments that have unfolded 
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internationally and across the region, there is a need for a new and a more advanced 
plan for interaction.”928 Similarly, the September 2009 offer stated: 
There is no doubt that our world is at the threshold of entering a new era. The 
difficult era characterized by domination of empires, predominance of military 
powers, dominance of organized and interrelated media networks and 
competitions on the basis of offensive capability and the power from 
conventional and non-conventional weapons is coming to an end. […] Many 
of the predicaments facing our world today, such as the unprecedented 
economic crisis, political and security dilemmas, and the mushrooming of 
terrorism, organized crimes and the illicit drugs are the products of the fading 
era of domination of ungodly ways of thinking prevailing in the global relations 
and the ominous legacy for present and future generations of humanity 
[sic].929 
 
In other words, the status quo was unsustainable, detrimental to security and needed 
to be replaced by new collective approaches. Stronger multilateral engagement and 
cooperation were necessary.  
 
Fifth, and linked to the previous point, Iran positioned itself as a crucial actor in this 
changing system and an upholder of the values and principles which would serve its 
security and stability. It frequently referred to itself as “a peace-loving nation that has 
spared no efforts to contribute to global peace and stability”.930 This positioning was 
part and parcel of Iran’s attempt to portray itself as a constructive and legitimate 
actor able to offer sustainable solutions. In May 2008, Iran thus called its negotiation 
proposal to the P5+1 “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Proposed Package for 
Constructive Negotiations”.931 In his letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 
Foreign Minister Mottaki positions Iran as a voice of authority:  
the Islamic Republic of Iran, following thorough and proficient studies and 
considerations, has carefully prepared a package containing important 
initiatives and proposals in different political, security, economic and nuclear 
fields, to be submitted to countries of the 5+1 Group […] We are of the firm 
belief that the present package will provide an exceptional opportunity for real 
and serious cooperation among the concerned parties.932 
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Similarly, in its September 2009 proposal, “Cooperation for Peace, Justice and 
Progress: Package of Proposals by the Islamic Republic of Iran for Comprehensive 
and Constructive Negotiations”, Iran argued: 
The Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation in order 
to lay the ground for lasting peace and regionally inspired and generated 
stability for the region and beyond and for the continued progress and 
prosperity of the nations of the region and the world. Our desire to enter into 
this dialogue and cooperative relationships proceeds from our inherent 
national, regional and international capacity and strength, our principled and 
historical commitment in applying this capacity to foster peace, tranquillity, 
progress and well-being for nations in our region and beyond.933 
 
The leadership systematically positioned Iran as a key regional power and a part of 
the solution to the many crises that were affecting the Middle East. In one of his last 
declarations, Foreign Minister Salehi presented Iran as “the anchor of security, 
stability and peace in its region”, and clarified that “cooperation for expanding 
bilateral and multilateral ties is the key defining concept [of Iran’s foreign policy], 
especially in issues related to regional security. Iran is a responsible regional player 
with legitimate security concern.”934 As previously explored, this was not a new claim 
since Iran had continuously perceived itself as a natural and legitimate power in its 
regional environment. The nuclear negotiations, however, provided a platform to put 
these claims forward with renewed vigour.  
 
 Modalities of interaction with Iran. Much as under the Khatami 
administration, Iran’s negotiation proposals between 2005 and 2013 emphasised key 
principles of interaction and engagement with the IRI. However, there were several 
differences, such as the fact that some of the regime’s expectations were now quite 
abstract. For example, the 2009 negotiation package showed that specificities were 
left aside: 
our world today needs mechanisms that come from divine and godly thinking 
and an approach based on human values and compassions. The new 
mechanisms should pave the way for the advancement, full blossoming of the 
talents and potentials of all nations and establishment of lasting world peace 
and security.935 
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The Ahmadinejad administration’s proposals were more concrete on other points 
however: rather than advocating “working groups” and “task forces”, Iran now put 
forward much clearer outlines regarding the various stages of potential negotiations 
with the P5+1. The July 2008 non-paper, “The Modality for Comprehensive 
Negotiations”, identified three stages (preliminary talks, start of talks and 
negotiations), a timeline of steps to be taken, and issues to be discussed at each 
stage.936 The July 2012 proposal, “A Framework for Comprehensive and Targeted 
Dialogue for Long Term Cooperation among 7 Countries”, was divided into five parts, 
which respectively outlined the guiding principles of those countries’ interaction, the 
talks’ objectives, the issues to be discussed (nuclear and non-nuclear), the structure 
of the process and the reciprocal steps all sides should take.937 Importantly, the 
proposal stated that 
For the purpose of broadening the dimensions of trust and confidence and 
working on the common grounds of interest in non-nuclear areas, parties 
agree to start their cooperation on the following issues; 
• The Islamic Republic of Iran’s priorities: Regional issues especially Syria and 
Bahrain 
• 5+1 priorities: combating Piracy and counter narcotic activities.938 
 
From the regime’s perspective, discussions and cooperation on non-nuclear issues 
could pave the way for a better understanding of one another’s interests, intentions 
and strategies. Additionally, by expanding their areas of mutual cooperation, Iran and 
the Western core powers could demonstrate their trustworthiness and goodwill 
towards each other. The inclusion of Syria and Bahrain in the July 2012 proposal 
also illustrated the salience of new regional developments which had somewhat 
overshadowed and become more urgent than Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Finally, the Ahmadinejad administration’s proposals often clarified the objectives of 
the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. The July 2012 proposal defined four:  
1. To normalize Iran’s nuclear file in the UN Security Council and in the Board 
of Governors by total termination of the UNSC, unilateral, and multilateral 
sanctions against Iran. 
2. To assure and guarantee the Islamic Republic of Iran of practically enjoying 
all its nuclear rights within the framework of the NPT and regulations of the 
IAEA, in exchange for implementing its safeguard obligations. 
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3. To achieve a sustainable nuclear cooperation for transferring advanced 
technologies. 
4. To conclude a comprehensive agreement on collective commitments in the 
areas of economic, political, security and international cooperation. 
 
Iran’s preference for clarifying objectives prior to entering into negotiations can be 
interpreted in light of its profound lack of confidence in the P5+1, the Western 
countries in particular. Iran feared that its legal right to peaceful nuclear energy 
would not be recognised and would be held hostage to other disputes, such as 
human rights or the recognition of the state of Israel.939 As such, its proposals 
clarified that the “end-game” of the Iran-P5+1 negotiations revolved around the 
return of the nuclear file from the UNSC to the IAEA Board of Governors. The July 
2008 non-paper, for its part, identified the timeframe of each stage of the 
negotiations (e.g. “a maximum of 3 rounds of talks” during the “preliminary talks”).940 
This arguably translated the regime’s worry that the discussions would be endless 
and jeopardise Iran’s interests. Thus, while Iran required security guarantees, it did 
not oppose a comprehensive agreement that encompassed economic, political and 
security issues with the P5+1 countries and, thus, with the US, the UK, France and 
Germany.  
 
Concluding Observations 
The nuclear issue provided paradoxical threats and opportunities for Iran, which can 
be divided into shorter- and longer-term considerations. In the short term, the 
Western-led opposition against what Iran viewed as its legal and legitimate nuclear 
activities enabled the regime to denounce the Western core powers’ double 
standards and the perpetuation of international injustice and dependency. In so 
doing, the regime was able to reaffirm and demonstrate its identity as a legitimate 
and constructive actor within the international system at large, and a proactive force 
of resistance defending the rights of developing nations in particular. Iran sought to 
show that it was guided by the legal and normative principles that regulated the 
international system as well as a justice-driven ethics. In addition, the Ahmadinejad 
administration’s attempt to broaden the scope of the nuclear issue partly aimed to 
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strengthen external legitimacy and support for its assertive nuclear resistance policy. 
This was all the more important since Iran was confronted with increasingly severe 
and hard-hitting unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and was once again depicted 
as a rogue state with abhorrent internal and external policies. Iran’s framing of the 
nuclear issue and firm nuclear stance received the support of a variety of states, 
whose relative power and influence within the international system varied but 
nevertheless helped the regime devalue its opponents and assert itself.  
 
In the longer term, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme provided the 
regime with opportunities to engage with the countries of the EU-3 and the P5+1 and 
present suggestions on issues of mutual interest. A striking commonality in the 
negotiation proposals of the Khatami and the Ahmadinejad administrations lay in 
their articulation of “dilemmas of common interests” and “common aversion”. These 
were country-related (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria) and issue-specific (e.g. terrorism, 
narco-trafficking). From Iran’s perspective, these shared dilemmas affected both 
sides’ ability to secure their national interests unilaterally and created a profound 
strategic incentive for multilateral cooperation and coordinated strategies. This was 
particularly the case for the Ahmadinejad administration, whose negotiation 
proposals systematically emphasised that the international system was changing 
and that new multilevel threats and opportunities were emerging. They also asserted 
that Iran had a crucial and legitimate role to play in these various areas and was 
seeking sustainable and constructive cooperation with its nuclear negotiation 
partners. However, and much in line with Wendt’s argument that “self-restraint” is a 
permissible cause of collective identity formation, Iran’s proposals always 
emphasised that principles of international law, especially states’ sovereign equality 
and right to territorial integrity, were crucial.  
 
Thus, although Iran continued to dispute the US-dominated international order and 
identify (and portray itself) as a protesting actor, it did not reject engagement with the 
Western core powers. The two roles were not conceived as incompatible: Iran could 
continue to exist as an anti-status quo power and a protector of developing nations, 
whilst simultaneously advocating new forms of cooperation with its traditional rivals 
which would produce better responses to several pressing transnational and 
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complex security challenges. In the following chapter, I explore Iran’s US policy and 
further engage with this seeming contradiction.  
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CHAPTER 6  
Iran’s Janus-Faced US Policy: Institutionalised Enmity 
Between Path Dependency and Rupture 
 
In the previous chapters, I noted that the Ahmadinejad administration firmly believed 
that the US was largely responsible for manufacturing and sustaining the nuclear 
issue. From Iran’s perspective, the problem of US-Iran relations lay at the core of the 
crisis: it was a covert struggle between an immoral superpower and a fiercely 
independent and justice-seeking nation. I also observed that Iran repeatedly included 
a range of security issues unrelated to the nuclear question in its successive 
proposals for negotiation with the EU-3 and the P5+1. Its proposals also clarified 
how Iran and its negotiation partners ought to engage and interact with each other.  
 
These various aspects of Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue led me to conclude 
that Iran presented two main role-identities. On the one hand, the leadership 
instantiated and reproduced Iran’s identity as an anti-status quo power that 
denounced and resisted the illegal and illegitimate practices of the Western powers 
within the hierarchical international system. In so doing, Iran presented itself as an 
actor that shared the grievances, concerns and priorities of oppressed and 
developing nations. On the other hand, the leadership used diplomatic negotiations 
to pinpoint areas of increasing interdependence and common vulnerabilities between 
Iran and the prominent powers of the EU-3 and P5+1. In sum, Iran’s nuclear 
diplomatic strategy included elements of conciliation and estrangement vis-à-vis the 
Western core powers, including the US.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on Iran’s policy towards the US during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency. The subject of US-Iran relations occupied a central place within Iranian 
decision-making circles, offering the possibility of critically engaging with common 
understandings of Iran’s interests and preferences. I am particularly interested in 
how (and why) Iran conceived of its relationship with the world’s superpower and 
whether (and why) its logics of representation and interaction persisted or were 
challenged during the Ahmadinejad presidency.  
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Potential patterns of continuities in Iran’s US policy could shed light on deeply held 
beliefs and perceptions, strategic values and consensus within the Iranian 
leadership. Conversely, possible shifts could indicate important particularities of the 
Ahmadinejad administration, which may or may not be related to external 
developments. I am particularly intrigued by the fact that, at first glance, the regime 
debunked several conventional wisdoms on both Iran’s foreign policy interests and 
the more conservative factions of the Iranian political spectrum.  
 
First, the Ahmadinejad administration assumed power after the nuclear talks 
between Iran and the EU-3 had failed to secure recognition of Iran’s rights under the 
NPT and diplomatic stalemate had confirmed the Western core powers’ 
untrustworthiness, disrespect and animosity. Second, Iran’s geopolitical situation had 
improved considerably by June 2005: Afghanistan and Iraq were no longer ruled by 
hostile regimes, oil prices had risen significantly, and attempts to isolate Syria and 
marginalise Hamas had further consolidated Tehran’s strategic position.941 Third, 
President Ahmadinejad embraced a very condemnatory rhetoric, which repeatedly 
denounced the Western core powers’ policies and favoured strong relations with 
developing nations and emerging powers. Finally, Ahmadinejad’s election 
consolidated the power of the principlists and military-security stratum of the IRI.  
 
Yet, it is during the Ahmadinejad presidency that fundamental developments 
occurred, including the first direct contacts between senior Iranian and American 
officials. Quite strikingly, the question of engagement with the US ceased to be a 
taboo within Iranian political debates: it was “no longer [a question] of whether but of 
how – and to what end”.942 Enmity with the “Great Satan” no longer seemed to 
constitute an uncompromising pillar of the IRI, without which the regime would 
experience a profound identity and legitimacy crisis.943 Understanding the sources of 
Iran’s (conditional) strategy of engagement with the US (i.e. where does it come 
from? Who is it supported by?), and its characteristics (i.e. under which conditions 
could Iran pursue better relations with the US? Which factors would preclude policies 
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of engagement?), sheds light on deep dynamics of national identity and interest 
formation.  
 
To this end, I first engage with the broad structures of relations between Iran and the 
US since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. I present a succinct analysis of their patterns 
of representation and interaction in order to identify key factors and dynamics that 
pre-existed, and likely constrained, the Ahmadinejad administration. As such, I pay 
particular attention to the indirect, but prominent, role the US played in the raison 
d’être of the Revolution and its long-term structuring effects on the IRI’s conception 
of its identity and interests. The Wendtian-constructivist perspective also enables a 
strong contextualisation of the factors that underlined the permanence of the 
institutionalised enmity between the US and Iran: it sheds light on the constitutive 
dynamics between their endogenously constructed role-identities on the one hand, 
and their behavioural practices towards one another on the other. 
 
Second, I turn to the fact that, despite their profoundly internalised and stabilised 
negative patterns of representation and interaction, and a plethora of internal and 
external status quo interests, Iran repeatedly responded to US offers of engagement 
and attempted to reach out to the superpower. These moves became more 
prominent during the Khatami presidency, which sought to “altercast” the US through 
both symbolic and concrete gestures. Such conciliatory signals, which became more 
frequent after 9/11, produced few tangible results for Iran however. Nevertheless, the 
Ahmadinejad presidency witnessed important developments, such as backchannel 
negotiations between Iranian and US officials, and the mobilisation of prominent 
personalities within the Iranian leadership in favour of less antagonistic relations 
between the two actors. Ultimately, however, the nuclear issue, the Syrian conflict 
and the Obama administration’s increasingly coercive approach to Iran, reproduced 
and perpetuated the institutionalised enmity between the two nations. 
 
Third, I conclude that Iran’s Janus-faced US policy, which oscillated between 
condemnation and defiance, and carefully calibrated engagement and attempts at 
conciliation, must be understood in light of Iran’s situation of discursive and strategic 
dependency on the US. A transformation of US-Iran relations, away from enmity and 
towards more collective identity information, would play an important role in enabling 
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Iran to secure the long-sought recognition of its legitimate interests, security 
concerns and role within its regional environment. Additionally, it would strengthen its 
ability to deal with a range of pressing security challenges which increasingly 
required multilateral strategies. Less conflictual relations would thus reduce Iran’s 
security dilemmas and help bridge the gap between its perception of its legitimate 
interests and its ability to play a role commensurate with its geopolitical aspirations. I 
also argue that the ebb and flow of Iran’s US policy must be interpreted in light of the 
Supreme Leader’s complex calculations and evolving views regarding the 
superpower and Iran’s interests.  
 
The US-Iran Culture of Anarchy Since the Revolution 
Iran’s US policy cannot be studied independently of the superpower’s own attitudes 
and behaviours towards the IRI, not least because its foreign policy interests and 
opportunities were profoundly affected by the superpower’s priorities and behaviour 
on its western (Middle East) and eastern (Central Asia) borders, as well as its 
specific strategies towards the IRI. In this section, I focus on the main aspects of 
their mutual grievances (negative images) and policies of estrangement (enmity 
practices) towards one another. I also outline the key internal and external factors 
and dynamics that participated in reproducing their structure of anarchy for over 
three decades. In so doing, I shed light on the culture of mistrust, insecurity and 
defiance that existed prior to the Ahmadinejad presidency.   
 
Logics of Representation and Interaction  
The US played a crucial, indirect, role in the Revolution and became an important 
actor against which the new Iranian regime reconfigured its identity and interests. 
The embassy hostage crisis epitomised this revised pattern of representation and 
interaction, and led the US to profoundly readjust its beliefs and interests regarding 
its former Iranian ally. After explaining why and how Iran and the US transformed 
their culture of anarchy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, I outline the main 
characteristics of their processes of interaction since. In particular, I note that, 
despite very different capabilities, Iran and the US systematically sought to contain, 
deter and delegitimise each other’s influence and practices.  
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The role of the US in the raison d’être of the Revolution. The Revolution 
significantly affected how Iran came to define its national interests and foreign policy 
practices.944 Guided by its formative slogans, “Neither West nor East, only the 
Islamic Republic” and “independence, freedom, Islamic Republic”, Iran aspired to 
fundamental cultural, political and economic independence. It advocated firm 
resistance of foreign interference in both internal politics and regional dynamics, and 
shifted to a self-reliant foreign policy. This led it to fully reconfigure its relations with 
the Western powers, the US in particular.  
 
Over a short period prior to the Revolution, the US had exercised a profoundly 
domineering and exploitative influence over Iran’s internal affairs, thus showing 
considerable disregard for a nation whose sovereignty and independence had 
already been profoundly harmed by external powers. The US disappointed many 
Iranians who had initially sought in it a “third force” to counter the debilitating 
influence of the Soviet Union and Great Britain.945 The 1953 coup against the 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh had “transferred 
Iranian suspicions from the historic Anglo-Russian axis towards the Americans”.946 
The US’ active support for the authoritarian Shah further consolidated its image as a 
corrupting and malevolent external influence.947 The 1964 Treaty that granted legal 
immunity to US military advisers in Iran symbolised the country’s capitulation to US 
power and the Shah’s betrayal of Iranians’ dignity and independence. While the 
Shah was increasingly represented as “a puppet”, Ayatollah Khomeini contended 
that the Treaty had “reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an 
American dog”.948 
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Revolutionary Iran came to reject the structure of the international system, 
particularly its core-periphery dynamics between the mostazafin (the oppressed) and 
the mostakbarin (the oppressors). The IRI advocated an anti-status quo and pro-
Third World foreign policy to undermine global hierarchy and injustice. It also 
rejected the categorisation of countries according to economic or military capabilities 
and favoured, instead, spiritual and moral features as sources of national and 
international legitimacy and power.949 Consequently, the US ceased to be perceived 
and treated as Iran’s greatest ally. It became the “Great Satan” and the greatest 
threat to Iran’s national dignity and independence, and to a just and stable 
international system. The US thus played an indirect but crucial role in the raison 
d’être of the Revolution and the IRI’s founding principles.950  
 
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the US also came to re-evaluate its interests vis-
à-vis the nascent IRI. The Shah’s overthrow represented the loss of a crucial ally in 
its containment strategy of the SU in strategic areas of the Middle East and Central 
Asia.951 The US’ failure to perceive the substantial domestic challenges faced by the 
Pahlavi monarchy also raised pressing questions about the CIA’s efficacy.952 All in 
all, US officials had largely failed to understand the extent to which their role was 
both a source of resentment and a driving force of the revolutionary processes.953 
 
The seizure of US diplomats and personnel for 444 days was experienced as a 
“national humiliation” of the US (Arjomand) and a “trauma” (Sick).954 For Iran, 
however, the hostage crisis acted as a founding moment that demonstrated its 
independence and emancipation from external tutelage. As Ayatollah Khamenei 
declared in 1993, “The matter of the den of spies cut the last possible thread 
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connecting the revolution and America.”955 To add insult to injury, the US rescue 
mission (Operation Eagle Claw) failed and more American citizens were seized in 
Beirut by Hezbollah.  
 
The significance of these episodes cannot be understated: they all profoundly 
complicated the lenses through which the US would view the IRI. As Ansari identifies 
in his 2006 Confronting Iran: the Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of 
Mistrust, while the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh “began the 
transformation of the relationship from mutual trust to mutual suspicion” and 
“coincided with the dramatic growth in political consciousness in Iran”, the 1979 
hostage crisis produced a similar “political myth of victimisation” whereby the 
televised trauma ensured that the Iranian regime remained a prominent factor of 
domestic political concern.956 The events of 1953 and 1979, in other words, 
“bounded Iran and the United States in an intimate ideological relationship, defined 
by a collective and shared traumatic experience.”957 
 
Successive US administrations continuously denounced Iran’s support of terrorist 
groups and organisations, its assumed pursuit of WMDs, non-recognition of the state 
of Israel and systematic violation of human rights. The US also remained profoundly 
preoccupied with Iran’s regional ambitions and assertive foreign policy, particularly 
from the mid-2000s onwards.958 In sum, from the US’ perspective, the IRI supported 
abhorrent internal and external policies, and was a threat to regional and 
international peace and security. 
 
The Revolution thus produced a profound transformation of the structure of US-Iran 
relations, which, as per Wendt’s argument that “anarchy is what states make of it”, 
shifted from relative trust and friendship to mutual incomprehension, mistrust and 
worst-case assumptions.959 According to Limbert: 
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For the American side, the Islamic Republic of Iran became suicidal, a rogue 
state, a regional hegemonic power, a threat, and the world’s number-one 
sponsor of terrorism. For the Iranian side, America became the great Satan 
and the leader of world arrogance calling for military action against Iran and 
for regime change in Tehran by subversion, bribery, and ethnic strife.960 
 
US-Iran relations since the late 1970s also demonstrate that cultures of anarchy tend 
to have self-perpetuating qualities: while practices play a crucial role in the creation, 
instantiation and perpetuation of relatively stable structures of identities and 
interests, actors both passively and actively perpetuate social institutions. 
 
The unknown Other: trust deficit and policies of estrangement. Four key 
characteristics of US-Iran relations since the Revolution demonstrate that their 
endogenously constituted culture of enmity predominantly acted as a coercive social 
fact on US and Iranian policymakers.    
 
First, Iranian and US officials enjoyed limited and intermittent, usually low-level, 
communication.961 In the absence of interests sections in each other’s countries, 
messages between their governments were mainly mediated by third parties, notably 
the Swiss government. As such, Iran and the US ceased to know each other directly. 
They mainly apprehended each other through the intermediary of their vitriolic 
discourses, antagonistic policies and “invented myths […] filtered through thick 
layers of normative and institutional structures”.962 For Beeman, the Iranian and US 
publics were presented with “very stark mythological representations of the other 
side designed to play as much as possible to their sense of villainy and evil”.963  
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Second, this socially constructed enmity situation complicated officials’ attempts to 
assess and understand their counterpart’s interests, aims, strategies and concerns. 
In December 2004, President George W. Bush declared that the US was relying 
upon others for its Iran policy because “we’ve sanctioned ourselves out of influence 
with Iran.”964 The US knowledge gap was aggravated by the fact that the government 
had not significantly renewed its cadre of expertise following the Revolution.965 
Tellingly, this intelligence void came under increasing criticism during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, including from former CIA officers.966 On the Iranian side, 
the Supreme Leader and other central forces within the political spectrum remained 
largely inaccessible to foreign policymakers.967 Their travel abroad also rarely 
included Western countries, which widened the gap between myths and first-hand 
experiences.  
 
Third, the absence of formal diplomatic ties and opportunities for engagement, and 
the difficulty of understanding the Other’s aims and preferences, produced great 
insecurity and led to worst-case assumptions. In particular, both sides repeatedly 
struggled to ascertain whether periodic offers of engagement were “a strategy or a 
tactic” (i.e. was the Other seeking a genuine resolution of outstanding issues or was 
it just a façade for realpolitik motives?).968  
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Fourth, these uncertainties led US and Iranian policymakers to opt for policies that 
confirmed, rather than undermined, their pre-existing beliefs and expectations of one 
another. Limbert is thus quite right to argue that “hostility begets hostility”.969 Their 
institutionalised enmity constrained their patterns of interaction, reinforcing certain 
behaviours and discouraging others. It acted as a coercive social fact on 
policymakers, deeply embedded as it was in individual and collective consciousness 
and routinised practices, a point to which I now turn. 
 
Mutual strategies: contain and deter versus resist and divide. Following 
the end of the First Gulf War (1990-1991), successive US administrations labelled 
Iran a “rogue state”; a categorisation that was primarily linked to “external 
behavioural criteria”, especially sponsorship of terrorism and presumed pursuit of 
WMDs.970 States like Iran, North Korea and Libya had failed to comply with 
international norms of behaviour and, consequently, posed a critical challenge to US 
interests and international security.971 The beginning of US Executive Order 12957 is 
telling in this respect:  
I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, find that 
the actions and policies of the Government of Iran constitute an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of 
the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that 
threat.972 
 
The Clinton administration shifted to a “dual containment policy” that paved the way 
for systematic policies of sanctions and deterrence against Iran, which remained 
excluded from the regional security architecture and the international economic and 
security environment.  
 
As Litwak convincingly argues, the rogue state category “distorted policy” since 
diplomatic engagement with such states became nearly impossible: “Once a state 
was relegated to this category ‘beyond the pale’, the default strategy was 
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comprehensive containment and isolation.”973 Ferrero similarly argues that “the Iran 
Narrative”, “a collection of myths, frames, themes, characterizations, and over-
simplifications which depicts the Islamic Republic as uniquely evil and beyond the 
pale”, significantly increased the political costs and reduced the normative 
desirability of pursuing policies of engagement with Iran.974 In particular, the idea that 
the Iranian regime was “irrational and fanatical as a function of its DNA” prohibited 
successive administrations from viewing Iran as a “normal” actor with legitimate 
security concerns and geopolitical aspirations.975  
 
From the Iranian leadership’s perspective, the US never came to terms with the IRI 
and Iran’s legitimate role within its regional environment. It systematically engaged in 
policies devised to undermine and weaken the IRI’s stability and influence, both 
directly (via sanctions and covert actions) and indirectly (via proxy support of internal 
and external opponents or the instrumentalisation of the nuclear issue). According to 
Mousavian, the Iranian leadership 
embraced the belief that the US, no matter the cost, was determined to 
change the Iranian Nezam (political establishment) […] The Iranian Nezam 
believes that, for its part, the US as the global superpower has applied almost 
all possible instruments at its command, short of an outright military 
intervention, to attain the goal of bringing down the Islamic Republic.976 
 
Additionally, the superpower’s superior technological capabilities, global network of 
military bases and regional security partnerships all raised the spectre of a possible 
military intervention in Iran’s national territory. This possibility increased in the 
aftermath of 9/11 when the Bush administration shifted to policies of regime change 
and identified Iran as a member of an “Axis of Evil.” As such, US interests and 
behaviours towards Iran in particular, and within its regional environment in general, 
remained a source of profound preoccupation for the Iranian leadership: “the 
“America question” or what kind of traditional or soft threats the United States poses 
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for Iran’s strategic ambitions and how to counter them plays a very large role in 
Iran’s foreign policy discussions.”977  
 
Iran’s preoccupation with the US, and the power discrepancy between the two 
actors, also placed Iranian policymakers in a reactive position vis-à-vis the 
superpower: 
due to the hostile relationship with the United States, the Islamic Republic 
“has gradually reached a situation in which the shadow of an enemy has 
covered its interests and these interests are defined in a passive way.” Hence 
in every issue, instead of giving attention to what its national interests are, it 
has to give attention to America’s position and frantically work to create an 
international front to counter the US pressures.978 
 
As the two previous chapters demonstrate, Iran systematically attempted to impose 
enforcement costs on US coercive policies. In general, to maintain its physical 
security and increase its relative autonomy, the Iranian leadership pursued internal 
and external balancing strategies: 
Iran is improving its retaliatory capabilities by developing the means to pursue 
asymmetric, low-intensity warfare, both inside and outside the country; 
modernizing its weapons; building indigenous missile and antimissile systems 
[…] Although it is being careful to avoid a military confrontation with the United 
States, Tehran is maneuvering to prevent Washington from leading a united 
front against it and strategically using Iran’s oil and gas resources to reward 
its friends.979 
 
Asymmetric warfare and capabilities enabled Iran to compensate for its inferior 
conventional military forces.980 Its financial, political and military support of non-state 
actors, including Hamas, Hezbollah and its Quds force, also formed critical 
components of its deterrence strategies.  
 
To conclude, the institutionalised structure of representations and interaction 
between Iran and the US since the late 1970s created significant order, predictability 
and ontological security. Iranian and US officials held well-established images of and 
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beliefs about one another, making change a remote and challenging possibility.981 
Instead, officials repeatedly resorted to strategies that confirmed and reified their 
negative representations, thus producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
It is interesting to note that Iranian and American officials regularly represented each 
other as “enemies”. Analysts, specialists and journalists also resorted to discourses 
of “enmity” to capture their bilateral relations. In practice, however, the two states 
were locked between a Hobbesian and a Lockean culture of anarchy. They viewed 
one another as threatening enemies and engaged in a highly competitive security 
system that made each assume the worst of the Other’s intentions, practices and 
material capabilities. Additionally, they profoundly mistrusted one another and were 
wary of cooperative moves. Nevertheless, Iran and the US never operated on the 
principle of sauve qui peut and kill or be killed: although they continuously sought to 
deter, contain and delegitimise one another, they also limited the use of violence in 
their processes of interaction. This was partly down to the fact that they did not 
profoundly dispute their mutual right to sovereignty and primarily sought to revise 
one another’s behaviours. From Iran’s perspective, however, the threat perceptions 
were much greater since the US was accused of interfering in its internal affairs and 
seeking to overthrow the IRI. As I subsequently argue, the fact that Iran and the US 
shared crucial components of a Lockean culture of anarchy helps explain their 
repeated attempts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. It must be noted, 
however, that a range of internal and external actors strongly favoured and actively 
sought the perpetuation of the status quo in US-Iran relations. 
 
Internal and External Factors Sustaining US-Iran Enmity 
In chapter 2, I indicated that, while states partly acquire and transform their identities 
and interests through processes of interaction, the transformation of cultures of 
anarchy towards more collective identity formation tends to be complicated by two 
domestic factors and one systemic dynamic.  
 
With regard to Iran-US relations, I have so far engaged with the systemic constraint 
and one of the domestic variables. On the one hand, the transformation of 
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intersubjective structures strongly depends on how much slack exists for dynamics 
of collective identity formation to develop. The greater the conflict, the more states 
are fearful and prone to engage in relative gains thinking. On the other hand, actors 
have strong interests in maintaining relatively stable role-identities due to their 
affective and cognitive inclination towards ontological security. As seen above, both 
dynamics considerably influenced the shape of US-Iran relations. 
 
The transformation of conflictual relations is further complicated by the commitments 
that states make to domestic and foreign actors. In this respect, the perpetuation of 
the US-Iran conflict, despite important changes within their respective domestic 
politics as well as the regional and international environments, was partly attributable 
to internal and external status quo interests.  
 
Domestic pressure groups. The absence of formal diplomatic relations and 
profound tensions between Iran and the US benefited a number of actors within both 
countries:  
For three decades, politicians and bureaucrats in both countries have made 
careers out of demonising each other […] The hostility has been 
institutionalised because either too many forces on both sides calculate that 
they can better advance their own narrow interests by retaining the status 
quo, or the predictability of enmity is preferred to the unpredictability of peace 
making.982 
 
Any attempt at addressing the question of US-Iran relations would incur domestic 
political costs and risks.  
 
Within Iran, three broad factors favoured a perpetuation of estrangement between 
Iran and the US. First, some individuals and groups were firmly opposed to any form 
of rapprochement with the US. Farhi and Loftan, who identify five categories of 
foreign policy perspectives within the Iranian leadership, argue that the “offensive 
regional power balancers” and the “global rejectionists” feared that improved 
relations would pave the way for (further) US attempts to transform Iran’s domestic 
politics (e.g. an influx of Western cultural influence) and its foreign policy strategies 
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(e.g. subordination to US priorities), thus jeopardising the heritage of the Revolution 
and the regime’s survival.983  
 
Second, Iran adapted to the sanctions against its economy, some individuals and 
groups developing international trade routes with competitors of the US and 
expanding their activities on the black market.984 Improved relations could thus 
threaten their interests, especially if they led to the scaling back of the sanctions and 
a firmer integration of Iran into the global economy. Third, domestic factional divides 
and competition for power made the transformation of US-Iran relations extremely 
difficult. Rivals were unwilling for their competitors to get the credit for reducing 
tensions or decide the contours of a strategic rapprochement between the two 
states.985 By the same token, any official seeking to improve relations with the US 
always had to “walk a fine line between being seen as promoting national interest 
and standing accused of engaging in “collusion” (sazesh) and giving in”.986  
 
Important political constraints also existed on the US side. While “the Iran narrative” 
repeatedly served to sideline and delegitimise those who wished to engage Iran, the 
political space in which to attempt mending ties was often too narrow and costly for 
policymakers to either take the risk or actively pursue their forward-leaning 
strategies.987 Moreover, the American media often raised the costs of reaching out to 
Iran. In their analysis of Time and Newsweek, Fayyaz and Shirazi find that 
representations of post-revolutionary Iran and Iranians over a ten-year period largely 
reflected Orientalist perspectives.988 Iran was presented as “a problematic nation-
state”, whilst its people were depicted as the victims of the “mullahs” and their 
government’s ideologies and behaviours.989 Finally, powerful interest groups proved 
particularly efficient at denouncing, and even derailing, cooperative policies towards 
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Iran. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), for example, was 
effective in creating a sense of urgency around the nuclear issue (“time is running 
out”) and keeping the military option open.990 Its position was echoed throughout 
Congress, letters to the President and legislative amendments.  
 
Ideological and strategic commitments to third parties. Iran and the US 
both developed a range of alliances and strategic commitments with external third 
parties which remained fundamentally opposed to each other. Their respective 
policymakers thus faced both domestic and external constraints when weighing their 
options. Little is known, however, about the ways in which Iran’s allies, especially 
Syria and Hezbollah, may have attempted to increase the Iranian leadership’s costs 
of engaging the US.991 Interviews with Iranian officials by prominent think tanks and 
analysts also contain little information regarding these potential pressure points. By 
contrast, a considerable amount of research exists on the positions of Israel and the 
Arab Gulf states, the US’ key strategic partners within the Middle East region. 
 
Parsi, who provides one of the most thorough analyses of Israeli-Iranian relations 
since the Revolution, contends that the transformation of those relations from relative 
friendship to profound enmity was the result of geopolitical shifts.992 Both 
instrumentalised the ideological framing of their conflict to pursue realpolitik, 
especially in the aftermath of the First Gulf War and the Cold War.993 Additionally, 
since the 1990s, both states repeatedly undermined any US initiative they deemed 
beneficial to the other side’s interests.994 Iran thus partly opposed the Middle East 
Peace Process on the grounds that it could increase its isolation. Israel, for its part, 
resisted US-Iran talks, fearing that a rapprochement would strengthen Iran’s 
strategic significance at its own expense.995 These concerns and manoeuvres 
became particularly prominent during the Obama presidency (see below). 
Mearsheimer and Walt, whose work complements Parsi’s analysis, emphasise that 
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shared values also explain why Israel received great attention and largely 
unconditional support from US policymakers, thus influencing the superpower’s 
foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.996  
 
In The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, Adib-
Moghaddam shows the role that “political norms, institutions, values, identities and 
other cultural artefacts” played in shaping key political dynamics within the Gulf 
region, such as the adversarial relations between Iran and Iraq, and Iran and Saudi 
Arabia.997 The shared knowledge that they were rivals often led them to reproduce 
their regional culture of anarchy. Additionally, he notes that 
One of the undervalued consequences of “Operation Desert Storm” is the 
“security transaction” that took place between the Persian Gulf region and the 
United States. By linking the security of the Gulf monarchies to its own, and 
by stationing large numbers of troops in these countries, the United States 
created fundamental interdependence between its own security and the 
security of the region.998 
 
The US remained deeply involved in the Middle East to protect Israel and its Gulf 
allies, secure the free flow of oil and counter several transregional threats such as 
terrorism and WMD proliferation. During the Obama presidency, the Arab Gulf 
states’ dependency on the US for the provision of external security became a point 
of profound contention (see below).  
 
To conclude, the Revolution profoundly transformed Iran-US relations and locked the 
two actors into a culture of anarchy balanced between Hobbesian and Lockean 
dynamics. Two broad factors participated in the instantiation and reproduction of 
their antagonistic representational and behavioural logics. First, both sides’ 
individually and collectively held negative perceptions of their enemy’s identity, 
interests and aims had constitutive effects on their logics of action to contain and 
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deter those threats. Second, their routinised mutual patterns of representation and 
interaction became all the more entrenched, and challenging to overcome, so that 
the US-Iran conflict produced internal and external status quo interests.  
 
I now turn to another crucial aspect of Iran’s US policy. For all its criticisms and 
condemnations, Iran repeatedly attempted to engage the world’s superpower. 
Analysts and policymakers alike often paid little notice to these strategies, focusing 
instead on Iran’s enmity towards the US as a function of regime legitimacy. However, 
Iran’s conditional offers of engagement, and its increasingly public debates on the 
subject of US-Iran relations, shed light on crucial processes of identity and interest 
formation.   
 
Beyond the Condemnatory Rhetoric and the Antagonistic Policies, 
the Repeated Engagement Efforts 
Despite its resentment and profound mistrust of the US, and its multi-pronged 
deterrence strategies, Iran repeatedly advocated and engaged in targeted 
discussions on bilateral and regional issues. These became more prominent after 
the US launched its War on Terrorism and increased its involvement in the Middle 
East and Central Asia. They also accelerated during the Ahmadinejad presidency, 
when a conflagration of internal and external dynamics heightened Iran’s incentives 
to foster less conflictual relations. After analysing the main features of Iran’s forward-
leaning strategies towards its significant Other during the Khatami and the 
Ahmadinejad presidencies, I contend that these patterns of continuities in Iran’s US 
policy can be interpreted in light of its discursive and strategic dependence on the 
superpower.  
 
Frequent Attempts to “Altercast” During the Khatami Presidency  
While the Iran-Contra affair revealed complex forms of contact between Iran and the 
US, President Rafsanjani’s 1995 offer to the US Conoco company to operate two 
Iranian oil fields seemingly indicated the Iranian leadership’s willingness to consider 
some forms of economic rapprochement between the two actors.999 These two well-
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known examples, however, remained relatively rare exceptions to the otherwise 
conflictual relations between Iran and the US from the late 1970s to the 1990s.  
 
The Khatami presidency, for its part, inaugurated a range of symbolic and practical 
gestures that aimed to lay down a path for constructive engagement. Iran repeatedly 
attempted to “altercast” the US by taking on a less antagonistic and friendlier role-
identity vis-à-vis the superpower. President Khatami’s call for a “dialogue of 
civilisations”, Iran’s multilevel cooperation with the US in Afghanistan and its 
unprecedented May 2003 negotiation proposal all constituted attempts to create new 
intersubjective meanings between the two actors, both willingly and out of necessity.   
 
A symbolic call for a dialogue of civilisations. President Khatami’s 
dialogue of civilisations was a powerful slogan and a strong rebuke to the clash of 
civilisations thesis. One of its most important aspects was the fact that it signalled an 
awareness of the Western states’ prominent power in the interdependent system: 
“Today’s world is Western in its orientation, techniques, and thoughts, such that if 
one lives outside the geographic boundaries of the West, one must incorporate the 
West into one’s values and life.”1000 Iran, in other words, could neither escape nor 
afford to ignore its influence.  
 
President Khatami’s call also articulated a demand for the theoretical and practical 
recognition of states’ sovereign equality: “‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ means 
equality between peoples and nations. In other words, one conducts a dialogue only 
when one respects the other party and considered [sic] the other party as equal to 
oneself.”1001 President Khatami advocated friendly relations with all states on the 
condition that they recognised Iran’s independence and did not pursue aggressive 
aims.1002 As I subsequently analyse, these two aspects of the dialogue of 
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civilisations illustrated Iran’s relative dependence on the West, the US in particular, 
and its non-negotiable expectation that its sovereign equality be respected.   
 
Particularly significant too was the fact that President Khatami first proposed his 
dialogue of civilisations during an interview with CNN in January 1998.1003 He chose 
an American cable and satellite television channel to spread his message, thereby 
ensuring high visibility amongst US policymakers and public. President Khatami also 
used this opportunity to reflect on the origins of American civilisation and its main 
sources of success, especially its balance between religion and liberty.1004 
Additionally, he established parallels between American and Iranian civilisations in a 
likely attempt to downplay the differences between the two actors. As Ansari 
observes, from Khatami’s point of view, potentially shared interests needed to be 
identified and articulated as a means to deconstruct the culture of mistrust between 
Iran and the US, and replace it by more constructive means of engagement.1005 
Additionally, while expressing regret for the US Embasy take-over and disapproval of 
the burning of US flags, President Khatami highlighted that “these slogans symbolise 
a desire to terminate a mode of relationship between Iran and America.’1006 His CNN 
interview, an illustration of his détente foreign policy agenda and his strategy of 
communication targeted towards “expatriate Iranians, the international media and the 
foreign intelligentsia,” was followed by several soft power diplomatic initiatives, 
including the visit of a US wrestling team to Tehran and the end of Iran’s support for 
Salman Rushdie’s assassination.1007  
 
The Khatami administration’s US policy was “successful” to the extent that the 
Clinton administration reciprocated and made symbolic gestures of its own.1008 
President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright thus expressed “hope” 
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and “intrigue” regarding the possibility of better relations with Iran.1009 They also 
acknowledged the role the US had played in harming Iran’s interests. President 
Clinton famously declared in April 1999: 
Iran [...] has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western 
nations. And I think sometimes it’s quite important to tell people, “Look, you 
have a right to be angry at something my country [...] did to you 50 or 60 or 
100 or 150 years ago.1010  
 
Albright, for her part, declared in March 2000 that the 1953 coup against Prime 
Minister Mossadegh “was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development”.1011 
High-level US officials thus publicly recognised Iran’s legitimate grievances with their 
government. The Clinton administration also took several practical steps to 
demonstrate its interest in transforming US-Iran relations, including adding the 
People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) to its list of terrorist organisations and relaxing 
trade sanctions to allow the sale of food and medicine in Iran.1012  
 
Several prominent individuals and groups were similarly inclined to pursue forward-
leaning policies towards the Khatami regime in the early years of the Bush 
administration. While Secretary of State Colin Powell wished to “re-set the clock”, 
Richard Haass, the new Director of the Policy Planning Office, advocated a two-year 
delay for the renewal of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act so the administration could 
first complete a thorough assessment of US-Iran relations and the sanctions 
policy.1013 In the aftermath of 9/11, spontaneous demonstrations of solidarity with the 
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American people were seen within Iran.1014 Firm condemnations of the attacks 
astounded American and European officials, perhaps unsurprisingly since the regime 
was commonly accused of supporting terrorism. In addition, Iran was exonerated of 
involvement in the Khobar Towers bombing, which “brought a degree of closure to 
one of many outstanding issues in US-Iranian relations”.1015   
 
Afghanistan: an opportunity for joint cooperation. President Khatami’s 
call for dialogue and improved relations between Iran and the US was supplemented 
by the substantial assistance it brought to the US-led military operation against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. In an unprecedented gesture, Iran allowed US aircraft to take 
off from its airfields and to offload cargo in the port of Chabahar.1016 It also agreed to 
rescue any American military personnel in distress within its sovereign territory.  
 
Additionally, the regime played a critical role in the November 2001 Bonn 
Conference, during which the various parties negotiated the shape of the future 
Afghan government.1017 The Iranian delegation reportedly lamented the omission of 
commitments to hold democratic elections and cooperate with the international 
community on terrorism (shared values) in the first draft of the declaration to 
establish an interim government. Javad Zarif, Iran’s representative at the 
Conference, was also able to influence the composition of the interim government, 
especially the power sharing between the various factions. This demonstrated Iran’s 
historic ties with Afghanistan and its factions. 
 
Iran’s provision of intelligence and military and political support to the US-led 
operation in Afghanistan took place before the nuclear-related sanctions were 
implemented against its nuclear programme. This point is noteworthy: Iran’s 
supportive policies were not prompted by coercive measures but by the (likely) 
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assessment that both actors shared common interests in Afghanistan and that these 
could be better served through enhanced cooperation. Indeed, since the 1998 
murder of eight of its diplomats and a journalist in Afghanistan, relations between 
Iran and the Taliban had been profoundly conflictual. From the Iranian leadership’s 
viewpoint, the Taliban were a threat to domestic and regional stability. In addition, 
hundreds of Afghan refugees had settled in Iran. The end of the Taliban regime 
would have thus eliminated a threatening regime on Iran’s eastern border, alleviated 
the burden of refugees within its territory and increased prospects of greater 
influence within Afghanistan.  
 
Although Iran and the US quite successfully interacted and cooperated in 
Afghanistan, the January 2002 Axis of Evil speech considerably delegitimised the 
Khatami administration. It is nevertheless within this context that Iran submitted an 
unprecedented comprehensive negotiation proposal to the US.   
 
Iran’s May 2003 proposal. Towards the end of President Bush’s first year in 
office, neoconservatives Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary 
of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and Vice-President Dick Cheney held increasing authority 
over the foreign policymaking machinery. US neoconservatives, who distinguished 
between forces of good and evil in the international system, believed that the US 
should act against those whose identities and interests were “morally abhorrent”.1018 
Profoundly distrustful of international law and institutions, they advocated the use of 
military force to pursue the US’ national interests.1019 Their beliefs were inscribed in 
the 2002 National Security Strategy, which identified hostile states against which the 
administration could use both pre-emptive and preventative actions.1020 9/11 had 
focused attention on the nexus of WMD proliferation (capabilities) and terrorism 
(intentions): “irredeemable rogue states and undeterrable terrorist groups such as Al 
Qaeda, whose only constraints were practical and technical, not moral or 
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political”.1021 From the Bush administration’s perspective, a change of strategy was 
thus needed, “from a pre-9/11 emphasis on containment [and deterrence] to a post-
9/11 emphasis on regime change.”1022  
 
It is within this context, two months after the beginning of the US-led preventative 
war against Iraq, that the extremely wary Iranian regime delivered its most 
comprehensive negotiation proposal to the US. Not only had the US conducted 
regime change policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and expanded its military presence 
on Iran’s western and eastern borders, but the Bush administration also never 
clarified whether it aimed to change Iran’s regime or conduct.1023  
 
The May 2003 proposal only became public in 2006 and was reportedly drafted by 
Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran’s Ambassador to Paris, refined by Zarif, Iran’s permanent 
representative to the UN, and endorsed by Ayatollah Khamenei.1024 It clarifies how 
the leadership viewed the contours of a strategic realignment between Iran and the 
US, and the conditions under which, and ways in which, Iran could renegotiate its 
role-identity vis-à-vis the US. 
 
First, Iran was willing to address four key sources of US concern. These included its 
nuclear activities, relations with terrorist organisations, influence within Iraq and 
position on the Middle East Peace Process. Of particular significance were Iran’s 
offers to pressure Palestinian opposition groups, especially Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, to cease violent actions against Israeli citizens, and to help transform 
Hezbollah into a political organisation. In effect, Iran indicated a willingness to 
transform its long-established resistance strategies and use its substantial political 
capital to improve the US’ (and Israel’s) security environments. Important too was 
Iran’s offer to work with the US to support Iraq’s political stabilisation and the process 
of democratisation. Iran, in other words, was inclined to use its enhanced soft power 
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capabilities over post-Saddam Iraq to achieve common aims with the US. Such 
developments would, in turn, legitimise its de facto role and influence in its 
neighbour’s domestic politics. Finally, in accepting the Arab League’s Beirut 
Declaration, Iran would agree to formally recognise a two-state approach to the 
Israel-Palestine question and tacitly accept peace with the Jewish state. In sum, the 
May 2003 proposal signalled no less than Iran’s readiness to profoundly revise its 
foreign policy to render it much more amenable to the US. 
 
Second, in return for these far-reaching actions, Iran expected the US to engage in 
“a dialogue in mutual respect” and halt its hostile behaviours. This included the 
demand to “rectify [the] status of Iran in the US” and desist from making references 
to “axis of evil” and “terrorism list”.1025 Such depictions contradicted Iran’s self-image 
and were humiliating. Additionally, Iran’s demand for “a dialogue in mutual respect” 
must be understood in light of the Afghanistan experience.  
 
From the leadership’s viewpoint, the US had pursued tactical cooperation since 
Iranian cooperation was only solicited where, and for as long as, it could benefit the 
US: 
Washington simply asked us to take specific steps without seeking to 
understand Iran’s overall position, as if it were possible to isolate the things 
we can do to help the U.S. from Iran’s broader regional role […] For us, that 
kind of dialogue symbolises the unequal relationship the U.S. has sought to 
impose under cover of mutual respect. Iran was invited to participate only to 
the extent it had something to offer to the U.S. – not because it had something 
to say.1026 
 
As Wendt highlights, the realisation of joint gains between rivals entails “the risks of 
being ‘the sucker’” when cooperative practices are not rewarded.1027 In the case of 
Afghanistan, Iran had failed to gain recognition of its legitimacy as a fully fledged 
regional actor.  
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Furthermore, the May 2003 proposal included demands for an end to all US 
sanctions, respect for Iran’s legitimate national interests and role in Iraq, recognition 
of its legitimate security concerns in its neighbourhood, as well as active support 
against anti-Iranian terrorist organisations. In sum, it reflected the leadership’s long-
term demand that its security concerns and geopolitical role be recognised by its 
significant Other.  
 
Third, the proposal included a step-by-step approach to start the negotiation process 
and move towards a long-term, mutually acceptable agreement. This calibrated 
approach was revealing of Iran’s profound mistrust and insecurity towards the US: 
the negotiation structure had to be devised in such a way that the two sides would be 
compelled to move forward together. Within this context, Iranian concessions would 
not (and could not) be met by ever-increasing US pressures and demands which 
would undermine its corporate needs.  
 
To conclude, the Khatami administration engaged in rhetorical and behavioural types 
of communication to signal its interest in less conflictual relations between Iran and 
the US. While this was a strong personal ambition of President Khatami, the 
geopolitical ramifications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks also led the regime to 
accelerate, diversify and strengthen its positive gestures towards the US. If 
Afghanistan represented an alliance-making opportunity on an issue of common 
interest, the 2003 US-led military intervention against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
heightened the need for a comprehensive, yet carefully calibrated, negotiation 
proposal. Indeed, in the midst of great turmoil and uncertainties regarding US 
policies in the Middle East and Central Asia in general, and towards Iran in 
particular, the regime offered a negotiation proposal that had the potential to create a 
profound strategic realignment of Iranian policies towards the US and its allies. Iran, 
however, clarified the specific conditions under which it would be willing to alter its 
behaviours. The leadership continued to view resistance of US pressures (and 
threats of future military intervention) as in its national interest until the world’s 
superpower changed its attitude (discourses) and policies (practices). Independence 
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and collective self-esteem could not be bargained away.1028 I now turn to Iran’s US 
policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency, which pursued and deepened conciliatory 
gestures within an overall framework that emphasised red lines and resistance 
strategies.  
 
Shifting the Red Lines During the Ahmadinejad Presidency  
Iran’s US policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency broke away from its previous 
patterns in two chief ways. First, Iran made repeated offers of direct negotiations and 
held several high-level public and “off the radar” meetings with its significant Other. 
Second, domestic debates about Iran’s US policy and desirable US-Iran relations 
changed considerably. In particular, prominent Iranian political figures and 
institutions came to support and legitimate direct talks and less conflictual relations 
between the two actors. Despite these dual shifts (external engagement, internal 
public discussions), the nuclear issue, the Syrian conflict and the Obama 
administration’s dual-track diplomacy profoundly reified Iran’s grievances vis-à-vis 
the US.  
 
Offers of direct talks, high-level meetings and backchannel negotiations. 
While the Ahmadinejad presidency observed several direct encounters between 
Iranian and US officials, their public and private meetings were accompanied by 
Iran’s repeated signals that the Iranian leadership wished to engage the US. 
 
President Ahmadinejad, whose rhetoric towards the US tended to be fiery and 
condemnatory, emerged as “probably the most eager closet advocate of resuming 
diplomatic relations with the Great Satan”.1029 He wrote unprecedented letters to 
President Bush and President Obama and, in 2009, became the first President of the 
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IRI to congratulate an American President on his election.1030 He repeatedly 
articulated Iran’s readiness to hold discussions with the US, especially during his 
trips abroad. Following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, for example, he gave 
several high-profile interviews with renowned media channels in which he 
systematically stressed Iran’s interest in advancing direct talks.1031 He also tried to 
implement measures to facilitate mutual contacts and better understanding. In 2008, 
he ordered the creation of an office within the Foreign Ministry specifically devoted to 
the US, and expressed interest in the prospect of opening an American interests 
section in Iran.1032 In so doing, he alluded to an Iranian knowledge gap on the US. In 
September 2011, he also welcomed the establishment of a hotline between Iranian 
and American naval units in the Persian Gulf to avoid strategic misperceptions, thus 
signalling an interest in preventing conflictual relations, mutual mistrust and worst-
case assumptions triggering rapid escalations of tensions. 
 
The tone of President Ahmadinejad’s letters to President Bush and Obama 
demonstrated his continuing attempt to position himself as a spokesperson for 
developing nations. His 2006 letter to Bush was, for example, repeatedly 
characterised as “strange” in the Western media because of his moralistic tone on 
issues as varied as the motives for and management of the 2003 Iraq war, 
Guantanamo and secret prisons in Europe.1033 In his 2008 congratulatory letter to 
President Obama, President Ahmadinejad also claimed to articulate worldwide 
popular aspirations when he encouraged Obama to profoundly change US foreign 
policy:  
People in the world expect war-oriented policies, occupation, bullying, 
deception and intimidation of nations and imposing discriminatory policies on 
them and international affairs, which have evoked hatred toward American 
leaders, to be replaced by ones advocating justice, respect for human rights, 
friendship and noninterference in other countries’ affairs.1034 
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As previously argued, President Ahmadinejad repeatedly used foreign policy as a 
vector of influence for his own persona (an ethical leader) and Iran’s role within the 
international system (a prosecutor and a peace-seeking nation).  
 
It was often unclear whether President Ahmadinejad’s US initiatives had received the 
Supreme Leader’s backing. As such, his relative activism may have been part of his 
determination to expand his domestic influence. However, President Ahmadinejad’s 
US agenda existed within a wider domestic context that witnessed repeated offers of 
direct engagement with the superpower and several meetings amongst high-level 
US and Iranian officials. As such, it is possible that President Ahmadinejad was 
given a freer hand than his predecessors to reach out to the US. This is an argument 
that Mousavian has put forward (and that Parsi echoes, see below): 
In my view, even though the Iranian leadership was still sceptical about 
Obama’s ability to break many long-standing U.S. policies, it believed in his 
personal intentions. For that reason, Iran’s leaders decided to test the 
possibility of a breakthrough by granting a freer hand to Ahmadinejad in 
managing the relationship with Washington.1035 
 
On several occasions between late 2005 and May 2006, Iran expressed an interest 
in pursuing direct talks with the US.1036 IAEA Director El Baradei transmitted a 
message from Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the SNSC, to Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice in May 2006, expressing this wish. Iraq, Afghanistan, Hezbollah 
and Hamas were all up for discussion, thus further illustrating Iran’s perception that 
regional security cooperation could be beneficial to both.1037 Slavin also reports in 
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies that Larijani, whom she interviewed in early 2006, 
explained that Iran had “no limitation” to negotiating with the US as long as its rights 
were respected.1038 President Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Javad Jaffari and other 
political figures similarly emphasised during her visit to Iran that the regime was 
willing to enter broad-based negotiations with the Bush administration. Iran’s 
February 2006 referral to the UNSC and the adoption of Resolutions under Chapter 
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VII of the UN Charter may have played an important role in these repeated offers of 
direct engagement.  
 
In May and July 2007, US and Iranian diplomats met in Baghdad, marking their first 
public and formal talks since the rupture of diplomatic relations.1039 Iranian 
Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi-Qomi and his American counterpart, Ryan 
Crocker, discussed the country’s deteriorating security situation. Iran proposed the 
creation of “a trilateral security mechanism that would include the US, Iraq, and Iran”, 
thus positioning itself as an influential actor in Iraq and tacitly recognising the US’ de 
facto role in its neighbour’s domestic politics.1040 Tellingly, Qomi called the May 
meeting “the first step in the process of negotiations between the two sides”.1041 In 
early April 2008, Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, also 
conveyed a proposal for comprehensive talks with the US through Iraqi President 
Jalal Talebani.1042  
 
However, it was the nuclear issue that provided the basis for most bilateral and 
multilateral encounters between Iranian and US officials during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency. In July 2008, William Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, attended the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, thus meaning that a US official was 
involved in a process that did not require Iran to end its enrichment activities up 
front.1043 Additionally, on the sidelines of a meeting in Geneva in 2009, Jalili and 
Burns held bilateral talks, which marked the highest-level encounter in three decades 
between Iranian and US officials. Additional covert meetings in “the Hague, Geneva, 
Vienna, Sweden, Tehran, Munich and New York” reportedly followed.1044  
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Last but not least, shortly after President Rouhani’s coming to power, evidence came 
to light that, in mid-2012, the Obama administration had launched secret talks with 
Iran.1045 The first undisclosed meeting took place in Oman in March 2013 and was 
followed by several more encounters until the November 2013 interim nuclear deal 
between the Rouhani administration and the P5+1.1046 William Burns (Deputy 
Secretary of State and US lead negotiator for the Iran-P5+1 talks), Jake Sullivan 
(National Security Advisor to Vice-President Joe Biden) and Puneet Talwar (National 
Security Council Senior Director for Iran, Iraq and the Gulf States) led the US 
diplomatic effort.1047 Less information is available on the Iranian delegation, which 
was led by Deputy Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs Ali Asghar 
Khaji.1048 Khaji had served as Iran’s envoy to the EU from 2008 to 2012. In March 
2009, he became the first Iranian official to meet with NATO in almost three decades 
to discuss Afghanistan.1049  
 
These meetings between US and Iranian officials were reportedly prompted by the 
Obama administration’s message that the US “would be prepared to accept a limited 
Iranian domestic enrichment program as part of a nuclear agreement in which Iran 
would take concrete and verifiable steps to assure the world its nuclear program 
would remain exclusively peaceful”.1050 As such, it is very likely that Iran’s positive 
response to this offer of secret engagement was prompted by the fact that the 
superpower recognised its right to peaceful nuclear energy.  
 
It is also worth noting that the US and Iran went to some lengths to keep their 
backchannel meetings off the radar, a by-product of their three decades of 
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animosity.1051 Secret negotiations allow for bargaining to take place in the shadows 
and protect the negotiators from media attention and manifold pressures: “parties 
can make breakthrough agreements before subparties or third parties have a chance 
to mobilise to work against negotiation, agreement, or implementation.”1052 Iranian 
and US officials likely sought to protect their exploratory talks from the spoiling 
effects of a highly politicised audience. Secret negotiations can also help parties 
reduce the uncertainties of entering into negotiations (i.e. problems of genuine 
intentions) and managing image problems (i.e. perceptions of weakness or 
surrender). As such, they enable parties “to maintain an adversarial public posture 
while secretly seeking ways to de-escalate the conflict”.1053 Finally, top leaders can 
authorise greater creativity and flexibility in such negotiations.1054 Although little 
information emerged regarding the content of these backchannel negotiations, they 
reportedly played a substantial role in enabling Iran and the P5+1 to reach the 
November 2013 nuclear agreement.1055 
 
To conclude, Iran’s repeated assertions that it wished to engage with the US, and 
the manifold public and secret meetings between Iranian and US officials during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, shifted the deeply institutionalised processes of interaction 
between the two nations. While direct encounters were allowed to take place, Iran 
simultaneously observed unprecedented domestic discussions on the taboo topic of 
US-Iran relations. Change was thus manifested both externally and internally 
through novel rhetorical and behavioural practices. 
 
Public Discussions about desirable US-Iran relations. A potent sign that 
public debates on the question of Iran’s relations with the “Great Satan” had become 
somewhat less dramatic and more legitimate was demonstrated by the fact that 
every candidate in the Iranian presidential election of June 2009 agreed that direct 
talks with the US would be desirable.1056 Additionally, officials close to the Supreme 
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Leader came to publicly advocate stronger US-Iran relations, often towards the end 
of the Ahmadinejad presidency.  
 
Salehi and Velayati, two of his foreign policy advisors, thus expressed their support 
for reaching out to the US in February and March 2013 respectively. In an 
unprecedented gesture, Salehi wrote two letters to Ayatollah Khamenei in which he 
advised that Iran enter into “broad discussions” with the US.1057 Velayati, for his part, 
publicly highlighted the benefits of possible US-Iran talks.1058 Rouhani echoed those 
positions, clarifying that: 
It is not the Supreme Leader’s view that Iran and the United States should not 
have negotiations and relations until the Day of Judgment […] If there is a 
situation where the country’s dignity and interests are […] served, he will give 
permission for dialogue.1059 
 
Such arguments by high-level Iranian officials may have aimed to prepare (i.e. 
legitimise) domestic audiences for a potential shift in the Supreme Leader’s public 
stance on Iran’s US policy. Tellingly, Ayatollah Khamenei had increasingly 
emphasised the importance of showing flexibility in dealing with enemies, often 
referring to Imam Hassan and Ayatollah Khomeini as sources of inspiration. 
 
Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security’s November 2012 report, “Reasons and 
Obstacles of a Military Attack by the Zionist Regime against Iran”, also indicated 
high-level deliberations over the positive consequences of better US-Iran relations. 
The report differentiated the perspectives and roles of Israel and the US on the 
nuclear issue. It argued that President Obama hoped for a diplomatic solution to the 
conflict, did not believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme posed an 
imminent threat and favoured a dual-track approach.1060 It also contended that 
Israel’s concerns vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear programme were not related to ideological 
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factors but geopolitical dynamics.1061 Finally, it concluded that diplomacy was the 
best way forward and highlighted the benefits of negotiations with the US to resolve 
the nuclear issue.1062 This report was significant since the Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security, whose head is approved by the Supreme Leader, reports directly to 
Ayatollah Khamenei. In other words, the Ministry had produced an intelligence 
assessment for Iran’s ultimate arbiter that advocated negotiations with the US.  
 
Parsi notes that debates within Iran on the profoundly controversial topic of US-Iran 
relations took place after President Obama had repeatedly signalled his personal 
interest and political determination to transform US-Iran relations (i.e. a reactive 
position).1063 However, if his diplomatic agenda intrigued and stirred discussion 
within Iran, no substantial transformation in the overall structure of the US-Iran 
culture of anarchy occurred during the Obama-Ahmadinejad era.  
  
Iran and the Obama administration: failed hopes, reified grievances. 
When President Obama assumed office in January 2009, the US was in the midst of 
the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression. It was also struggling 
with two very unpopular wars with no end in sight in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges. Additionally, a global transition 
from concentrated power to multipolarity was occurring, which raised crucial 
questions as to the sustainability of US primacy and its future relations with rising 
powers.1064  
 
Within this context, President Obama came into power with the ambition to conclude 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and avoid getting dragged into international 
crises.1065 A consistent element of his foreign policy approach, as Quinn argues, was 
                                                          
1061
 Marashi and Namazikhah, “Tehran Looks Ready to Tango.” 
1062
 Ibid.   
1063
 Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice, 36.   
1064
 The 2008 US National Intelligence Council’s report estimated that the “most salient characteristics 
of the ‘new order’ will be the shift from a unipolar world dominated by the United States to a relatively 
unstructured hierarchy of old powers and rising nations, and the diffusion of power from state to 
nonstate actors […] although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the 
United States’ relative strength – even in the military realm – will decline and US leverage will become 
more constrained”. See “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” US National Intelligence 
Council, vi.  
1065
 J. L. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership,” 
International Affairs 87, no. 4 (July 2011): 772.   
284 
 
its “strategy of restraint and circumspection in the use of American power”, and 
“caution, self-restraint and consciousness of limits”.1066 He ended President Bush’s 
democracy and freedom agenda, and addressed the substantial reputational 
discredit of the US within the Middle East region (“To the Muslim world, we seek a 
new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect”).1067 He also 
emphasised the critical role of international institutions in regulating states’ 
behaviours and promoting international stability. Observing that “power, in an 
interconnected word, is no longer a zero sum game” and that “America cannot meet 
the threats of this century alone”, Obama advocated stronger international 
engagement to deal with issues of global interest.1068 A “rules-based international 
system” which would emphasise the rights and responsibilities of all nations would 
be most effective in serving US interests.1069  
 
On his Iran strategy, President Obama significantly distanced himself from his 
predecessor. He abandoned the “rogue state” categorisation and advocated 
engagement with those he called “outlier states”, famously declaring during his 
inaugural address that the US “will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your 
fist”.1070 In an August 2007 address to the Woodrow Wilson Center, the then Senator 
Obama had already articulated his favour for engaging adversaries:  
The lesson of the Bush years is that not talking does not work […] It’s time to 
turn the page on Washington’s conventional wisdom that agreement must be 
reached before you meet, that talking to other countries is some kind of 
reward […] President Kennedy said it best: “Let us never negotiate out of fear, 
but let us never fear to negotiate.” […] As President, I will work with our friend 
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and allies, but I won’t outsource our diplomacy in Tehran to the Europeans, or 
our diplomacy in Pyongyang to the Chinese.1071 
 
President Obama also eschewed regime change rhetoric and offered “a clear 
choice” to adversarial governments: 
abide by international norms, and achieve the political and economic benefits 
that come with greater integration with the international community; or refuse 
to accept this pathway, and bear the consequences of that decision, including 
greater isolation.1072 
 
He took several steps to signal his personal interest in engaging Iran. He wrote 
several letters to Ayatollah Khamenei (two in 2009, one in 2012) and reached out in 
an unprecedented move during his March 2009 Nowruz message.1073 By releasing 
the video online with Persian subtitles, he was able to address Iranians directly and 
bypass any potential interference.1074 He also became the first US President to 
acknowledge the IRI by its name. Finally, his call for engagement included no 
preconditions, no threats, and used the language of “honesty” and “mutual respect”, 
all of which could have appealed to the Iranian leadership.  
 
Iran’s 2009 election crisis, however, cast a long shadow over President Obama’s 
agenda. In this respect, the diplomatic mismatches during the Ahmadinejad-Obama 
era were symptomatic of the two states’ history of missed opportunities. As Marashi 
contends, “The great tragedy of this relationship is that when one side was ready for 
a rapprochement, the other was not.”1075 Murray makes a similar observation, 
labelling their history of misunderstandings and bad timing a “dialogue of the 
duff”.1076  
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Iran’s electoral crisis presented complex immediate challenges to the recently 
elected Obama administration.1077 First, President Obama never received a 
response to his second letter to Ayatollah Khamenei, thus effectively delegitimising 
his personal attempt to engage the Supreme Leader.1078 Second, the upsurge of 
violence and repression, and the increasing securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics, 
reduced his administration’s room to manoeuvre. Not only was the Iranian regime 
conforming to its long-standing reputation as a violator of human rights, but the 
magnitude of the election protests also pointed to depleted legitimacy. Engaging Iran 
could be immoral and counterproductive, whilst applying pressure could further 
weaken the regime and strengthen the more democratic forces. Third, the Iranian 
regime’s sudden rejection of the October 2009 fuel swap deal “frustrated” the Obama 
administration and weakened its political capital.1079  
 
A year and a half into his mandate, President Obama shifted to a pressure track that 
remained in place until the end of the Ahmadinejad presidency. In his January 2010 
State of the Union Address, he made no mention of engagement and focused on 
Iran’s international isolation instead. In a September 2010 interview with BBC 
Persian, he distinguished between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people: “this is 
not a matter of us choosing to impose punishment on the Iranians. This is a matter of 
the Iranians’ government [sic] I think ultimately betraying the interests of its own 
people by isolating it further.”1080 Crucially, the Obama administration had come 
under substantial pressure from internal and external status quo actors.  
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Domestically, Obama faced growing challenges from Congress, pro-Israel 
supporters and sceptics within his own administration.1081 Externally, the US was 
confronted by the acerbic criticisms and security concerns of its regional allies, 
especially Saudi Arabia and Israel.1082 Their regimes continuously framed Iran’s 
nuclear programme as a security threat and were greatly concerned about the 
Obama administration’s seeming willingness to allow the regime to retain its dual-
use technologies. Additionally, they feared that the US “strategic pivot” towards the 
Asia-Pacific region would weaken its regional security commitments and lead it to 
retreat from the Middle East.1083 Last but not least, President Ahmadinejad’s 
statements also considerably complicated the Obama administration’s initial 
engagement agenda.1084   
 
Iranian officials reacted very negatively to the Obama administration’s dual-track 
diplomatic approach. In February 2013, for example, Ayatollah Khamenei declared: 
“You [the Americans] point the gun at Iran and say either negotiations or we pull the 
trigger! You should know that pressure and negotiations don’t go together, and the 
[Iranian] nation will not be intimidated by such things.”1085 From their perspective, this 
approach was disrespectful and counterproductive.1086 It was also the Obama 
administration that oversaw the enforcement of the most comprehensive sanctions 
against Iran, a development that President Obama himself framed as an 
achievement:  
Through the power of our diplomacy, a world that was once divided about how 
to deal with Iran’s nuclear program now stands as one. The regime is more 
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isolated than ever before; its leaders are faced with crippling sanctions, and 
as long as they shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent.1087 
 
The US also pursued and expanded covert actions against Iran.1088 In particular, 
President Obama accelerated the Bush administration’s Olympic Games programme 
and “repeatedly used cyberweapons to cripple […] what until then could be 
accomplished only by bombing a country or sending in agents to plant 
explosives”.1089 The Obama administration also removed the MEK from its Foreign 
Terrorist Organisation List in September 2012. Within this context, Iran complained 
of a continued discrepancy between the US’ proclaimed intentions and its actual 
practices: 
Various American officials and administrations usually act contrary to their 
declared stances […] Praising Iran for its help in establishing a national and 
democratic government in Afghanistan on the one hand and placing Iran in 
the so-called axis of evil on the other hand […] they violate all legal, moral and 
international laws by imposing the most unprecedented unilateral sanctions 
[…] they collaborate in the assassination of our scientific elite or arrest our 
innocent citizens such as our university professors […] and after all these 
actions against the Iranian nation, they raise the issue of direct 
negotiations.1090 
 
Confronted by immoral practices and substantial differences between words and 
deeds, Iran unsurprisingly renewed its resistance strategies against the superpower 
(processes of self-assertion). For example, it established a Cyber Command 
headquarters under IRGC command and infected major Israeli and American 
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companies in July and November 2012.1091 It also conducted several naval exercises 
and military drills in the Strait of Hormuz, and emphasised significant progress in its 
indigenous defence industry.1092  
 
Finally, the Obama and Ahmadinejad administrations opposed and alienated one 
other over the Syrian conflict.1093 While the US firmly opposed President Bashar al-
Assad and backed the opposition, Iran brought active (and growing) support to its 
long-time ally. The Iran-Iraq war inaugurated a strategic alliance between the two 
actors when President Hafiz al-Assad provided critical intelligence and military 
support to the revolutionary regime to outmanoeuvre its Ba‘athist rival. After the war, 
Iran and Syria continued to cooperate and position themselves along an “Axis of 
Resistance” to the Western core powers and Israel.1094 Their important ideological, 
financial and tactical backing of Hezbollah further bound their strategic interests 
together. Finally, 9/11, the War on Terror and the US-led invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq had resulted in frequent high-level visits between Iran and Syria.1095 In an 
attempt to diversify Syria’s economic relations and avoid dependence on the West, 
President Bashar al-Assad had also pursued an eastward strategy that included 
Iran.1096  
 
Iran and Syria thus shared significant ideological, financial and strategic interests. 
Should the Syrian regime fall or Syria disintegrate, Iran would likely find itself in a 
much more vulnerable geopolitical position. Consequently, Iran provided political, 
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financial, military and intelligence support to the Syrian regime, which increased over 
time, as the conflict changed and expanded into “an arena for the struggle of 
external forces, all seeking to shift, through it, the regional balance of power in their 
favour”.1097 During the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran’s relations with non-state actors 
proved crucial to keeping the Syrian regime in power.1098 Hezbollah, in particular, 
considerably expanded its presence in Syria to fight against the takfiris (Sunni 
fundamentalists).1099  
 
Russia’s position also greatly benefited Iran since it opposed a forcible external 
intervention, warning against the presence of a credible alternative to the regime and 
the rise of Sunni extremist groups within and beyond Syria. As such, Russia used its 
veto right at the UNSC to avert any Resolution that could pave the way for a military 
intervention in Syria. Russia also repeatedly welcomed Iran’s involvement in the 
international conferences on Syria; a position strongly opposed by the US.1100 As 
previously mentioned, Syria featured in Iran’s negotiation proposals to the P5+1 from 
2011 onwards. The regime claimed that it could (and should) play an important role 
in resolving the conflict and offered several initiatives in the form of transition plans 
and peace conferences.1101 It also attempted to reach out to regional states, 
including Brotherhood-led Egypt.1102  
 
In sum, the Syrian conflict acted as a platform where the US and Iran vigorously 
opposed one another. While Iran condemned US interference in Syria’s sovereign 
affairs, the US rejected the rogue state that, once again, supported acts of terror and 
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violation of human rights both directly and via proxy groups. At the same time, the 
Syrian conflict made Iran and the US more interdependent, a point I now turn to.   
 
Concluding Observations: Iran’s Dependency on the US 
I have argued that the US was a crucial actor against which the IRI defined its 
identity and interests. For over three decades, Iran perceived the superpower as the 
main threat to its national independence and to a just and stable international 
system. The US never ceased to be a prominent factor of concern for the leadership, 
who systematically responded to its attempts at isolation and containment with 
multipronged strategies of resistance and deterrence. I have also noted that the US-
Iran culture of anarchy acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy since their discourses and 
practices often confirmed and reified their grievances and animosity towards one 
another. Their mutual mistrust, insecurity and scepticism made the reproduction of 
their collective knowledge all the more likely, as did the fact that their enmity was 
profoundly institutionalised in individual and collective consciousness, routinised 
practices and status quo interests. I have also highlighted that, beyond the vitriolic 
discourses and resistance strategies, the Khatami and the Ahmadinejad 
administrations both repeatedly attempted to lessen the spoiling effects of their 
conflictual relations and pursue forward-leaning strategies. Although President 
Khatami engaged in more conciliatory rhetorical communication, the question of US-
Iran relations shifted more deeply during the Ahmadinejad administration. 
 
I suggest that Iran’s Janus-faced interests and strategies towards the US must be 
understood in light of its discursive and strategic dependency on the superpower. 
Developments within its regional environment and the global system made the latter 
increasingly prominent. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader, whose position must be 
integrated to contextualise the ebb and flow of Iran’s US foreign policy, increasingly 
moved away from Manichean conceptions of the “Great Satan” and Iran’s national 
interests vis-à-vis the US. 
 
A Situation of Discursive Dependency  
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Following the Revolution, Iran and the US opposed narratives that devalued the 
other and asserted their own legitimacy and moral authority.1103 The US, for 
example, continuously positioned itself as a defender of international peace and 
security, and the leader of the free world, standing against tyrannical regimes and 
terrorist groups. Iran’s “Westophobic” and “anti-Western” discourses, for their part, 
represented the West as “satanic, unreliable, crafty, suppressive, and terrorizing”, 
and enabled the regime to define itself as “divine, reliable, honest, emancipatory, 
and reassuring”.1104 Such dichotomous representations helped assert positive self-
images.  
 
In so doing, however, Iran became “entirely dependent on invented images of the US 
in particular and the west more generally”: “the political independence of Iran [was] 
achieved via a discursive dependence” on the US.1105 Ansari, whose work has partly 
investigated Iran’s (construction of its) history and relationship with the West, 
highlights that the US became “the priority for the revolution”:  
[For] all the success of the practical eviction, the Islamic Republic now found 
itself defined against the very foe it had sought to remove. Arguably, it was 
the beginning of a mutual obsession. The point to be made, and regularly 
overlooked, is that whether as friend or foe, Iran enjoyed an intimate 
relationship with the West and its epitome, the United States. The counter 
hegemony that it had sought to construct was defined and hence related to 
the hegemonic challenge posed by the West.1106 
 
In chapter 4, for example, I highlighted that Ayatollah Khameini had defined Iran’s 
ethical principles (i.e. normative condemnation of nuclear weapons) and scientific 
interests in juxtaposition to the US. The Supreme Leader had thus found it relevant 
to explain Iran’s interests by comparing and contrasting its position with its significant 
Other. More generally, Warnaar observes that the representation of the US in Iran’s 
foreign policy discourse makes possible both its “identification as its opposite (moral, 
democratic, etc…),” and its “identity as resistant and an example to other countries. 
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Iran can only be resistant and defensive is there is something to be resisted; Iran can 
only defend the victims if there is a culprit.”1107 
 
This discursive dependence on the US created a dilemma for Iran. The world’s 
superpower was able to profoundly shape narratives of the IRI as a rogue state with 
abhorrent internal and external policies, and these depictions contradicted Iran’s self-
perception as a legitimate actor and a force of good within the international system. 
Mousavian alludes to this situation when he writes that Iranians “fear deception and 
humiliation by what they perceive as a powerful propaganda machine, without any 
opportunity to defend itself or confront such propaganda on an equal footing.”1108 
 
 As such, Iran was discursively dependent on a state that recurrently humiliated and 
disregarded its identity and interests (negative self-images). In this respect, Farhi 
and Lotfian argue that Iran remained a “conflicted aspiring power”: 
Throughout the twentieth century and more so since the 1979 Revolution, Iran 
has not been a “comfortable” state as its legitimacy and even survival have 
continuously been challenged by […] external players perceived to have 
alternatively had Iran’s containment, isolation, or at times destabilization and 
disintegration on their agenda. This lack of comfort has kept the general 
nationalistic emphasis on political sovereignty, military preparedness, Persian 
identity, and now Islamic identity.1109 
 
Iran struggled to be recognised and integrated as a legitimate and constructive 
power because it was not acknowledged and treated as such by the world’s 
superpower. The transformation of Iran’s international status thus strongly depended 
upon a shift in US discourses, attitudes and behaviours towards the IRI. This 
situation of dependency explains why Iranian officials systematically stressed that 
the US needed to review its rhetoric and attitude towards Iran.1110 It also justified 
Iran’s insistence that the US recognise its national interests, security concerns, and 
place and role within its regional environment.1111 
 
 
                                                          
1107
 Warnaar, Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad, 104. 
1108
 Mousavian, Iran and The United States, Kindle edition. 
1109
 Farhi and Lotfian, “Iran’s Post-Revolution,” 117. 
1110
 Not being as discursively dependent, the US placed more importance on Iran’s behaviour (e.g. 
ending its support for terrorist organisations). 
1111
 “U.S.-Iranian Engagement,” International Crisis Group, 1-2.  
294 
 
De Facto Strategic Dependency, Rising Interdependence and Common Fate 
Despite their absence of formal diplomatic relations and considerable geographical 
distance, Iran and the US never ceased to take each other into account. For four 
crucial reasons, they continuously had to assess whether their counterpart’s 
strategies would challenge, increase or reduce their own (and their allies’) relative 
security, a danger that was particularly acute for Iran in light of the power 
discrepancy between the two actors.  
 
First, as previously highlighted, Iran was repeatedly affected by the US’ containment 
policy which severely constrained its involvement in the regional security architecture 
and the international economic and security environment. From the Iranian 
leadership’s viewpoint, the nuclear issue also illustrated the US’ considerable 
influence over both international institutions (e.g. IAEA, UNSC) and third parties (e.g. 
EU-3). 
 
Second, the US and Iran both advocated strong involvement in world affairs, 
particularly within the Middle East region. Importantly, the US was likely to remain 
the most prominent state actor in the international system for years to come.1112 
While it faced increasing constraints to its ability to lead and shape outcomes, the 
US’ soft and hard power capabilities remained unmatched. Additionally, US officials 
emphasised that the US will continue to act, both directly and indirectly, in Iran’s 
regional environment. As Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta declared in 2011: 
The Middle East is a vital interest to the United States, and we will not let our 
commitment to its security and stability waver. That is why we maintain a 
significant military presence throughout the region to defend our partners, to 
counter aggression, and to maintain the free flow of resources and commerce 
that are so vital to the fragile global economy.1113 
 
Despite global power shifts, the US was thus expected to sustain its direct and 
indirect influence within Iran’s neighbourhood in order to attend to its own and allies’ 
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interests.1114 Iranian officials would thus continue to be preoccupied with the US and 
to define Iran’s national interests reactively, in light of the superpower’s behaviours. 
 
Third, Iran is located in an area of great strategic interest to the US. It has, for 
example, direct access to the Caspian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian 
Sea. It also shares borders with Iraq and Afghanistan, and substantially increased its 
relations with their respective central authorities and subnational groups in the 
aftermath of the military interventions of the early 2000s. Iran was thus in a de facto 
position to disrupt the flow of oil exports and subvert regional stability and US 
interests if it so wished.  
 
Fourth, Iran and the US shared several de facto security challenges, such as nuclear 
non-proliferation, energy security, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and counterterrorism.1115 
Although the US and Iran may have disagreed on the end goals or strategies to deal 
with such threats, they both had strong interests in containing and reducing them. 
During the Ahmadinejad presidency, for example, Iran and the US both aimed to 
maintain a unitary Iraqi state powerful enough to withstand internal and external 
shocks, but not strong enough to pose a renewed threat to its neighbours. From 
Iran’s viewpoint, the US also had to recognise the inevitability and legitimacy of its 
role and influence, given the two states’ geographical proximity, shared history, 
cultural and religious ties, and economic and commercial links.1116 In Afghanistan, 
Iran and the US both aimed to maintain the country’s stability and keep the Taliban 
at bay. They also sought to curtail the flow of drug trafficking, within and across 
Afghan borders. This was a particularly pressing issue for Iran, which held the world 
record for drug use in 2012.1117 As was the case with Iraq, Iran also expected the US 
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to recognise its legitimate role and influence in Afghanistan, a country it shared a 
936-kilometre-long border with and it long viewed as a vector of cultural, economic 
and political influence throughout Central Asia. On the question of the Syrian war, 
Iran’s inclusion in the multilateral negotiations increasingly appeared to be a sine qua 
non and started to become more of a political reality during the Rouhani 
administration: 
Keeping Tehran from Geneva will not lessen its role in Damascus […] the 
West ought to overcome its reluctance to include Iran. In any event, the 
negotiations themselves are to be held among Syrians with the UN acting as 
mediator; keeping Tehran out would be tantamount to denying the 
unmistakable fact of its involvement, not altering it.1118  
 
Iran and the US thus shared country-specific issues and broad transnational 
challenges. These de facto realities created “dilemmas of common interests” 
(Wendt’s concept of “interdependence”) and “aversion” (notion of “common fate”), 
which increased their “objective vulnerability and sensitivity […] to each other”.1119  
 
Crucially, the above analysis of Iran’s US policy during the Khatami and the 
Ahmadinejad presidencies demonstrates that geopolitical developments, particularly 
the US’ deeper penetration in the Middle East and Central Asia post-9/11 and the 
nuclear issue, had reduced Iran’s incentives to hang on to egoistic identities and 
conflict-ridden relations. Instead, they had created a preference for reduced tensions 
and (conditional and carefully calibrated) cooperation on several issues. This 
development was more clearly visible during the Ahmadinejad presidency, when 
high-level officials spoke of Iran-US relations in novel terms. In a nutshell, better 
understanding of one another’s interests, priorities and concerns, and potential 
cooperation on issues of common interests, could reduce Iran’s security dilemmas 
and help bridge the gap between Iran’s perceptions and understandings of its 
legitimate interests on the one hand, and its ability to play a role commensurate with 
its geopolitical aspirations on the other. A less security-oriented relationship could 
pave the way for greater regional and international integration and feed “positive self-
images”. As such, I agree with Warnaar that Iran’s foreign policy during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency strongly focused on developing and strengthening relations 
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with “like-minded states in an effort to circumvent US unilateralism and build an 
alternative power structure”.1120 I dispute, however, the observation that Iranian 
officials acted “within the framework of a world without US hegemony.”1121 Iran’s 
relative discursive and strategic dependence on the US strongly influenced and 
shaped how it defined its national interests. More specifically, this dependency 
situation provided the context for Iran’s repeated forward-leaning strategies towards 
its significant Other, whose de facto influence increased over time. However, Iran’s 
US policy must also be analysed in light of the Supreme Leader’s position, not least 
because he possessed ultimate authority over the country’s foreign policy. 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s Beliefs and Calculations 
Ayatollah Khamenei held largely negative views of the US, a fact which must be 
understood in light of his direct knowledge and experience of Iran’s significant Other: 
He lived through – as a participant, not an observer – every dark chapter he 
cites in his speeches, from the hostage crisis to the Axis of Evil speech. His 
skepticism of U.S. intentions, rightly or wrongly, is a product of the four 
decades of baggage he carries on his shoulders.1122 
 
From Khamenei’s perspective, the US had repeatedly harmed Iran’s national 
interests and proved “wicked” and “unreliable”.1123 In his 2009 response to President 
Obama’s Nowruz message, he thus recalled that “Before the Revolution, Iran was in 
the hands of the United States” and, since the IRI’s inception, the US had supported 
domestic dissidents, confiscated Iranian property with no compensation, “showed the 
green light” to Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran, destabilised the Persian Gulf 
region, unconditionally supported “the cruel Zionist regime”, and “insulted the Iranian 
nation, the Iranian government, and the Iranian president, over and over again”.1124 
As Ganji observes, Ayatollah Khamenei rapidly concluded that the US was 
determined to overthrow the IRI “whether through internal collapse, democratic 
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revolution, economic pressure, or military invasion”.1125 He repeatedly drew parallels 
with the Soviet Union, whose collapse he partly attributed to US manipulation of the 
media, “cultural invasion”, and political and economic pressures.1126 As such, he 
remained profoundly concerned about the capabilities of US soft power and the 
threat of Western cultural invasion.  
 
The Supreme Leader also held the US responsible for much of the regional and 
global instability and insecurity. The Centre for Preserving and Publishing the Works 
of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei has an entire section on “The Supreme 
Leader’s View of Global Arrogance”, which seeks to unpack its meaning, tools, and 
the rationale and means for fighting it.1127 The American government, not its people, 
is identified as “the symbol of arrogance” and “an enemy” of Iran. The superpower is 
condemned for considering itself “above justice”, pursuing “unfair” and 
“discriminatory” policies, and using its disproportionate capabilities to “bully”, 
“humiliate” and interfere in other states’ sovereign affairs, even as it preaches 
democracy and human rights.1128 Violation of states’ sovereignty is a major source of 
concern and contention for the Supreme Leader.  
 
However, despite his criticisms and profound mistrust of the US, Ayatollah Khamenei 
seemingly came to view engagement as neither necessary nor intrinsically negative: 
dialogue was “a function of political circumstance rather than ideological purity”.1129 
His statements became more nuanced and less Manichean over time:  
The discourse depicting the United States as an absolute enemy with which it 
would be absurd and naive even to think about negotiating has given way to a 
discourse about the United States as a potential interlocutor with which it 
might be possible to discuss acceptable terms of negotiations over such 
issues as the nuclear program and security in Iraq. It appears that for 
Khamenei, the United States has gone from being the monstrous absolute 
other to a powerful regional presence with a domestic political system plagued 
by the painful consequences of two recent failed military adventures in the 
Middle East.1130 
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In a 2008 speech in Yazd, Khamenei thus declared that “relations with America have 
no benefit for the Iranian nation now […] undoubtedly, the day the relations with 
America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation I will be the first one to approve 
that.”1131 Unless his core and non-negotiable expectations of how the US ought to 
treat and interact with Iran were met, the country’s national interests were better 
served by its long-standing policies of resistance and defiance. One interviewee 
echoed this position: “If principles and values are respected, then a relationship 
[between Iran and the US] could exist. However, we’ve lived without a relationship 
with the US for 35 years.”1132  
 
The Supreme Leader’s response to President Obama’s 2009 Nowruz message 
epitomised this nuanced position. While he expressed interest in the US’ offer of 
engagement, Khamenei voiced his scepticism and questioned the President’s 
sincerity: “They say that they extended their arm towards Iran. What kind of a hand? 
If it is an iron hand covered with a velvet glove, then it will not make any good 
sense.”1133 In questioning whether President Obama would be able to transform the 
US’ Iran policy, he also implicitly acknowledged the presence of internal and external 
status quo actors: “I would like to say that I do not know who makes decisions for the 
United States, the President, the Congress, elements behind the scenes?”1134 Within 
this context, he asked that the promises of change be followed up and supplemented 
by concrete actions: 
Where is the change? What has changed? […] Has your enmity toward the 
Iranian nation changed? What signs are there to support this? Have you 
released the possessions of the Iranian nation? Have you removed the cruel 
sanctions? Have you stopped the insults, accusations, and negative 
propaganda against this great nation and its officials? […] this change cannot 
be in words only. It should not come with unhealthy intentions. You may say 
that you want to change policies, but not your aims, that you will change 
tactics. This is not change. This is deceit.1135 
 
In sum, verbal communication and stage management were insufficient: words 
needed to be supplemented by deeds. Khamenei’s comment that “We do not have 
any experience with the new US President and Government. We shall see and 
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judge. You change, and we shall change as well”, also confirmed Iran’s relatively 
reactive position vis-à-vis the US.1136 The superpower was expected to make the first 
move since Iran required strategic guarantees. The US could not (be allowed to) 
pursue tactical cooperation and self-interested policies again.1137 According to 
Mousavian, 
In [the Supreme Leader’s] eyes, seeking reconciliation with the US before 
ensuring that their enmity has changed to a real desire for a mutual, respectful 
relationship, would ultimately end in Iran’s humiliation and would be 
interpreted as our weakness and our fear of the Americans.1138 
 
As an Iranian official also explained, Ayatollah Khamenei had “more than fifty years 
of experience dealing with the US, including before the Revolution. It’s therefore not 
easy to deceive him, it’s also not easy to convince him. If you want to convince him, 
you need clear signals.”1139 
 
In his 2009 response to President Obama, the Supreme Leader thus warned against 
the dual-track diplomatic strategy that was then being considered, which led Farhi to 
observe that  
Clearly from his view, engagement in talks must be accompanied with some 
concrete steps that show Iran that the United States is interested in a process 
and give and take and not a process based on “either deception or 
intimidation.” Deception because the objective remains the same while the 
softer language is a mere tactical change. Intimidation because talks are 
combined with further squeeze of Iran. He leaves no doubt that further 
squeezing of Iran leading up to talks and during the talks will be seen as a 
sign that President Obama’s rhetoric of change is a farce. As such the speech 
should really be seen as a carefully calibrated attempt to shape the debate in 
Washington on how to go about talking to Iran [sic].1140 
 
From the Supreme Leader’s viewpoint, Iran needed to know whether the US was 
seeking behavioural or regime change.1141 This can be understood in light of its past 
experience with the US (e.g. covert actions) and its deeply held belief that the 
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superpower never accepted the identity of the IRI. Additionally, as I explained in 
chapter 2, states have needs by virtue of their corporate identities and must be 
certain that their individuality will be respected (i.e. fear of being engulfed). Iranian 
officials thus needed to know that the US would treat Iran as an equal state and 
exercise “self-restraint”. As Wendt highlights, while this is the “permissible cause” 
that enables the emergence of collective identity formation, it is crucially important 
because it signals the Other’s “respect for difference”.1142 In interview, an Iranian 
official thus emphasised that “interference” was Iran’s biggest concern with the US: 
This is the first and most important issue for Iran and it is historically rooted 
[…] we have a deeply rooted negative impression of foreign interference in 
Iranian domestic politics. Many people also say that Iran is surrounded by the 
US; sometimes we say the US is our biggest neighbour. I don’t think this is 
our biggest concern. This can be negotiated and dealt with. The US is present 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. We do not agree with this but we have accepted it. 
Their presence is not directly against us and we can’t do anything about it. But 
our main concern, I think, is interference in Iranian politics because if it 
happens, it has some consequences. It may lead to disintegration, invasion, 
etc.1143  
 
Domestic political calculations also likely affected Ayatollah Khamenei’s public 
stance on the US in two chief ways. First, his long-standing preference for balancing 
a multiplicity of competing interests and preferences may explain why he allowed 
forward-leaning strategies to be pursued whilst not fully supporting them in public. 
This carefully calibrated positioning enabled him to preserve his political capital 
regardless of how developments in US-Iran relations fared.  
 
Second, for purposes of domestic legitimacy, the Supreme Leader would need to be 
able to both claim ownership of any substantial development in US-Iran relations and 
frame it as a success for the IRI. No transformation of one of the most central 
aspects of Iran’s identity and interests since the Revolution (i.e. enmity with the 
“Great Satan”) could occur unless it was able to strengthen Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
own personal and the system’s legitimacy. As such, domestic considerations, 
including Khamenei’s relations and political brinkmanship with the President, likely 
affected whether he could allow policies of rapprochement to occur and/or move 
forward. Tellingly, Iranian officials were able to offer bilateral talks and engage 
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directly with their US counterparts at a time when the Majles, the Presidency, the 
judiciary, and the military and security establishments were all in the control of the 
more conservative factions, and the reformist proponents of “the dialogue among 
civilizations” were isolated. The US-Iran backchannel negotiations from 2012 
onwards may also have been useful to Ayatollah Khamenei in preventing the then 
isolated and challenging President Ahmadinejad from attempting to dominate the 
headlines.   
 
To conclude, the more conciliatory and forward-leaning aspects of Iran’s Janus-
faced US policy showed that, from the leadership’s perspective, reduced threat 
perceptions and increased cooperation within an overall dialogue of mutual respect 
could help strengthen Iran’s collective need for self-esteem and relative security 
position, and pave the way for the recognition and acceptance of its national 
interests, security concerns and geopolitical role. In its 2009 study, the International 
Crisis Group highlighted that the leadership envisioned a wide-ranging strategic 
dialogue with the US which would cover both bilateral and regional issues, as well as 
targeted cooperation on specific issues, all of which would occur against the 
backdrop of enduring competition and differences.1144  
 
In other words, Iran aspired to neither the full normalisation of US-Iran relations nor 
the abandonment of its Third World and anti-status quo identity and behavioural 
commitments. Instead, it sought long-term dialogue to minimise the risks of 
confrontation, isolation and humiliation on the one hand, and to advance areas of 
mutual interest on the other. Additionally, Iran’s attempts to expand relations with 
energy-hungry states were not “a temporary stopgap as Iran await[ed] restored 
relations with the U.S. and the end of sanctions; it reflect[ed], rather, a strategic 
decision aimed at bolstering independence vis-à-vis the West.”1145 The more 
partners Iran had, the more it could balance external threats and engage with the US 
on a more equal basis (i.e. negotiate from a position of strength). 
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CHAPTER 7  
Conclusion 
 
My interest and exploration of the polarising subject of Iran’s foreign policy began 
with the nuclear issue. I became intrigued by the fact that the Western and Iranian 
narratives had continuously evolved alongside one another, depicting the nature of 
Iran’s nuclear programme and its significance for international security in 
diametrically opposed ways. While Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions were taken for 
granted by a wide range of policymakers, academics and analysts, Iranian officials 
persistently insisted that their nuclear programme was peaceful and in line with their 
international obligations.  
 
Additionally, while the former portrayed Iran’s nuclear activities as the latest in a long 
line of challenges posed by a profoundly subversive regime for regional and 
international stability, Iranian officials persisted in their claims that the IRI was the 
victim of political conspiracies. These parallel narratives became more entrenched 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency, when Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy 
appeared to be under the firm control of ideologically zealous and anti-Western 
forces. Within this context, my interest was also strengthened by the fact that the 
unilateral and multilateral sanctions seemed to have little effect on the regime’s 
nuclear calculus. In sum, the two broad parallel narratives that shaped the nuclear 
issue produced policy results that widened the gap between the Iranian position and 
that of its nuclear opponents. 
 
Both the strong assumption that Iran was covertly pursuing nuclear weapons 
ambitions and the depiction of its nuclear activities as a threat to international 
security were strongly conditioned by the IRI’s rogue status (see chapter 1). The 
contention that Iran’s foreign policy behaviour had repeatedly defied pragmatic logic 
was strongly attributed to the resilience of a range of ideological factors that had 
shaped the Revolution and the raison d’être of the IRI. This ideological legacy was, 
in turn, upheld differently and with varying intensity by various Iranian forces and 
factions, thus explaining the ebb and flow of its more or less rational foreign policy 
behaviour since the late 1970s. From the viewpoint of many policymakers and 
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analysts, the diplomatic language and policy agenda of the Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad administrations had exposed these contrasts, thus justifying the 
growing securitisation of Iran’s nuclear activities from the summer of 2005 onwards. 
Indeed, while the reformist administration appeared to prioritise reintegration in the 
international system and lesser conflictual relations with Iran’s neighbours and the 
international system’s core powers, the principlist regime seemed anxious to revive 
revolutionary principles. from the viewpoint of many policymakers, academics and 
think-tank analysts, the threatening nexus of revolutionary intentions (that the 
Ahmadinejad administrations embraced) and deadly capabilities (that Iran’s nuclear 
programme and developments posed) needed to be contained and curtailed.    
 
I argued that the Iranian nuclear issue highlighted that the juxtaposition of 
ideologically and pragmatically driven foreign policy behaviour was profoundly 
problematic, both theoretically and empirically. At the theoretical level, this 
dichotomisation tended to produce decontextualised analyses that judged Iran’s 
rationality of action against sets of predefined expectations. Whether or not, and the 
extent to which, Iran diverged away from these requirements determined how 
pragmatic and optimal its foreign policy behaviour was. In the case of Iran’s nuclear 
policy during the Ahmadinejad presidency, for example, the regime’s non-
compliance with the demands of the EU-3/P5+1, the IAEA and the UNSC, and its 
decision to endure increasingly stringent unilateral and multilateral sanctions, 
demonstrated that Iran was behaving ideologically and sacrificing Iran’s national 
interests. Left unexplored were questions pertaining to how and why resistance to 
these demands, and how and why acceptance of the material costs of this strategy, 
constituted Iran’s interests. Equally troubling were the practical consequences of this 
paradigm: while Western policymakers widely attributed Iran’s non-compliance 
strategy with the UNSC resolutions to the strength of ideological factors, they were 
left with few options other than a military intervention or the pursuit of a quasi-default 
sanctions strategy that was visibly failing to curb Iran’s nuclear programme.  
 
I contended that an approach that made Iran’s identity and interests a central subject 
of enquiry would be better placed to analyse and understand why the regime 
pursued its nuclear programme despite increasing and objectively painful economic 
and political consequences. It would also shed much-needed light on how (and why) 
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Iran both conceived of the range of opportunities and constraints created by the 
nuclear issue, and how it sought to respond to them. This thesis therefore set to 
examine how Iran understood and pursued its national needs and interests in the 
context of the nuclear issue.  
 
I was particularly interested in how Iran defined the situation, framed its objectives 
and policy decisions, and attempted to legitimise its stance. It also appeared that 
Iran pursued a complex nuclear policy that was neither limited to, nor solely defined 
vis-à-vis, its interaction with its EU-3/P5+1 negotiation partners and the IAEA. I 
focused extensively on how and why Iran sought to generate external support for its 
nuclear programme, and how and why it attempted to transform this issue into multi-
faceted geopolitical opportunities. A Wendtian-constructivist approach enabled me to 
identify and contextualise the motives that justified Iran’s unfaltering commitment to 
its nuclear programme, especially full fuel-cycle activities, as well as its defiant 
responses to successive UNSC resolutions and rounds of sanctions. It also allowed 
me to shed light on certain seemingly contradictory aspects of Iran’s nuclear policy, 
particularly with respect to both the instantiation of its culture of mistrust and 
animosity vis-à-vis the Western core powers and its repeated expressions of interest 
for strategic cooperation on issues of mutual interests.  
 
A key underlying rationale of this thesis thus lay in the need to depart from realist-
type approaches which struggled to both account for Iran’s rationality of action 
(questioning the very premises of its foreign policy behaviour instead), and capture 
the multifaceted aspects of its interests and strategies (focusing on its anti-status 
quo intentions instead). As such, chapter 2 was devoted to discussion of Wendt’s 
social constructivist approach in order to highlight how and why his argument 
challenges neo-realists’ assumptions and provides valuable insights into states’ 
behavioural logics.  
 
States’ identities have “subjective” and “intersubjective” qualities: they are rooted in 
processes that are both related and unrelated to interaction with other actors. I 
highlighted that the IRI’s subjective “type identity” acted as both a source of pride 
and anxiety, in large part due to its enemy “role identities” with the Western core 
powers, the US especially. The concept of “role identity” was central to this thesis 
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since it underlines the argument that states’ behaviour towards their Others depends 
on the perceived meaning of their beliefs about them. This argument must 
nevertheless be nuanced for not all Others are equally significant in constituting a 
state’s identity: power relations and dependency relationships play an important role. 
This is a point I developed in chapter 6, when I argued that Iran’s Janus-faced US 
policy could be explained largely in light of its discursive and strategic dependence 
on the superpower.  
 
Furthermore, the Wendtian-constructivist perspective sheds light on the causal and 
constitutive dynamics between identity and interests: the former defines the latter 
since it shapes preferences and conceptions of legitimate (and unacceptable) policy 
options. This further demonstrates that interests are not given and exogenously 
defined: they are endogenously constructed and contingent. Chapter 4 thus argued 
that Iran’s nuclear resistance strategies were strongly conditioned by perceptions of 
appropriate and necessary responses in the context of a three-year-old politically 
manufactured crisis that had already severely harmed the country’s national 
interests.  
 
The concept of “national interests” is considerably enriched by a Wendtian-
constructivist perspective that goes beyond the traditional realist concerns with 
territorial integrity (“physical survival”), freedom (“autonomy”) and wealth (“economic 
well-being”). The notion of “collective self-esteem” transposes human beings’ need 
for respect and recognition to the state level. It explains why states are sensitive to 
perceptions that (their significant) Others disrespect and humiliate them, and why 
they are likely to react by “self-assertion and/or devaluation and aggression”.1146 This 
dynamic of self-compensation is particularly useful to contextualise how and why 
Iran sought to respond to its perceptions that the Western core powers were 
disregarding its legal nuclear rights and legitimate energy interests. During the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran prioritised its “collective self-esteem” needs over 
considerations for its “economic well-being”, a decision whose pursuit the regime 
believed was legitimate, necessary and possible.  
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This brings me to the key argument that “anarchy is what states make of it”: 
structures of relations between states are always socially constructed and do not 
exist independently from their conceptions and practices. Practices play a 
fundamental role since they are the medium through which states signal their 
identities and interests, create their “role identities” and “collective knowledge”, and 
perpetuate or challenge their stabilised culture. Crucially, however, social structures 
tend to have self-fulfilling qualities. In this respect, the dynamic of “supervenience 
and multiple realizability” is useful (although incomplete) to understand why 
policymakers are likely to engage in patterns of aggregate behaviours. Chapter 6 
showed that the US-Iran enmity was a socially constructed process that often acted 
as a coercive fact on policymakers and acquired a dynamic of its own from the late 
1970s.  
 
As such, I also engaged with the Wendtian argument that self-help is not a 
constitutive feature of the international system. The “Hobbesian”, “Lockean” and 
“Kantian” cultures of anarchy show the causal and constitutive effects of beliefs and 
expectations on states’ processes of interaction and interpretation of material 
realities. They are useful to understand and unpack the underlying drivers and 
motives of states’ foreign policy behaviours, both with respect to short- and long-term 
considerations. Additionally, Wendt’s discussion on the differences between “friends” 
and “allies” is particularly useful for “rivals” can cooperate with one another in 
response to a specific threat (e.g. the Iran-US multilevel cooperation in Afghanistan 
in the early 2000s).  
 
This, in turn, paves the way for the argument that structural change is always 
possible. Rival states can, for example, develop more collective identity formation, 
which can be spurred by cooperative practices. In this respect, Wendt’s four 
systemic “master variables” (“interdependence”, “common fate”, “homogeneity” and 
“self-restraint”) proved particularly useful in contextualising Iran’s negotiation 
proposals to the EU-3/P5+1 and the US specifically. These offers repeatedly 
indicated that, from its leadership’s viewpoint, Iran shared several “dilemmas of 
common interests” and “common aversion” with the Western core powers. The 
regime communicated this assessment both discursively (rhetoric) and practically 
(behaviours), but within limits: it demanded that its sovereignty be recognised (“self-
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restraint”) and its cooperative practices reciprocated (risk of being “the sucker”). 
These limitations, in turn, illustrated that structural change remains difficult and 
exceptional.  
 
In chapter 3, I analysed the main characteristics of Iran’s domestic politics during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency. While chapter 2 explained the need for such domestic-
level considerations, I also wished to understand how (and why) the two, largely 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing, dynamics of securitisation and polarisation 
may have impacted upon Iran’s foreign policy priorities and decision-making 
processes during the period 2005-2013.  
 
The June 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad both illustrated and accelerated 
the domestic power shift towards Iran’s more conservative factions. A nexus of 
internal (i.e. the reformist administration) and external circumstances (i.e. the Bush 
administration’s preventive regime change policies and the January 2002 “Axis of 
Evil” speech) had resulted in institutional and informal strategies to paralyse the 
Khatami government and consolidate the levers of power in the hands of more 
conservative forces and figures (e.g. the 2003 municipal and 2004 Majles elections).  
 
Additionally, the multi-level rise in power of the military-security stratum heightened 
the securitisation of Iran’s domestic politics. The IRGC, in particular, considerably 
expanded its areas of responsibility, reach and influence. As such, the contested 
June 2009 re-election of President Ahmadinejad demonstrated the ability of the 
military-industrial complex to diffuse popular protests and assert strategies of 
repression, control and violence. The events of 2009, however, also constituted the 
most profound domestic challenge the Iranian regime had faced since the late 
1980s. The bottom-up protests were supported by unprecedented elite-level 
criticisms which were partly directed against the Supreme Leader. 
 
Within this context, I argued that Iran’s domestic politics was also characterised by 
the profound polarisation of its political elite, along three chief lines. First, divisions 
between and within the conservative factions dominated Iran’s political debates 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency. While the “old” and “new” guards opposed each 
other on meritocratic and other grounds, President Ahmadinejad and his followers 
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faced systematic competition from figures affiliated with the military-security stratum 
and were never in full control of the policymaking process. Second, elite-level 
criticisms of the Ahmadinejad administration’s threats to Iran’s national interests 
coalesced around two interconnected issues: economic performance and foreign 
policy results. Domestic condemnations were repeatedly followed by institutional and 
ad hoc strategies to both limit the administration’s influence over the policymaking 
process and manage the fall out of certain decisions/statements.  
 
Third, the very personality and behaviour of President Ahmadinejad profoundly 
heightened the polarisation of the Iranian elite. To understand how and why he 
deviated from the normative expectations that were associated with his role, his 
modus operandi was analysed. President Ahmadinejad systematically attempted to 
carve out opportunities to expand his own influence, both within and outside Iran, 
including when institutional avenues were unavailable. He relied on catchy 
(mediatised) statements, tit for tat and publicly challenged the Supreme Leader, thus 
showing that he had little regard for consensus building and Iran’s constitutional 
power-sharing agreements. Instead, he exploited conflicts and tensions in order to 
remain at the centre of Iran’s politics. President Ahmadinejad quite successfully 
managed to intertwine Iran’s foreign policy with his persona, often seeking to present 
himself as a man of principles and solutions, and as a spokesperson for developing 
and oppressed nations. His views, however, frequently proved more complex and 
less Manichean than commonly assumed. This, in turn, can shed light on his 
proactive US policy, a point analysed in chapter 6.  
 
I concluded that the extreme securitisation and polarisation of Iran’s domestic politics 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency likely had two main consequences on its foreign 
policy. Insights into Iran’s policymaking processes remained limited and, as such, I 
based my assessments on theoretical models and circumstantial evidence. The 
diversionary theory of war was probably of some relevance to Iran’s approach to the 
nuclear issue, particularly in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election. 
Faced with unprecedented public displays of domestic criticism, the nuclear issue 
provided a platform to revive the guiding principles of the IRI, particularly its 
independent, justice-seeking and anti-imperialist principles. The framing of the 
nuclear issue as a Western-led politically manufactured crisis to undermine a regime 
310 
 
with which the core powers had never come to terms and a nation that they had so 
often attempted to keep dependent may have aimed partly to heighten feelings of 
national solidarity and support for the regime in the face of externally induced 
injustice.  
 
Additionally, the profound polarisation of the Iranian political elite, including the 
Supreme Leader’s weakened domestic legitimacy, could have affected Iran’s ability 
to adapt, shift and transform its foreign policy strategies. As such, it cannot be 
excluded that Iran’s remarkably consistent nuclear strategies of resistance were 
partly down to the regime’s inability to create sufficient consensus for potential 
strategic shifts. In this respect, the failure of the 2009 Vienna Agreement also 
illustrated that influential Iranian personalities may have been profoundly averse to 
the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough while President Ahmadinejad remained in 
power.  
 
In chapter 4, I began the analysis of Iran’s nuclear policy. I took a narrow approach 
to examine how (and why) Iran chose to respond to its multilateral negotiation 
partners (the EU-3 and the P5+1) and the international organisations involved in the 
management of the situation (the IAEA and the UNSC). To do so, I first explored 
Iran’s interpretation of its nuclear programme and noted that its quest for nuclear 
energy was embedded within a structure of meaning that emphasised the legality 
and legitimacy of its programme. In the official narrative, Iran was complying with its 
rights and obligations under the NPT and profoundly abiding by the principles of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Additionally, it was seeking an alternative source of 
energy that would secure its corporate needs of economic well-being, autonomy and 
collective self-esteem. Processes of analogical reasoning also explained Iran’s 
insistence that its nuclear programme needed to remain under indigenous control 
(i.e. “history matters”). 
 
Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue during the period 2003-2005 revealed that the 
Khatami administration had decided to pursue a goodwill, confidence-building 
approach that included the temporary suspension of its enrichment activities in the 
hope that Iran’s “inalienable” nuclear “rights” would be recognised and Iran itself 
treated like the other NNWSs of the NPT. The paralysis of the Iran-EU-3 diplomatic 
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process following the November 2004 Paris Agreement had several important 
political consequences, however. First, it demonstrated that the nuclear issue was a 
proxy in a wider struggle between Iran and the Western core powers, especially the 
US. The Ahmadinejad administration’s threefold narrative pointed to their intentions 
to undermine the IRI, prevent the development of the Iranian nation and increase 
their intelligence-gathering activities within a country they despised. Second, the 
failure of the diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 paved the way for 
Iran’s quasi-sacralisation of its enrichment activities (a red line never to be 
compromised again) and its firm rejection of the AP.  
 
In pursuing a Wendtian-constructivist approach, I was able to analyse why the 
Iranian leadership interpreted the events of the period 2003-2005 as a national 
humiliation (“negative self-esteem”) and how this perception, in turn, called for 
strategies of compensation. Crucially, however, I showed that the Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad administrations pursued the same objectives but different strategies to 
secure Iran’s nuclear rights. Iran’s more assertive approach during the period 2005-
2013 was profoundly based on the “lessons learnt” during the Khatami presidency. 
One key “lesson” was that Iran had no alternative other than to give up on its nuclear 
rights or to pursue its programme in defiance of foreign actors’ concerns.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration thus pursued an assertive nuclear policy that was 
bent on resisting illegal and immoral external pressures on the one hand and, on the 
other, reinstantiating Iran’s reputation and honour as a force of resistance and a role 
model for developing nations. As such, Iran decided to return to the letter of the law 
by exercising the full spectrum of its rights under the NPT and no longer accepting 
measures that singled it out. Additionally, it systematically refused to comply with the 
UNSC Resolutions it deemed illegal, illegitimate and, therefore, unbinding. It also 
retaliated against the coercive diplomatic manoeuvres of the UNSC, the P5+1 and 
the IAEA. In particular, the regime accelerated and expanded its nuclear programme, 
thus creating new nuclear realities on the ground that imposed enforcement costs on 
its nuclear opponents.  
 
Although Iran’s resistance strategies resulted in the adoption of six UNSC 
Resolutions and the enforcement of increasingly stringent unilateral and multilateral 
312 
 
sanctions, they also brought substantial benefits to the regime. On the one hand, 
Iran achieved considerable scientific and technological progress, which strengthened 
a sense of national pride and dignity. They also revived confidence in the 
righteousness of the IRI’s principles of independence and resistance against 
hegemonic policies. On the other hand, the creation of new nuclear realities forced 
the P5+1 negotiators to adjust their parameters. From the Iranian regime’s 
perspective, by not giving in to (illegal and immoral) external pressures, by sticking to 
its rights and by staying true to its identity, it was able to protect Iran’s national 
interests.  
 
In chapter 5, I analysed in greater depth how and why Iran attempted to present itself 
as a security-seeking and morally driven actor profoundly committed to the NPT. 
Iran’s resistance strategies and its efforts to impose enforcement costs on its nuclear 
opponents partly revolved around an attempt to situate the nuclear issue within the 
wider context of global debates around access to peaceful nuclear energy and the 
sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As such, the Western-led 
opposition to Iran’s nuclear activities provided the regime with a platform to expose, 
denounce and articulate its long-standing grievances against key power dynamics 
and behavioural practices within the international system.  
 
On the one hand, the regime framed the politically motivated crisis as the latest of 
many attempts on the part of the (Western) NWSs to prejudice the right of the 
NNWSs “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes”, and to receive support from those “in a position to do so” (Article VI of the 
NPT). In other words, the Iranian nuclear issue illustrated the (Western) NWSs’ 
discriminatory practices and imbalanced interpretation (and enforcement) of the 
rights and obligations enshrined in the NPT in an attempt to retain the NNWSs 
dependent and under-developed. On the other hand, the Ahmadinejad 
administration exposed and vehemently condemned the (Western) NWSs’ lack of 
compliance with their own nuclear disarmament obligations (Article VI) and the 
double standards in their dealings with nuclear armed states that were not 
signatories of the NPT (Article I). In so doing, Iran argued, the nuclear armed 
Western core powers were threatening the bargain at the core of the non-
proliferation regime and undermining the prospects of international security.  
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Both narratives, captured in the motto “nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for 
none”, enabled Iran to position itself as a constructive state party to the NPT that 
was acting in the interests of developing nations and international security. Of 
particular relevance was Iran’s articulation that compliance with international law and 
treaties was a sine qua non to states’ sovereign equality and international security. 
Iran, in other words, had internalised international norms and accepted them as 
legitimate. Also of crucial importance were Iran’s attempts to proactively address the 
issue of unequal access to peaceful nuclear energy and to delegitimise those who 
possessed and relied on nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.   
 
Iran’s framing of the nuclear issue brought discursive and strategic benefits to the 
regime. Its grievances against the prejudiced interpretation and enforcement of the 
rights and obligations of the NPT echoed those of other developing nations, including 
countries of the NAM. Statements that supported Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear 
energy and denounced the enforcement of stringent sanctions helped the regime 
counter the argument that it was isolated and pursuing rogue behaviours. In this 
respect, the May 2010 Tehran Declaration was particularly symbolic for it signalled 
the concerns that Brazil and Turkey also shared over the NNWSs’ ability to access 
peaceful nuclear energy. Additionally, it signalled the growing political assertiveness 
of the Brazilian and Turkish governments within international fora. However, the way 
in which China and Russia decided to manage the Iranian nuclear issue also allowed 
me to warn against a simplistic view that global power shifts had either necessarily or 
automatically benefited Iran. The fact that these two rising powers continued to 
account for, and be constrained by, the US’ interests and strategies in their approach 
to the Iranian nuclear issue showed that the Ahmadinejad regime could neither 
completely ignore nor bypass the superpower’s role and influence.  
 
This brings me to another aspect of Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue, which was 
unpacked in chapters 5 and 6. A component of Iran’s dual-track strategy vis-à-vis its 
negotiation partners, the Western powers in particular, lay in its repeated offers of 
cooperation and engagement on a range of security matters. These were unrelated 
to the nuclear issue per se but were of mutual concern to all. As such, Iran did not 
limit itself to discrediting its significant Others. Instead, it attempted to transform the 
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nuclear issue into a broader geopolitical opportunity whereby Iran and its rivals could 
collaborate on several “dilemmas of common interests” (e.g. Afghanistan, economic 
and energy cooperation) and “common aversion” (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking).  
 
In comparing and contrasting the negotiation proposals of the Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad administrations, I was able to show that they often pursued the same 
objectives but their tone and emphasis differed. While they identified similar 
dilemmas for potential cooperation, they also systematically articulated Iran’s 
expectation that its sovereignty and independence be respected, that the coercive 
policies cease and its international rights be recognised. During the period 2005-
2013, however, Iran articulated a stronger concern for social justice and the Third 
World, putting forward suggestions for more multilateral and inclusive approaches to 
transnational challenges. Such propositions were presented as all the more 
necessary since the status quo was untenable and new multilevel threats had 
emerged. This also enabled the Ahmadinejad administration to present Iran as a 
“peace-loving nation” that was seeking comprehensive and constructive negotiations 
on issues where it had a de facto role to play.  
 
Crucially, however, while the Khatami administration had often recommended 
“working groups” and “task forces” to foster deeper understanding of the 
stakeholders’ respective interests, the Ahmadinejad regime clearly identified both the 
various stages and the ultimate objectives of their potential collaboration. This, I 
argued, reflected its profound mistrust of the Western core powers’ intentions 
towards the IRI and its concerns that its security and dignity would be jeopardised 
through unrewarded potential collaboration and compromises. Iran thus required 
certain guarantees before it could commit to engaging with its significant Others.   
 
In chapter 6, I pursued this analysis through the prism of Iran’s approach to the US 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Not only did the administration firmly believe 
that the US was responsible for manufacturing and sustaining the nuclear issue, but 
the subject of Iran-US relations also came to occupy a central place within Iranian 
(public) political debates. Crucially, while officials widely reproduced Iran’s 
longstanding grievances against the superpower, the question of engagement with 
the “Great Satan” ceased to be a taboo. Additionally, through both discursive and 
315 
 
carefully calibrated behavioural practices, Iran indicated a (conditional) interest in 
less conflictual relations. How and why Iran’s US policy shifted during the 
Ahmadinejad presidency thus needed to be carefully scrutinised, not least because it 
challenged several pieces of conventional wisdom on both Iran’s foreign policy 
interests (i.e. enmity with the US as a condition of regime legitimacy) and its 
domestic politics (i.e. the principlists and the military-security stratum of the IRI as 
intrinsically opposed to any form of rapprochement). 
 
To understand how and why Iran’s US policy differed during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency, I first examined the main characteristics and policy consequences of the 
US-Iran culture of anarchy since the Revolution. The Wendtian-constructivist 
perspective was particularly useful to identify (and contextualise the effects of) key 
internal and external factors that underlined and reproduced their institutionalised 
enmity for three decades. In particular, it was highlighted that the US played a crucial 
role in the raison d’être of the Revolution and the IRI’s founding principles. The 
superpower became Iran’s significant Other, the greatest threat to its national dignity 
and independence, and to a just and stable international system.  
 
Additionally, the transformation of their culture of anarchy in the late 1970s had a 
profound influence on how the US and Iran came to define their interests and policy 
orientations towards one another from then on. In this respect, the US-Iran culture of 
enmity acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy: not only did their negative mutual beliefs 
lead them to adopt practices that confirmed the relevance of these expectations, but 
their role identity and collective knowledge often acted as a coercive social fact on 
US and Iranian policymakers. Having ceased to know each other directly, officials of 
both countries approached each other via the (biased) medium of historical 
experiences and myths, vitriolic discourses and routinised practices of estrangement. 
This fed their respective sense of mistrust, insecurity and worst-case assumptions, 
leading them to pursue policies that confirmed that they were enemies.  
 
Additionally, despite their very different capabilities, Iran systematically pursued 
internal and external balancing strategies in an attempt to deter and impose 
enforcement costs on the superpower. Situations of power asymmetry thus did not 
condition the behaviour of weaker (i.e. less capabilities) states. From the 
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leadership’s perspective, the US never came to terms with the IRI and never 
accepted Iran’s legitimate role within its regional environment. The US posed 
multidimensional threats to Iran’s physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being 
and collective self-esteem, thus often placing it in a reactive position to protect its 
national interests. 
 
The Wendtian-constructivist perspective also enabled me to shed light on apparently 
contradictory and paradoxical aspects of Iran’s US policy: namely, its repeated 
forward-leaning strategies and positive responses to US offers of engagement. 
Starting with the Khatami administration, Iran pursued a dual policy towards the US 
that oscillated between (and often combined) resistance/defiance and 
conciliation/engagement. In particular, the Khatami administration repeatedly 
attempted to “altercast” the US by taking on a less antagonistic role identity vis-à-vis 
the superpower. President Khatami’s call for a “dialogue of civilisations”, Iran’s 
multilevel cooperation with the US in Afghanistan and its unprecedented May 2003 
negotiation proposal, all constituted symbolic and practical attempts to create new 
understandings between the two actors in an attempt to transform their structure of 
relations towards less antagonistic and more trustworthy processes of representation 
and interaction. Both the call for dialogue and the May 2003 proposal articulated 
principles that the Ahmadinejad administration reiterated, thus showing strategic 
consensus on key objectives. These included the theoretical and practical 
recognition of Iran’s sovereign independence and equality, the abandonment of 
humiliating rhetoric (i.e. rogue state qualifications) and the recognition of Iran’s 
legitimate interests and security concerns.  
 
The Ahmadinejad administration, for its part, shifted several red lines on the question 
of Iran-US relations. Iran multiplied offers of direct talks and several high-level public 
and back channel meetings occurred. The fact that most encounters between (high-
level) Iranian and US officials revolved around the nuclear issue may have showed 
that both sides perceived that an accord between them was a prerequisite to a 
broader Iran-P5+1 agreement. Their direct encounters also revealed that Iran’s 
resistance strategies, its creation of new de facto nuclear realities in particular, had 
forced the US to shift its position: the suspension of Iran’s enrichment activities was 
no longer a prerequisite for bilateral and multilateral encounters.  
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One of the most important aspects of Iran’s US policy during the Ahmadinejad 
presidency was the fact that influential Iranian officials came to publicly advocate and 
legitimise direct engagement and dialogue between the two actors. Key foreign 
policy advisors to Ayatollah Khamenei made these views public. They also 
sometimes attempted to clarify that the Supreme Leader viewed the inimical 
relationship between the US and Iran as neither a given nor a necessity. What 
mattered were the conditions under which Iran could contemplate different 
processes of interaction with the superpower. The escalation of the nuclear issue 
and President Obama’s belief that the US would benefit from engaging adversaries 
may have prompted such internal developments. Both aspects, in turn, were 
symptomatic of Iran’s relative discursive and strategic dependency on the US. 
 
Iran’s Janus-faced US policy could be understood in light of the IRI’s inability to 
either escape or ignore the role that the US played in both shaping its external 
reputation and constituting its foreign policy options. While Iran’s political 
independence was achieved through and at the cost of a discursive dependence on 
the US, the superpower was able to profoundly shape external narratives of the IRI 
as a rogue state with abhorrent internal and external policies. In light of the 
profoundly hierarchical international system, Iran’s identity and legitimacy were thus 
likely to be challenged until or unless the superpower revised its patterns of 
representation and interaction with it.  
 
Additionally, the US and Iran increasingly became “neighbours” through their 
respective involvement and interests in the Middle East and Central Asia. While this 
situation forced them to take each other’s actions into account (a necessity that was 
particularly acute for Iran), they also shared several country-specific (e.g. Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria) and transnational challenges (e.g. drug trafficking, terrorism). 
While Iran (like the US) had a limited ability to manage these dilemmas unilaterally, 
its offers of engagement indicated that the leadership was not averse to cooperating 
with the superpower on these shared security issues.  
 
Put simply, a transformation of US-Iran relations, away from enmity and towards 
more collective identity information, could help reduce Iran’s security dilemmas and 
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bridge the gap between its perception of its legitimate interests and its ability to play 
a role commensurate with its geopolitical aspirations. However, the Supreme 
Leader’s position indicated that, in a context where mistrust was pervasive and the 
US had repeatedly harmed Iran’s national interests and humiliated the Iranian nation, 
the regime needed guarantees (i.e. demonstration, evidence) that the US would 
recognise (both discursively and practically) Iran’s independence, equality, interests 
and concerns. This, in turn, confirmed Iran’s reactive position vis-à-vis the 
superpower.  
 
In fine, Iran’s complex and multifaceted approach to the nuclear issue showed that 
the regime had instantiated different role identities. On the one hand, Iran was an 
anti-status quo power and, as such, it resisted the illegal and illegitimate practices of 
the Western core powers and sided with oppressed nations and rising powers in the 
pursuit of its nuclear interests. On the other hand, Iran was a constructive and 
influential actor that was both able and willing to cooperate with the Western core 
powers, including the US, on issues of mutual interest. However, “mutual respect” 
had to regulate their processes of interaction since Iran could neither abandon nor 
bargain away its independence and self-esteem.   
 
Moving forward, more research is needed on the Supreme Leader’s political 
legitimacy, particularly with respect to the ways in which he sought to ensure regime 
survival and preserve the heritage of the Revolution in the aftermath of the 2009 
disputed election. While the popular protests had illustrated the depth of the 
frustration and social malaise within Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei was also chastised by 
prominent political and religious figures in Iran for his decision to support the re-
election of President Ahmadinejad and for allowing the military-security stratum to 
violently crack down on the protestors. Additionally, if Iran’s nuclear strategies of 
resistance during the period 2005-2013 provided substantial benefits to the Iranian 
regime, they nevertheless failed to pave the way for a comprehensive diplomatic 
agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Instead, the passing of six UNSC 
Resolutions and the numerous rounds of unilateral and multilateral sanctions raised 
the spectre of an exhaustion of the diplomatic process. The Arab uprisings also 
showed that Iran’s western neighbours often struggled to respond to sustained 
mobilisations for socio-economic and political reform. Within this context, strategies 
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of repression, coercion and co-optation could “buy time” but not necessarily 
contribute (sufficiently?) to the persistence of the legitimacy of the IRI. Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s concerns were arguably visible in his unprecedented call to “those who 
don’t support the Islamic Republic” to cast their vote in the June 2013 presidential 
election.1147  
 
It would be worth examining whether, during the first two years of the Rouhani 
administration’s mandate, the Supreme Leader may have attempted to recast the 
system’s legitimacy through novel approaches to the interrelated questions of the 
nuclear issue and Iran-US relations. Indeed, the Rouhani administration has been 
able to both compromise on Iran’s sensitive nuclear technologies (e.g. the November 
2013 Joint Plan of Action, the July 2014 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the 
October 2015 nuclear deal) and to meet its American counterparts with 
unprecedented frequency. Tellingly, Ayatollah Khamenei continuously presented the 
Rouhani nuclear negotiation team as “children of the revolution” and repeatedly 
called for “heroic flexibility”. He also frequently emphasised that he did not oppose 
direct talks between Iran and the US, though he was sceptical about their likely 
results. In so doing, Ayatollah Khamenei helped legitimise the Rouhani 
administration’s forward-leaning and conciliatory approaches towards the US, whilst 
preserving his political capital. On 9 April 2015, he also commented that, should the 
nuclear negotiations with the US be successful, “this will become an experience. If 
the other side gives up its usual diversionary tactics, this will become an experience 
for us that, very well, we can negotiate with them on other issues.”1148 Additionally, 
he specified that he would not interfere in the details of the nuclear negotiations 
since his personal involvement was limited to setting broad policy guidelines and red 
lines. In so doing, Ayatollah Khamenei helped legitimise the Rouhani administration’s 
forward-leaning and conciliatory approaches towards the US, whilst preserving his 
political capital.  
 
                                                          
1147
 “Great Expectations: Iran’s New President and the Nuclear Talks,” International Crisis Group, 
Middle East Briefing 36, 13 August 2013, 4-5, accessed 9 September 2014, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/b036-
great-expectations-irans-new-president-and-the-nuclear-talks.pdf. 
1148
 “Leader’s Remarks on Anti-Iran Sanctions and Yemen Developments,” The Office of the Supreme 
Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, 9 April 2015, accessed 28 May 2015, 
http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=bayanat&id=13068. 
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